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ABSTRACT 
 
    This dissertation examines the role of risk in international relations – including its 
interactive relationship with domestic civil society – from a case study perspective. The 
research aims to disentangle complex processes by which Japan has framed and 
recalibrated risks in response to North Korea, and how those risks have been mediated 
between the state, market and society . Therein, while acknowledging the relevance of 
established International Relations (IR) theories, it highlights their limitations in terms of an 
inability to comprehensively assign agency for processes of inter-state-society change, and 
state governance. The study is, therefore, necessary in order to better understand how such 
processes are socio-politically contingent in relation to risk, and the implications for issues of 
national security and identity. This includes stimulating further research into how risk is 
instrumental in justifying political agendas, facilitating policy reforms, and as a key agent in 
continuing discourses.  
    In order to gain an empirical understanding of how agency operates within processes of 
risk recalibration across domestic and international spheres, actors such as policy makers, 
mass media, and civil society stakeholders have been identified as the primary targets of 
analysis. A combination of Constructivist-derived theories and conceptions from literature on 
risk are employed as the theoretical framework within which to analyse empirical data – 
primarily pertaining to Japan‟s responses to post-Cold War North Korean missile and nuclear 
tests – assimilated from a combination of qualitative and quantitative sources relating to the 
areas specified above.  
    The conclusion drawn from the case studies examined is that the recalibration of risk by 
Japan in response to North Korea highlights how risk governance at the state level – via 
processes of mediation between the state, market and domestic society – causes 
reverberations at bilateral, regional and, ultimately, global levels. Specifically, in the case of 
Japan, there has been a significant impact in terms of changes to societal norms, national 
identity and state-level policies; facilitated through the aggregated processes of risk 
recalibration. 
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Cut-off Point, and In-Text Referencing and Japanese Terminology 
 
Translations and Romanization 
Unless otherwise specified, quotations from Japanese sources (such as Diet records and 
newspaper articles) have been translated by the author. Where possible, all such 
translations should be viewed in their original Japanese form, and should be engaged with 
on the basis of that text. 
 
Apart from commonly known proper nouns, such as “Tokyo”, Japanese has been transcribed 
into Roman script based on the Modified Hepburn (PCGN, 1976) system. 
 
Diet References 
References pertaining to statements made in all chambers and committees of the National 
Diet (e.g., 126: 193) refer to the number of the Diet session followed by the number of the 
turn of the speaker. Therefore, in the above case, the statement is made in the 126th session 
of the Diet by Tamura Hideaki, who is the 193rd speaker (including his own previous 
statements in the same session).    
 
Research Cut-off Point 
The research contained within the dissertation at hand essentially targets case-study 
analyses pertaining to events in the two decades between 1991 and 2011. Within this, 
practical considerations relating to data assimilation, analysis and editing have meant that, 
although some more recent sources are included, an approximate cut-off point for the 
majority of new data has been set at the end of the Kan Naoto premiership, prior to 
September of 2011.   
 
In-Text Referencing and Japanese Terminology 
Due to their extensive coverage as primary data sources for this dissertation – and on 
account of their oft-times lack of a specified author – Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun 
articles have, in the main, not been included in the Bibliography. Conversely, they are 
referenced only in-text. Date and page numbers are provided wherever possible, and 
editions are specified when other than the standard morning edition. 
A number of key Japanese terms and phrases which relate primary data central to the core 
discourses under analysis (predominantly those used by speakers in the Diet, newspaper 
editors and organization/committee titles) have been selectively preserved/included (with 
English translations/explanations) in the text. This is justified on the grounds that they 
provide specific linguistic emphasis in their original form – and allow Japanese speakers 
(both native and non-native) to further appreciate their significance (see also Glossary of 
Japanese Terms, above).  
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Introduction 
0.1. Central approach: significance and hypotheses 
This dissertation is a study of how Japan has recalibrated risk through its framing of the 
Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) in the post-Cold War era.1 It 
is based upon the hypothesis that there has been a substantial recalibration of the risks that 
are perceived and portrayed to emanate from the entity conceptualized as North Korea 
(kitachōsen) by multiple actors – intersecting the state, market and society – in Japan.2 It is 
also hypothesized that this has occurred through a complex interactive process – reliant 
upon these actors‟ inter-subjective identities and their disposition towards the adherence to a 
number of salient norms, as elaborated in Chapter 2, Section 2.6 and Section 2.13. 
Ultimately, the analyses below elucidate how such a process has taken place, and identify 
the relative influence of the key actors upon it. 
   
    The significance of the research question outlined above originates, in the first instance, 
from the fundamental understanding that there is a global political system, within which the 
state remains the primary unit of analysis. Studies into the internal (state-societal) workings 
of states and, most pertinently, their interdependent international relations have been given 
heightened significance by what Carr (1981: 4) terms “the demand for the popularization of 
international politics.”3 Indeed, from the broader perspective, it is the increase in public 
interest in, understanding of, and involvement with, interactions between bilateral, regional, 
and global systems of states which forms the basis for justifying an exploration of how the 
                                                          
1  For an explanation of terminology; referring to recalibration and framing, see Section 0.2, below. 
2  Hereafter, for purposes of style, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is referred to as North Korea, the 
North, DPRK, and Pyongyang interchangeably. 
3  Carr asserts that prior to the war of 1914 there was little general interest in political 
    science, particularly international relations, which was considered to be the specialist 
    pursuit of diplomats and other foreign ministry officials – hence it was underdeveloped as a    
    scientific discipline. 
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state, market and civil society intersect and interact, and how they influence domestic and 
foreign policies, and national identity.4 As such, the above elements can be categorized as 
constitutive parts of a system. Within this, it should be apparent that there is a high level of 
interdependence between states and their internal entities and actors – much of which is 
articulated through ideas contained in discourse. This dissertation is, therefore, premised on 
two key theoretical positions: a constructivist conception of the socio-political world (as 
socially constructed), and the contention that a vast mass, perhaps all, of politically 
motivated ideas are in some aspects generated, developed and mediated in relation to 
considerations of risk – and its variable calibration. Japan‟s framing of North Korea provides 
a relevant case study through which significant empirical research can be guided by these 
theories. 
 
    A constructivist perspective is central, it is argued, to understanding the dynamic 
processes of interaction between states internationally, and the state, market and society 
domestically. Constructivism exposes how interdependent ideas (expressed and acted upon, 
primarily through discourse) are, in the final reckoning, the function of inter-subjective, 
socially constructed identities (Wendt, 1999: 344-9). Therein, it is only with reference to 
identity (including collective identity up to the level of the state) that politically-charged action 
and state responses can be fully understood. This is particularly significant in terms of 
extrapolating meaning and causality from analyses of national responses to external threats 
and uncertainties, which can be constructed in terms of crises (Weldes, 1999: 37, Allison, 
1971: 2-7), or crisis-equivalent situations, and mediated as the on-going source of indefinite 
and salient risks.5 
                                                          
4 The salience of such in the case of Japan during the post-Cold War period is examined succinctly by Funabashi 
(2002). 
5 Allison does not address the construction of crises through risk recalibration per se, but his outline   
   of how complex interactive behavior is manifest in state actors’ responses to  rival states provides an 
   excellent theoretical basis from which to examine the role of risk and its relation to the framing of  
   external states. 
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    Risk is embedded in international relations and the domestic structures of interacting 
ideas in an extremely pervasive form, though it is often under-discussed or left to the implicit, 
not least by constructivists and other leading-school International Relations (IR) theorists. To 
some extent this can be attributed to the inability of IR scholars and policy entrepreneurs to 
properly decouple the theoretical definition of risk from that of danger, harm or threat. 
However, this dissertation asserts, through its discussion of the relevant literature and 
theoretical frameworks, that there is a meaningful distinction to be made here. External 
threats (dangers, harms etc.) in themselves do not present the same form of malleable 
indefinite conception, which contains in itself opportunities for the organized manipulation of 
the future, as does risk. As Beck (2005: 90) simply states, “perceptions of risk pave the way 
for new opportunities for power.”6  The focus of this dissertation is, then, to explore how 
perceptions of risk can be recalibrated through complex processes of mediation between the 
state, market and society – resulting, ultimately, in the revision of national posture and policy.                   
 
     This broad theoretical discussion can, forthwith, be narrowed to an East Asian socio-
political and economic perspective. This dissertation sharpens its focus further, ultimately to 
a case study of the state conceptualized of as Japan – and the primary actors which drive its 
policy trajectories.7 Within this, in light of the above conceptualizations, the research project 
can be expressed constructively through a series of questions, which contextualize the focus 
for the specific sub-case studies examined in the chapters below. Firstly, within the 
conceptual structure of states, how is the socially constructed entity of Japan to be 
understood? Moreover, how does Japan generate and maintain its identity in the post-Cold 
                                                          
6  As discussed in Chapter 2, Beck posits a theoretical argument that stresses the cozmopolitanization 
    of political structures designed for the governance of risk. Conversely, this dissertation primarily 
    seeks to examine the mechanisms by which the state internalizes and mediates perceived external   
    threats into risks – in this case through Japan’s framing of the DPRK. 
7  In this sense the state is treated as one of a number of elements – including the state, market and  
    society – which interact to create and disseminate national policies (see Chapter 2, Section 2.8). 
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War, post-9/11 world? How does Japan come to adopt its domestic, national, regional and 
global security roles – i.e., upon what norms are these based? What risks does it identify 
and seek to mediate through its international relations, which relate to those norms? What 
processes have occurred and are occurring to change how it calibrates such risks? Most 
specifically in relation to this dissertation, what significance does North Korea and its framing 
by Japan have within such processes? Ultimately, how has Japan recalibrated risks in 
response to North Korea? By spotlighting a series of case studies, this dissertation examines 
the last of these questions empirically. The analyses are, furthermore, directed through an 
innovative theoretical approach, which, in addition, offers a route – or at least a productive 
methodology – by which to address multiple elements of the other related questions, as 
posed above. 
 
    The analyses are initiated on the assumption that there has been a disproportionate 
recalibration of risk by Japan, expressed or realized through the framing of North Korea as a 
negative entity, which poses a variety of salient, potentially catastrophic, risks.8 In light of this, 
as outlined above, the core hypothesis posits that there are complex processes of risk 
mediation and recalibration which manifest themselves in responses to the DPRK, and that 
these can be observed across a sphere which incorporates the state, market and society of 
Japan. In addition, the dissertation illuminates both a deficiency in the extant understanding 
of these processes, and a means by which to better understand their full relevance. Within 
this, it attempts to conceptualize them in previously uncharted detail from an original 
perspective. As such, the puzzle to be addressed below is less one of what or why, 
                                                          
8  This is illustrated by the diverse responses to North Korean actions observed between Japan and 
     other comparable states such as South Korea, China and the United States. For example, this was 
     particularly apparent following North Korean missile tests in 1998, 2006 and 2009. While 
     Japanese mass-media sources and political figures increasingly interpreted the launches as a direct  
threat to national sovereignty, bringing the matter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),  
and contemplating pre-emptive strikes in self-defence, South Korean and other states’ responses 
     were notably less confrontational, and generally devoid of overtly nationalist sentiment. For 
     discussion see: Woo and Uk (2007: 193-194), Kim Hak-Chun (2006: 448-452). 
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focussing rather on explorations of the how, in order to explain the processes of risk 
recalibration and their agency. Furthermore, the dissertation delineates the trajectories along 
which these processes have run and can be expected to gravitate towards in the future. 
Amid this, while the creation of magnified threats to garner greater government control and 
justify increases in militarization, or normalization (e.g. to a state with offensive military 
capabilities), is an important factor in these processes, they to do not tell the whole story.9 
Therein, although domestic politics are of crucial significance to how successive Japanese 
governments deal with pressing North Korean issues, and despite individual political 
legacies often having been prioritized ahead of holistic diplomatic solutions, there are 
structural and systemic shifts, often manifest in changes to norms and understandings at the 
broader national and ideational levels which hold considerable influence in this respect 
(Wendt, 1999).10 Such arguments are unpacked to demonstrate, additionally, that while 
external, particularly United States (US), pressure (beiatsu) exerts extensive, indeed 
exaggerated, political force and salience upon such processes, the recalibration of risk by 
Japan in response to North Korea cannot simply be attributed to US or other external 
pressures (gaiatsu) alone.11 
 
    Exploration of the outlined research question is, therefore, designed to expand knowledge 
in the areas of East Asian bilateral and regional relations, and elucidates the applicability of 
risk as an expansive theoretical tool in these fields. In addition to these important aspects of 
the dissertation, the narrower normative aim of the analyses provided is to supply a fresh 
                                                          
9   For a full exposition of this idea, see: Son (2008). “Normal” or Normal power is used here to refer  
      to a future Japan comparable to that discussed by Christopher Hughes (2005: 49-59). In this sense,  
      ultimately, it amounts to a nation state which holds armed forces that are not constitutionally  
      embargoed from external (overseas) engagement. In essence, therefore, a normal power is a state  
      which has the means and potential to project military power beyond pure sovereign self defence. 
10 The specifics of how recent Japanese premiers and their administrations have, largely as a result of 
      pursuing personal or narrow-banded interests (hijacked by the abduction issue), failed to   
      normalize relations with North Korea is critically analyzed by Wada (2009). 
11 Japan’s increasing subordination and adherence to US interests, observed within its international    
      relations and domestic politics, is explored by McCormack (2007).   
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body of research that offers an innovative, interdisciplinary approach to understanding 
Japan‟s relationship with, and framing of, North Korea. This may act as both an aid to policy 
formation and as a counter to current myths and misunderstandings regarding how Japan 
mediates risks in relation to its own national, regional and global security concerns. As such, 
a further goal of this dissertation lies in an attempt to fill parts of a number of gaps in the 
extant literature, which fails to comprehensively integrate all aspects of Japan‟s civil society 
and state apparatus with its international relations. Therein, this is tackled through the 
application of theories which expose recalibrations of risk relating to each of the specific 
case studies explored below. 
 
    In order to fulfil these goals, extensive empirical research – adopting actor-specific 
analysis – into the crucial role of policy makers and other leading political actors, the sphere 
of mass media, and stakeholders within civil society, which combined can be seen to 
constitute Japan‟s policy community, as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.8, has been 
undertaken. In relation to each sector, respectively, these largely amount to: politicians, 
officials, and bureaucrats; newspapers and news media, internet-based broadcasters, and 
private media sources; societal groups such as the North Korean community in Japan, and 
others with a specific market, political or social interest in DPRK-related affairs. This has 
primarily been achieved through discourse analysis, which highlights changes representative 
of recalibrated risks, in terms of the types of terminology and praxis used to describe North 
Korea-related actors and bodies. This is further supported by quantitative indicators, relating 
to the above sources. In short, the focus of this dissertation lies in the complex interactional 
processes manifest between the state market and society, which result, ultimately, in the 
realization of a given set of policy prescriptions and implementations at the level of (in this 
case Japan‟s) state governance and international relations. In the chapters that follow, this 
takes the form of a study into how their interactions and interrelations work to mediate and 
recalibrate risks identified with the DPRK.    
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0.2. Definitions: recalibration and framing 
The terms recalibration and framing, and their relationship to actors intersecting the state, 
market and society, are key to the theoretical framework and empirical research contained in 
the chapters that follow. Here, the significance of each is dealt with in turn. In the sense 
outlined above, the state primarily refers to the executive arm of government – including its 
associated bureaucracy, market to commercially based actors such as mainstream media 
and business groups, and society to non-governmental groups and individual citizens. 
However, it is posited that the boundaries between these spheres are dynamic and 
permeable. As such, because of the salient influence of the latter elements upon the former 
– particularly with regards to central political discourses and policy formation – a combination 
of powerful actors from within these sectors can, in fact, be identified as an interactive policy 
community, broadly representative of the Japanese state; as explained in detail in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.8. The definition and usage of risk is covered more extensively elsewhere; most 
comprehensively in Chapter 1, Section 1.5. 
 
    Recalibration refers not only to how the level of perceived risks have changed, though this 
is a key component of its employment, but also to how risks per se are qualitatively re-
conceptualized into a form which poses a different kind of potential harm to those of a 
previous calibration – and hence a different kind response. Therein, the recalibration of risks 
refers to how a risk, such as that of being struck by a North Korean missile in Japan, is 
mediated between state, market and societal spheres to greatly differing levels and effects. 
This definition of risk (re)calibration, therefore, neither assumes nor excludes the deliberate 
recalibration of risk (disproportionate or otherwise to probable potential harms). Indeed, 
while such an understanding obviously allows for the impacts of intentionally exaggerated 
risk recalibration, the focus of this dissertation is primarily directed at analysis of the 
processes by which discourse mediating interactive elements of the spheres outlined above 
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creates a particular trajectory of risk recalibration that results in the on-going prioritization of 
specific socio-political norms and the implementation of concordant policy directives. For 
example, in the case at hand, what were once broadly considered as distant military 
potentialities (e.g., a North Korean missile strike against Tokyo), for which countermeasures 
were predominantly the domain of sophisticated military experts, and which bore little 
significance to the general public or a broader socio-economic sphere, became re-
conceptualized as something which at once represented pressing and salient risks to the 
state, market-based enterprises, and individual citizens of Japan.12 
 
    In relation to the (re)calibration of risks at the national (or state) level, how a given external 
entity is framed becomes of particular significance, because it effectively justifies how 
associated risks are to be calibrated in response to it. In the case of Japan‟s framing of North 
Korea, the increasingly negative framing of the DPRK and its leaders, therein, facilitated a 
broad-ranging recalibration of risks which could be attributed to that state.13 Specifically, this 
dissertation examines how the recalibration of risks pertaining to North Korea‟s military 
capabilities and nuclear development can essentially be viewed as a function of North 
Korea‟s multifaceted negative framing in Japan. This involves a complex process of 
interaction between the state, market and society, which is, among other elements, highly 
contingent upon media and societal reactions towards the issue of Japanese citizens 
abducted by the DPRK – and the ability of influential actors to conflate the issue with other 
risks attached to nuclear proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, and 
illicit or covert activities. In essence, this created a truncated framing of the North as one 
entity, even in relation to issues which were initially decoupled from one another. 
                                                          
12   Moreover, the case at hand is also representative of how individual citizens are expected, to  
       varying degrees, to take responsibility for those risks – i.e., as shifted from the state to self- 
       responsibility (Hook and Takeda,  2007). 
13   This can be compared to Professor David Nutt’s famous statement regarding the risks posed by    
       ecstasy and horse-riding (The Telegraph, 7 February 2009) – i.e., due to their utterly different  
       framing across state and societal spheres, the calibration of their associated risks is equally unalike  
       regardless of the probability of harms which they potentially pose. 
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0.3. Historical background 
Although greater detail will be given to items of historical significance in later chapters, such 
as those examined in Chapter 2, Section 2.7, it is worthwhile to briefly reflect on from 
whence and when the phenomenon of North Korea as a high-risk entity to Japan first 
emerged.14 Following World War II (WWII) and the Korean War, Japan had yet to restore full 
diplomatic relations with South Korea (ROK) when, once full sovereignty was regained from 
the US,15 it began pursuing a cautious, though largely non-confrontational, relationship with 
the newly formed DPRK,16 based on the policy of seikei bunri, or separation of politics and 
economics. This culminated in the creation of the DPRK-Japan Trade Association in March 
1956 (Byung, 2007:38-41). In retrospect, this may be seen as Japan stretching its 
parameters within the formula of the Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasized broad economic 
expansion, while relying almost entirely on the US for external military protection.17 
 
The seikei bunri formula, thus, allowed Japan-DPRK relations sufficient stability to permit 
an increased flow of bilateral resources, in the form of human, as well as trade, capital, such 
as North Korean repatriations for those still resident in Japan after WWII. Indeed, these took 
place at a rate of up to 1,200 persons per week between 1959 and 1960 (Morris-Suzuki, 
                                                          
14  Japan, here, refers to a geo-political entity that is located primarily throughout the five land blocks of 
Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa, with its central administrative core based in Tokyo. For a 
suitable definition, see Princeton University (2009). This point is stressed, not only because clarity over 
definitions is important for the purpose of scholarly analysis, but also to refute any suggestion that this 
dissertation is ethnocentric. There is no intention to suggest that Japan represents an, or multiple, entities 
which are naturally prone to overreaction or are inherently racist towards North Korea or what have you. 
15   Although still effectively under US occupation during the Korean War, Japan in fact gained greatly in 
economic terms by acting as a fueling and military base for UN forces fighting against North Korea (Ko, 1987: 
46). 
16  The term ‘relationship’ does not refer here to full official diplomatic relations, as these were never     
       established between Japan and the DPRK. 
17  This was the policy formula pioneered by post-war Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, which 
"centered on close alliance with the United States, minimal military rearmament, and a focus on economic   
recovery" (Green, 2001: 11). 
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2007: 224-5). Despite surface-level recognition of the repatriations serving both Japanese 
and DPRK national interests, however, disapproval from both Washington and Seoul, 
because of their animosity towards the North, led to a degree of strained relations with 
Japan as a result, and Japan‟s official political position retained a rival-state stance towards 
Pyongyang. Without revision of this stance, or the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations between North Korea and Japan being secured, momentous events such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the wider ending of the Cold War, the rapid economic 
advancement of China, and the 9/11 terror attacks have radically altered the respective 
geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics of the Northeast Asia region. Amid this, 
Pyongyang has become ever more isolated, and has repeatedly resorted to brinkmanship 
tactics in its international relations with its neighbours (Masaki, 1995; Michishita, 2009). 
 
  In its recent relations with Japan, tactics employed by North Korea have included,18 
amongst other controversial actions and incidents, numerous abductions of Japanese 
citizens,19 multiple missile launches over Japanese territory,20 the intrusion into Japanese 
sovereign waters by spy-ships, agents and other unauthorized vessels (Black, 2006), and 
nuclear tests in defiance of Japanese and international condemnation.21 As a result, the 
DPRK‟s image has taken a particularly severe battering in recent decades across almost all 
sections of the state, market, and society in Japan. Indeed, negative representation and 
framing of North Korea developed to the point where the emergence of a phenomenon that 
included extended coverage in the media and printed press, and which witnessed sustained 
political attention directed at the regime in Pyongyang took place.22 This also led to the 
                                                          
18 “tactics” is used here in the sense of actions, which can be construed as politically motivated and authorized  
       or administered by the central state apparatus of the DPRK. 
19  Although the majority of the abductions were carried out between 1977-83, the issue became particularly 
prominent during the 1990s and intensified following Kim Jong Il’s admission of thirteen abductees during 
his summit meeting with former premier, Koizumi Junichirō. For discussion, see Wada (2009). 
20  See August 1998, July 2006 and April 2009, (Arms Control Association). 
21 October 2006 and May 2009 (Arms Control Association). 
22 The term "phenomenon" refers to the combination of various social and political issues associated 
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demonizing of Kim Jong Il and his dynasty. Much of this framing centres on emphasizing the 
condemnation of unruly actions deemed to have been taken against Japan – particularly 
those of abductions (Akaha, 2007) – and upon the heightened risks that the DPRK 
represents.23 The construction and manipulation of such risks has, therefore, been made 
accessible by means of framing North Korea as a salient evil. This is demonstrated in 
Chapter 4 by the case study analyses of responses to a range of North Korean actions and 
provocations made between the maritime incursions of 1999 and the underground nuclear 
test of 2006. Moreover, these represent risks which contain an implicit responsibility for the 
Japanese state to act in order to counter them. 
   
0.4. Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 consists of a literature review, which is included in order to establish the state of 
extant works on the subject matter of this dissertation and assess their relevance and 
limitations. It compares and contrasts established paradigms of International Relations (IR), 
such as those which derive from Realist, Liberal and Constructivist schools of thought. In 
addition, the chapter attempts to integrate these IR paradigms with a range of literature 
addressing the theoretical conception and application of socio-political risk, and its 
implications for domestic politics and civil society, as well as its broader effects upon the 
specifics of international relations. The existing studies are, therefore, critiqued in terms of 
their ability to satisfactorily describe and explain processes of risk recalibration by Japan, 
observed in relation and response to North Korea. Within this, the causal significance, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
      with the DPRK in Japan, which have been given widespread media coverage, and gained the 
      attention of a broad range of citizens and powerful actors at the stae level.    
23 It should be noted that for the purposes of this dissertation the so-called North Korea phenomenon    
      is understood as a social construct which includes elements of the established context outlined by Son 
(2004: 189), who notes that, “many observers dismiss North Korea’s threats as a pretext  for Japan’s military 
build-up to counter-balance the rising Chinese political and military power in East Asia”. Japan’s obvious 
long-term concerns with a rising China do not in themselves, however, 
      fully explain the processes by which risks are recalibrated against the DPRK. 
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terms of agency, of mass media and other market actors, and political elites, as well as civil 
society (including stakeholders such as the North Korean community in Japan) are identified 
as key areas upon which to focus the core body of research. Moreover, in light of this critical 
discussion, gaps which remain under-explored by the contemporary literature are unveiled, 
and the relevance of applying risk theories to those of IR, in order to address the processes 
examined through these case studies, and potential others, is established. 
 
    Deriving its focus from the most pertinent literature reviewed throughout Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 focuses on building a coherent methodology and theoretical framework for 
tackling the research project. This explores how constructivist lines of argument may be 
integrated with a range of theories explaining the salience of socio-political risk in order to 
create a functional model, within which empirical findings can be unpacked and analysed in 
a productive fashion – via the accessing of a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative data 
sources. By addressing how Japan‟s domestic and foreign policy agendas intersect to 
influence its framing of North Korea, and the resulting construction of pertaining risks in line 
with (or counter to) shifting norms of anti-militarism, bilateralism and military normalization, 
the ground is laid for the detailed case study research.24 This is focused on the particularities 
of the specific influential areas within the state, market and society identified here. The 
events covered introduce the basis for analysis of data collected which pertain directly to 
those sectors constituting Japan‟s policy community, as outlined above. 
 
    Chapter 3 attempts to locate and identify the processes of risk recalibration initiated by 
these core actors in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, focussing primarily on a 
comparative analysis of events such as the multiple missile test firings conducted by the 
DPRK in 1993 and 1998, and the nuclear crisis of 1993-4. A range of qualitative and 
                                                          
24 These norms are assessed in relation to the negative framing of North Korea – itself becoming in  
     once sense a tributary norm, which can be referred to as anti-North Koreanism. 
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quantitative data are provided in an attempt to uncover how a combination of complex 
disparities, and broad-based convergences, in individual and organizational interests are 
disseminated in order to construct and mediate a range of risks that are framed against 
North Korea. These are addressed in terms of responses from within Japan to Pyongyang‟s 
actions and political posture.  Such actions are interpreted and utilized with varying 
consistency to promote an agenda, albeit contested, which is representative of Japan‟s 
policy community – and the prevailing norms to which central actors attach their identity and 
construct policy. 
 
    The continuation of these processes, articulated by political elites, mass media and other 
market actors, as well as civil society – with regards to risk mediation and its socio-political 
and commercial functions – is scrutinized in detail within Chapter 4. Once again, data from a 
variety of sources are collated systematically and compared in order to build up a picture of 
how media and other market actors have interacted with state and non-state political 
elements in response to key events unfolding in the early 2000s.25 These include the 
maritime incursions of 1999 and 2001, revelations over the abduction of Japanese citizens, 
revealed in September of 2002, and further missile test firings and a nuclear test in 2006. 
The results expose how this interaction created and inflamed political inertia in response to 
North Korea, which intensified and perpetuated how the DPRK came to be framed by Japan, 
and the manner in which associated risks were recalibrated. 
 
   Chapter 5 examines the process of risk recalibration – particularly in terms of policy 
revisions – through the case studies of further missile and nuclear tests conducted by 
Pyongyang in 2009. As with the previous chapters, it also explores the role of other societal 
                                                          
25  In the main, this dissertation refers to media (newspaper and TV journalists and editors etc.) and   
       other market actors (business associations, industrial complexes and other commercially-driven  
       actors) separately, and predominantly analyzes them as distinct influences upon the process of Japan’s 
recalibration of risk in response to North Korea. However, the obvious overlap, in terms of the market-
driven commercial interests of leading media sources is acknowledged and controlled for. 
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actors within the processes of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea. The 
influence of opinion polls and the role of the North Korean community in Japan, in addition to 
other related socio-cultural and socio-economic agents are, therein, investigated up to the 
present. In addition, the North‟s framing, and the recalibration of risks as an interactive 
process intersecting the media and policy making apparatus, is examined in relation to the 
DPRK‟s most recent provocations, including the suspected sinking of the ROK‟s Cheonan 
naval vessel and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In conclusion, the empirical data from 
these events are discussed in order to expose a plateau-like effect, suggestive of a 
lessening in the further recalibration of risk framed against Pyongyang following the change 
of administration.    
 
    In the concluding sixth chapter, the dissertation evaluates the extent, primacy and 
instrumental status of the various actors contributing to processes of risk recalibration by 
Japan in response to North Korea. In particular, Chapter 6 seeks to identify more concretely 
how they combine and interact to perpetuate a temporal policy agenda at the state level, 
which includes the framing of the DPRK as a source of multiple and salient risks. This is 
achieved through extensive mixed-method, comparative analyses of the results unearthed in 
each of the case study chapters. When evaluated in totality, the research findings suggest 
that Japan‟s framing of North Korea and the associated recalibration of risks has entered a 
new equilibrium, within which levels of recalibrated risk are maintained but do not exhibit 
obvious signs of an additional recalibration in response to recent events. In addition, spheres 
where risk recalibration and the norms it is based upon are accessible to potential shifts are 
highlighted, tentative predictions for incremental change are expressed, and areas open to 
and requiring further research are outlined.          
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Chapter 1. How risk has been understood in the contemporary 
literature on Japan’s international relations: searching for 
theoretical innovations to explore uncharted territory 
 
“The ubiquity of political risk explains its empirical presence despite its 
conceptual absence in the study of IR”                                                                                 
                                                 Darryl S.L. Jarvis and Martin Griffiths (2007b: 7) 
 
1.1. Missing pieces in the literature puzzle 
As stated in the Introduction – and alluded to by the quote above – this dissertation is 
premised upon the idea that there is a conceptual gap in the relevant literature, which 
requires filling by way of an improved theoretical model, empirically applied through use of 
what might be termed an enhanced methodological toolkit. It is hoped that such a 
methodology can be engineered to unlock an effective understanding of how ultimately 
significant the conception, mediation and recalibration of risk is to Japan‟s relationship with 
(and framing of) North Korea and, moreover, for civil societies, regional strategies and 
international relations as a whole. It is contended that the most effective way to empirically 
test the significance of the concept of risk in relation to the specific context of Japan‟s 
responses to North Korea, is by way of examining pertinent case studies that intersect the 
state, market and society, and which influence national policy and posture. As such, 
research for this study focuses on Japan‟s policy communities (Campbell, 1989), which can 
be conceptualized as constituted by policy-making elites, mass media (primarily news 
coverage – expanding upon analysis developed by Krauss and Pharr (1996)), and non-state, 
stake-holding actors (such as the North Korean community in Japan) within Japan‟s civil 
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society.26 Nevertheless, in order to explain why extant methodological models adapted for 
the analysis of these sectors in Japan‟s international relations exist in the forms that they do, 
and to demonstrate why they require supplementation, it is first necessary to establish where 
their current parameters lie. Indeed, it is not disputed that existing IR theories and other 
relevant literature offer, though often not explicitly, a great deal of guidance in the quest to 
understand where and how risk-based theorizing needs to be applied. In this respect, the 
puzzle to be addressed, through synthesis of existing theoretical models with the risk-driven 
theory which we hope to construct, can be expressed broadly in the form shown 
schematically by Figure 1.1 (below).  
    With reference to the schema devised in Figure 1.1, at least three areas are clearly 
identifiable in terms of applying the relevant literature. In this chapter an attempt is made to 
address these areas in a manner that clarifies their relevance to the core issue of 
recalibrated risks – manifested and observed through variable responses to North Korean 
actions and discourse – located within Japan. The first of these areas, is the literature which 
solely concerns Japan‟s international relations (IR literature),27 particularly its regional 
relations and orientation, and the shifting position of the Japanese state within a, perhaps 
increasingly, volatile global system of nation states. The following sections address texts that 
                                                          
26 Minimal coverage  is given in the following literature review to texts addressing representatives of the North   
   Korean community and their intersection with other key socio-political processes, specifically their degree of  
   direct agency and causality exerted upon Japan’s national responses to the DPRK. The principal organization     
   involved in such processes is Chōsensōren/Chong-ryon, or the General Association of Korean Residents in  
   Japan (less so Mindan, or Korean Residents Union as they are allied more generally with the ROK). Their  
   potential significance is identified, however, and full explanation of how they are to be integrated into the  
   research project as a whole is given in the following chapter. This critical literary absence is due, primarily, to  
   a lack of relevant political science texts. There are, however, a number of excellent  texts which address the    
   historical precedence of the North Korean community, relating to issues such as those of how the DPRK is   
   framed within Japan, see: Morris Suzuki (2007), Okonogi (2004), Han (2002) and Ryang (1996). Detailed   
   description of the history, political motives, and current activities of the North Korean community in Japan is     
   also provided in Japanese language text on Chōsensōren’s (2011) own website.  
 27 The term “IR literature” is avoided initially here on the grounds that it connotes a kind of specialized field of  
knowledge which is entirely, perhaps needlessly, disaggregated from combinations of other academic  
disciplines and social/political/natural sciences, and from the standard lowercase adjective-noun syntax that  
is “international relations”. However, it is also conceded that IR literature is a now well-recognized piece of  
terminology, and is, therefore, adopted intermittently for purposes of clarity and convenience. 
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explore the dynamics and development of risk in socioeconomics and political science, as 
much as possible focussing on important concepts which can be transferred and applied to 
those of Japan‟s international relations and, most pertinently, its responses to North Korea. 
Finally, literature which illuminates how the state and critical actors within the civil society 
respond to, and mediate, regional concerns, such as those pertaining to risks posed by the 
DPRK, is examined. This third area is tackled by way of discussion of materials which cover 
government policy formation and implementation (domestic politics), and those which can be 
observed in the coverage, focus and interpretation of media sources. As such, within the 
framework of this chapter Japan‟s recalibration of risk, in the sense outlined above, is 
addressed from a perspective that assumes threats perceived to stem from North Korea, 
regardless of the ultimate considerations of a rising China,28 have been the single greatest 
tangibly identifiable means by which progressive debates relating to Japan‟s normalization, 
in geo-political terms, have been propelled (Cooney, 2007:163; Umeda, 2007).29  
    In essence, then, by combining the core areas of literature outlined above, it is possible to 
assimilate and integrate a background body of existing scholarship which articulates Japan‟s 
recalibration of risk, understood in terms of its international relations in the North East Asia 
region, specifically with reference to Japan‟s perception and framing of North Korea.30 This 
also serves to illuminate why this is an issue of pressing concern, and the extent to which 
even a well-adapted combination of the literature available in these fields leaves extensive 
                                                          
28   It is evidently recognized by Japanese (including official sources) and external observers that, at the very  
     least in military terms, Japan’s increased acquisition of sophisticated defensive weaponry, coordination of     
     naval operations with the US and changes to security policy, although often only specifying the DPRK as a  
       potential adversary (Ministry of Defense, 2009), are clearly affected by the longer-term considerations of    
       security challenges posed by a more assertive and powerful China (Hagström, 2005: 62-63). 
29   The ease with which Japan can justify the recalibration of risks emanating from the DPRK has been    
     highlighted by a number of scholars on Japan’s international relations (Hughes, 2009a; Pempel, 2010). As  
Philip Shetler-Jones asserted during a talk on the effects of Globalization (suggesting comparisons to risk 
recalibration in its effects) on Japan’s foreign policy: “You’ve got at least four things: Nuclear bombs, Missiles, 
Abductions and Spy Ships. If that’s not some kind of threat, I don’t know what is?” (Japan’s 2004 National 
Defense Programme Guidelines: A Case Study for the Effects of Globalization on National Security, lecture at 
the Faculty of Humanities, University of Sheffield, 21 October 2009). 
30   This approach to structuring the literature review draws on that conceptualized by Cooper (1998). 
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openings, indeed the necessity, for extended research. Further, in this regard, while this 
chapter provides a concise analysis and critique of a selection of literature which addresses 
the core areas central to the hypotheses identified in the Introduction, Section 0.1, additional 
literary sources have also been included throughout. These provide both supporting 
empirical data for analyses conducted in relation to the case studies under examination, and 
act as a means by which to supplement the explanation of existing literary arguments and, 
therein, facilitate a more comprehensive literature review in totality.     
    An examination of texts that contain influential IR theories which have been utilized to 
asses Japan‟s responses to regional threats posed by states such as North Korea, and to 
explain its position in the East Asia region,31 is, therefore, of considerable importance when 
trying to conceptualize the context within which risk is calibrated and recalibrated by Japan. 
This is the case because theoretical analyses based on established IR paradigms are 
influential at the level of both policy formation and, though more indirectly, comprehension 
within the mass media and civil society as a whole. Hence, in order to address how Japan‟s 
position in its international relations within East Asia has been evaluated, particularly with 
respect to the mediation of risks and its relationship to North Korea, it is evidently necessary 
to critique the relevant literature through explication of a cross-section of these paradigms, 
pitched from contrasting schools of thought.32 This, therein, lays the ground work for 
                                                          
31   The core historical origins and obstacles (in relation to their affect upon contemporary, temporal  
     considerations explored below) of such a position, including analysis of how Japan’s future prospects for  
     more favourably recalibrating risks against the DPRK are contingent upon its capacity to overcome a  
     lingering inability to fully reconcile historically contentious disputes with China and South Korea, are  
     fruitfully discussed by Ōsawa and Saeki (2005: 210-6). 
32   It is beyond the remit of this dissertation to analyse and critique the entirety of established theories and   
     sub-theories of the massive literature available on International Relations. As such, the IR literature under   
     review, which is infused and integrated with the relevant strands of Risk literature later in the chapter, is   
     limited, essentially, to authors who have written on or concerning Japan using theoretical frameworks            
     that derive their logic from core strands of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, and those   
     who address multiple issues of domestic politics (much of which relies on theories underscored by       
     Etel Solingen’s theoretical emphasis (Solingen, 2003)). This is a practical strategy designed to incorporate  
     the widest breadth of theories that are obviously applicable to the case study. Further empirically based  
     works have also been incorporated into the later chapters as secondary data sources. In addition, this  
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explaining and justifying the theoretical framework and methodological approach adopted 
throughout the remainder of the dissertation, which is developed fully in Chapter 2.  
Figure 1.1.
 33   
The Role of Recalibrated Risk in Processes of Socio-Political Change within Japan 
Agents of Change                         State/Market/Civil Society                Extent of Policy and               
(for Risk Recalibration)                              Mediation                             Social Norms Change 
 
Political Elites                                                                                                  National Strategy Change 
Media/Market                                                                                                                      Normalization 
Civil Society                                                                                                          Regional Reorientation 
(Perceived External Threats)                                                                              Global Identity Changes 
Source: author 
NB: Although simplified, this basic structure represents an illustration of how risk recalibration can 
be broken down into three fundamental phases – readily identifiable with established models of IR 
theory. Within this representation, however, it is the central core, consisting, it is argued below, of 
under-researched, complex interactional processes, which is the primary focus of this dissertation.     
 
1.2. Realist/Neo-Realist perspectives 
The first literary school of IR to be reviewed here, primarily because of its extensive policy-
driven impact upon the field, is that of conventional (mainstream) realism/neo-realism. For 
the analysis attempted in this chapter, the definition of realist-derived theories is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
     chapter indirectly critiques elements of a broad range of other theoretical strands; and as such, counter- 
     critique from, in particular, scholars of Functionalism/Neo-functionalism, Marxism/Neo-Marxism, Critical  
     Theory, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Eclectic approaches is expected and encouraged.         
33 Derived from Cooney (2007: 13) – as adapted from Hermann (1990: 13). 
Public debate, intra-party 
and inter-party negotiations, 
calibration of risk (levels), 
political decisions, policy 
formation /implementation 
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approximated to those based on the idea that nation states behave as rational actors, 
seeking power and relative gains in relation to other states. As such, the world is made up of 
an anarchic system of “self help” states (Waltz, 2000: 39). Regardless of political or 
economic developments, alliances or integrations, according to arguments stemming from 
the realist paradigm, the international system will, fundamentally, remain one oriented 
around competition between nation states (Burchill, 2002: 70-102).  
     Neo-realist arguments have faced a number of paradigm-shaking challenges in recent 
years, particularly following the end of the Cold War, as politicians, business leaders and 
academics have sought to find alternatives to the confrontational rigidity of an anarchic, 
state-centric, super-structure at both regional and global levels. As examined below, both 
Liberalism/neo-Liberalism and Constructivism have been influential theories in facilitating 
this challenge to realism, and the latter may be particularly key to conceptualizing the 
process by which risks are recalibrated. However, at present, the nation-state remains the 
primary unit of analysis in international relations, and as such a powerful contingent of realist 
thought remains among numerous, perhaps even dominant, influential actors and scholars, 
who continue to promulgate the reality of a system based on the anarchic self-help state.   
        Indeed, although this dissertation is concerned primarily with Japan‟s recalibration of 
risk, in terms of its formation of policy vis-à-vis the DPRK, it is of considerable significance to 
understand how East Asian regional relations are conceptualized as a whole within the 
relevant literature, because this directly affects how Japan formulates policies and responds 
to individual challenges, such as those posed by North Korea. Furthermore, it is clear that 
neo-realism has been comprehensively applied to the task of describing the recent history of 
conflicts and security in the East Asian region, specifically with regards to events centred on 
the Korean peninsula. In fact, ironically however, one point of particular concern to Japan 
and Japanese sources regarding how current regional international relations are evaluated 
in this regard has been the lack of a Japan/Korea focus in leading realist texts. In other 
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words, Japan, South Korea and the DPRK are often relegated to the role of subsidiary 
territory that is to be dominated by either the United States or China, and are perceived only 
as instrumental to the broader systemic struggle for, and balance of, power between these 
larger states, which can itself be implicitly understood in terms of their grander plans for risk 
mediation or aversion. This strand of appraisal is exemplified by John J. Mearsheimer‟s 
assessment of the core security issues in East Asia as essentially a competition for regional 
dominance between the US and China. He offers the following symptomatic analysis: 
If... ...China becomes... ...the world‟s wealthiest great power it would almost 
certainly use its wealth to build a mighty military machine. For sound strategic reasons, 
moreover, it would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in 
the western hemisphere during the nineteenth century. So if Chinese relative power 
grows substantially, one should expect it to attempt to dominate Japan and South 
Korea, as well as other regional actors, by building military forces that are so powerful 
that those other states would not dare challenge it (Mearsheimer, 2001: 57).   
 
A number of prominent scholars, political analysts, and military experts support 
Mearsheimer‟s argument, or though they may see it as more complex, at least agree on the 
conclusion that realist explanations offer the most empirically convincing theoretical 
approach for describing the dynamics of international affairs relating to the Korean 
peninsula. As Gabriel Jonsson simply states, "The United States, China, Japan and Russia 
have all had their own interests to pursue in their policies towards Korea." (Jonsson, 2006: 
216) 
    The result of this pursuit, however, encounters serious conceptual difficulties when realist 
analyses set out to demonstrate, the less than logically coherent argument, that increases in 
military capabilities, specifically for Japan to counter North Korean threats, will result in 
greater national, regional and global security. This position is epitomized by Ōta Fumio, who 
devotes a considerable section of his security analysis to the alleged gravity of potential 
harms posed to Japan by Pyongyang‟s military capabilities, concluding that enhanced 
militarization and band-wagoning with the US are the most effective means by which to 
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secure Tokyo‟s safety and establish regional harmony (Ōta, 2006: 117-22).34 Such 
postulations do, however, highlight in rudimentary terms how the influence of realist thinking 
is well-suited to facilitating the upward recalibration of risks and shaping of how Japan 
should take responsibility for them; particularly through the framing of the DPRK as a source 
of salient and ominous threats – which become internalized as risks.  
     Indeed, analyses offered by the realist derived schools of thought tend to provide 
pessimistic, nationally self-interested conclusions for policy prescription. As such, while 
leading realist scholars often omit direct references to the state-level mediation of risk, they 
surely pave the way for politicians and high-level government authorities to calibrate risk in a 
manner that incorporates an anarchic, almost fatalistic, approach to international security. 
Once again, Mearsheimer exemplifies this approach, stating with regards to the security of 
the Korean peninsula and how it should be dealt with that, "US interests would be best 
served by pulling American troops back so that they can stay out of future wars, or at least 
join them later rather than earlier" (2001: 47). 
     Realist discourse of the kind contained in the above statement is, therefore, a theoretical 
perspective that is likely to heighten Japan‟s sense of insecurity in the East Asian region, 
and is compatible with the Japanese state justifying a heightening of risk perception in 
relation to Pyongyang. Indeed, furthermore, a number of prominent Japanese scholars and 
specialists of Japan‟s foreign policy continue to assess responses to the DPRK, and the 
risks that it poses, in terms of realist-based strategic concerns, stressing the important role 
that the Japanese state has to play in regional affairs affected by North Korea. Moreover, 
                                                          
34     Ōta Fumio is a retired Vice-Admiral and director of the Center for Security and Crisis Management   
       Education at the Japan National Defense Academy. As such, one would have to consider his scholarship as,  
       at the very least, highly oriented to Japanese defence authorities’ official viewpoints and policies, and   
       certainly reads as such. It is perhaps surprising, on account of this weighty bias, therefore, to find his work  
       amongst other leading  political science texts within university libraries. Therein, although there is not the  
       standard attempt at objective neutrality and rigour which would normally be expected from an academic  
       source, it is still worthy of review – precisely because it represents a particular polarized stance on this  
       subject matter; formed within a realist-based theoretical framework.     
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although potential economic gains for the DPRK are expressed as a primary factor in 
Pyongyang‟s manoeuvres, they are observed by realist-minded scholars with caution and 
the understanding that any such agenda is driven by the power-political imperative of 
regime survival. Such an outlook is typified by Michishita Narushige, who evaluates Japan‟s 
options vis-à-vis Pyongyang by warning against being drawn into a North Korean-
engineered game of competition over the future geopolitical and economic battleground that 
will likely dominate Korean affairs. Indeed, in consecutive sections of his 2009 article for the 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, respectively entitled “Enhancing regime security” and 
“A reconfigured equidistance policy” (2009: 115-17) He states that, 
   Normalization of relations with the United States and Japan would be the single most   
important turning point for North Korea‟s security and foreign policy strategy. If this is 
achieved, North Korea‟s regime survival would be significantly enhanced. 
In this new strategic environment, North Korea would benefit from the reconfigured 
equidistance policy…   …Regional rivalry between China and Japan, and South Korea‟s 
concern that their influence over the northern part of the peninsula might become too 
strong would benefit Pyongyang. If North Korea provides appropriate incentives, it might 
be able to draw Russia into this game as well… …The Japanese input would be 
particularly important because the Japanese have a lot of money but do not pose a 
political threat to the legitimacy of the North Korean regime.
35
 
 
In addition to the kind of defensive-realist analyses provided by security experts the like of 
Michishita, there is also an emerging realist-rooted understanding amongst some schools of 
thought that Japan‟s framing of risk pertaining to North Korea is part of an unavoidable 
alignment within a strategic regional policy framework, referred to by Michael J. Green as 
“Japan‟s reluctant realism” (2001). Green notes a tangible shift in Japan‟s risk-mediation 
strategy at the level of national foreign policy over preceding decades, highlighting the clear 
transition from an, “…omnidirectional, risk-free formula that suggested no national strategy 
at all” (2001: 1) to one which, not least because of the increased security threat from North 
                                                          
35
    In the same article Michishita also discusses how responses should counter what he terms as Pyongyang ’s   
       ‘cybernetic decision-making’ to refer to the DPRK’s ‘cyclic application of adventurism and caution, coercion    
       and dialogue’ in its attempts to maintain regime survival (2009: 110-11).  
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Korea,36 the rise of China, and external pressure and a degree of abandonment from the 
United States, has prompted Japan into “more sharing of the risk” (2001: 10) in strategic 
realist terms. A key element of this is how North Korea is framed by Japan within the 
regional balance of power, as a prominent and probable source of risks attached to tangible 
harms, such as those contained in potential nuclear and military aggression by the DPRK. 
Indeed, although less overtly realist in approach, Richard Samuels concisely expresses how 
Japan‟s North Korea policy has been structured to this affect. In a somewhat cynical 
passage, he asserts that, 
If the cultish regime in North Korea had not existed, some Japanese strategists surely 
would have wished to invent it. It was easy for the Japanese public to perceive 
Pyongyang‟s militarism and persistent provocations as a threat – one much less 
ambiguous than China‟s , which was, after all, encased in considerable economic benefit 
(2007: 171). 
 
Thus, where Green stresses the unavoidable nature of strategically orientated moves by 
Japan, including those which maintain a high-risk evaluation of North Korean issues, 
Samuels, as in the passage above, posits that there is a high degree of independent 
reactive planning by the Japanese state apparatus in such endeavours.37 Either way, both 
point towards realist-informed directives that are indicative of a recalibration of risk, which 
includes the public framing of the DPRK as a source of serious, potentially eminent, harms. 
    From the perspective of this dissertation, however, there are serious concerns with 
realist/neo-realist perspectives which make them problematic. Not least, this is because of 
their seeming lack of an apt ability to effectively describe and account for domestic political 
concerns, particularly in terms of how they influence the mediation of risk between the state, 
market and society within Japan – specifically in relation to the DPRK. Indeed, this is of 
                                                          
36   For Green’s full exposition of how, despite liberal-minded attempts to normalize Japan-DPRK relations,   
      realist concerns continue to dominate the troubled relations either side of the Japan Sea, see the section    
      entitled “Elusive Normalization” (2001: 117-20), which concludes by describing developments in the Tokyo-   
      Pyongyang relationship as “a nightmare of escalating confrontation” (2001: 120). 
37  Samuels suggests that this is part of Japan setting a course to hedge between the US alliance and      
      increased integration with China, which he terms the “Goldilocks consensus” (2007: 9).   
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particularly key relevance when assessing the processes of how North Korea is framed 
among these core sections of Japan‟s socio-political apparatus in order to justify and 
facilitate national policy prescriptions.  
 
1.3. Liberal/Neo-Liberal perspectives 
Liberal-based perspectives will be defined here as those which rely upon the theory that 
cooperation, largely socio-economic, between states can reduce, mitigate, and/or 
supersede realist concerns over military struggles for power, as any two states (or a 
greater number) stand to benefit more in terms of absolute gains from increased 
cooperative action than they would from military conflict (Russett, 1994: 84).38 This is 
typically institutionalized in democratic governments which seek to trade and cooperate 
with other states, particularly their neighbours and regional powers, for the normative 
goal of their own prosperity and the greater good.39      
       Though perhaps less obviously structured around, or linked to, conceptions of risk, 
classical liberal political theories and their derivatives, such as neo-liberalism and neo-
liberal institutionalism, offer a potentially much broader and more integrated means by 
which to assess national foreign policies and the structuring of reactive relationships 
than their realist rivals can provide. At the very minimum, they help to provide an 
explanation of why, for instance, there is continuing salience to the theme, at least 
sporadically, of attempts by Japan to normalize politico-economic relations with North 
Korea. Furthermore, they are broader and more integrated than neo-realist perspectives 
                                                          
38 Put simply, whereas neo-realist theories often presume, or can be reduced to, a zero-sum game scenario,   
     neo-liberal models offer a means by which to avoid necessitating an opponent’s loss in order to maximize a  
     perceived gain (plus-sum game), evidently framed here within the context of Japan’s relations and  
responses to North Korea.    
39 For a practical and theoretical outline of how a revised version of this concept might be applied and realized   
     in North East Asia, including obstacles imposed by Japan’s domestic-issue-focused policies toward   
     Pyongyang, see Noland and Haggard (2009, 119-37). 
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because they exclude less the role of a number of domestic influences within the state, 
market and society. Moreover, as we shall observe in later sections that cover the risk 
literature, regardless of how preferentially it is subjectively evaluated, liberal-based 
thinking and theory has, in fact, been at the core of modern day developments in 
socializing and re-calibrating the conception of risk. 
    In terms of how this has been applied to literature on Japan‟s dealings with the 
DPRK, there are a considerable number of descriptive and prescriptive texts on Japan‟s 
international relations, which tend to cover similar ground, though not without 
contradictions, in terms of depicting a period of recent ebbs and flows in efforts to 
normalize Japan-North Korea relations by way of economic incentives and diplomatic 
initiatives for conflict mitigation. Scholars in the ilk of Funabashi Yōichi et al., for 
instance, advocate implementation of increased institutional dominance, through bodies 
such as the United Nations (UN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Group of Seven (G-
7 (G8)) and International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as a means to mediate 
Japan‟s nationally salient risks through international institutions (Funabashi, 1994: 22-
25).  
    However, through the course of the past decade, repeated failure of such 
organizations to effectively deal, not least with the core issues associated with North 
Korea, has undoubtedly aided those agents within Japan that would wish to frame the 
DPRK as a high-risk “rogue state” which is beyond the bounds of internationally 
implemented restraint.40 Nevertheless, for some purveyors of liberal-oriented lines of 
                                                          
40 It is interesting, however, in contrast with realist perspectives discussing compliance to, or independence  
    from, US pressure, to note that Funabashi both posits and critiques the agency of domestic politics in  
    Japan’s response to beiatsu. Essentially, his argument highlights the use of such pressure as a means to both  
    avoid, and where necessary justify as unavoidable, more difficult or controversial policy decisions and  
    deflect domestic criticisms under the guise of US culpability. Thus, it suggests, Funabashi sees the relocation  
    of responsibility for security risks to international institutions more as a means to alleviate Japan’s bilateral  
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thinking, such as Katahara Eiichi for example, Japan‟s international role, particularly in 
non-nuclear proliferation efforts, is a key factor of how North Korea is framed. Hence, to 
this effect, the risks of nuclear armament in “rogue states”, and indeed caution over 
Japan‟s own nuclear aspirations as a response, need to be extrapolated from other 
conflated issues, and emphasis placed on the financial incentives of normalization and 
regional cooperation (Katahara, 1998: 30-36). In other words, preventative action, based 
on the incremental and conditional provision of economic incentives in return for large-
scale politico-economic liberalization within the DPRK, is prescribed as a means by 
which Japan can both accurately calibrate and effectively respond to risks identified as 
rooted in Pyongyang (Takeda, 1998: 97). This is also well expressed by Christopher 
Hughes (1999), who establishes that Japan has been in a position to use its economic 
power to, potentially, alleviate security risks posed by the DPRK, normalize relations 
and aid in the endeavour of increasing prosperity on both sides of the northern Japan 
Sea. Yet, in Hughes‟ view, attributed to the decisions or pressures brought to bear on 
the iron triangle of the former long-term ruling LDP, bureaucracy, and big business 
which have oft-times been accounted for as constituting Japan‟s policy elite, Tokyo did 
not chose to do so (1999: 161).  Moreover, key structural obstacles; such as Japan‟s 
need to align foreign policy with the US, an inability to resolve the abduction issues, and 
anti-Pyongyang focused domestic media and public opinion are consistently cited as 
core factors in preventing a conventionally liberal-focussed resolution to Japan‟s North 
Korea concerns.  
    In addressing such impediments, which – as discussed in the chapters which follow – 
have been integral to how risks identified with the North are recalibrated, radically liberal 
proposals have also, nevertheless, been suggested by progressive scholars. For 
instance, Okazaki Hisahiko (2003: 170-6) suggests that as a means to re-engage 
normalization initiatives with Pyongyang, Japan needs to actively offer, indeed “link” 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    bind. 
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(2003: 170), economic incentives in return for complete resolution – on Tokyo‟s grounds 
– to the abduction issue. In this sense, he argues for greater understanding of the 
internal risks which are faced by actors within the North – particularly in order to make 
any concessions towards Japan. However, such literature – based on liberal ideals 
endorsing exchange and plus-sum calculus – fails to deal with the reality within Japan 
which, for the immediate future at least, essentially makes any form of perceived 
conciliation with regards to the abductions issues politically untenable; not to mention 
the increasing inability of Japan to provide financial incentives due its own economic 
malaise. Indeed, as the authors of Japan‟s International Relations succinctly state,  
…despite Japan‟s pro-activity, improved relations with North Korea still remain an 
elusive goal… …international and domestic structural obstacles have meant that 
Japan has been unable to utilize its economic power to forge greater engagement 
and interdependence with North Korea… (2005: 216-17) 
 
     In order to overcome these blockages to economic and political channels of access 
from Japan‟s perspective, Hook et al. also explore an essentially constructivist 
perspective to Tokyo‟s North Korea policy, which will be examined in more detail below.  
     For now, it is at least noteworthy from the perspective of this dissertation to take 
stock of how it might be claimed that a majority of literature from mainstream IR 
perspectives on Japan‟s responses to the DPRK seeks,41 either explicitly or implicitly, to 
trace the influence of a globalized neoliberal policy paradigm, promoted specifically in 
Japan with particular veracity and rationalized US support by Koizumi Junichirō and his 
successors.42 In addition, it is necessary to elucidate how neoliberal institutionalist 
                                                          
41 Evidently terms such as “majority” are problematic when describing literary opinion, because there is an   
     almost inexhaustible supply of material, which could plausibly count as literature. However, it is used here   
     in order to evince the consistency with which certain themes are current within numerous prominent texts.  
42  Koizumi is merely the most famous in a succession of neoliberally-minded Japanese prime ministers and  
     leading politicians, which are often times argued to stem back from Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s  
     political reorientation in line with Reaganite (as of US president, Ronald Reagan) neo-liberal policy reforms  
     initiated in the 1980s. For diverse perspectives on the influence of neo-liberalism on Japan’s regional and  
     global policy trajectories, see: Nakano (2004), Watanabe (2005).  
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notions of the multilateral mitigation of associated risks through economic exchange 
have been thwarted, but might yet plausibly come to fruition. As will be addressed in 
later sections, these are issues for which it is hoped an enhanced understanding of 
processes relating to how comparative risks are calibrated will better illuminate their 
constitutive causal agents and the political structures which underlie them, and thus 
facilitate a more accurate analysis of the resulting policy outcomes. 
 
  1.4. Constructivism 
The concept of constructivism is defined here as a knowledge-based, ideological, socio-
cultural approach which, unlike IR paradigms developed from realism and liberalism, 
focuses less on material factors such as military power or economic trade, and more on 
the possibilities for transforming the identity of states through the elites who run them 
(Walt, 1998: 40-41). Hence, changes to state identities, norms, and values will result in 
shifts within the state‟s internal structure, and, therefore, alter the nature of its external 
(international) relations. Security issues, constructivists argue, are based upon the 
intersubjective relationships between states, which can be socially reconstructed 
(Wendt, 1992: 393-407). 
   The constructivist literature is, potentially, able to complement and even champion that 
which is derivative of realist and liberal perspectives in examining many areas of Japan‟s 
North Korea policy, particularly in terms of exploring the processes of recalibrations of 
risk. That ability is premised on the fact that constructivism focuses on the continuation 
and change of causal agents and norms. This allows both longitudinal comparison 
through time, and insights into possible futures. Hook et al., for example, seek to go 
beyond explanations of policy trajectories based on purely economic, trade-based, or 
geo-military factors, to identify the norms and larger societal structures, which are 
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shaping Japan‟s policy vis-à-vis the DPRK, and, moreover, to “demonstrate how policy 
making agents and other political actors are socialized through mutual interaction into 
patterns of behaviour, which shape their definition of interests and rationality” (2005: 42). 
In the case of North Korea, for example, this is seen to have been extensively shaped, in 
the post Cold-War era at least, by the oft-times conflicting interests of Japan‟s national 
economic (developmental, in terms of national economic power and influence) and 
bilateral (orientated to the US) norms (Hook et al., 2005: 215). Hence, at the structural 
level, although normalization with Pyongyang may adhere to the former, it has often 
caused the latter to become strained. Hook et al.‟s work is, therefore, not explicitly 
concerned with how Japan calibrates and recalibrates risks in response to North Korean 
action or policy, but implicitly draws into question the state and societal rationales within 
which policies directed against the DPRK are being conceived and implemented. 
Therefore, it expands a view to better understand how such processes are increasingly 
affected by shifting understandings of future uncertainties and dangers. Moreover, as 
such, the processes by which potential harms are calibrated into socio-politically 
constructed risks can be examined. 
    Scholars such as Thomas U. Berger (1998) and Peter J. Katzenstein et al. (2006) 
expand on this constructivist perspective of security policies galvanized to deal with 
Pyongyang by pointing to how, in Japan, there has been a shift in the way external 
security concerns are mediated amongst the state, media and society. Indeed, Berger in 
arguing for the salience of domestic historical-cultural norms as a major influence upon 
defence policy making, also notes the significance of scholarship which addresses the 
increased risk aversion present in advanced industrial states such as Japan (1998: 201-
5). However, while his own culturally based theories offer an invaluable insight into 
Tokyo‟s policy formation, which highlights the deficits of neo-realist and neo-liberal 
explanations, he ultimately omits analysis of how the calibration of risk is also central to 
such historical-cultural paradigms. Katzenstein, in contrast, suggests that such 
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processes are linked to a restructuring of norms concerning Japanese uniqueness, and 
the fear of external, foreign threats. His central claim (2006: 86-7), in terms of how the 
norm has been reconceptualized in relation to North Korea, is posited in the following 
passage: 
 
Police and diplomatic efforts that focussed primarily on the safety of Japanese from 
depoliticized overseas threats also reinforced the idea of Japan as a family polity, 
with benevolent and protective government willing to step in to protect citizens from a 
world they did not make and cannot understand. Since 9/11, however, Japanese 
conservatives have successfully mobilized domestic fears, especially of North Korea, 
to justify an expanded antiterrorism role alongside the United States. Legitimized by 
U.S. efforts to remake security as a comprehensive phenomenon, the government 
has successfully pushed for a more muscular presence overseas while maintaining 
institutionalized motifs of homogeneity and state responsibility at home to keep at 
bay fears of a changing region and changing nation.  
 
    Hence, in terms of a perceptive analysis of how organs of the Japanese state have 
constructed and recalibrated risks that rely on the framing of North Korea as the source of 
potentially catastrophic harms, Katzenstein et al. express a powerfully convincing conception 
of the processes‟ outcomes. However, little attention has been paid to the actual causal 
dynamics of how that risk has been mediated between core sections of the state, 
commercial media, and civil spheres of Japanese society. It is that literary gap, in terms of a 
more refined understanding of socialized risk and its applicability, which provides the basis 
for the following sections, and indeed the research project of this dissertation as a whole.  
    Although, then, undeniably not a comprehensive, exhaustive, or even extensive survey of 
all possible IR literary sources, the above critique should have sufficiently served to 
demonstrate the relevance of the core theoretical paradigms to the case study of Japan‟s 
North Korea policies and, implicitly, their potential relevance to countless related others, 
while also highlighting a number of complex processes they, as yet, empirically struggle to 
explain. Moreover, it is hoped, that this broad-sweeping critical perspective on the IR 
literature has, once again, hinted at some of the ways in which a revised and refined 
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understanding of risk may be applied to plug many of these otherwise deceptively expansive 
literary gaps.  
    In the sections that follow, the theoretical and empirical potency of risk, as a socio-political 
construction, is outlined, and an image of how its core elements can be linked and applied to 
the case study at hand is also proffered. This is provided primarily in relation to events that 
occupy the central focus of discourse on North Korea within the public sphere in Japan. The 
specifics of how it is to be forged into a theoretical framework forming a basis (approach) for 
the empirical research undertaken herein are then addressed in Chapter 2.     
 
1.5. Risk literature 
The pertinence of engaging theories of risk with respect to international relations stems from 
the understanding that risks are not necessarily equivalent to dangers (e.g., as of military 
threats posed by external states) but, rather, are oft-times constructed as a form of uncertain 
opportunity, which carries a responsibility based on the accepted knowledge of a given risk. 
Therefore, it is of crucial importance as to who holds the dominant position, in terms of 
defining that knowledge and abstracting the associated risks. This logically applies, 
moreover, to the responsibility for dealing with risks posed by external nation-states, and to 
the formulation and comprehension of transnational risks (Richter, Berking, Muller-Schmid, 
2006: 4-16). In the above respect, in terms of how risk is mediated, this dissertation is 
premised, ultimately, on the Foucauldian contention, that power relations within society – 
such as those discussed between Japan‟s media and other market interests, civil society, 
and political elite – are unequal and analogous with war (i.e. inter-state war) (Downing, 2008: 
19-21). 43 Hence, as such, both what Ulrich Beck (2009) has termed the “cosmopolitanized” 
(as related to a global phenomenon that has state-reliant variances, or glocalized forms) 
                                                          
43 In essence Foucault is using a reversal of Carl von Clausewitz military theory that “war is the continuation of   
     politics by other means” (1874: 1), applied to politically competitive actors within civil society. 
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production of risks, viewed amid the reflexive “second modernity” within which Japan‟s (and 
all others‟ it is presumed) international relations lie,44 and the governance, in the Giddensian 
sense,45 of those risks becomes an unavoidable issue of pressing concern and practical 
relevance. To put it another way, one cannot decouple how the state mediates and governs 
risks, such as those enframed by Japan against the DPRK, from the background socio-
political environment of a risk society, which influences the very institutions within the state 
that will exact such a process of risk recalibration.46 
    A standard definition of risk is “the possibility of something bad happening” (Cambridge 
Advanced Learners Dictionary, 2009)|. However, in terms of being interested in the 
processes by which Japan recalibrates how that possibility is understood and mediated at 
the national level as a responsibility to respond, vis-à-vis the enemy constitutive of the DPRK 
for instance, we require a definition that explores the open-ended (future orientated) 
construction of risk, i.e., in terms of its malleability. To this end, it is necessary to recognize 
Adam and Van Loon‟s claim that, 
  The inescapability of interpretation makes risk infinitely malleable and, as Beck (1992: 
23) insists, „open to social definition and construction‟.” [And, moreover, that]  “The 
pervasiveness of mediation, the high level of indeterminacy and the inevitability of 
political involvement mean that there is no one truth, that there are no facts outside the 
relativizing influence of interpretations based on context, position, perspective, interest, 
and the power to define and colour interpretation.  
(Beck, Adam, Van Loon, 2000: 4) 
 
                                                          
44 In his presentation on 18 November 2009 at the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB) Conference on Risk  
     in East Asia, Beck outlined how the term cosmopolitan required redefinition in order to understand how the  
     global risk society has, largely as the result of almost universally adopted neo-liberal policy trajectories,  
     become both utterly interconnected and at the same time pluralized state-to-state – hence, he claimed,  
     requiring a cosmopolitanized understanding and solidarity among interstate actors, particularly in East Asia,  
     in order to address how institutions may be better integrated to perceive and cope with the increasingly  
     unequal challenges posed by global risks. 
45 For an exposition of how Giddens’ and Becks’ theories contrast and intersect, see: Giddens, Beck   
      and Lash (1994), and for further discussion, Giddens (1999, 1-10). 
46  As such, this study adopts a somewhat eclectic, or at least theoretically integrated, approach to  
      understanding socio-political risk. For an excellent discussion of how varying, distinct, schools of thought on  
      risk relate specifically to Japan’s international relations, see Williamson (2011). 
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     Yet, although this statement offers an insightful impression of the processes at hand, as 
will become apparent, at the practical level of aiding and formulating policy prescriptions 
Beck et al.‟s risk society theory extensively concedes empirical precedence to theories 
exploring the governmentality per se of risk.47 However, it is, nevertheless, from Beck‟s 
literary departure point, that IR theorists and security analysts now face the challenge of how 
to incorporate what has become an increasingly significant body of literature on the societal, 
and, hence moreover state, role of risk. Indeed, in light of an accelerated period of hyper-
globalization (Ravenhill, 2008), in which risk has developed into a key discourse by which 
policies are, regardless of varying levels of implicitness and explicitness, discussed, 
formulated and implemented, the implications for future expansion of IR theories and their 
application is potentially immense. This is particularly poignant to issues pivoting on the 
framing of security concerns, such as those related to the North East Asian region, and, 
specifically, Japan‟s mediation of risk framed as a response to North Korea – not least at the 
state governance level in the name of maintaining security and order. Indeed, as Nils 
Bubandt (2005: 278) asserts,  
In its conventional forms, „security‟ may be defined as „freedom from danger and risk‟… 
Security, in other words, deals with the problem of order and disorder, being both the 
ontological condition of order, in the sense of an absence of doubt, danger and risk, and 
the political means of ensuring that order. 
 
If accepted as a compelling argument, this conceptually innovative statement from Bubandt 
surely highlights how the norms that are used to (re)calibrate risk at state and societal levels 
must clearly permeate the political decisions and process, therein, in increasingly 
fundamental ways. Moreover, with the acceleration, at the very least in perception, of 
globalized modes of political behaviour, the role of risk in security is of particularly 
heightened significance. Indeed, as an analytical tool for examining such behaviour, it would 
                                                          
47 Although a subjective interpretation, this state of the on-going theoretical discussion on risk is understood   
     through expert opinion gauged, predominantly, from public debates at the University of Sheffield and the  
     Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB Conference on Risk in East Asia, November 2009), particularly relating  
 to appraisals by professors Frank Rövekamp, Werner Pascha, Glenn Hook, and Ulrich Beck himself.  
35 
 
appear to lend itself well to providing better access (including to the understanding of 
reflexive effects (Beck, 2009) to specific bilateral and regional international relations, 
including, not least, Japan‟s relationship to North Korea. 
    It seems consistent to argue that it is, therefore, necessary to examine pivotal studies 
(literature) which express how risks have been reinterpreted by societal actors and the state 
itself. Indeed, despite containing areas of limited empirically assessable data in a conceptual 
or theoretical sense, once again probably none has been more influential in this endeavour 
than Ulrich Beck. In his work on the risk society Beck explores how risks have been 
detached from their previous calibration as phenomena associated in purely negative terms 
with harms, towards a means by which scientific communities, commercial and other 
interests, and societies and states as a whole produce and justify a range of activities and 
industries that are reliant upon the ingredient of risk. He is also broadly pessimistic, and 
somewhat fatalistic, at the global level when it comes to assessing how scientific 
development has created a risk society in which there exists a paradox of catastrophic risks 
that cannot be fully managed (such as nuclear or environmental) and a society obsessed 
and manipulated by a perceived need to counter an expanding barrage of risks (Beck, 
1992). 48 Moreover, Beck offers to supersede, while yet still making use of, the standard 
application of IR theories such as neo-realism and constructivism in order to better 
understand how risk is constructed, evaluated and utilized in foreign policy formation and 
societal change. Indeed, with direct reference to this function of applying risk-theories to 
those of IR, he states (2000: 33) that, 
 
    I do not restrict my analysis to one perspective or conceptual dogma: I am both realist 
and constructivist, using realism and constructivism as far as those meta-narratives are 
useful for the purpose of understanding the complex and ambivalent „nature‟ of risk…  
 
                                                          
48 It is the contention of this study that Japan’s calibration of risks that arise from perceptions of the DPRK  
 have been recalibrated to the level where they are seen as comparable to these, in terms of    
     presenting the potential for equivalent, unimaginably catastrophic harms. 
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    Therein, Beck‟s work is of specific interest in relation to this case of recalibrations of risk in 
Japan‟s international relations, particularly because North Korea offers an obvious source of 
both unmanageably catastrophic risks (nuclear, military, biological etc.) and, if framed 
effectively as such, a focal point around which a range of security risks have to be identified 
with, accounted for and countered or adapted to (i.e., taken responsibility for). As we 
observed in the literature that takes a constructivist approach, the conceptual framework, or 
“epistemological paradigms” (Hall, 1993: 279) that international relations are conducted 
within may shift, or can be shifted, over time, but Beck‟s analysis would put a distinctly 
negative spin on the ideological progress promoted by constructivism, suggesting, rather, 
that we would do well to look more at how powerful actors inside the Japanese state and 
society are able to engineer recalibrations of risk, justified in terms of responsibilities to 
secure Japan against a scientifically calculated threat from the DPRK, making use of the 
unequal power relations that give them a variety of controls in shifting risks. 
    However, prior to any attempt at comparison and application of Beck‟s work on risk with 
the relevant schools of thought in IR theory, it is necessary to acknowledge and assess a 
number of perspectives in the available literature, which debate, contest, and challenge the 
core of his thesis on the changing nature of sociological risk. These critiques and conceptual 
variations, after all, have important consequences for any research addressing the 
application and use of Beckinian risk theory in international relations.49   
    Not least within this field, though not always directly linked to the subject matter of 
International Relations, there are a number of scholarly works which constructively build on 
Beck‟s initially pessimistic outlook concerning the recalibration of risk across the wider global 
society, which may be scaled down for application to the case study of Japan‟s responses to 
                                                          
49 For an excellent summary and critique of Beck’s work, and its implications for IR and further social theories,   
      see Jarvis (2007). Jarvis provides a range of data sources and socio-geographical evidence to refute the  
 empirical validity of Beck’s thesis, but acknowledges the importance of his theoretical constructs regarding  
 socio-political concerns with risk. 
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North Korea. These, in turn, offer a glimpse of how we might re-conceptualize risk as an 
important construct at nation-state, regional and global levels of unit analyses. Many of the 
theoretical groundwork for such re-evaluation is captured in Tom Baker and Jonathan 
Simon‟s volume, Embracing Risk (eds, 2002), which seeks to demonstrate how there has 
been a fundamental shift over recent times in advanced societies from spreading risks and 
risk prevention per-se, to embracing risks as a means by which to maximize future outcomes 
and profits.50 
    Although focused primarily on national social insurance policies, by identifying a key 
distinction between the spreading and embracing of risk Simon and Baker provide an 
indicative insight as to how research into the recalibration of risk, justified or framed in terms 
of a changing security environment, might be tackled. That is, they expose the extent to 
which risk has been reinterpreted as a social construct throughout advanced nations during 
the twentieth century, not least in Japan. Indeed they assert that, “...focus is on the United 
States, but we think that experience is not unique. If anything, risk has been socialized to an 
even greater extent in Western Europe and Japan” (Simon and Baker, 2002: 3).  
 
    As such, the primary significance of Simon and Bakers‟, and their contributors‟, writings, 
as far as this dissertation is concerned, is their attempts to broaden Beck‟s overarching 
doom „n gloom theory to allow a more flexible means by which to apply risk related theories 
rooted in social economics to a wider range of academic disciplines, including those 
concerned with international relations, and national, regional and global governance. 51 
Therein, the central claim of the above work is succinctly encapsulated in the passage 
below: 
                                                          
50 Baker and Simon are primarily focussed on the conception of risk in insurance practices, but their volume is  
      pivotal in as much as, albeit from a diverse perspective, it illuminates how risk can facilitate political gains. 
51  See Beck (1992: 57) for an example of his seemingly cynical view of the expanding growth and use of the  
risk society for commercial gain, seen as a symptom of what he terms “reflexive  modernity”, which holds  
that scientific progress is inextricably bound up with increases in potentially catastrophic risks. 
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  ...embracing risk also encompasses a broader idea of governing through risk.   ...the 
core idea of governing through risk is the use of formal considerations about risk to direct 
organizational strategy and resources. …And presidents and prime ministers alike now 
define themselves by the risks they would have the state lift from the shoulders of the 
populations and the risks they would not (2002: 11). 
 
The above clearly reflects and engages a constructivist conception, as observed in Hook 
and Takeda‟s appraisal of “self-responsibility culture” in Japan (2007: 93-123), while also 
implicitly expressing a transition to the conceptualization of risk as distinct from danger; a 
position inherent in a great deal of the risk literature, particularly that which stems from an 
engagement, be it negative or positive, with theories devised by the likes of Beck and 
Foucault.52 This is, not least, because Beck is effectively accusing state authorities of 
blurring scientific credentials that justify policy, under the ideological discourse of calculated 
risk aversion – taking place amid forms of societies which are increasingly unable to avert 
cataclysmic risks.   
 
    Further, in addition to the impact of recalibrated societal risks upon ideological and 
normative frameworks key to constructivist thinking, the risk literature also intersects with 
neo-liberalism and other liberal theories in a manner which holds considerable significance 
to international relations and national responses as a whole. The link between risk and 
liberalism is addressed by Pat O‟Malley (2004) in his analysis of “risk, uncertainty and 
government,” in which he highlights the paradox between calculable future risks allowing for 
provisions that will potentially guarantee freedoms, and the inability of freedoms to be 
obtained without a degree of uncertainty removing the constraints of a pre-calculated 
future.53 O‟Malley‟s discussions are also of specific relevance to international relations 
issues, such as those contained in Japan‟s responses to North Korea, because they expose 
                                                          
52 This distinction is, indeed, expressed more explicitly by Pat O’Malley (in Simon and Baker (eds.), 2002:   
    111) with reference to Francois Ewald (a further contributor to the above work, and himself a   
    distinguished scholar of risk theory). 
53 See also, O’Malley (2004: 2-4) for an exposition of Beck’s postulation of the latter position contrasted with  
 Peter Bernstein’s promotion of the former.  
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a further crucial theoretical distinction in how risk is popularly perceived to be calibrated, or 
recalibrated; i.e., as opposed not only to danger but also as opposed to uncertainty. In 
addition, they highlight the lack of analytical attention paid to risk as a key component of 
liberal-derived, and more specifically neo-liberal, theories which have continued to pervade 
and underlie a great deal of tactical provisions made at the state level.54  Indeed, O‟Malley 
stresses the need to understand how governments with a neo-liberal agenda now combine 
and integrate the concepts of calculable risk and creative uncertainty in order to recalibrate 
how the responsibility for risks are consequently assigned. He posits that, 
 
  the promotion of neo-liberalism and entrepreneurial governance has also pressed a new 
telos of creative uncertainty to the foreground. Rather than concerning ourselves about a 
possibly futile exercise in measuring whether risk is „spreading‟, we should recognise that 
risk and uncertainty are both being valorised in new ways and forms. And they are being 
deployed in relation to different domains or functions of government than was the case in 
the post-war years. Not the least important of these changes is that both are mobilised to 
emphasise the choice and responsibility of individuals for the governance of their own 
futures and the futures of their families and „communities‟ (2004: 73). 
 
    Although O‟Malley neglects (excusably in light of his domestic policy focus) to define what 
a “community” extends to, his theorized point regarding the shift of emphasis in mediating 
risk and uncertainty between the state and its citizens can, with a little imagination and 
conceptually logical licence, be extended to national and foreign policy models, particularly 
those of modern-day Japan. Indeed, this potentially opens the door to justifying the 
relevance of an investigation into how creative uncertainty is used when it comes to 
recalibrating risks posed by Kim Jong-Il‟s (or Jong-Un‟s) North Korea, specifically those 
posed by nuclear, military and abduction issues. In other words, it poses the question of how 
O‟Malley‟s conception of risks and uncertainty, as a phenomenon mediated and outsourced 
by the state to civil society, can be, is, or has been present in Japan‟s recalibration of risks 
that are identified with the DPRK.   
 
                                                          
54 For detailed exposition of neoliberal policy trends, see Harvey (2005: 64-119). 
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    There are, of course, also other theoretical literary works, not focussed directly on 
international relations, which may still contain valuable insights when it comes to exploring 
the conception, recalibration and application of risk between the state, market and society. 
Indeed, many such texts provide considerable scope for interdisciplinary transfer, or 
reapplication, including to the case study at hand. For instance, as a tool for deciphering 
what factors need to be considered in order to understand how a phenomenon is framed as 
a means by which to evaluate risks, Handmer and Dovers (2007: 83) offer the following 
insight,  
 
…it is useful to examine risk using multiple framings. Recognizing and applying different 
perspectives will highlight where important issues may lie and who stands to lose from 
different policies. But this may be difficult to do because some of the drivers of problem 
framing are fundamental to society and it can be difficult to step outside dominant 
institutional or disciplinary ways of thinking. Of course, this raises the issue as to who 
frames problems and why. Any stakeholder can frame or reframe the problem; but some 
are more influential. The media are powerful problem framers in most policy arenas; they 
may lead or often follow framing by political leaders, commerce may frame problems to 
their advantage, and so on. Framing can occur at a number of levels from the generic to 
policy dealing with a single hazard.  
 
Hence, it is apparent that if adapted to the case of Japan‟s state, media and other 
commercial interests – the generic hazard being North Korea and single hazards amounting 
to issues such as abductions, nuclear proliferation and missile development etc. – that the 
above forms a very pertinent theoretical conception, necessitating consideration and 
application for the research undertaken in this dissertation.55 
 
     In essence, then, the risk literature provides a great deal of tangible insight into how risk 
can be understood and re-evaluated as a shifting social construction with broad-ranging 
political malleability that is applicable, potentially, to a vast array of interactive issues. They 
                                                          
55 Although Handmer and Dovers are primarily discussing theories of risk applied to policies for disasters and   
    emergencies at the domestic or civil level, much of the following dissertation is focussed on assessing   
    how North Korea has been,  or is being, framed in those terms, as a risk-calculable hazard. As such, it is  
claimed that the cross-application of constructive theoretical ideas akin to the above is invaluable, indeed  
necessary, in order to gain maximum practical fruition from the empirical research.  
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include those of interstate security concerns, which are open to state-societal-level 
mediation – facilitating the recalibration of such risks. In this sense, risk is distinct from 
concepts such as danger, threat and uncertainty per se, but is also able to transform the 
discourse connected to those conceptions into transitive, future-oriented issues,56 which 
allocate responsibility to a given set of actors, who are required to make appropriate 
responsive decisions. Amid this, in the case of Japan‟s framing of and responses to North 
Korea, such decisions are being taken within the context of a post-bubble society, which has 
been highly sensitized at state, institutional and individual levels, to the perception of salient 
external risks.57 
 
1.6. IR –v– domestic politics: risk and critical writings on Japan’s state policies   
A great deal of literature on Japan‟s international relations has contained sections or   
chapters that deal with the issues of North Korea policy. However, very little work has 
offered a comprehensive overview and detailed analysis with both full descriptive and 
prescriptive elements. This is particularly so in terms of analyses which integrate both 
domestic and international elements. In contradiction to this trend, however, Gavan 
McCormack (2007) provides an impressively well-formulated and comprehensive 
perspective with which to address the topic. Moreover, McCormack offers a distinct position 
on the key issues at hand by extending beyond the much-covered rhetoric of Japan‟s threat 
inflation and creation of fear vis-à-vis the DPRK to expose the instrumental role that the US 
                                                          
56 The idea of a future oriented, transitive understanding and application of risk (as a form of anticipation) was  
     discussed at the symposium on Risk in East Asia, JDZB, Berlin (17-20 November 2009) in response to a  
     presentation given by Ulrich Beck, entitled “World Risk Society: The Cosmopolitan Turn”. 
57 There are a wide range of phenomena through which Japan has become a so-called risk society, from state  
     to individual levels, which span almost the entirety of social science disciplines – as discussed at the above  
     conference by scholars such as Hanns Günther Hilpert, Itō Midori, Osawa Mari, Ogawa Akihiro, Suzuki  
     Munenori, Takeda Hiroko, and Werner Pascha. Elements of these diverse areas are well combined  
     and outlined by Yui Kiyomitsu through his Japan case-study of what he terms “multiple reflexive   
     modernities under glocalization”. For further discussion, see Yui (2009). 
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has played in shaping Japan‟s North Korea policies and media depiction of Pyongyang. The 
implication is that the US, particularly unscrupulously under the Bush administration, has 
used a combination of political intervention, military posturing, and ideological propaganda to 
create a regional environment within which Japanese efforts to normalize relations with 
Pyongyang and mellow public opinion towards the DPRK are scuppered (2007: 94-115). The 
culmination of these pressures, stemming primarily from the US it is claimed, leads to Japan 
repeating a self-perpetuating (i.e. seized upon and whipped-up by mass-media and 
individual politicians) process of negatively framing North Korea in a one sided 
disproportionate manner, exacerbated by political and public inertia. The result is that, “North 
Korea exercises a powerful hold over the Japanese imagination, but the shadow that it casts 
is disproportionate to the reality” (2007: 95).58 However, although McCormack is 
impressively rigorous in exposing how both the US and Japanese governments have, and at 
times in combination, calculatedly manipulated information in order to frame Pyongyang as a 
dangerous “evil”, due to his highly anti-US neoconservative stance, the entire piece reads as 
a critique of the American neoliberal agenda and its negative influence over Japan – thus 
relegating the specifics of Japan‟s North Korea policy to a function of that process. It is, as 
such, necessary to be wary of analyses (while, of course, noting areas of empirical value 
which they may hold) that explain away too much of Japan‟s state, market and society 
agencies under the uniform label of beiatsu.59 
 
    In this respect, Wada Haruki (2003) is more critical of the Japanese government, domestic 
media and political apparatus in their own right, in terms of identifying how, following a 
perceived genuine opportunity to recalibrate risks in relation to North Korea more positively 
                                                          
58  For discussion of how the US has since also redirected Japanese policies, in line with its own changing  
strategic needs, and in counter to the emphasis upon the abductions issue which has influenced the  
particularly hard-line applied by Tokyo against Pyongyang, see McCormack (2009: 259-66). 
59 Likewise, however, one must not underestimate the causal power of beiatsu as at least an agent in almost  
     all aspects of Japan’s state-level policy formation. As Ronald Dore succinctly puts it, “…all questions of    
     Japanese foreign policy are referred back to one central, axial criterion: what would be the effect on Japan’s  
     alliance with the United States” – Dore (1997: XX).  
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after Koizumi‟s 2002 summit meeting with Kim Jong-Il, the chance was both lost and 
relations dangerously restructured around the negative framing of Pyongyang.60 Wada 
specifies Abe Shinzō‟s confrontational attitude, moulded by public support for a tough stance 
on North Korea following the admission that a number of abductees had been taken and 
eight of the thirteen had died, as a key factor in fusing civil society and the state to combine 
in framing the DPRK negatively.61 Moreover, he establishes how, while premier, Fukuda 
Yasuo had, once again attempted to soften relations with Pyongyang, his resignation and 
the appointment of Asō Tarō again dashed hopes of improving how North Korea was 
publically and politically framed (Wada, 2009). This was predominantly because, once again, 
Asō and the LDP were entrenched in domestic troubles, and sought to garner support in the 
public sphere by taking a tough line, recalibrating the perception of risks attached to DPRK 
issues, and distracting attention from pressing domestic concerns. In terms of the processes 
of risk recalibration in response to the DPRK, then, Wada‟s analysis only provides a clear 
illumination of how risks have been unevenly divided between the various North Korean 
issues, with political leaders mediating risk through an inflated appraisal of the abduction 
issue. His assertions, in essence, do not establish a deliberate strategy, the like of which is 
postulated by Samuels (2007), but rather convey a lack of awareness and competence on 
the part of leading political figures within Japan‟s policy elite, an inference that domestic 
interparty infighting has taken precedence over national interest, and a sense that the 
abduction issue has been used as a political pawn, which exerts a disproportionate influence 
                                                          
60 Koizumi suffered a blow to his popularity, and required some form of diversion from domestic criticism,    
     following his sacking of former foreign secretary, Tanaka Makiko. Hence, he seized upon public sensitivity to   
     the abductions issue, and the prominence of concerns directed at the DPRK. By making a historic visit to  
     Pyongyang in 2002, receiving an oral apology from Kim Jong-Il, and securing the return of abductees and the  
     Pyongyang Declaration, he was seen not only to have scored a major foreign policy success for Japan, but  
     also served his own political interests. Moreover, his particular means of doing so would not have been  
     possible without the existence of a North Korea phenomenon in Japan, and the ability to convince the  
     relevant sectors of the state, market and society of its seriousness. However, the exercise ultimately  
     back-fired in terms of normalization with the DPRK, due to outrage over Kim’s admission of abductions. 
61 For specific criticism of Abe’s domestic and international policy stance in relation to the DPRK, see Umeda  
(2007: 155-75). 
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due to its sensationalized public appeal (Wada, 2003). Hence, while indirectly providing 
excellent accounts of how the political elite compete over the manner in which risk is 
calibrated domestically and nationally for their own or grander aims, both Wada and 
Samuels, despite their diverse perspectives, seem to have paid little attention to the broader 
processes by which risk has been recalibrated by a combined (compounded) framing of the 
DPRK as a national phenomenon located beyond purely political circles. In essence, 
whether tackled from an IR or domestic political perspective, a not fully explained tension 
remains over how risks framed against North Korea are constructed between the state, 
market and society.      
 
    In terms of prescriptions for responding to such risks, and the tension between structural 
changes to the post-Cold War regional environment and domestically driven agendas, Ono 
Naoki (2011) unpacks the theory, akin to that of Berger et al. (2007), that Japan‟s policy 
trajectory vis-à-vis the DPRK has essentially been adaptive – based on whether the 
calibration of risks warrants the categorization of domestic crises or not. In this sense, Ono 
(2011: 204-31) argues that regional dynamics and US-led gaiatsu have had an impact upon 
how risks, such as those assigned to North Korea, have been recalibrated, but that 
responses have been minimalized in keeping with Japan‟s domestic political processes. 
Therein, he posits that, in line with Japan‟s existing security policy structures, revisions have 
only taken place in as much as leading political actors within Japan have been forced to 
internalize such concerns in legalized form, such as those set out in the new US-Japan 
security guidelines of the 1990s, to avert domestically untenable situations. However, 
despite Ono‟s convincing arguments regarding Japan‟s deviance from what could be 
considered rational choices, based on a neo-realist account of external factors, his analysis 
relies heavily upon the ascription of causality to Japan‟s internal political structures in 
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themselves.62 In this sense, further explanation of how media, other market, and societal 
actors have interacted – through their framing of the DPRK – to impinge upon how the state 
has recalibrated the various associated risks, is required. In addition, although limited in 
scope, Akaha Tsuneo (2007) provides an astute historical evaluation of both why Japan‟s 
policies toward the DPRK are manifest in their present form, and what could and should be 
done to improve them – outlined along familiar neo-liberal lines. Akaha‟s central claims are 
his assertions that contrary to the demonized image of the regime in Pyongyang (as framed 
by Japan‟s mass media for instance) Japan‟s political elite, in the majority at least, desire 
normalization of relations with the DPRK and, moreover, that the primary stumbling block to 
this being realized is, once again, the abduction issue, which needs to be downplayed. 
Indeed, he states (2007: 297) that, 
 
  Japan must also demonstrate that it is willing to give priority to the issue of global 
significance, that is, the nuclear weapons development in North Korea, over the 
abduction issue if doing so will enhance the probability of success of the multilateral [six-
party] talks. 
 
    As such, Akaha advocates a combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches, within 
which he believes a globalistic mainstream in Japan‟s upper political and commercial circles 
can out-manoeuvre a hawkish right-wing minority that wish to see risks pertaining to the 
North Korean threats maximized to justify decisions taken towards more assertive security 
policies.  
 
    To this end, Akaha, in line with many policy analysts outside of Japan, seeks to assess 
the North Korean issues, in terms of Japan‟s risk-governance at least, in liberal-minded 
terms with a view to level headed (reisei-na), practical mitigation, ultimately involving the 
                                                          
62 Ono (2011: 207) asserts that, based on structural factors manifest in the external security environment –  
as derived from neo-realist theories, Japan should have revised Article 9 of its constitution, increased  
military spending and fundamentally reviewed and strengthened its security intelligence systems during  
the post-Cold War era.  
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wider international community to further Japan‟s national interests –v– the DPRK. However, 
there is an extensive body of texts, particularly those stemming from Japan and the Korean 
peninsula, but also from elsewhere, which take a more accusing, suspicious or defensive 
stance in their understanding of Japan‟s North Korea policy and its causal agents (Nishioka 
et al. (2005), Yoshida (2008), Lee (2009), Shigemura (2011)). As already noted, Japan‟s 
security policies and risk (re)calibrations at the international level have been closely (indeed 
inextricably) linked to US foreign policy interests in the region, and as such there are those 
(although variant, generally in concordance with McCormack‟s appraisal of Japan‟s DPRK 
policies) that see the high-calibration of risks and negative framing of North Korea as a 
function of Washington‟s agenda in exerting, at different times, external pressures on both 
Tokyo and Pyongyang.63 This has also been the object of suspicion regarding the conflation 
of issues, even including the abduction issue, as highlighted by Suh Dong-Man who insists 
(2004: 136), for example, that in early post-Cold War normalization talks between the DPRK 
and Japan, 
 
  Due to America, the North Korean nuclear issue was raised, and as a result the talks 
broke down. On the surface, a North Korean backlash against Japan raising the 
abduction issue was thought to be the cause, but one can be pretty sure that the 
fundamental reason for it was actually America‟s prerogative to establish a US dominated 
Korean peninsula.
64
       
 
                                                          
63 This strand of evaluation essentially depicts the US as an imperialist hegemonic power which seeks to  
     portray the East Asian states as incapable of dealing with their own regional security concerns, and hence  
     requiring an extensive US military presence to do so, which is then covertly used as means to maintain  
     geopolitical, ideological-cultural and economic regional dominance. The fundamentals of this thesis are  
     quintessentially expressed by Hirama and Sugita (2003: 89-99). Hirama and Sugita go on to accuse the US of  
applying  disproportionate and unwarrantedly excessive pressure on the DPRK, through bodies over which it  
exerts extensive influence, such as the IAEA and UNSC, in order to provoke retaliatory reactions from  
Pyongyang. The DPRK, despite its actual weakness and vulnerability (and at times even despite its  
conciliatory approach (2003: 96-98)), is then framed as a source of potentially huge – or “supersized”  
(Hughes, 2009a) – risks, which can only by countered by the maintenance of a large US military presence and  
increased pressure from the subordinated surrounding states, such as Japan and the ROK, who are in turn  
encouraged to inflate these risks, stalling the normalization process, and perpetuating a US-orchestrated  
regional status-quo.  
64 Translated from Suh (2004).  
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    This view is echoed by Byung Chul-Koh, who stresses that Japanese state-level 
negotiators should be aware of the pressure being put on their possible normalization 
process with Pyongyang by Japan‟s over-domineering ally, the US. Indeed, as Byung notes, 
Japan has been alerted to this issue by, among others, the North Koreans. As he discusses 
(2007: 256) with reference to the political negotiations in 2005, 
 
   [DPRK government negotiator], Song reminded Yamamoto that it was the US, not the 
North, that had erected a stumbling block to Six-party Talks; hence Japan should ask its 
US ally to remove it.
65 
   
However, as with Akaha, Byung recognizes that it is not simply a matter of US pressure 
single-handedly shaping Japan‟s North Korea policy, as he also identifies the abduction 
issue as an obvious stumbling block in this regard.66  Rather, he illuminates to just what 
extent US interests have taken advantage of powerful conservative elements within the 
domestic Japanese political elite in order to persuade Tokyo to identify the DPRK as a high-
risk entity in line with Washington‟s own budgetary concerns regarding “sharing the burden” 
in East Asian regional security efforts. In this sense, one can clearly observe how the 
abduction issue has indeed, perhaps predominantly or at least to a considerable extent, 
come to drive the process of risk recalibration through the negative framing of North Korea.67 
                                                          
65 Byung highlights how economic pressure on the North has been led by US freezing of remittances that   
    were then extended and facilitated by Japan – thus implicitly hinting, that the US would like Japan,    
      including even on issues such as abduction, to “make a fuss” over North Korea, because it allows them to  
apply pressure on Pyongyang less overtly, acting as an apparently moderating influence over Tokyo, while   
    simultaneously persuading the Japanese public and political elite that it needs to step-up efforts, and   
    military spending, directed at policing the North East Asia region – ultimately for the cause of meeting the  
    challenges of not just North Korea, but a more powerful China.   
66 The manner in which essentially separate concerns  have been conflated with the abduction issue within  
    Japan’s political elite in order to construct a kind of compounded super-risk, framed inside the single  
    heading of “North Korea”, can be seen in statements released from the Headquarters for the Abduction  
Issue (rachi mondai taisaku honbu, 2008). Although the original Headquarters was dissolved in October  
2009, it was immediately replaced, with an equivalent mandate and under the same name, by the incoming 
DPJ-led government.  
67 Survey results conducted over the six years from 2002-2007 show that those without a specific concern  
    regarding Japan’s relations with North Korea have dropped from an already low 4.9 per cent to just 3.2 per  
    cent while concerns over abductions, nuclear proliferation and missile threats have largely remained above  
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After all, in the early post-Cold War era, this is a process, which according to Wolf Mendl‟s 
analysis (1995: 72-5) previously caused deep divisions between the defence agency and 
those at the helm of the central political bureaucracy, such as former premier, Miyazawa, not 
least because civil society as a whole prioritized normalization with Pyongyang over the kind 
of public indignation depicted in today‟s mainstream Japanese press.68  
 
    Nevertheless, as Sakai Hidekazu (2001) has demonstrated, one should, once again, be 
wary of painting the Japanese policy elite as ultimately little more than powerless victims of 
US-lead gaiatsu  (external pressure). Although suspiciously contorted to instil a sense of 
Japanese guile in the face of challenging pressures applied by US brawn, Sakai‟s claim 
regarding Japan‟s motivations to resume its participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) programme, following suspension after the Taepodong 
missile incident of 1998 for instance, does present a convincing case study of how 
heightened risk perceptions and their mediation to the civil society have been combined with 
political pragmatism, which makes tactical use of gaiatsu, particularly US-led pressure 
(beiatsu). Sakai posits (2001: 69-72) that, the cabinet of former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and other important actors in the Japanese policy elite 
were content to use gaiatsu from the US and South Korea as an official reason to resume 
participation in the KEDO, because it allowed them to take a bold stance against what was a 
heightened sense of danger within the media and civil society towards Pyongyang, while 
providing a convenient get-out-clause that also allowed them to maintain Japan‟s economic, 
bilateral (with US, which assumes a global policing role) and regional developmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    85 per cent, 75 per cent and 55 per cent respectively, all showing an increase from the rates observed in    
    2002 (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2008). See also, Chapter 5, Figure 5.3. 
68 It is worth noting that although Mendl is a well-respected scholar of Japanese and East Asian affairs, his   
    fundamental prioritizing of unification issues in predicting the shape of Japan’s Korean Peninsula  
    policies in the early 21
st
 Century has not come to fruition. However, his analysis of US influence over Japan’s  
    state policy does offer a sound theoretical basis for understanding areas of the empirically testable elements  
    of how Japan’s risk recalibration vis-à-vis the DPRK has been driven since the end of the Cold War.     
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norms.69 As examined in the following section, this process of ratcheted-up risks, combined 
with pragmatic policy in response to the DPRK appears to be consistent with Japan‟s on-
going construction of national and international norms at the state-political level, which 
include facilitating Japan‟s transformation towards becoming a “normal power”. Once again, 
however, they as yet do not fully account for how the processes of interaction between state, 
market and society facilitate the exact composition and expression of associated socio-
political risks. 
  
    These kinds of national political trajectories, and the manner in which risks associated 
with them are calibrated, can also be seen through the lens of identity. Although not 
identifying the re-calibration and mediation of risk per se, the process by which danger and 
uncertainty have been attached and postulated, through the medium of identity, in 
pertinence to the DPRK, particularly following changes in the regional security dynamics of 
the post-Cold War world, are well exposed by Bhubhindar Singh. In root cause of this 
process, he claims that,  
 
  Despite the presence of competing threat construction processes, it is important to note 
that all members within the security policy-making elite support Japan‟s move away from 
the peace-state identity and the continued strengthening/expansion of the international-
state security identity (2006: 106). 
 
   Such perspectives, as he points out, are in line with Japan‟s grander normative goals of 
normalization and extended regional influence. Moreover, crucially, Singh examines how, 
during the 1994 nuclear crises, Japan‟s policy elite was able to convince the media and 
other commercial interests, as well as civil society that North Korea presents a genuine 
security threat that must be countered long-term, while for a number of practical domestic 
                                                          
69 The topic of Japan’s willingness to tactically bend to beiatsu in order to further the norm of bilateralism and  
      US-lead security in North East Asia is also discussed by Miyashita (2001).  
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and military-logistical reasons did not perceive the situation as an actual crisis (2006: 198-
201).  
 
   For Singh, there appears to be a consistent constructivist agenda, linked to Japan‟s more 
assertive, yet (though once again not explicitly stated) risk-oriented post-Cold War identity at 
work, which perpetuates a process of constructing identity threatening crises, followed by 
strong responses, evoking Japan‟s vulnerability, and justifying reformatory countermeasures. 
This, he argues (2006: 108-09), serves the goal of, 
 
   ...working towards creating a security environment that conforms to [a] positive 
representation [of Japan‟s identity, intersubjectively constructed in relation to other 
states] as a constitutive member of the regional and international security environment.  
             
 
    Indeed, in terms of understanding how the processes that the literature above points to 
(regardless of the actual increased military or logistic capabilities of Pyongyang, less 
covered by Singh) by way of the construction of higher risk calibrations (Jinbo, 2009) the 
issue of Japan‟s constructed and contested identity appears to be of considerable 
significance,70 Furthermore, in this respect, it is noteworthy that despite the remaining five of 
the six parties all being more economically and (given the US‟s logistic support for Japan 
and South Korea) militarily powerful than the comparatively weak North, and making similar 
noises regarding normalization and de-nuclearization of the peninsula,71 it seems that Japan 
is probably more prominent in this process of identity-based risk recalibration than any of her 
regional and global contemporaries,72 In that sense, then, although for this dissertation 
Singh‟s analysis is lacking a concrete explanation of important recent events such as 
Japan‟s responses to the latest round of North Korean missile and nuclear tests and 
                                                          
70 For expert analysis of North Korea’s realistic military capabilities and options, see Masaki (1995: 365-425),  
Ogawa and Sakamoto (2007: 11-78). 
71 Referring here to the members of the Six Party Talks (Japan, US, China, South Korea, North Korea, Russia). 
72 For a related text in Japanese, see Jinbo (2009). 
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inconsistencies over the abduction issues, it functions as a persuasive introduction as to how 
identity may feature as a key component for better understanding the processes by which 
risks are framed and perceived. 
 
1.7. North Korea in Japan’s public sphere 
As the literature thus far has corroborated, public spheres intersecting civil society and the 
market (including media and academic discourse) and their relationship to domestic and 
international politics are of considerable significance to an explanation of how processes 
such as the construction and calibration of risk are manifested at the state level. Writings 
and commentaries from, and upon, what might be termed the public debate in Japan, and 
media attention devoted to Japanese concerns stemming from Pyongyang are, therefore, of 
crucial importance to understanding how Japan has recalibrated risk in response to North 
Korea. Not least, this is so because they offer an obvious temporal barometer; and because 
such channels of discourse evidently reflect, drive, and are driven (reflexively) by the elite 
political thinking of the time, which ultimately facilitates the formulation and implementation 
of policy directives.  
    Whether, however, deliberately incorporated into policy or obliviously (or at least 
unconsciously) consumed and affected by it, much of the politicizing in Japan‟s responses to 
North Korea stems from processes and forces identified by the IR theories discussed above. 
Nevertheless, they increasingly require an interpretation of how those forces embrace risk, in 
order to more accurately and incisively explain them. Indeed, forthwith, in terms of 
understanding how risk is mediated between the state, market and civil society, such is 
deemed of sufficient importance to dedicate considerable weighting within each case study 
chapter of the dissertation to the study of media sources. However, prior to the systematic 
analysis of that primary data, it is necessary to grasp some kind of broad sample 
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understanding, or rough sketch, of some of the key literary sources from the public sphere, 
which evince an altered stance in the post-Cold War era, particularly in terms of transforming 
nationally ascribed policies and norms related to how Japan calibrates risks associated with 
the DPRK.  
    As noted above, Japan‟s responses to North Korea have shifted over time, particularly 
following the end of the Cold War, and again somewhat after the 9/11 attacks, as well as 
being consistently affected (fluctuating) in the face of domestic leadership changes. These 
changes are usually framed in relation to key events relating to the core issues of missile 
launches, nuclear proliferation, marine intrusions, and abductions. There appear to be 
various interactive (socio-political, geo-political and politico-economic) phenomena at work 
amongst these processes of change, and although the overall perceived risk levels have 
been raised, it is by no means a steady or even process. Within this, one intriguing element 
of such a process is the apparent shift in the distance at which North Korea is framed in 
relation to Japan, in terms of how the risks of potential direct conflict with Pyongyang are 
delineated. In other words, how far Japan is seen to lie from engagement with North Korea 
has not remained constant. Examples of this can be seen in debates and commentaries on 
Pyongyang‟s manoeuvring. Such was highlighted in an on-going discussion forum 
conducted in the Japanese foreign affairs periodical, Gaikō Fōramu. For instance, in the 
September 1999 issue, during a discussion held between a high-ranking MOFA official 
(Sasae Kenichirō (moderator)), Okonogi Masao (renowned North Korea expert), Shigemura 
Toshimitsu (North Korea specialist and then editor of the Mainichi Shimbun) and Komaki 
Teruo (an expert in East Asian affairs from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 
it is stated that one of North Korea‟s primary concerns is to improve relations with the US in 
order to begin a normalization process with Japan, that would facilitate economic aid to the 
North (Okonogi, 1999: 27). Indeed, all discussion of weapons and nuclear armaments are in 
relation to such a strategy. Hence, there is a sense of a perceived indirectness concerning 
the connection between Pyongyang‟s actions and the Japanese state. This changed 
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dramatically with the commencement of Koizumi Junichirō‟s term as leader, and his historic 
visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. In response, Gaikō Fōramu published an article 
expressing how Japan‟s relations with North Korea were the key to improving DPRK-US 
relations and regional stability (Hiramatsu, 2002: 25), suggesting a much greater proximity 
between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Despite the raising of the stated core issues of Japanese 
concern being present in both editions, the framing of North Korea as a greater element of 
concern within the public sphere in Japan under the Koizumi administration is reflected by 
this subtle redressing of how the Japan-DPRK relationship is expressed.73 Furthermore, by 
2003 the journal was publishing articles which suggested a far more obvious recalibration of 
risk in response to the DPRK, such as that posted by former State Department North Korea 
Desk Officer, Kenneth C. Quinones, who warned that Pyongyang‟s “…large arsenal of 
reliable, medium-range ballistic missiles could strike anywhere in Japan” (2003: 38), and 
claimed that a crisis that posed serious potential harms to Japan and regional security was 
looming (2003: 32-4). Needless to say, although not all as concrete as that observed in 
Gaikō Fōramu, this shift in the appraisal of Tokyo‟s responses to North Korea, and 
comprehension of the associated risks, appears as a trend in a variety of leading journals 
and literature.74   
    Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the post-spy-ship incursion and multiple-missile launch 
era of Koizumi,75 76 military beefing-up, by way of BMD systems and such like, has 
                                                          
73 Therein, abduction, nuclear proliferation, missile, and commercial/criminal issues all being perceived as  
 posing risks to Japan which result directly from North Korean action. 
74 Specific demonization of current North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il within recent Japanese literature, as a   
     function of this process, is particularly notable. For instance, searches of leading publishers and bookshop  
     websites using the Japanese characters for “Kim Jong-Il” locate over 200 titles, the majority of which are  
     highly negative, derogatory or fear-provoking from the outset, see also Chapter 4, Section 4.8. 
75 For a full description of the Spy-Ship incidents and the means by which they were used, in particular by the  
    Koizumi administration, in a temporal context to raise perceived risk levels against the DPRK and enact a    
    more assertive maritime and coastguard defence strategy, see Black (2006).  
76  i.e., as of post-1998, following satellite and Taepodong launches which took place five years after the initial  
     Nodong missile test of 1993, and within a climate of increasingly consistent negative framing of the DPRK  
 within the public sphere.  
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increasingly and predominantly been discussed in terms of Japan acquiring necessary 
defensive capabilities and enacting normalization (of the state) to deal proactively and 
responsibly with risks posed by Pyongyang.77 Such public discourse is clearly distinct from 
that present prior to North Korea‟s missile launch in 1998.  As discussed further in Chapter 3, 
although risks began, in a limited fashion, to become more extensively framed against the 
DPRK after the initial Nodong test of 1993 and nuclear crisis of 1993-4, sentiments such as 
those posited in the LDP‟s in-house journal, Jiyū, for example, which express as much 
concern for former Prime Minister Hashimoto‟s willingness to bow to US external pressure 
and take more responsibility for East Asian military security as it does for the potential harms 
that might be exacted upon Japan by the North Korean regime (Ishihara , 1997: 76-9), were, 
it seems, of greater prominence within political academia, commercial media, and civil 
society.  
    However, it is obviously important when examining the role and influence of actors, such 
as media and prominent strands of academic discourse, in the processes of risk recalibration 
not to over simplify or misconstrue what is meant by the public sphere. This is not a single 
organism or even necessarily a loose affiliation of actors. Indeed, it goes without saying that, 
particularly across the academic disciplines, opinions on the understanding of, and 
appropriate policy responses to, risks arising from actions by the DPRK which are perceived 
to be directed at Japan have doubtless always been utterly divided.78 However, a process or 
processes, such as that expressed by Son Key-Young‟s conception of an “invention of fear”, 
appear to have been incrementally affected, whereby (2008: 6) the totalled balance is shifted 
into a position within which “totally new discourses [can be] empowered” (i.e., repositioning 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
77 This kind of discourse is often represented by the advocating of an inclusive (hōkatsuteki) or composite  
(fukugōteki) strategy employed with renewed urgency in response to potentially escalating risks attached  
to the DPRK, as outlined by panellists (Katayama Masaichi, Michishita Narushige, Masuda Masayuki and  
      Gerald Curtis) at the Tokyo Foundation (2009).    
78 For an example of prominent journal discussion, including academics, politicians and journalists criticizing  
     confrontational state posture and over-calibration of risks framed against North Korea, see Wada,   
     Iwakuni, and Aoki et al. (2008: 122-186). 
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of conceptual boundaries in the form of recalibrated agendas). Moreover, they are 
empowered in no small measure through the constructions and conceptions of risk which 
they contain, and, therein, the mediation of it. Hence, it is necessary to explore how such 
discourses are expressed when cutting across multiple political, civil society and media 
spheres, and to assess their temporal weight of influence. This can at least partially be 
achieved through examination of the specific responses which they continue to stimulate and 
reflect in the public sphere.  
 
1.8. Summary: the necessity of risk as a supplement to the literature 
It is clear, then, from the above examination of relevant literature, that risk, specifically in its 
socio-politically constructed and publicly actualized form, is an integral element of how 
Japan responds at the level of bilateral relations to movements from North Korea. Indeed, 
although demonstrating implicit recognition of such, and offering partially applicable 
theoretical tools by which these processes can be empirically tested, none of the major 
strands of IR literature provides an entirely satisfactory explanation or analysis of how Japan 
has recalibrated and mediated risk through its framing of North Korea. Realist perspectives 
fail to fully develop how risk is manifest within domestic interactions between the state, 
market and society. The liberal-oriented viewpoints struggle to deliver a satisfactory account 
for why Japan lacks a whole-hearted pursuit of an economically focussed engagement 
strategy with Pyongyang, and are ill-adapted to explain the apparently complex process by 
which competing elements of the state, market and society have resulted in an increasingly 
high-calibration of risk construction in response to the DPRK.79 Moreover, although subtle 
shifts in ideology and governmental norms, towards a risk society in Japan, can perhaps 
                                                          
79 Although focussed on the US, UK and Australia, an excellent example of such an ideological shift of risk,  
     described as, “a disturbing shift from the dominance of the Enlightenment idea of trusting in science and    
       knowledge to accepting a post-Enlightenment idea that authority and ideology are all that can ever  
 underpin the assessment of abstract risk” is provided Handmer and James (2007: 120-30). 
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best be addressed by constructivist theories of the state, the degree to which the specifics of 
how risk has been present, indeed integral, within this process is given scant scholarly 
attention (in terms of explicit application), by many of its leading theorists. 
    It is, then, the goal of this dissertation to adapt and supplement the above theories and 
their derivatives so that they better fill such a literary gap. To this end, the risk literature, by 
way of its concentrated focus on the effects and governance of radicalized risks, offers a 
potential means by which to engage with and expand upon a combination of contemporary 
IR theories and those of domestic politics, in order to more comprehensively research how 
seemingly complex socio-political processes at the national level, such as those manifest in 
Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea, can best be tackled and unravelled.  
    Ultimately, therefore, this understanding of the extant literature and its limitations, 
promises to provide a starting point from which to develop the framework for synthesizing a 
theoretical super-tool (or super-theory) with which to unscramble the puzzles left by these 
literary cavities and their inconsistencies. Therein, the task of identifying how such a 
theoretical framework can be constructed and methodologically applied to the job of 
empirical analysis, conducted on the results of data assimilated from research carried out 
into specific case studies (as stated above), is assigned to the following chapter.80 It is 
argued that only via such a process of theoretical refinement, and its targeted pursuit 
through rigorous empirical research and analysis, can a more in-depth understanding of how 
Japan has recalibrated risk in response to North Korea be credibly established. 
 
                                                          
80 For this dissertation, Japan’s policy making elites, mass media and other commercial stakeholders, and  
particular societal stakeholders (such as resident Koreans) have been identified as key actors in terms of  
providing a means to elucidate the interactive processes of framing and risk recalibration addressed.  
However, the specific case studies utilized for this purpose should not be considered an exhaustive or  
exclusive data-set for such analyses.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework: combining risk and 
constructivism in a case study research design  
“And so, my fellow theorists; ask not what risk can do for theory,  
ask what theory can do for the greater cogitation of risk” 
Adapted by the author from John F. Kennedy (20 January 1961)81 
2.1. Outline of the methodological approach and research design 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 ~ Section 1.4, the methodological approach adopted 
in this dissertation is that of targeted case-studies, which adopt mixed-method analyses 
based on a research strategy combining quantitative and qualitative data collection. Data are 
primarily sourced from three intersecting areas representative of the state, market and 
society in Japan.82 This chapter outlines how, in light of the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, 
data sources which express these constitutive elements can be effectively accessed and 
analysed. It then examines how the resulting phenomena can be understood theoretically, in 
terms of an interactive process which results in the creation and implementation of a given 
set of policies at the national level in Japan. Specifically, this includes those targeted at, or 
utilizing the framing of, North Korea during the post-Cold War era. The recalibration of risk 
(justified and facilitated via an external framing) is integral to this process and is examined in 
                                                          
81 The adapted section of Kennedy’s original speech read as, “And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your     
    country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country”. The quote is contextualized here as  
    representative of how IR theories and theorists oftentimes assume that non-conventional approaches to  
    analysis should be required to prove their functionality in terms of providing a contribution to established  
    theoretical models – i.e., as opposed to demanding that their existing theories contain the capacity to  
    contribute towards a wide range of analytical approaches to interdisciplinary research questions. This is  
    particularly pertinent to those which are highly contingent upon the application and (re)calibration of risk.   
82
 
These primarily, though not exclusively, focus on Diet minutes and government reports and papers, leading 
newspaper coverage and large-scale domestic and international business interests (Nippon Keidanren, 
Japanese defense industry, US defense industry, commercial media interests etc.), and opinion polls and 
targeted interview data (though mass media sources intersect each of the three sectors). For further 
explanation of data sources, see Section 2.3, below. 
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terms of being the function of a historically recurrent process which can best be understood 
within a constructivist theoretical framework that utilizes a redefined, contemporary, 
conception and application of risk.  
Further, the ontology and epistemology of the theoretical framework outlined below is 
developed along constructivist lines. This is based on an understanding of agents acting 
within the bounds of constructed norms associated with Japan‟s identity. Within this, such 
norms are shown to be profoundly affected by recalibrations of risk realized in relation to 
each of the contemporary case study events analysed in Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5. The 
specifics of such affects and the delineation of norms are discussed further in Section 2.12 
and Section 2.14, below, but it is first necessary to establish the suitability, efficacy and 
applicability of the methodology to be adopted. This chapter, therein, introduces a variety of 
historical and methodological aspects which are deployed in combination to facilitate a 
theoretical approach based, primarily, upon conceptions of constructivism and risk which 
offer the most effective means by which to explain Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response 
to North Korea.   
    In order to apply such a methodology effectively, aspects of longitudinal and comparative 
research designs are employed throughout the dissertation as a means by which to aid the 
analysis of dependent variables, including those of policy trajectory and national norms. 
These are measured against a succession of intersecting independent variables manifest in 
the (North Korea-related) post-Cold War case studies examined in the chapters below. The 
core of the research design, therein, adopts an events-based model, in terms of its case-
study analyses of a series of related events and issues – central to Japan‟s framing of the 
DPRK and the resulting mediation and recalibration of risk. The prioritizing of this approach 
is justified in light of its ability to offer a coherent method for temporal investigation, which 
provides a range of insights and theoretical development within one concise framework. An 
events-based case study research design, therefore, supplies the most productive tool with 
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which to examine relevant data sets and samples, and to make them readily accessible to 
further research and supplementation. Moreover, it is particularly applicable as a method for 
analysing data used to explain dynamic phenomena which intersect a myriad of fluid, 
interactive, socio-political spheres and processes influenced by a multitude of individual and 
organizational actors. Specifically, such an approach can be applied to the dissemination of 
media coverage relating to particular on-going issues (Bryman, 2008: 53), the specific 
agendas of a given political elite, and the prevailing trajectories of civil and commercial 
stakeholders – such as those most centrally involved in Japan‟s responses (mediated 
through the public sphere) to the DPRK.83  
The specific qualitative and quantitative methods, and systems for data analysis, 
employed in each of the case studies are examined in further detail in Section 2.3 and 
Section 2.4, below, and the primary means of application for key data sources are grouped 
and expressed in Table 2.1. Preceding that, the following section briefly outlines the 
cognitive and normative rationale behind sampling techniques and data sets used to 
facilitate the empirical research presented in later chapters – based on the theoretical 
framework constructed in the latter half of this chapter. The central concept for this approach 
is also expressed crudely in the schematic model shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.2. Observational –v– experimental approaches 
As stated in Section 0.1 of the Introduction to this dissertation, its aim is to explore and re-
evaluate complex processes that explain Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea. However, in terms of a scientific methodology which can hope to achieve such a goal, 
there are obvious areas, such as the relative causal influence of the case studies researched 
                                                          
83 Bryman’s methodologies are primarily concerned with domestic and transnational social research  
     projects,  rather than IR theory per se. However, the models he adopts for data collection and  
     analysis are rigorously devised to incorporate a wide range of variables and are clearly adaptable  
     to analyses of actors which influence national policy trajectories, such as those addressed here.  
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in the chapters that follow, which are not amenable to objective evaluation through 
conventional experimental means. In order to overcome this, however, a schematic system, 
as outlined in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, below, of quantitative data sources, designed 
primarily to observe shifts in the volume of Japan‟s negative framing of North Korea in the 
public sphere during the post-Cold War era, has been employed. This is also demonstrated 
by Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5. Though crude in its design, such an approach allows an 
approximate tangible measure of risk recalibration to be made, which in turn provides 
evidence to support a more detailed qualitative assessment of the relative interactive factors 
involved within that process. It is thereby possible to more informatively discuss the 
phenomena of the DPRKs framing, and responses to it from within Japan, in terms of the 
causal weight applied to the process by various actors. In this sense, a fundamentally 
observational, as opposed to experimental, approach has been adopted. This means, 
unavoidably, that pronouncements made in conclusion contain an element of tentativeness 
(Kellstedt and Whitten, 2009: 83), but this is more than compensated for by the insights 
which can be generated from a more flexible and theoretically innovative approach. A hybrid 
methodology is also deemed necessary in order to effectively compare state, societal and 
market elements, due to each of the case studies being essentially divided into these three 
core, conceptually distinct, spatial sites (or sectors), and the focus being on a temporal shift 
mediated among them.84 Therefore, in addition to the methodological and theoretical tools 
outlined above, elements of time-series and cross-sectional analyses are also employed to 
                                                          
84  The term sectors, is applied here with reference to policy making elites, mass media sources, and civil    
society actors (stakeholders) as a means to facilitate the application of established modes of political science 
research methodology. In fact, however, it is the processes of interaction between these spatial areas, rather 
than the isolated (aggregation of) influences of their individual agency, that is of central concern. Hence, this 
understanding motivates the employment of a methodology which includes the synthesizing of constructivist 
theories with conceptions of spatially pervasive socio-politically constructed risk (see Section 2.13, below). 
Indeed, without reference to understandings of such concepts and their causal impact, any analysis of 
research data cannot hope to meaningfully or fully explain the processes at work therein. Moreover, the 
conceptualization of spatial sectors of analysis as being both socially constructed and heavily influenced by 
their relation to risk, potentially benefits the further analysis of a broad range of associated phenomena 
manifest in the study of international relations.     
61 
 
facilitate their empirical investigation.85 This allows each of the case studies to be tackled 
systematically in order to elucidate the specifics of contemporary shifts in risk recalibration, 
observable through their comparative examination.     
    In essence, because the phenomena being dealt with in relation to each of the case study 
events contain permeable and intersecting boundaries (Hook, 2011), delineated between the 
state, market and society, it is necessary to adopt an approach which provides maximum 
analytical flexibility in order to analyse them effectively. This is so even at the cost of 
sacrificing detailed empirical, particularly statistical, evaluation and accuracy in one specific 
area. The justification for such an approach is derived from the theoretical philosophy 
elaborated by David Williams (1996: 51-96), which argues against over-reliance upon 
Western positivism, particularly in political-science research on Japan.86 Nevertheless, 
despite its largely observational approach, this dissertation does attempt empirical analyses 
that utilize the established forms of political science methodology outlined above. This 
achieves an exposition of the processes involved in the observed phenomenon of Japan‟s 
recalibration of risk, framed against the DPRK, which produces a number of significant 
insights and conclusions. It is, however, argued that hypotheses and conclusions made in 
relation to the processes of national policy formation, and other state and non-state actors 
and structures in this sphere, cannot be reduced effectively into solely quantifiable causal 
units. Therefore, the rationale for adopting a predominantly observational approach stems 
from the contention that it offers the most productive means by which to illuminate the totality 
of broader structures, or zentaizu, underpinning Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to 
the DPRK. Furthermore, in this respect, observational analyses are more constructive than 
                                                          
85 Essentially, in terms of theoretical origin, this form of approach is also derivative of eclectic  
    approaches to IR issues in this area, e.g., see Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02), O’Shea (2012). 
86 William’s primary concerns with positivist-reliant methodologies (particularly sciencism) being adopted for  
   political science research on Japan are two-fold. In addition to the obvious concern of being weary of  
   Eurocentric approaches, he, more pertinently, notes the conflation of positivism with empiricism (1996: 60- 
   78), which, he argues, if left unchecked, can result in the total curtailment of meaningful research into the  
   agency and processes of political phenomenon. 
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those provided by an experimental approach, in terms of contributing to the development of 
risk-based approaches to political science and international relations studies as a whole.87 
Therein, an image (impression), supported by qualitative and quantitative evidence, of the 
processes most central to the temporal shifts in Japan‟s recalibration of risk vis-à-vis North 
Korea is expressed. This elucidates how risks attributed to the DPRK have been mediated 
between state, market and societal actors – and provides a theoretical and methodological 
basis for further analyses in this sphere. It is, however, beyond the remit of this dissertation 
to conduct a scientific experiment which expresses the totality of results gained from the 
research undertaken in explicitly positivist or quantifiably reducible terms.88 
 
2.3. Targeted data sampling: state, market and societal actors 
The data employed for analysis in this dissertation has been selected for the purpose of re-
examining and extending extant explanations of the processes which affect Japan‟s national 
responses and policies vis-à-vis North Korea. As such, the potential scope for sampling 
within each case study is vast. As a result, it is necessary to establish the significance levels 
for data according to each of the sampling methods used. These are generally set at an 
optimum, though arbitrary (Cramer and Bryman, 2005: 130) maximum, and are explained 
further in relation to the data used for each of the case studies examined in the chapters 
below.89 In addition, this dissertation maximizes the degree of qualitative interpretation and 
explanation through its targeted sampling of the relevant actors, organisations, and other 
                                                          
87 I.e, an observational approach to the study of risk recalibration offers a broader theoretical analysis, which 
has the potential to be adapted and applied to a variety of other cases studies dealt with in the fields of 
International Relations and Political Science.  
88 Regardless of the time and resources available, it is, indeed, highly doubtful that such an experiment would 
be possible within any of the established social science disciplines in their current forms; hence providing 
further justification for the use of an observational approach in this field. 
89  As stated by Cramer and Bryman, the significance level for the majority of established methods of social 
science research, such as random, stratified and cluster sampling etc., is oft-times decided on the basis of such 
criteria , and therefore has to be adapted selectively in relation to each case study analysis.  
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data sources which can be justified as warranting specific significance to each of the three 
case study areas.90  
   The epistemological basis for applying the sampling methods outlined below is dealt with 
fully in Section 2.6. However, it should be noted here that within these, the emphasis is 
placed on discourse analysis, in terms of assessing how each of the data sources intersect 
and represent influences upon national policy directives, and explain the effects of prevailing 
societal norms (or explain their formation and implementation). Moreover, despite a high 
degree of national specificity being assigned to data samples taken from the research results 
gathered in Japan, where possible reference is made to the potential for generalizing case 
studies to alternative examples. In addition, while broader international and regional 
comparisons are beyond the remit of this dissertation, the samples and justification for their 
usages are placed within a comparative historical context.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 It should be evident that such a common sense approach to analysis is based on previous  
   candidate samples, targeted by comparable or related political science research. 
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Figure 2.1. 
Core structure of research design for assessing influence of policy makers, media 
and other market actors, and civil society stakeholders in Japan upon the 
recalibration of risk vis-à-vis North Korea91                               
Source: author 
    Figure 2.1 represents a crude schematic image of how the core spheres of analysis 
intersect in influencing the processes of policy formation and national responses to North 
Korea. In order, however, to attempt an analysis of the interactive processes therein, it is 
                                                          
91 As stated in Section 0.2 of the Introduction, media sources, though expected to be more  
     extensively influenced by state and societal aspects than other significant market actors, are  
     nevertheless categorized as such within the above schematic, due to their overwhelming reliance  
     upon volume of sales, commercial enterprises, and  other sources of revenue in order to maintain    
     prominence and readership.   
Civil Society 
(Stakeholders, 
Korean community 
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necessary to estimate their form and weight of influence.92 Moreover, it is argued that while 
qualitative data provides the most illuminating results in terms of explaining interactions of 
this kind between the state, market and society, quantitative data collection is also required 
in order to provide a form of objective statistical support for conclusions which are reached 
through scrutinizing an extensive range of qualitative sources. This remains so regardless of 
the limitations to quantitative analysis outlined above. Indeed, the mixed-media methodology 
utilized for data collection in this dissertation, including comparative quantitative analyses, 
enables increased levels of accuracy in the evaluation of Japan‟s temporal shifts. 
Specifically, as expressed in Chapter 5, Section 5.6, and discussed further in the Conclusion 
(e.g., Chapter 6, Section 6.3), these serve to expose the manner in which responses to the 
DPRK have been altered to reflect a recalibration of risk – observed through the tangible 
transformation of how Pyongyang has been framed in each of these three areas.  
    In sum, a combination of sampling techniques and sample types are employed within the 
limited remit of this dissertation in order to facilitate the maximum significance level for data 
collection. These vary across the three central spheres of state, market and societal actors, 
though sources for data sampling are, where possible, replicated for each case study event 
– as discussed further in Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5.93 In addition, data sets are indexed in order 
to provide a means by which to compare those data sets and control for a range of variables 
and practical differences in data types. In terms of key data sources, Table 2.1, below, 
shows a breakdown of the various materials and sample types accessed for each of the 
case studies across the primary target spheres of analysis. 
                                                          
92  In this respect, the above model, while derivative of Shinoda’s circular (enban) model of foreign policy    
      formation (2006: 61 and 177), parts company with the aforementioned in terms of offering a    
      comprehensive re-evaluation of the interactive elements leading to a given policy directive or trajectory –   
      i.e., as opposed to assuming that a given set of actors represent the central core and others play   
      increasingly limited roles in influencing its creation and implementation.  
93  For instance, newspaper coverage and Diet minutes are compared in relation to each case  
  study event; whereas sources such as opinion polls, government ministry annual reports and  
  defence  guidelines are available only in relation to a limited section of the events covered.  
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Table 2.1.          Targeted data sources for the analysis of Japan’s recalibration of  
risk in response to North Korea94 
   
  Sample Type                                                           
Primary Actors (Target of Analysis) 
Policy Makers                  Mass Media/Market Civil Society 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
O O O 
Unstructured 
Interviews 
O O O 
Surveys/ 
Opinion Polls 
X O O 
Diet Minutes O X X 
Newspapers O O O 
T.V./Internet 
Sources 
O O O 
Magazines O O O 
  Source: author 
 
    Given the differences in context, extensive variations may be present in the specific form 
and, moreover, interpretation of data sets from within the same category of data listed in 
Table 2.1 (e.g. T.V./Internet Sources etc.) across each of the case studies. However, in each 
case such variations are explained and controlled for. The inability to conduct 
comprehensive linear and longitudinal analyses for all of the events covered does not, 
therefore, prevent both deductive and inductive analyses being undertaken, using a 
combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods listed above. Indeed, these provide 
the foundations for an informed interpretive evaluation and comparisons of each of the data 
samples.  
                                                          
94 Table 2.1 constitutes a non-exhaustive list of applicable data sources. These are subcategorized  
   within the analyses explicated throughout (see Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5). Other sources include:  
   academic presentations,  conference dialogues and press statements. 
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2.4. Quantifying the recalibration of risk: towards a mixed-method analysis model 
In terms, then, of analysing the precise structure of interactive processes intersecting the 
state, market and society – with respect to the significance of proliferating socio-political 
risks which operate on national and international levels – the advantages of qualitative 
approaches that evaluate specifics rather than solely calculating formulaic numerical values 
should already be apparent from the discussion above. Indeed, the most illuminative forms 
of qualitative data application are discussed in further detail below and are adopted 
consistently throughout the remaining chapters – based on the theoretical frame work 
outlined in the latter half of this chapter. Further, a high-degree of reliance upon qualitative 
methods is necessary in order to meaningfully explain the core puzzle of Japan‟s 
recalibration of risks through its framing of North Korea. Nevertheless, even the most 
enlightening of adapted theoretical approaches, applied through rigorous qualitative analysis, 
including the constructivist-derived theories employed below, contain constitutive building 
blocks which are in some ways rooted in quantifiable attributions.95 These are, therefore, 
recognized as being partially reducible to an estimation of calculable influences – 
presentable in schematic and statistical forms (e.g., see Chapter 5, Table 5.3 and Figure 5.5, 
and Chapter 6, Figure 6.1). This combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology can 
be, as Bryman (1988: 129) argues, particularly effective when attempting to research policy 
innovations, which are central to the case of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to 
North Korea. In essence, the persuasive strength of qualitative data sets expressing the 
processes outlined above is, therefore, enhanced in as much as it increases the capacity to 
                                                          
95 Material is used here not to mean physically present, but rather quantifiable in terms of weight of  
   influence. For instance, the influence of news media upon public, commercial and political opinion  
   in Japan, in terms of how it affects the internalized calibration of external risks, may not ultimately  
   be measurable in absolute terms, but it should be possible to estimate more accurately with the aid  
   of quantitative data – or at least such can be made use of to provide a more convincing qualitative  
   account.  
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confirm hypotheses and answer research questions in quantitative terms. In this sense, the 
mixed method analysis adopted in this dissertation contributes to the scientific pursuit, 
outlined by Jarvis and Griffiths, who ask, 
 Can meaningful data sets be generated that successfully correlate risk with structural 
features in the political composition and political practices of states, their institutions and 
the cultural or procedural norms that comprise their markets and social, political and 
juridical systems? (2007:18) 
 
    In answer to the above, Jarvis and Griffiths (2007: 19) note the applicable use of the 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) index. Indeed, the CIFP offers a valuable 
reference source from which to adapt the application of indexing to Japan‟s recalibration of 
risk in response to the DPRK.96  However, the CIFP and other comparable bodies of data 
generally attempt to assess risks in terms of the relationship between structural features of a 
given state and the risks they pose to other states or economically motivated investors. 
Conversely, the methodology employed in this dissertation hopes to facilitate both 
quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the interactive structural properties of Japan‟s 
state, market and society (examined via a series of case study events and issues), in terms 
of their cumulative relationship to risks perceived to be posed by North Korea.97 
 
    In order to tackle this task, a number of analytic techniques which provide a means to 
quantify risk in terms of its narrative properties have been employed. In the case of Japan, a 
                                                          
96 Created as a cooperation between the Canadian government and Carleton University, the CIFP is  
     an on-going project which attempts to engage with and more effectively prescribe policies for  
     “failed states”, based primarily on their internal structural features. As such, it employs a range of  
     quantitative methods applied through the “events-based information analysis”. Moreover, as  
     stated, the index “employs qualitative information, as a valuable complement to the systematic  
     collection of statistical data.” Arguing that, “when correctly structured, expert opinion can provide  
     the "why" behind the "what" revealed through structural and dynamic data analysis.” (CIFP, 2010).  
     It is this analytical goal and  methodology which provides the justification for a modified version of  
     such analysis being applied to the case study of risk recalibration in Japan’s relations with the  
     DPRK.  
97 For related data sets concerning how risks are associated with specific states and their internal  
     structural features, see, Aon Political Risk Map (2011), CIA World Fact Book (2010).  
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narrative has been constructed through the framing of North Korea, which can be delineated 
through a series of key events. Therein, while narrative analyses are typically associated 
with qualitative, oft-times biographical, data, the chapters below demonstrate that it is also 
possible to combine these with observational quantitative approaches, borrowing extensively 
from methods applied in the social and conventional sciences. As a result, a degree of 
empirical positivism, in terms of assigning definitive causal properties, has been sacrificed in 
order to produce a range of illuminative insights in conclusion. In this instance, these relate 
predominantly to the assessment of the relative influences of leading civil society, media, 
and policy making actors in Japan. Further, data relating the narrative of a post-Cold War 
events history – such as that leading to the recalibration of risk framed against the DPRK – 
has been “discretized” (Elliot, 2005: 83) for each event in order to reassess how to assign 
weight to each of the dependant variables. The quantitative breakdown of available data for 
each event can, therefore, be interpreted informatively, facilitating a meaningful evaluation of 
how the given variables intersect and interact in qualitative terms.98 In the cases examined in 
this dissertation, these elucidate the realization of processes of negative framing and risk 
recalibration vis-à-vis Pyongyang.  
 
In this sense, a combination of qualitative and quantitative data which relates how a 
narrative of risk is formed and mediated at state and societal levels can be highly illuminating 
in terms of deciphering how best to interpret the state‟s resulting interstate (international) 
relations, national policy formation, and implementation of risk-justified measures. In addition, 
Elliot‟s interpretation of “event history modeling” (2005: 77-9) has also been fruitfully adapted 
in the assessment of how Japan, as a state, maintains the civilian population as a “risk set” 
through a continual process of recalibrating risks via the framing of North Korea. Within this, 
a risk-set (i.e., as conceptualized within established methods of sociology) will often be 
expected to diminish as the risk of a particular event‟s occurrence lessens. However, by 
                                                          
98 This is primarily based on the content analysis of relevant discourse. 
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framing a series of actions and events associated with the DPRK, and particularly Kim Jong-
Il‟s regime in Pyongyang, as part of an on-going narrative of risk, it has been possible for the 
state, media and society – aided by additional market forces – to legitimate and reinforce the 
view of Japan as constituting a potentially indefinite risk-set.     
 
    This dissertation, as such, posits that Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea is well suited not only to qualitative interpretation, but can, without over reliance on 
positivism (or sciencism), also be quantitatively examined across each of the core sectors, 
through the series of case study analyses undertaken in Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5. Indeed, the 
adoption of such an approach, it is argued, is particularly effective in this case. This is also 
qualitatively verifiable and coherent because socio-political reaction to Pyongyang within 
Japan, and the subsequent recalibration of risks associated with the DPRK, has clearly 
taken place in the form of responses to a number of identifiable events – most notably those 
occurring in the context of a renewed dynamism in the East Asia region following the end of 
the Cold-war.99 Furthermore, these can be traced across each of the spatial sectors 
(including policy makers, media and other market actors, as well as those from civil society). 
 
    In addition to a series of missile tests, pivotal events and issues relating to this process 
include; nuclear proliferation issues, first brought to national pre-eminence during the nuclear 
crisis of 1994, on-going abduction cases, reaching fever-pitch after Koizumi‟s summit with 
Kim Jong-Il in 2002, and incursions into Japan‟s Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) by North 
Korean intruders, already noted in terms of striking shifts in risk-related responses to the 
spy-ship intrusions of 1999 and 2001 (Black, 2006). Detailed specifics of how each issue is 
quantifiably observed and evaluated in relation to each of the socio-political sectors identified 
above is explored in detail in the following chapters. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that 
                                                          
99  Put simply, the external risks posed to Japan are no longer as straightforward as those calibrated  
     against (or with reference to) the military might of the former Soviet Union vis-à-vis entrapment  
     or abandonment by the US. 
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data sets such as Diet minutes, extensive collections of news sources and opinion polls, and 
a variety of statements made in reference to and by stakeholders in the Korean community, 
in addition to those provided by a range of academic and other interviewees (see Appendix 
A), amount to key resources utilized in estimating the gravity and impact of given events in 
this process.100 
   Therein, largely through means of qualitative (abductive) reasoning, a set of hypotheses 
(see Introduction, Section 0.1) which tackle the complexity of the above variables as they 
shift through a temporal transition have been established. In addition, quantified data sets 
have been fruitfully utilized, assimilated from sources such as those outlined above, in order 
to deduce more specific relationships between the target actors and variables. Furthermore, 
the analysis contained within this dissertation aids substantially in deciphering the range and 
influence of those specifics. Indeed, these dictate the prevailing trajectory of Japan‟s risk 
recalibration in this area. Moreover, this form and volume of quantified assessment applied 
to the analysis of relevant samples, while not indisputably verifying or rejecting the proposed 
hypotheses in terms of definitive causal relationships, contributes significantly to the 
continuing acquisition of clues (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001: 61) which serve to build up a 
body of evidence from which to induce both descriptive and, where applicable, prescriptive 
conclusions that contain the greatest available degrees of explanatory objectivity possible.    
 
2.5. Normative and ethical considerations 
In light of the fact that the stated goals of maximum quantitative and qualitative objectivity, 
and subjective neutrality, have been maintained, the research methods adopted in the 
                                                          
100 The above is in no sense an exhaustive list, but rather specifies examples of the key data-sets  
    that are scrutinized through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.  
    Secondary literature sources are also employed widely throughout the dissertation, in addition to  
    public statements and a variety of other secondary data, such as those gathered selectively from  
    multiple online and electronic databases – as stipulated in Table 2.1, above. 
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analyses below contain few ethical pitfalls.101 However, while attempting to maintain 
neutrality, this dissertation does contain a flexible normative framework. Moreover, a number 
of ethical biases are unavoidably exposed by the position of the author. Within this, the 
research attempts to sustain a position which is both transparent to the reader, in terms of 
allowing access to new knowledge, and does not advocate a nationalist or ethnocentric 
standpoint. In spite of this academic position, however, it is conceded that, due to its partial 
reliance (despite extensive use of Japanese language sources) on English language-based 
literary debates, there is inevitably a bias towards understandings of socio-politically 
constructed risk and theories of International Relations based upon established Western 
academic traditions. Furthermore, because it is located within the normative frameworks of 
such disciplines, this dissertation aspires only to achieve a contribution towards the 
academic fields which it intersects, in terms of explaining the processes it analyses, and 
generating new and original knowledge.102     
 
    Nonetheless, the subject matter is such that there is a strong tendency, both within and 
outside of academia, not to maintain congruency with the principle of attempted neutrality. 
Indeed, as argued below (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6 and Section 1.7), mainstream 
academic and media debates within Japan have tended to deny the legitimacy of applying a 
standardized neutrality with regards to the DPRK. Specifically, in terms of the analysis of 
Japan‟s responses to North Korea, one such position – prominently visible in Japan – is 
quintessentially represented by Kawahito Hiroshi (2007), who is unrelentingly scathing, on 
ethical grounds, of highly acclaimed scholars such as (amongst others) Wada Haruki and 
Kan San-Jung, because, he contends, they act (and write) overwhelmingly out of their own 
                                                          
101 While total neutrality is evidently not entirely possible, emotional detachment is assumed as an  
     ethic of professionalism to be aspired to during data collection and analysis. 
102 Normative often has a broad and malleable definition within academic disciplines, but is used  
     here merely to refer to the stated goals of the research – in terms of contributing to knowledge  
     and aiding the facilitation of constructive policy formation and revision (or implementation).  
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academic self-interest, which, he argues, not only distorts how events are interpreted and 
analysed, but also obstructs and deviates public discourse away from pressing ethical issues, 
such as those attached to the Japanese abduction cases.103 104 
    In addition, depending upon the primary actors that are likely to make use of a dissertation 
which covers politically controversial or loaded subject matter, such as Japan‟s recalibration 
of risk in response to North Korea, there is a concern that it may be utilized as a function of 
securing power over opinion (Carr, 1981: 122). Therein, if a text is made accessible to 
interpretation, it is also vulnerable to manipulation, and as such applicable to use in the 
support and or facilitation of propaganda. However, as Carr himself counterclaims, while 
educational (in terms of contributing original knowledge) materials are oft times garnered to 
support knowledge for use in the exercise of power, including political propaganda, they are 
themselves also a powerful “antidote” to such usage.105 Fundamentally, this is premised on 
the argument that new knowledge extends existing conceptual and epistemic parameters, 
which allow not only the capitalizing upon of that knowledge but also its further extension 
and reinterpretation. It can therefore be contended, as Carr posits, that “In so far as it strains 
and interprets facts for a specific purpose, propaganda always contains within itself this 
potentially self-defeating element” (1981: 129).   
 
                                                          
103  Kawahito suggests this amounts to furthering research funding opportunities as opposed to  
      acting out of the national interest, which, he claims, would be ethically prudent for  
      representatives of a national university (2007: 76). 
104 Comparable ethically based criticisms have been levelled at what might be termed academic  
      moderates by other leading promoters of the abduction issues, such as those identified by Morris- 
       Suzuki (2010), including Araki Kazuhiko, Okazaki Hisahiko and Satō Tatsumi. However, it should be  
       noted that any criticism questioning the intellectual integrity of scholars such as Wada, needs to  
       be prefaced with recognition of their considerable academic achievements and consider the  
       significance and merit of a broad transnational (or multi-national) perspective (e.g., see Wada,  
       1987: 201-12).  
105 For further discussion regarding the individual subjugation of political power, see Foucault (1982:  
       777-95). 
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    In essence, then, Western academic biases, and the appropriation of prose for the 
exercise of power through acclaimed knowledge, are both ethical concerns, but neither 
prevents this dissertation from achieving its goal of meaningful scholarship based on a 
normative framework which seeks to maintain neutrality. Indeed, this research into Japan‟s 
recalibration of risk through its framing of North Korea has, while rooted in a given academic 
tradition and normative framework, provided a means by which to address and reinterpret 
many of the ethical biases and misconceptions that cloud this area of the discipline. 
Moreover, as inclusive analyses of Japan‟s security framework (e.g., Sato, 2006: 1-18) 
highlight, the dominant conception of Japan‟s relationship with other regional players within 
East Asia, and most specifically North Korea, has been generated largely by endogenous 
actors and institutions developing their own epistemological paradigms.106 The normative 
goal of this dissertation is, therefore, not to claim universal neutrality or unequivocal 
objectivity, but rather to maintain awareness of the need for ethical issues to be 
acknowledged and controlled for from within a theoretical framework which is applied with 
maximum rigour and minimum bias. As explained below, the foundations for this approach 
have been developed ontologically and epistemologically along constructivist lines. 
 
2.6. Constructivist ontology and epistemology: risk in an adapted approach 
Any dissertation premised on the conception of a state as being fundamentally a political 
entity, including inseparable constitutive parts such as identity and culture, which operate at 
the national level in coordination with and adherence to certain norms, can be described as 
essentially constructivist in its epistemological position. This is so unless those parts remain 
structurally fixed and unchanged. Indeed, this is consistent with the core hypotheses (see 
                                                          
106 I.e., however exogenously derivative or influenced, such paradigms relating to the interpretation of North 
Korea’s actions in Japan cannot be ascribed solely as an extended arm of the established Western political 
sciences.  Hence, the argument that this sphere is essentially dominated by Western-centric discourses 
imposed upon academic institutions in Japan can largely be rejected. 
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Introduction, Section 0.1) of this dissertation, which assume a degree of change in the norms 
that have allowed, moreover facilitated, Japan‟s recalibration of risk through its framing of 
North Korea.107 Within such a process, however, it is necessary to understand, as Wendt 
does in his critique of neo-realist theories developed by Waltz (1999: 251-9), “the distinction 
between material and ideational (or socio-cultural) elements of the underlying ontology to 
such a discussion” (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2 and Section 1.4). Therein, the socially 
constructed nature of intersubjective ideas, crystallized into cultural norms, does not deny 
the existence of material aspects which they may hold influence over. Indeed, borrowing 
from Wendt‟s analogies once again, the thousands of nuclear and intercontinental ballistic 
weapons held by the US pose an unimaginably lower risk to Japan (or are at least calibrated 
and framed as lower risk) than do the materially vastly inferior weaponry possessed by 
Pyongyang.  
    In addition, as Dobson warns, it is important not to obfuscate what norms consist of, or to 
conflate them with what is explicitly stated in public discourses. Thereby, as he contends 
(1998: 44), they are essentially the “basic actions expected of actors in a given issue area”. 
This is relevant, then, in terms of how they operate at the level of national policy formation, 
and the conceptualization and internalization of external risks. Therein, if it can be assumed 
that norms are reliant upon a given set of world views, the proliferation of risk within those 
views and its encroachment upon them will implicate it as a prevalent concept in actions 
stemming from the related norms. This is particularly salient if risk becomes standardized 
within the political language and zeitgeist of the time.  
                                                          
107 It is important to note here that reliance upon a constructivist epistemology (and or ontology) of ideational  
     and cultural norms does not, in any way, exclude neo-Darwinian or biological evolutionary approaches to  
     case studies such as the one at hand or, ultimately, to IR theories as whole – in terms of denying objective  
     reality. That is to say, as Dawkins (1976 and 2009) has attempted to reason, ideas (or memes) evolve (like  
     genes) as those which remain as a function of evolution, which does not (though often misconstrued as   
     such by critics) assign them with volitional causality in their own right.  
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    In the case of Japan‟s shifting norms in relation to the DPRK, Son‟s model (2004: 66) of 
how policy entrepreneurship has been key to the processes of national redirection in security 
policy, contingent upon perceived crises, can be adapted to focus on how risk is recalibrated 
through its attachment to movements from Pyongyang.108 For example, in addition to the 
“structural shocks”, such as the collapse of the Cold War communist powers and the 
occurrences of the 9/11 New York and other terror attacks, which have already aided a 
process of norm reconfiguration within Japan, governmental change, in the form of a new 
political administration, has also allowed the potential for increased policy entrepreneurism 
and bandwagoning onto new or revised norms.109 Son‟s argument suggests that this would 
be the case because (2004: 67), “After the inauguration of an activist government with new 
identity norms, „norm bandwagons‟ take place, as individuals feel freer to reject old norms”. 
In Japan‟s case, the full effects of administrational change upon the identity and cultural 
norms that underpin its framing of North Korea remains unclear (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5), 
but that a shift in governmental authority structures is likely to further expand opportunities 
for ideational revision in this area seems consistent with the arguments explicated above.110  
    However, while Son‟s theory posits that a new administration can affect a large degree of 
national ideational change, whereby conflicting norms surpass a tipping point to transform 
into a “norm cascade” (2004: 69), it is the contention of this dissertation that a cascade-like 
process has already been realized in Japan (prior to administrational change), through which 
                                                          
108 For further discussion, particularly concerning the use of fear emanating from the DPRK as a tool to  
     recalibrate how associated risks are framed, see Leheny (2006: 158-64). 
109 In fact, however, the extent of norm entrepreneurism enacted by the incoming Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) administration has been limited by a number of internal and external factors, which are explained in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.5. 
110 Son concedes that incoming administrations face difficulties in maintaining consistency in enacting policy    
     trajectories towards the revised national norms which they may wish to promote. In the case of Hatoyama  
     Yukio’s DPJ-led coalition, although early discussions of engagement and increased dialogue with the  
     North (in contradiction of the kind of ratcheted-up risk calibration discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,  
     below) was prevalent,  the problem of consistency became exacerbated because it faced entrenched  
     domestic opposition and political inertia left-over from decades of LDP rule, internal disputes within the  
     coalition, and a continuation of cybernetic actions from Pyongyang. 
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the gradual erosion of conflicting norms, and conformation and confluence of others has led 
to North Korea‟s framing as a high-risk entity.111 This argument is dealt with further in relation 
to each of the case studies analysed in Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5, though taken in totality 
Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK can be seen as representative of an 
increase in the prominence of norms such as militarism, normal-nationism, neo-
conservatism, and bilateralism. Conversely, it reflects the decline of anti-militarist and pacifist 
norms. It is, therefore, the components of this process, and their relation to Japan‟s 
conceptions of national identity, by which what might be termed the North Korea-risk norm, 
or anti-North Korea-ism, has been realized which forms the focus for the research 
undertaken in the following chapters. Furthermore, in contrast to the limitations of other 
leading theories of international relations, as discussed in Chapter 1, it becomes clear that a 
constructivist-based examination of how such norms will develop offers a practical means by 
which to explore, describe and explain the complex interactive elements of the domestic 
processes contained therein. Not least, as confirmed almost universally by literary and 
interview data (Appendix A) gathered for the analyses of this dissertation, such can be 
further linked to the transferral of identity – from aggressor to victim – contingent upon a 
negative framing of North Korea, and a high calibration of risks associated with it.112 
    In terms of constructing an epistemology to justify explanations of the various phenomena 
involved in these processes, then, the creation and dissemination of knowledge relating to 
Japan as a national entity relies upon an inter-subjective understanding of the Japanese 
state. Therein, it also assumes comparable comprehensions to be articulated by other 
observers, including those constructed by each of the actors and agglomerations of actors 
                                                          
111 The salience of national normative changes in relation to Japan’s recalibration of risk vis-à-vis the DPRK can  
      be placed into the context of Japan’s broader shifts in security concerns and identity norms through the  
      retrospective examination of literature on national goals and priorities during Japan’s period of extended  
      high growth. For a concise representation, see Murakami (1970: 1-5).  
112 Though such a portrayal of Japan, as a victim – e.g., of Western oppression or discrimination – has not  
       been absent in the post-War era (e.g., see depictions of Japan’s historical struggle against the Western  
       powers displayed at Yushukan, Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo), during the post-Cold War era, North Korea’s actions,  
 particularly those of state-ordered abductions, has given greater legitimacy to such an identity. 
78 
 
(institutions, companies, parties, communities etc.) identified in the case studies examined 
below. Nevertheless, however, the dissertation also maintains a form of detached 
“epistemological realism” in the sense outlined by Singh (2006: 122), in as much as it 
asserts the existence of an objective reality. This may be limited to a shared cognitive 
understanding, and be socially constructed in terms of how it is acted upon, but mutually 
observed social actors and phenomena will be located within it.113 
    In light of the above, the processes examined in this dissertation are, in essence, those 
focussed on how, through a sequence of mediations, information (primarily concerning risks) 
becomes knowledge, and how this is linked to the perpetuation and/or alteration of cultural 
and ideational norms, and the determining of national policy trajectories. As expressed 
succinctly by Barnett (1999: 177), this is validated as an investigation into, “How information 
[is] framed and arguments [are] constructed; and generally how to use language that [is] 
consistent with the understandings and discourse”. Furthermore, this rests upon the 
supposition that knowledge is culturally contingent, or at least that “whether [it is] accepted 
and effective [is] dependant on acting in a manner that [is] consistent with that culture” (i.e., 
the present culture of Japan‟s ideational norms).114 As posited in Chapter 1, Section 1.6, and 
functionalized in Section 2.4, above, such knowledge relating to Japan‟s changing 
responses to North Korea can be examined through a series of pivotal contemporary events, 
which have served to create the agency for Japan‟s recalibration of risk, through the 
construction of specific types of subjective framing attached to the DPRK. These are, in turn, 
reliant for their public sphere saliency upon being perceived as threatening within the context 
of Japan‟s national identity. The following sections briefly introduce how these critical events 
                                                          
113 For an excellent and succinct discussion (not limited to, but offering a theoretical building block for, the  
     realms of IR, risk theory and political science) of the ontological and epistemological properties of reality, as  
     conceptualized within social science, see Williams (2000: 104-21). 
114 In concordance with Barnett’s argument, the position of this dissertation is, therefore, that interests, such  
     as those of policy communities, mass media and stakeholders within civil society – including  the North   
     Korean community in Japan – may believe they are acting out of rational (or “real”) rather than socially  
     constructed interests, but in fact any such interests are themselves, essentially, the function of an  
     interaction of ideas contingent upon a socially constructed reality. 
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can be interpreted within a historical context, in terms of having been mediated by the state 
and society in a similar, yet distinct, fashion to previous examples. Ultimately, this elucidates 
how their conception as the source of risks is integral to an on-going process of risk 
recalibration based on external framings; manifest during the post-Cold War era in Japan‟s 
framing of North Korea. 
 
2.7. Historical context of an events-based theoretical framework 
This dissertation essentially focuses on temporal changes in the post-Cold War, and, most 
intensively, post-Korean Nuclear Crisis eras.115 Within this period, moreover, particular 
emphasis is assigned to the intensification of Japan‟s socio-political recalibrations of risk 
following former premier, Koizumi‟s visit to Pyongyang in 2002, and the ballistic missile 
launches and so called Second Nuclear Crisis of 2006.116 However, it is nevertheless 
necessary to identify the contemporary historical context from which recent recalibrations of 
risk on the part of Japan have occurred. This serves to allow an improved evaluation of 
characteristics representative of the current recalibration of risk, as a distinctive form of 
response to the DPRK, most pertinently those manifest in the negative framing of North 
Korea.  There are a number of cross-national comparisons which offer potentially fruitful 
areas for further research, such as those relating to other stakeholder states‟ responses to 
North Korea, and to Japan‟s responses to sources of arguably more salient risks than those 
emanating from Pyongyang, such as China.117 However, while these issues need to be born 
                                                          
115 The exact start and end of the so-called Korean nuclear crisis is a contentious issue. However, for the  
    purposes of this dissertation, it refers to the period between North Korea’s refusal to allow IAEA inspections  
    on 10 February 1993 up until the signing of the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea in  
    Geneva on 21 October 1994 (e.g., see GlobalSecurity.org, 2010). 
116 The fundamental aspects of specific characteristics associated with Japan’s recalibration of risk following  
the second nuclear crisis, including core national policy trajectories leaning towards stick –v– carrot  
approaches are succinctly presented by Funabashi (2006: 735-6).  
117 It is sufficient for the dissertation, herein, to be content with assuming a pretext that renders the majority 
of geo-military-based responses by Japan in relation to DPRK-contingent security risks as potentially 
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in mind when examining the surrounding international security structure, a historical analysis 
of Japan‟s past responses to rival regional states in the post-World War II period is 
particularly relevant in terms of accounting for the precedents of how socio-politically 
constructed risks are recalibrated within the Japanese state through the framing of external 
actors and entities – such as in the case of North Korea. This is particularly pertinent when 
examining the process through an events-based approach, because there are clear parallels 
with previous incarnations of risk recalibration on the part of Japan. The examples of the 
former Soviet Union and South Korea are spotlighted here on account of their geopolitical 
and socio-strategic comparability (albeit contrasting) in relation to Tokyo‟s current framing of 
and responses to the DPRK. Indeed, Japan‟s framing of the former Soviet Union contains 
multiple elements of framing and risk recalibration also exhibited in the case of North Korea. 
  
2.7.i. Japan‟s recalibration of risk: the framing of the former Soviet Union 
Throughout the cold war a series of key events facilitated a comparable yet, for obvious 
structural, ideational and geo-political reasons, distinct process in response to the former 
Soviet Union as that observed in Tokyo‟s contemporary framing of the DPRK.118 As with 
Japan‟s current responses to North Korea, domestic politics and external US pressure 
(Kachra, 1981: 59-68) clearly had powerful parts to play in the shaping of Japan‟s Soviet-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
justifiable in terms of ameliorating risks posed by the future rise of China (Hagström, 2005). With regards to 
explaining Japan’s responses to North Korea through a constructivist-based theoretical approach, cross-
national comparison with the ROK’s DPRK policy and its responses to comparable issues, such as nuclear and 
abduction crises, would be invaluable, and, it is hoped the discussion below will provide the basis for future 
research in this area. Such studies are beyond the remit of this dissertation. 
118 It goes without saying that the USSR was in many material aspects not a comparable geo-political entity to  
    today’s DPRK. However, in addition, it also needs to be remembered that the Cold War provided an  
    essentially bi-polar global structure to security issues, which were framed in terms of communist/socialist – 
    v– liberal/capitalist ideologies, and as such represents a structurally very different regional environment to  
    that seen today. Indeed, both Russia and China have, to a large extent been economically neo-liberalized,  
    leaving the DPRK as a sole bastion of neo-classical, pseudo-communist, ideology – which is, therefore,  
    historically significant in terms of how it is framed by Japan, regardless of the comparative political  
    democratization (or not) of the surrounding powers.  
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directed policies and responses, but once again they cannot account for the entirety of all 
the complex processes that mediate public opinion, commercial interests and political capital, 
and create inertia effects which affect the normative framework governing national policy.119 
In this sense, instances during the 1970s, such as the Balenko affair,120 the Soviet 
declaration of jurisdiction over 200km of seas surrounding its land territory, and Moscow‟s 
hostile reaction to the signing of the September 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (followed 
by an extended Soviet military build-up in the Western Pacific) all, to differing levels of 
severity, contributed to a climate within which already anti-Soviet inclined elements of 
Japan‟s socio-political make-up were in a position to exact a further recalibration of risks in 
response to the Soviet Union. These were increasingly framed as representative of a 
threatening adversary (Hasegawa, 1998: 159-61), despite considerable doubts being 
present with regards to the plausible likelihood of tangible practical concerns over an 
envisaged military contingency.121   
    It is particularly relevant in this regard to note the level of risks perceived to emanate from 
the Soviet Union by the public and across political elites during this time, irrespective of 
political allegiance and occupational cohorts (Nakamura, 1984: 70). The parallels with 
Japan‟s contemporary responses to the DPRK are also striking in terms of rhetoric, 
justification for policy responses and adherence to specific norms. Within this, Nakamura 
(1984: 57-8) notes the increasing recalibration of risk in response to the USSR as identifiable 
by way of its public and political sphere framing during the latter half of the 1970s. Therein, 
Nakamura notes the usage of recalibrated risks, framed against the uncertainty of the Soviet 
Union‟s hostile intentions, as a justification by then prime minister, Ōhira, for increased 
                                                          
119 For an excellent illustration of the degree to which compliance to the US-Japan alliance and cooperation in  
      furthering US interests was assumed, at least by the US side, during the Cold War, particularly with  
      reference to the “Ikeda outburst”, see Ishī (1989: 138-44). 
120  The Balenko affair amounts to a notorious incident in which a former Soviet Air Force pilot touched down 
his fighter jet on Japanese soil and requested political asylum (Hasegawa, 1998: 159). 
121  For a full list of key geo-political events that lead to Japan’s recalibration of risk in response to the Soviet  
       Union, see Kimura (2000: 88).  
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military expenditure and consolidation of the US-Japan bilateral alliance (1984: 57).122 
Indeed, in line with observations of a broadly convergent and intensifying recalibration of 
risks represented by the framing of North Korea in Japan during the post-Cold War era, 
reaction to the Soviet Union was similarly clustered and increasing in momentum. Over 80 
per cent of those polled in 1985 reportedly saw the Soviet Union as a military threat, in 
comparison to just over 55 per cent in 1981 – observed through a gradual upward curve 
(Glaubitz, 1995: 187-201). Concordantly, rhetoric not dissimilar to that used in descriptions 
of Kim Jong-Il‟s North Korea by present-day Japanese politicians and commentators was 
also used in criticisms of the Soviet Union, particularly in terms of identifying an aberrant 
entity (the USSR) in juxtaposition to a measured and just state (Japan).123  
    Reference to Japan‟s responses to the Soviet Union as an external foe that was perceived 
as the source of various and eminent risks, is, therefore, comparable to that of the case 
study at hand, with regards to the recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK. Within this, 
political statements and public opinion poll data reveal that during the 1980s the Soviet 
Union‟s military capabilities and political agenda became identified broadly by Tokyo as a 
salient risk to Japan‟s national interests and public safety (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1982: 23).  
However, despite such a framing and recalibration of risk in response to the former USSR, 
one element that confirms the need to investigate the framing of North Korea more 
comprehensively on its own terms is the degree to which responses within Japan to the 
Soviet Union did not pre-empt a more universally extensive justification for military 
strengthening and other policy revisions. Therein, policy revisions on a much grander scale 
are illuminated by this dissertation in relation to the DPRK‟s post-Cold War actions. As such, 
                                                          
122  The use of the potential risks contained within the Soviet Union’s uncertain militaristic intensions as a  
justification for increased military expenditure and the consolidation of biliateralism clearly demonstrate a  
historical precedent for the formation of risk recalibration framed against the DPRK (Umeda, 2007, see also 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2 ~ Section 4.5).  
123  This kind of discourse’s prominence, even within academic fields, is epitomized by Kajima’s  
       critical analysis of the Northern Territories dispute, in which he advocates “patien*ce+ and persisten*ce+  
       until the justice of [Japan’s+ cause is recognized by the dissenting nation” (1965: 114). 
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the examination of processes mediated between the state, market and society, in response 
to North Korea requires an approach which can at least attempt to explain the primary 
causal agents which have become present in such justifications, and explore the means by 
which norms such as anti-militarism have been eroded in a historically novel way – as a 
function of Japan‟s recalibrated risk, manifest in the framing of Pyongyang.124 
 
2.7.ii. Japan‟s recalibration of risk: the framing of South Korea 
In the above sense, it is also worth noting the historical transition in terms of Japan‟s 
responses to North and South Koreas during the post-War period. Indeed, even at the time 
of writing, experts from a cross-section of academia, politics, bureaucracy, and journalism, 
as well as those representative of resident Koreans, consistently cited (Appendix A) the 
need to address Japan‟s shift in perception of, and relationship to, Korea (and Koreans) as a 
whole when dealing with risks attributed by Tokyo to the North‟s current regime.125 
    As Morris-Suzuki (2007) and others have exposed, if anything it was Seoul rather than 
Pyongyang which was considered the source of greater risks to Japan‟s fledgling democracy 
immediately after World War II. The North‟s communist ideals, conversely, were aspired to 
by numerous political and civil groups amid a climate of strong leftist movements within 
Japan – spurred not least by the image of Kim Il-Sung as an egalitarian leader who assured 
welfare for his populous (Asahi Shimbun, 2010: 363-5). However, once again the idea that 
                                                          
124 Of course it is important here to be wary of making sweeping generalizations concerning how the Soviet  
     Union was, and how the DPRK has been, perceived in terms of what national policy revisions could or can be  
     made as a result of their framings, not least because they are not entirely separate security concerns from  
     Japan’s perspective. Rather, the intention is to note the significance of what has now been made possible in  
     terms of risk recalibration through the contemporary framing of North Korea. For an illustrative example of  
     how risks perceived to emanate from China, Russia, and the DPRK are often times conflated and interposed  
     ostensibly in order to justify Japan’s remilitarization, see Sakurai (2007: 56-66, 101-6). 
125 Based on interviews, including: 20 December 2010, 8 February 2011, 25 July 2011, 23 August 2011, 27  
      August 2011(Appendix A). For a detailed account of contemporary historical perceptions and treatment of  
      Koreans by Japan – focusing on migration and repatriation issues – see Kikuchi (2009). 
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but for external pressure applied by the US-led international community Japan would have 
soon normalized relations with the DPRK and continued a frosty relationship with the ROK 
remains in doubt. Rather, in concurrence with the discussion above, while beiatsu and 
gaiatsu had important parts to play, it also appears to be as the result of complex 
interactional processes between civil society stakeholders (including Korean residents), 
domestic politics, commercial interests, and other sources of national identity and ideational 
norms which, ultimately, led to the recalibration of risk upward and downward respectively 
vis-à-vis the two Koreas.126 
    Within this, a number of key events prompted much of the shift in Japan‟s responses to 
South Korea; including resolution of the Korean War, economic benefits to Japan‟s 
assistance in the Vietnam War (and hence to supporting US containment strategy which 
included allying with the ROK), the invention of the Park Chung-Hee regime in Seoul, which 
encouraged pro-South Korean forces within Japan‟s political elite (Hook et al. 2005: 204), 
and the ending of the Cold War. Therein, while nationalist discourses and interests have 
been fuelled both sides of the 38th parallel, not to mention within the Korean community in 
Japan, by anti-Japanese sentiment, and despite both the DPRK and ROK having potentially 
hostile dictatorial regimes during the post-War era, the risks pertaining to each have been 
increasingly calibrated with differentiation from Japan. Within this process, it would be 
problematic to deny the influence of bilateralism, but the normalization of relations with 
South Korea on economic grounds (Cummings, 1997: 158) nevertheless evinces a process 
                                                          
126 Indeed, this can also be seen as reflective of a more general ideological shift in terms of Japan’s attitude 
towards socialist political systems. As posited in an interview (8 March 2011, Appendix A) by one former 
MOFA official now employed as a university professor of political science, there was initially a sense within 
large areas of Japan’s populous and political factions that the DPRK, particularly under Kim Il-Sung, 
represented, however flawed, an ideologically sound model. The ROK was perceived largely by Tokyo as an 
undemocratic dictatorship. Evidently, these perceptions have changed dramatically with the advents of the 
Kim Jong-Il administration and South Korea’s democratization. Their resulting framings within the public 
sphere in Japan have, therefore, undoubtedly played a critical role in influencing how risks attached to each 
have been recalibrated.  
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of both social learning and socio-political risk reconstruction by Tokyo, as opposed to an 
isolated tactical calculation based on immediately identifiable, military, security concerns.127 
    Moreover, initial perceptions of the Korean community in Japan as a high-risk (in the 
sense of risks posed to law, order, social stability and commercial operations) group were 
not predominantly framed in terms of a link to the communist regime in the North.128 Indeed, 
counters to any such trend can be observed in debates over the finger-printing of Korean 
residents in Japan – which targeted those originating from both North and South.129 
Conversely, media attention and public concern over violence and disruptive behaviour 
perpetrated by migrants and residents originating from the Korean peninsula within Japan 
was more uniformly directed at Seoul.130 Furthermore, consequences interpreted as 
threatening to civil society in Japan, were largely framed against a negative image of the 
dictatorial Rhee Syng-Man, the first president of the ROK, and highlighted the tense 
relationship between Seoul and Tokyo (Chong, 1985: 31-2). Indeed, this reaffirms that 
changes to the negative framing of the South were reliant upon pivotal events, such as the 
Korean War, and normalization and economic agreements (ultimately culminating in the 
Treaty on Basic Relations being signed in 1965), in order to shift the emphasis of risk 
calibration downward vis-à-vis Seoul.131  
                                                          
127 The idea of social learning by the state, particularly for economic gain, is explored productively by 
     Hall (1993). The conception of socio-political risk construction in this sense refers to the processes,   
     examined throughout this dissertation, which drive levels of risk calibration based on the framing of an  
     external entity. The premise is that risks come to be perceived differently at the national level by means of  
     mediation between the state, market and society, stemming, primarily, from a series of identifiable events.      
128 Indeed, early post-War Japan witnessed a strengthening of domestic socialist and neo-communist political  
     factions, essentially sympathetic to the DPRK, particularly as a response, or counterforce, to the US-led  
     occupation.  
129 For an illustrative example of Japan’s policy makers refuting the salience of risks attached to the North’s  
communist elements within Japan, see former MOFA minister, Sone Eki’s statement made to the Diet’s  
Foreign Affairs Committee (4 September 1950, 8: 2).   
130 For further discussion of contemporary state and societal perceptions of resident Koreans, and official  
     discourses relating to the origins of their negative framing in Japan, including US supported repression and  
     shifting in emphasis between South and North Koreas, see Mitchell (1967: 27-47, 100-18).     
131 See also, Japanese translation (Okonogi and Furuta, 1989). 
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    Nevertheless, as far as public opinion and media rhetoric goes, Japan‟s conception that 
Korea has historically been a “dagger pointed at its heart” (Mendl, 1995: 61) is 
representative of a more general negative framing of that which is Korean, as opposed to the 
specific targeting of Seoul or Pyongyang. However, such a concept does little to dispel the 
conclusion that recalibrations of risk against the DPRK are deeply embedded in Japan‟s 
international relations history, and domestic political and civil contestations. Therein, while a 
risk-based approach to understanding the associated processes may be an analytical 
novelty in itself, the combination of a series of events mediated to enact a process of 
“confirmation bias” (Gardner, 2008: 120-8), upon which the recalibration of risk is based, can 
be observed from the examples highlighted above to contain substantively recurrent 
elements.132  
    In addition, Japan‟s shifting recalibration of risk in response to the two Koreas can be 
seen partially as the function of surrounding structural factors and pressures. Beiatsu alone 
cannot fully account for all aspects of the processes by which Japan has come to frame the 
DPRK in the manner which it does.133 Bilateralism has, however, maintained a largely 
consistent presence, within which the scope of other domestic socio-political processes in 
Japan have to a certain extent been restricted and demarcated. Indeed, although the 
recalibration of risk in response to North Korea since the first nuclear crisis of the early 
1990s does, as argued below, represent a new form of socio-political phenomena, the initial 
antecedents of such a process can be traced back at least as far as the US‟s preparations 
for military engagement on the Korean peninsula in the late 1940s. In that regard, while 
Rhee Syng-Man may have been identified by many prominent thinkers and civil society 
                                                          
132 The theory of confirmation bias posits that once a powerful conception, such as that of a high-risk external 
entity or state, has been formed, individual actors will assimilate all information that confirms their belief 
while rejecting sources which contradict it. This is a theoretical strand which supports the events-based 
approach, not least because impactful events are a prerequisite for both altering and perpetuating a 
reconfirmation bias.  
133 Japan’s opposition to the US’s removal of North Korea from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism in October 
2008 is evidence in itself that Tokyo’s responses to, and calibration of, risks pertaining to the DPRK are 
significantly distinct from Washington’s agenda. For discussion, see Bloomberg (2008).  
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groups in Japan as a source of potential risks, it was clear from the establishment of the Kim 
Il-Sung regime in 1948 that the US and leading Japanese policy makers (then the occupied 
interim government in Japan) intended to portray the North as a potential threat to Japan (Ko, 
1987: 35).134 Furthermore, it has to be questionable as to what extent it is really possible to 
compare Japan‟s perceptions of South Korea following World War II to those of its present 
day framing of the DPRK.135 Not least, this is due to the fact that, given the US had allied 
with South Korea, if large sections of Japan‟s state, market and societal spheres perceived 
Korea as a dagger pointed at Tokyo‟s heart, the dagger had to be framed against the North, 
as an enemy of Japan‟s sole alliance partner. Put simply, the image of Korea as a “dagger” 
has had to be refocused on Pyongyang as a function of the increasing salience of 
bilateralism and the alignment of the US, ROK and Japan. Nevertheless, right-wing literature 
(Sakurai, 1999; Nishioka, 2001) which focuses on the North Korean threat is often keen to 
portray the fusion of Northern and Southern elements, particularly within Japan, or as led by 
the DPRK regime, as the ultimate risk to Japan‟s sovereignty and safety.  
In essence, however, the issue of greatest significance raised by the comparative 
examples unpacked above, most extensively in the case of the former Soviet Union‟s 
framing, lies in their ability to expose a historical cross-over. In relation to Japan‟s post-Cold 
War framing of North Korea, such examples are illuminative in terms of delineating the kinds 
of complex processes and phenomenon which are operating interactively with external 
pressures, mediated between the state, market and society. Moreover, they provide a 
valuable insight into how such influences facilitate the recalibration of risk in Japan‟s 
international relations, not least by framing potential competitors and adversaries in contrast 
to its own national identity. The primary agency of such processes can, then, be examined in 
                                                          
134 Not least the Japan Communist Party, which enjoyed a rejuvenation of popularity and membership in the  
       immediate aftermath of World War II. This also aided the prominence of leading Marxist theorists. 
135 This is particularly so given the relative implausibility of a Seoul-led military strike on the Japanese 
mainland – or any other military actions which could be compared to post-Cold War conceptions of 
Pyongyang’s provocations against Japan. 
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terms of an identifiable, though permeable, group of actors (or policy community) forming the 
central locus of Japan‟s policy creation, implementation and reformation in this sphere.       
    
2.8. Policy communities: linking actors, agency and norms with external risks 
As observed in the extant literature (see Chapter 1), Japan‟s post-Cold war foreign policy 
has consistently been shaped and reshaped by a combination of prevailing norms, 
delineated broadly by relative identity (Singh, 2006; Anno, 2007), the consolidation of 
bilateralism (Hook, 2011; McCormack, 2007), economic realism (Hughes, 1999), and 
regional (primarily vis-à-vis China) hedging (Samuels, 2007). At the state level, these norms 
are manifest in policies which can be understood as responses to risks (Williamson, 2011). 
Therein, policy making decisions are predominantly justified on the grounds that risks, 
including those perceived to be posed by Pyongyang, can only be ameliorated through 
Japan‟s political adherence to such norms within its international relations. Furthermore, this 
dissertation concords with the majority of the literature discussed above, in as much as it 
suggests that such norms are currently leading Japan towards becoming, albeit with its own 
characteristics (Inoguchi, 2005: 182), a normal power.136 However, analyses of the 
processes by which national norms of identity and shared conceptions of international status 
are mediated between the state and society in order to influence leading actors in setting 
foreign policy agendas remains an area rife with theoretical lacunas and methodological 
deficiencies. As highlighted in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, this is particularly so 
in Japan‟s case when tackled using extant liberal or realist based theoretical frameworks.  
    It is, therefore, necessary to examine the processes by which (internalized) external risks 
are linked to the evolution of such norms, in order to gain a more sophisticated 
comprehension of how those norms are constructed, and to illuminate the specifics of their 
                                                          
136 Essentially, “normal” once again refers to a nation-state with the capability to posses and operationalize  
     independent armed forces. For more detailed specifics, see Ozawa (1993 and 1994). 
89 
 
contingency upon the mediation of risk. An understanding of such processes allows a more 
fruitful analysis of the causal weight of norms and the salience of risk calibration in dictating 
the trajectory of policy paradigms. In addition, the acceptance that risk plays a primary 
causal role in defining the normative parameters for policy makers provides the basis for a 
robust theoretical methodology with which to develop analyses beyond the dichotomy of 
external pressures –v– domestic factors.137  
In concrete terms, the uniqueness of Japan‟s constructed post-War and post-Cold War 
norms associated with national identity, such as anti-militarism, bilateralism, and 
developmentalism (Hagström and Söderberg, 2006: 3)138 are obviously fuelled, at least in 
terms of how they are operationalized through the state‟s political apparatus, by an almost 
infinitely complex myriad of individual and organizational domestic interests, and external 
pressures.139 Amid this, responses to such pressures, in both endogenous and exogenous 
forms, are primarily made through policies which attempt to balance and reduce risks 
manifest within them. In the case of Japan‟s framing of the DPRK, analyses of the events 
addressed in Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5 expose how risks have been framed and recalibrated 
for a range of strategic purposes – predominantly associated with adherence to the 
prevailing norms outlined above. Put simply, external threats and pressures can be 
incorporated into the process of constructing Japan‟s domestic norms by internalizing them 
                                                          
137 Such debates are often linked to contesting arguments between essentially neo-realist and constructivist 
(respectively) claims concerning political causality, but are not as productive as risk-based approaches in this 
context, because they fail to account fully for a range of interactive processes which intersect external and 
internal spheres. In this sense, risk is an effective theoretical and methodological tool in terms of flexibly 
addressing multiple factors which can facilitate a more eclectic approach. 
138 For specific discussion of the relationship between Japan’s temporal political transformations and the  
     development of security norms, see also Katzenstein (1996: 191-210). 
139 Hagsröm and Söderberg’s volume explores these issues in depth, through a multiple-perspective  
    examination of Japan’s North Korea policy, which exposes a variety of shifts in Japan’s contemporary foreign  
    policy making structures. However, akin to other texts which attempt to analyze the rationale for North  
    Korea policies, an application of risk-related approaches would doubtless be beneficial to understanding  
    how each constitutive part of such rationales can likely be linked, once again at individual and institutional  
    levels, to the conception of responding to and ameliorating risks – which in the specific case of those  
    perceived to emanate from the DPRK have clearly been upwardly recalibrated.  
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through their identification as salient risks. This process is exemplified by Tokyo‟s attribution 
of recalibrated risks attached to North Korea in the post-Cold War era. 
    In light of the above, this dissertation seeks to employ a functional definition of what 
constitutes the core of Japan‟s policy making actors, or policy community, in order to assess 
how political elites come to formulate and enact responses to exogenous risks – such as 
those posed by the DPRK.140 The term “policy community” is adapted from Campbell et al.‟s 
(1989: 86-94) conception of a fluid means of unitary analysis that can account for the 
interaction between "cosy little triangles" defending tightly demarcated vested interests, and 
the "issue networks which impinge upon them in seeking to actively change existing policy 
domains” (1989: 87).141 The argument, then, is that policy communities, or some equivalent 
unit of analysis, is necessary, because, as Takahashi and Kitayama (2003: 156-71) posit, 
the so called iron triangles of prominent politicians, bureaucracies and big business are less 
than assured in the increasingly volatile climate of today‟s Japan.142 As such, examination of 
Japan‟s policy making elite, understood in terms of the permeable unit of a policy community, 
offers a practical means by which to evaluate its interactions with media and other market 
actors, as well as societal stakeholders. These include Diet members, newspaper editors, 
Nippon Keidanren executives and various other issue networks and actors within civil society, 
such as the North Korean community (see Section 2.9) which can be assessed in terms of 
their relative influences upon the policy making process in Japan.  
                                                          
140 Policy making actors in this case refers to any individuals or groups significantly influencing policy 
innovation and implementation at the national level, as opposed solely to politicians or bureaucrats who are 
responsible for their practical application. 
141 Campbell et al. argue that the former are more likely to be predominant in authoritarian governments and   
    the latter more active in pluralist systems, Japan being recognized as pluralist system. 
142 This is particularly pertinent when one considers the fact that Takahashi and Kitayama are outlining the  
    permeability and potential for reform present even in iron triangles, which were reinforced by LDP power.  
    The invention of the DPJ-led coalition obviously offers increasing potential for instances of a less rigid unit of  
    political elite. Examples might include as broad a spectrum as the erosion of iron triangles which stand to  
    gain from base relocation and construction in Okinawa, to the overturning by the Supreme Court of  
    convictions made against journalists and officials accused of using unlawful means to uncover secret  
    collusions by the LDP with the US government – such as those relating to nuclear power projection from US  
    bases during the 1960s. For related discussion, see Asahi.com (2010). 
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    In terms of assessing how a policy community gains a mandate to affect significant policy 
change, particularly through the recalibration of risk, John Keeler‟s “crisis-mandate 
mechanism” (1993: 439) has been adapted.143 This offers a model which can be used to 
evaluate the on-going ability of new governments (such as the DPJ coalition from 2009) to 
enact political sea-changes. Moreover, given certain alterations, the basic concepts 
explicated by Keeler are transferable to more extended temporal policy shifts under a ruling 
administration (i.e., the LDP government up to 2009). As stated in the Introduction, Section 
0.1, these temporal changes to core policy trajectories can be examined through a series of 
events and actions perpetrated by the DPRK. Therein, this dissertation exposes how such 
actions have effectively been interpreted in an equivalent manner to crises by Japan‟s policy 
community.144 Within this process, even when the North‟s provocations have not been 
mediated as crises per se, the risks associated with them have been recalibrated as 
representative of such.   
    Keeler (1993: 440) posits that a crisis serves as a means to secure a mandate for policy 
reform in so much as it “discredits the ideas and leaders of an incumbent party (or 
coalition)…   …stimulating both negative voting and the inclination to risk giving new leaders 
(with new ideas) a chance to resolve the crisis”. However, it is theoretically congruent to 
assume that a new administration or incoming party is not a prerequisite for activating a 
crisis mandate. Indeed, as Luebbert (1991: 312) asserts, crises are able to “break old 
patterns of thought and behaviour”, allowing “…possibilities for new approaches and ideas”. 
Therein, as noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.6, prominent leaders and political figures in Japan 
have been able to recalibrate risks from the DPRK by expressing them as crises, even 
without administration change. These have, in turn, been deemed to require shifts in 
                                                          
143 In contrast to Keeler’s model, this dissertation does not posit that the DPRK’s post-Cold War actions, in fact, 
amount to a series of crises. Rather, it argues that Japan’s interpretation of risks, perceived to stem from the 
series of case studies examined, has been assigned comparable weighting to that of crises.  
144 These take the form of a succession of missile launches, illegal incursions, nuclear tests, and, not least,   
     unresolved abduction issues (e.g., see BBC News, 2010). 
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approach, in order to counter the crisis-level risks posed. This dissertation, therefore, 
examines policy communities within Japan in terms of core groups of politically motivated 
actors, which have responded to a series of politically-loaded events identified with North 
Korean actions. These events have been perceived by Japan‟s policy community as the 
source of risks, which have been successively recalibrated to a level equivalent to those 
manifested in crises. As a result, an interactive process has been facilitated between the 
state, market and society which assigns a disproportionate number of North Korean actions 
with crisis status, and amplifies the gravity of associated risks.145      
 
2.9. Civil society stakeholders: perceptions of the Korean community as a new risk 
There are a range of civil society actors which have evidently had a significant influence 
upon the process of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea. Most ostensibly, 
these include stakeholder organizations representing the families of abduction-case victims, 
such as the kazokukai, and pressure groups seeking to promote a specific political agenda, 
including sukuukai. In addition, NGOs such as the Japan Red Cross and Amnesty 
International, which have historically sought to highlight the risks posed to human security by 
the regime in Pyongyang and its affiliated actors, are also of significance.146 Indeed, close 
scrutiny of these and other civil society actors holds the potential to add greater empirical 
detail to the explanation of how Japan has recalibrated risks framed against the DPRK 
through an interactive, actor-specific, process (interview, 26th October 2010, Appendix A). 
However, among various civil society candidates, this dissertation focuses most specifically 
upon the role of the resident Korean community, on account of its comparability to the DPRK 
in terms of framing within Japan. In particular, the North Korean-affiliated residents in Japan, 
and those associated with Chōsensōren can be analysed as representative of a microcosm 
                                                          
145 This is, in essence, the societal structure which perpetuates so called “North Korea phobia” in Japan.  
146 The role of coalitions, made between multiple groups within civil society and those representative of the  
state, is dealt with further in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.  
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of North Korea itself. This is particularly pertinent, given the focus on the relationship 
between domestic and international aspects of risk recalibration as a function of given 
framings.      
    Therefore, as a stakeholder group on the fringe of the policy community, Korean residents 
represent a significant body of actors within the process of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in 
response to the DPRK.147 Evidently, North-affiliated groups, including Chōsensōren, are 
particularly relevant in this regard, because they amount to an identifiable sub-group within 
Japan with close ties, both politically and economically, to Pyongyang. It is, therefore, 
important to understand their influence upon processes through which risk has been 
recalibrated by Japan‟s policy community as a whole. As such, resident Koreans have been 
included in the case studies, employed in line with Yin‟s definition (2009: 18), as an aid to 
the “investigation [into] a contemporary phenomenon” which explores “the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context [which] are not clearly evident”. Organizations such as 
Chōsensōren are, then, an invaluable source of accessible data in this regard, because their 
contemporary framing within Japan can be seen as comparable to Tokyo‟s external framing 
of North Korea as a whole.   
   Indeed, the North Korean-aligned section of the resident community in Japan is particularly 
significant due, primarily, to the lack of distinction made between themselves and the DPRK 
itself within Japan. This is particularly visible in terms of how their diverse forms of 
connection to the North are widely overlooked when calibrating risks associated with them. 
For example, this can be seen in sanctions which indiscriminately target kinship ties and 
socioeconomic aid provided by remittances, and those of direct political donations and 
support for the regime in Pyongyang (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.11).148 Pertinently, 
                                                          
147 Here, Korean residents provisionally refers to those of both Southern and Northern origin, though the 
specific significance of the North-affiliated Chōsensōren organization, in terms of its targeting as the source 
of risks associated with Pyongyang, is noted, and covered in greater detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.11. 
    148 The blurring of such distinctions is clearly an important factor in the manipulation of perceptions within  
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furthermore, the framing of such elements as North Korean, or representative of the DPRK 
state, has been realized and propagated in spite of the increasing “Japanization” (Mitchell, 
1967: 160; see also Ryang, 1996) within all cohorts of the Korean community in Japan. 
Therein, a growing proportion of citizens within Japan defined as second and third 
generation Korean have gradually intensified their identity as Japanese, while diluting ties 
with the Korean peninsula as a whole.149 This dissertation, therefore, addresses the North-
allied community within Japan from the perspective of recalibrated risks which have been 
attached to all that can be perceived to be North Korean. The relevance of such an approach 
is made clear when one observes how the Korean community has, as one entity, gone from 
facing primarily generic discrimination within Japan (see Section 2.7.ii, above) to becoming 
the focus of specific attention by leading media sources, state authorities and civil society 
organizations – as the source of risks identified with the North.150 The direct targeting of 
groups such as Chōsensōren can, then, be examined as the result of Japan‟s framing of the 
DPRK as a whole – and the recalibration of associated risks.  
    Furthermore, Japan‟s framing of the North Korean community is illustrative of how risks 
have been disproportionately recalibrated in relation to their material size and influence.151 It 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
     the state apparatus and media, and hence societal public sphere, of how North Koreans are identified and  
     portrayed. This is exemplified by the confusion over terms which have, to a certain degree, indirectly come  
     to connote or construe links with Pyongyang, such as that of “zainichi” itself. The consequences of this kind  
     of definitional ignorance and opaqueness are highlighted by Kim (1981: 7-11). 
149 Mitchell notes this trend as early as the mid-1960s as a result of inter-ethnic marriage and other  
     demographic changes, which bears testimony to the obvious fruition of such a process entering into the  
     second decade of the 21
st
 Century. Inter-ethnic marriages between ethnic Koreans and Japanese amounted  
     to 8376 in 2006, up from 1971 in 1965 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2010). 
150 Evidently, these have been driven and exacerbated by ultra-right-wing and extra-legal groups which also 
engage the policy community (i.e., are themselves a fringe group with agency affecting such a process). For 
further discussion of the convergence of a diversity of fringe groups, in the form of coalitions constituting 
multiple agendas, which serve to perpetuate Japan’s recalibration of risks perceived to emanate from 
Pyongyang, see Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
151  Although there is also undeclared transfers of funds, remittances to North Korea from Japan (primarily  
      from North Korean residents or their organizations within Japan), despite often being claimed in Japan as a  
      means by which the regime in Pyongyang gains access to international funding, actually represents only a  
      portion of the already negligible eight per cent of North Korea’s international trade which is conducted  
      with Japan. In material terms, the DPRK is far more economically reliant upon both China and South Korea,  
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is also reflective of the juxtaposing of national identity against a framed rival state, and the 
reconstruction of norms which underpin the construction of such an identity. The Northern 
half of the zainichi, or “residents in Japan”, therefore represent a suitable case study 
through which to review a domestic microcosm of the national (bilateral) phenomenon under 
investigation in this dissertation.152 This is coherent in as much as the North Korean zainichi 
have been framed in a comparable form to the DPRK‟s framing as a whole within Japan‟s 
public sphere. Within the constructivist framework, as delineated in Section 2.12, below, the 
zainichi‟s identity has been framed in a processes involving mediation between the state, 
media and other market sources, as well as society, as that which is counter to Japan‟s 
national interests and political ideology. This includes emphasizing not only the intimacy of 
organizations such as Chōsensōren to the political philosophies promoted, in the name of 
self reliance, or juche, by the North‟s leaders, but also to their links with unfashionable or 
controversial political factions in Japan.153 Hence, the North Korean community within Japan 
has been consequentially framed as that which contains the potential for harbouring 
elements of risks perceived as being posed to Japan by Pyongyang. As a result, this framing, 
and the following recalibration of risks associated with resident North Koreans, has facilitated 
a number of tangible policy measures. These include the raiding of Chōsensōren‟s offices 
and the termination of tax-relief measures in 2003 and 2006 (Akaha, 2006: 32; Hughes, 
2006: 476) which were identified as allowing the zainichi to generate funds to aid and abet 
the North‟s government, stricter search and port entry (insurance etc.) rules for shipping 
brought into effect by the Japanese Coastguard, and other measures designed to reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
      and is arguably affected very little by sanctions directed from Tokyo, not least those enacted through  
      repression of North Korean elements within Japan. For reference and discussion, see Akaha (2006: 19-35).  
152 The official estimate for the total number of those of ethnic Korean origin living in Japan is approximately  
     600, 000. For detailed statistics on resident and returnee Korean numbers, see Mindan (2010). However,  
     the numbers may actually be far higher, particularly considering unofficial residents and those of mixed race.  
     Within this, as Morris-Suzuki (2007) suggests, the identity of North – v – South can at times also be far from  
     clear cut or rendered as peripheral (i.e., vis-à-vis Japanese – v – Korean identity).    
153 For a full discussion of the connection between zainichi and the Japanese Communist Party, see Moon  
     (2000: 191-204). 
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contact and exchange between the zainichi and the DPRK.154 Further unilateral sanctions 
imposed upon the DPRK by Japan also include the strict control of remittances, particularly 
those sent as international cash transfers, by individuals within Japan directly to North 
Korea.155 These measures, in combination with illegal (at times violent) actions perpetrated 
by extremists from the political ultra-right-wing and others, therefore, represent a tangible 
measure, in microcosmic form, of Japan‟s upward recalibration of risk and related responses 
to North Korea.   
 
2.10. Media influence, foreign policy and risk 
The examination of media discourses, particularly those contained in leading newspapers, is 
a key methodological tool by which to measure Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to 
North Korea. This is applied to both qualitative and quantitative analyses, and is 
contextualized within the media‟s cross-interaction with political and societal spheres. 
Qualitative analysis focuses primarily on the comparative reactions – in terms of changing 
discourse – of two historically ideologically contrasting broadsheets; the Asahi Shimbun and 
the Yomiuri Shimbun, which can be seen as representative of traditionally liberal, or 
progressive, standpoints, as taken by the Asahi, and conservative positions, in the case of 
the Yomiuri.156 In addition to these sources, quantitative evaluation for the full spectrum of 
major national newspapers, NHK coverage, and news magazine articles is provided in order 
                                                          
154 For full details of the measures employed to target North Korean groups operating within Japan, see    
     Chapter 4, Section 4.11 and Chapter 5, Section 5.10. 
155 The limits for individual transactions were reduced to ¥10,000,000 from ¥30,000,000 and from ¥1,000,000  
      to ¥300,000 in 2009 (Yomiuri Online, 2010), with approval of a further extension of existing sanctions  
 passing the Diet to come into effect from 13 April 2010. It is also notable that when sending remittances  
 anywhere abroad from Japan, the individual has to declare that they are not destined for North Korea  
 (Appendix C, Item II), symbolizing how the state has shifted the perceived risks of the DPRK onto a  
 responsibility born by citizens. 
156 As such, the Yomiuri Shimbun is effectively identified as representative of a majority of major national  
newspapers in Japan, which can be seen to lean towards the right, particularly on issues concerning North 
Korea. This includes staunchly right-wing tabloids, such as the Sankei Shimbun and less overtly hard-line 
publications, including the Mainichi Shimbun – as highlighted by Figure 6.1(a), Chapter 6. 
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to offer greater empirical support for qualitative analyses, and as a means by which to place 
their shifting trajectories of risk recalibration within the broader context of national media 
responses. Moreover, the degree to which political and civil society actors rely upon 
mainstream media as the basis of their information on international affairs, and the close 
relationship between media actors and policy makers is highlighted in order to expose the 
extensive prevalence of convergence – both within the media and in its cross-relationship to 
state and societal sphere actors.     
    The media are, therefore, a core means by which risk is mediated between the state, 
market and society in Japan. However, this understanding does not assume that the media 
does no more than reiterate and reflect the direct concerns of a narrow political elite 
responsible for policy formation. Indeed, news media in particular play an important function, 
in themselves, with regard to driving debates over issues of national concern in the public 
sphere.157 This in turn galvanizes societal consensuses, which compound or reform existing 
mainstream norms, and influence the policies adopted within their bounds (Smith, Hadfield, 
Dunne, 2008: 141). A central objective of this dissertation is, hence, to evaluate the causal 
power of those norms, delineate the policy parameters which they facilitate, and illuminate 
how they are expressed through the media. It should be noted, however, that there is no 
intention to conflate pervasive normative consensuses observed with uniformity across what 
is a sizeable variety of news sources, some of which vary widely. Specifically, it is worth 
noting the distinction between national news gathering agents and major newspapers, such 
as NHK, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Yomiuri Shimbun (which would at least all claim to 
attempt neutrality and objectivity), and those such as the Sankei Shimbun or North Korea 
Daily which do less to conceal their weighty bias. 
 
                                                          
157 For the analysis of this dissertation, a maximum of accessible sources that can be linked to Japan’s national  
     policy responses to North Korea, manifest in recalibrations of risk set against its negative framing, are  
     included in order to assess their impact in totality.  
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    In this respect, with regards to the case study of Japan‟s recalibration of risks vis-à-vis the 
DPRK, although policy provisions and debates may remain within the context of accepted 
national norms, they are also complicated by domestic political competition, and the public 
inertia that it creates, particularly in terms of maintaining a mass media focus upon 
Pyongyang. As noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.6, domestic politics are a key factor in how 
North Korean issues are framed. Yet, this has often involved political opposition for its own 
sake, as in the case of the DPJ blocking LDP moves to implement powers for stop-and-
search rights on North Korean vessels, which was then enforced following its election victory. 
Pertinently, this has also been present within media coverage – particularly as a form of 
competition over who can take the toughest line against Kim Jong-Il‟s Pyongyang 
administration.158 These influences reverberate into the public sphere, whipping up further 
anti-North Korean sentiment – and stimulating further harsh political and media rhetoric and 
so forth (political inertia).159  
    A model for how to assess the extent and processes of this phenomenon can be adapted 
from the arguments provided by Hyung (2006: 483-508), who confirms the relevance of such 
a case study by succinctly asserting that, “The power of the virtual, constructed, and 
mediated reality of North Korea…  …cannot be overlooked when formulating or analysing 
policies towards [the DPRK]” (2006: 507). Hyung‟s approach is particularly applicable 
because it focuses on elements such as media-societal pre-conditioning, priming of 
audiences, and media collusion. Indeed, large sections of Japan‟s mainstream media 
sources have aligned market interests in terms of how they are commercially linked. This, 
                                                          
158  In the run up to the 2009 general election in Japan, following PM Asō’s announcement of the dates for the  
     dissolving of parliament, the DPJ and opposition parties moved against him to submit a censure motion in       
     the House of Councillors and a motion of no confidence in the House of Representatives, and made it clear    
     that they would not cooperate with relevant deliberations in the National Diet. This can be seen,    
     largely, as a means to scupper key LDP bills to be passed prior to the election, most prominently one that     
     would have allowed inspection of DPRK cargo ships by the JCG.  
159 This phenomenon can be observed, as examined in the following case studies, by the relentless coverage  
     of North Korea, as the source of multiple and salient risks, with increasing – albeit irregular – fervour. For  
     quantitative illustration, see Figure 6.2, Chapter 6.   
99 
 
Hyung posits, contributes to “intensive agenda setting and framing effects” (specifically 
regarding Japan‟s responses to North Korea) and offers an explanation of “how mass media 
affects international relations through the construction of mediated realities” (2006: 484-5).160 
Moreover, Hyung highlights how, due to the lack of real first-hand experience of almost all 
areas of the DPRK‟s society by those within Japan, North Korea is, as a socially constructed 
entity, ideally suited to societal-level manipulation by mass media interests161. Furthermore, 
this serves to meet a range of socio-political, emotional and ideational, and economic needs 
in Japan162. Thus, the US and other external pressures, as well as the political consensuses 
discussed above, which are predisposed to encourage the negative framing of North Korea 
within Japan, amount to only one part of the puzzle in terms of the overall process of risk 
recalibration in response to Pyongyang.  
Therein, citizens, through the consumption of media discourse and imagery, are also able 
to exonerate sentiments of national guilt towards Korea, appropriate blame for socio-
economic decay onto an external assailant, and demand strong leadership to counter a 
perceived threat (Hyung, 2006: 499). However, in terms of the methodology used to analyse 
the impact of media sources, the last of these functions (the perceived threat) requires 
supplementation to Hyung‟s conceptualization. This can be achieved through an 
appreciation of how the framing of the DPRK is reliant upon an understanding of the threat 
being calibrated into a range of risks. Particularly given their multifaceted nature (nuclear, 
                                                          
160 As such, although Hyung focuses primarily on television sources (and indeed argues for their primacy), the  
     inference is that despite a declining proportion of younger adult newspaper readers, and a surprising lack of  
     internet usage in Japan for accessing information on current affairs, each of the leading providers of media  
     information on North Korea, across all major sectors (along with journals etc.) contain not only subjective  
     and objective collusion on issues concerning the DPRK, but also hold tangible business links in terms of  
     cross-shareholding – inferring that further media consensus, albeit with variations in style, is present.   
161 Evidently, the degree of manipulation vis-à-vis a first-hand objective analysis of sources within the DPRK is 
not accessible, but the lack of access to target subjects in North Korea demonstrates in itself the potential for 
one-sided framing and manipulation – without objective means for a strong counter-argument to develop 
within central discourses in Japan.  
162 Economic in this sense, however irrational, refers to a combination of distraction and scapegoating  
     directed against North Korea to alleviate and apportion blame over Japan’s long term fiscal downturn and  
     gloomy business and employment market.  
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abduction, military, sovereign etc.), these are seen to require nationally orientated responses 
from Japan. Indeed, as such, not only from the state, but additionally from the entirety of 
individual citizens and, moreover, society as an interactive, collective whole.163     
    In light of the above, media influence as an aggregate impact upon national responses to 
North Korea can, then, be seen as one significant sector of an interactive structure that 
constitutes Japan‟s policy community. As such, this dissertation posits that analysis of 
central media discourse is, in addition to the examination of other market, political elite, 
bureaucratic, and civil society group sources, essential to elucidating the interactive process 
of macro-national risk recalibration vis-à-vis North Korea. Moreover, as stated in Section 2.4, 
this requires both comprehensive qualitative and quantitative systems of data analysis in 
order to index and evaluate the myriad of causal influences therein – and the (re)calibration 
of perceived risks which they are seen to engage. This can be fruitfully achieved through 
analysing variables consistently against a series of comparable case studies, as provided in 
Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5. Amongst these, responses within Japan to the North‟s multiple 
missile and nuclear tests provide a consistent source for such analyses.  
 
2.11. Missile tests and other events as a means for measuring risk recalibration within 
the post-Cold War policy community  
As stated above, this dissertation identifies the nature of Japan‟s policy community and 
attempts to track its recalibration of risk in response to North Korea since the geo-political 
restructuring initiated from the ending of the Cold War.164 As such, it is hypothesized that the 
                                                          
163 This phenomenon is a further example of the noted recurring theme of a shifting or re-appropriation of  
  risks from the state onto citizens. Associated issues are discussed in depth with regard to each of the case  
  studies examined (see Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5), and the salience of resulting socio-political impacts are  
  evaluated in conclusion.   
164 The permeable, indefinable, nature of Japan’s policy community is addressed in Section 2.6, above. 
  Terminology such as “political elite” and “policy elite” are employed (interchangeably) to 
  describe the operational front of the policy community, which is assumed to be represented by  
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response of the political elite to actions and issues associated with Pyongyang started out 
slowly and became increasingly fervent as a momentum of anti-North Korean framing took 
hold in Japan. Within this, by employing an events-based analysis it is possible to identify a 
number of surges in risk recalibration made by Japan‟s political elite in response to actions 
by Pyongyang. As discussed in Chapter 3, the first such surge was generated in response to 
the Taepodong 1 test missile launch of August 1998 (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2). Moreover, 
in light of analyses discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the on-going process by which the 
cumulative framing of the DPRK facilitated that recalibration, mediated through interactions 
between the political elite, media and civil society begins to exhibit a qualitative and 
quantitative form, which can be objectively observed (e.g., see Chapter 5, Figure 5.5). 
As explained in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, above, a wide-range of data and information 
have been utilized to provide illustrations and comparisons of how risks were recalibrated. 
This has been applied for the junctures immediately prior to and after each missile test 
launch. Within this, the primary data sources used to identify observable shifts in the policy 
community‟s recalibration of risk during the post-Cold War period are those of Diet (upper 
and lower house, and committees) records and archival data for the leading newspapers – 
with specific attention paid to the Asahi Shimbun, as discussed in Section 2.10, and further 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.16.165 This specified focus is adopted on the grounds that these two 
core sources of relevant data demonstrate the most clearly identifiable features of risk 
recalibration, as expressed in Chapter 5, Table 5.3. Additionally, it should be noted that 
electronically generated quantitative data, of significance to analyses for the missile test 
launches, generally relates to the broad search term, kitachōsen, because this is how North 
Korea is standardly referred to within the public sphere.166 Research results have been 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  bureaucrats and members of the National Diet. This is distinct from the policy community as a whole,  
  which is defined as including media and other market, as well as societal, actors.  
165 This utilizes the digitalized search-engine databases (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/).  
166 Although the full (official) term, “chōsen minshushugi jinmin kyōwakoku” does exist, Japanese texts  
 generally contain less equivalent variant usages compared to English terminology, such as DPRK (an  
 abbreviation of the above), Pyongyang or The North, particularly in terms of general use within discourse  
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quantified and assessed selectively according to the relevance of the discourse‟s content. 
The primary focus, therefore, essentially prioritizes statements from the security and foreign 
ministry committees. Further, although explications have preferentially been restricted to the 
Diet sessions which took place immediately following key events such as missile launches 
(in addition to nuclear tests, incursion incidents etc.), mention of relevant statements relating 
the state of discourse during intervening periods is also included.167  
Furthermore, in addition to scrutinizing the positions of the ruling administration‟s and 
opposition‟s leading, and most outspoken, representatives on North Korean affairs, a variety 
of political statements conveyed by related bureaus, committees and ministries are also 
examined. These are further supplemented with input from other political organizations and 
parties outside of government which can be seen to play a significant role in the policy 
community, as outlined above. Conclusions drawn from the archival data located within 
Japan‟s leading media sources and political elite are buttressed by a range of qualitative 
assessments made by experts in the field and are supported by the predominantly 
quantitative results of opinion polls. In addition, responses are analyzed and contrasted with 
the positions of a variety of secondary literature which covers the same events. The 
theoretical foundations for the conclusions reached are discussed below. 
 
2.12. The construction of risks and crises: relations between citizens and the state 
As noted in the Introduction, Section 0.1, at least three powerful vested interests stand to 
gain from the framing of North Korean actions as equivalent to crises that bear salient 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 and official records. 
167  Citations from the Diet are standardized for reference using the speakers name and date within the text. 
The Diet session number and turn of the speaker are also provided in parenthesis following each quotation 
(see Note on Translations and Romanization, Diet References, Research Cut-off Point and In-Text Referenc-
ing and Japanese Terminology). 
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security risks for Japan. These include the US‟s geo-political strategic concerns, Japan‟s 
policy community‟s expansionist convergences (or consensuses), and distractive (foremost 
from negative attention within the public sphere) or leadership roles for leading domestic 
political actors. However, it is necessary to note the discrepancy between conventional 
events that have been assigned the status of crises in the sense outlined by Keeler (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.7 and Section 2.8, above), and those that relate to Japan‟s recalibration 
of risk in response to the DPRK. Indeed, it is the fact that risks have been abnormally and 
innovatively constructed, and reconstructed by the state, to convey a level of calibre equal to 
that of crises which is of particular significance.  
    Akin to the analysis provided by Singh (2006: 99), this dissertation attempts to explain, 
“how a state (Japan) uses or relies on the crisis element as a source of legitimacy in bringing 
about change to its security identity and behaviour”. However, it parts company with the 
aforementioned in both its definition of crises, and its focus on the salience of risks per se – 
i.e., as opposed solely to the events they are attached to. Moreover, the construction of 
crises within a risk-based approach is reliant upon the understanding of how the recalibration 
of risk, as that which is potentially so catastrophic it facilitates the overriding of established 
scientific knowledge in order to act pre-emptively (or out of amplified precaution) to counter it, 
becomes the norm of state governance. In this sense, the management and pre-emption of 
risks gravitate towards the core discourses of governmentality.168 Therein, risks are shifted, 
primarily by the state, though observed through processes of mediation (facilitated not least 
by vassals of the mass media) between government, the market and society. Essentially, 
shifting occurs from the quantifying of crises based on the calculation of material and 
strategic dangers, into a focus on the associated risks. In the case of those framed against 
                                                          
168 This is also employed in general congruence with the Copenhagen School of “securitization.” For discussion,  
      see Stritzel (2007).  
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North Korea, risks take the form of “a scenario, followed by a policy proposal of how to 
prevent this scenario from becoming real” (Rasmussen, 2006: 2).169 
    In this sense, it is argued that risks have been identified with Pyongyang, and mediated 
effectively enough across large spheres of domestic society, to the extent that justifications 
for policy changes do not require the previously established criteria for a crisis. This is 
contended in as much as events framed within Japan as a function of North Korea‟s hostile 
actions have not consistently or unequivocally met international crisis conditions. These 
would often include those requiring clear time-pressures for response, a multiple threat to 
national values, or the likelihood of imminent military engagement (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 
1997). Rather, it is posited that each of the key temporal events (discussed in detail 
throughout the chapters below) identified as evidence of the DPRK‟s hostile intentions, and 
assigned crisis status, have been used as tools, or compounding elements, in the 
incremental accumulation of risk that has been attached to North Korea.    
   Therein, the recalibration of risks identified with Pyongyang, via their framing by the state 
(oft-times via mediation through news media) in an arbitrary, or at least less than statistically 
valid, form can be observed in terms of a “negative optimism-bias” (Gardner, 2008: 258). 
This results in exaggerated perceptions by citizens and societal actors, and is frequently 
present in conceptions of risk mediation. Gardner uses the example of Americans‟ perceived 
risks of suffering a terrorist attack in the wake of the 9/11 disasters to highlight how 
individuals (in contradiction to their normal optimism-bias) overestimate the likelihood (to 
themselves) of being adversely affected by an external harm.170 Moreover, the fact that 
citizens are so inclined to arbitrarily estimate external risks, particularly at the national level, 
                                                          
169 Rasmussen explores the broader theoretical phenomenon (upon which, given the explicit focus on North  
     Korea,  Japan’s contemporary responses to the DPRK evidently appear to be based) of risk recalibrations in  
     the post-9/11 world through an examination of risk-orientated doctrines, within which he highlights the  
     proliferation of “precautionary principles and anticipatory defense” enacted by the state in response to  
     perceived crises. 
170 Optimism bias refers to the phenomenon whereby people consistently view themselves favorably  
 compared with others. 
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is symptomatic of the fact that such risks are simply too complex for the individual to 
accurately estimate (Gardner, 2008: 108). It is, therefore, within this context of risk that 
readily available and easily digestible sources of authority, such as news media or political 
statements are digested as facts. In the case of the US and the perception of terrorist 
attacks, this phenomena of overestimated risk perception has been perpetuated by powerful 
media imagery and politically charged events associated with the remembrance of 9/11. 
Likewise, this phenomenon is observable in the case of Japan‟s framing of North Korea. 
However, in the case of Japan‟s perceptions and responses (at the levels of both state and 
the individual citizen) to North Korea, there are arguably a far more extensive and diverse 
range of recent events (abductions, missile launches, nuclear tests, maritime intrusions etc.) 
which lend themselves to the accentuation of such processes of risk recalibration.171  
    This dissertation, therefore, adopts an approach which assumes there has been a 
temporal process of negative optimism-bias, which has allowed the Japanese state to frame 
itself, in juxtaposition to the DPRK. Through the mediation of perceived risks between the 
state, market and society in Japan, this process has been sustained by a number of events 
identified as hostile North Korean actions (or hostile national posture). As such, the state is 
portrayed as responsible for the protection of citizens, albeit precariously, from an unknown 
yet salient composite of externally generated, though now internalized, risks which are 
perceived to emanate from the regime in Pyongyang. In essence, this approach is consistent 
with that developed by Buzan, who posits that, “The stability of the state derives… …from 
the understanding by its citizens that it is the lesser of two evils” (1991: 38). Therefore, the 
state may be seen as the source of risks in itself, if, for example, it should suddenly 
implement a range of repressive or militaristic policy reforms. However, in the case of 
                                                          
171 Gardner notes (2008: 260-2) that the actual chances of an American (over their entire lifetime) being killed  
     as the result of an act of terrorism could be lower than one in a million, as opposed, for example, to the  
     relatively high chance (1 in 79,746) of being wiped out by a venomous plant. Likewise, this gap between  
     perceived risk and statistical probability can be compared to the chances of a Japanese citizen being  
     abducted by North Korean agents or struck by a missile launch from Pyongyang.    
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Japan‟s responses to North Korea, the processes of risk-perception outlined above have led 
to the DPRK being framed as a persistent source of both imminent and latent risks, for which 
citizens apparently have little choice other than to entrust appropriate action to the state. The 
state, in turn, where possible, shifts responsibility onto its citizens. The concept of a 
recalibration of risk in this process is, therefore, central because it captures the means by 
which risks are not only constructed and mediated by the state, but also how they are 
maintained indefinitely. This is achieved via the risk-perceptions of individual citizens (and 
their societal consensuses), such as those of being abducted or facing a nuclear attack 
(Buzan, 1991: 136), and is reliant upon a lack of objective calculability and perceived inability 
to be effectively countered at the micro level.172 Therein, the lack of objectivity facilitates the 
subjective (re)construction of risks.          
 
2.13. Synthesizing risk and constructivism 
Within the process of risk recalibration outlined above, then, a constructivist understanding 
of international relations theory, as opposed to so-called reductionist positions often 
represented by realist schools, forms the basis for theoretical analysis. This posits not only 
that ideas are inherently critical to the formation of norms, agency and behaviour, but also 
that the interaction of ideas, including those articulated through the nation-state, contain a 
distinct level of structural analysis in themselves (Wendt, 1999: 145-57). If, therefore, a huge 
proportion of any such structure is based on ideas which are contingent upon an evaluation 
of risk, in a socio-politically constructed form, how that interactional structure is manifest 
between agents such as the state, market and society, is evidently reliant upon how risks are 
calibrated by each of those agents (or actors) through those interactions.173 In other words, it 
                                                          
172 That is to say, citizens do not have the means (time/resources etc.) at their disposal to compile empirical  
    studies on the multitude of risks that they perceive to be faced with at any one time (or during any one  
    lifetime).  
173 For an excellently concise outline and evaluation of the core elements of contemporary constructivist  
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is not sufficient to simply calculate (numerically or otherwise) and aggregate the isolated 
properties or influences of, for instance, policy makers, mass media and the North Korean 
community in Japan, because part of their effect upon national posture and foreign policy is 
likely to be manifest within their interactions per se. 
    It is, thus, the intention of this dissertation to draw, as Wendt (1999: 317-36) does, on 
interactionist social theory in order to provide an evolutionary account of the process by 
which Japan has come to calibrate risks framed against the DPRK. Within such an account, 
Wendt (1999: 319) seeks to “explain the movement of variable(s) over time”, “specify a 
means for generating variation in the dependant variable.. …from unit-level changes in the 
structure of state-society relations and from the strategic choices of foreign policy decision-
makers”, and to “incorporate inertial tendencies that stabilize these changes”. The inference 
contended here is that recalibrations of risk within Japan in response to the DPRK should, in 
essence, be determined by such a process. For this dissertation, then, the moving (in one 
sense dependent) variable is the level of risk perceived to emanate from North Korean 
adventurism, which is salient to Japan. The means for generating variation is examined and 
expressed, therein, through the interactive influences of actors in response to the series of 
case studies (independent variables). Inertial tendencies are then explored as the result of 
such an interactive process - resulting, ultimately, in Japan‟s extensive contemporary 
recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK.174  
    Therefore, by synthesizing theoretical strands of risk and constructivism, as outlined 
above, a practical methodology can be applied to unravelling the hypotheses expressed in 
the Introduction. Within this, attention is primarily focussed on the manifestation of these 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    theory, including how they can be reconstructed to intersect with Ulrich Beck’s conceptions of “reflexive  
    modernity”, see Guzzini (2000). 
174 Concrete examples of the process of unit-level interactions resulting in a specific direction of political  
    inertia (towards re-militarization in Japan), including the need for public and commercial  
    recognition/agreement towards increased joint US-Japan military initiatives in response to a perceived threat  
    from North Korea, are expertly explicated by Smith (1999: 69-93). 
108 
 
interactive processes in discourse, often representative of continuing narratives (see Section 
2.4). Therein, by analysing how risk is integrally manifest in the interactions between socially 
constructed ideas contained in discourses mediated between the state, market and society, 
it is possible to elucidate an image of how these sectors intersect and affect concrete shifts 
in the development of social and national norms. Moreover, this illuminates the process 
through which they result in the creation and implementation of reactionary policies and 
influence the direction of national policy trajectories. Further, the theoretical foundations for 
explaining how the recalibration of risk is framed against North Korea by Japan are 
grounded in an appreciation of the proliferation of so called soft power and the influence it 
holds over its harder counterpart. Concurrently, the significance of ideational crystallizations 
becomes of particular salience “whenever there are „willing interpreters and receivers,‟ that is, 
whenever there is a cultural and ideational context that is shared and commonly understood” 
(Chiozza, 2007: 99 (quotation from Nye, 2004)).175 In addition, it is contended that, in 
concordance with Aradau and Munster (2007: 89-115), risk as a construct central to 
domestic socio-political concerns (here within Japan) is the subject of contestation and, 
ultimately, governance.176 It is, therefore, the contested governmentality of risk, and its 
constitutive processes, embedded within the state, market and society, which become of 
primary importance to the dissertation below. Evidently, the prominence of such a 
phenomenon, which has resulted in the upward recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK, 
is present in contemporary Japan. 
    Within this, constructivist concepts of how “systems of signification” (Milliken, 2001: 138-
45) are produced through discourse can also be applied fruitfully to the case of Japan‟s 
                                                          
175 Chiozza’s quantitatively based concepts (2007: 93-126) are adapted to form part of Katzenstein and  
     Keohane’s edited discussion of anti-Americanism, much of which serves to highlight parallels with Japan’s  
     negative framing of the DPRK, or anti-North Koreanism in Japan. 
176 Aradau and van Munster draw, once again, on the work of Michel Foucault in order to note the importance  
     of distinguishing between the risk discussed by Beck (as that which is all-encompassing, exponential and  
     catastrophic) and the use of risk as a kind of heterogeneous “dispotif”, containing a multiple of socio- 
     political elements for utilization in various and complex processes of governmentality.     
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discursive responses to North Korea.177 Milliken adopts a form of “predicate analysis” (2001: 
140-2) to enhance the systematic rigour with which examination of discourse can be used to 
understand a given issue in international relations. This entails analysing the syntactic 
predications of language used by different state and societal agents and actors in order to 
frame the conceptions of a specific issue area (such as those associated with North Korea in 
Japan). As she states (2001: 139), the significance of this approach is that a systematic 
analysis of the linguistic means utilized to frame international issues allows an understanding 
of how it is that,  
beyond giving a language for speaking about (analysing, classifying) phenomena, 
discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world and of 
operationalizing a particular “regime of truth”, while excluding other possible modes of 
identity and action. More specifically, discourses define subjects authorized to speak and 
to act (e.g., foreign policy officials, defence intellectuals, development experts)…   
 
In addition to Milliken‟s analytical framework,178 this dissertation posits that the legitimization 
of such discourses and the actors that propagate them is largely justified in relation (and with 
reference) to the risks that they offer to engage, and seek to ameliorate.179 As such, 
systematic analysis of linguistic predications contained in key discourses relating to the case 
studies discussed in the chapters below also requires an understanding of how risk operates 
within those discourses. In the above sense,  this dissertation attempts to demonstrate how 
                                                          
177 Systems of signification are used here to refer to how a particular discourse leads to the construction of a  
     given social reality based largely upon linguistic sign systems, as opposed to materialist conceptions that     
     would contend a kind of reverse logic. Therein, materialist theories lean towards assigning inherent  
     meaning to material structures, presumably including, for example, the text contained in discourse.    
178 Milliken’s epistemological position on the socio-political salience of discourse is concisely expressed in her  
     discussion of  Western (of which Japan would be included) Alliance identity formation through its framing of  
     North Korea. She asserts that, “state insecurities… …are not given but are (re)constructed through discourse,  
     and ordering of terms, meanings, and practices that forms the background presuppositions and taken-for- 
     granted understandings that enable people’s actions and interpretations. Discourses provide people with  
     the capabilities to represent a situation to themselves and to others. Those capabilities give ways of naming  
     and characterizing the subjects and objects of international relations, including states” (1999: 92).    
179 In concordance with Milliken, this dissertation in no way excludes other forms of discourse analysis (such  
    as metaphorical, syntactic-statistical, or purely interpretive), but rather asserts that a predicative approach  
    lends its self effectively to the task of exposing how risk has been recalibrated within the discourses present  
    in Japan which relate to its framing of the DPRK.  
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risk can be seen to operationalize globalized conceptions of legitimate political behaviour, 
which operate at the level of “statehood” to affect (or dictate) transformations in “cultural 
identity, economic and military foundations, democracy and legitimation” (Beck, 2005: 257) – 
such as those that dictate how Japan frames and responds to North Korea.  This approach 
is derivative of Beck‟s conception of a risk society, in as much as it identifies the escalation 
and exponential construction of risks in the public sphere, which determine how knowledge 
is packaged and acted upon from discourse to policy. In contrast, however, to Beck‟s 
evaluation (2005: 249-79) of a globalization and transnationalization of risk which legitimizes 
a standardized form of global governance (in light of the perceived globality of risk), this 
dissertation posits, rather, that the effects of globalization upon the nationalized construction 
of discourses defines how, at the national level, risk is increasingly utilized (or inadvertently 
adopted) by a broad range of actors incorporating the state, market and society. This affects 
both the construction of cultural norms and the direction of policy based upon them. In other 
words, the globalization of risk intensifies the process of glocalization of those risks, and also 
amplifies the nationalizing of discourses and responses that relate to them.180 
    Furthermore, socio-politically constructed risk, and its influence upon prominent sections 
of discourse within core public and political spheres should be understood in terms of 
containing a high-degree of what Taleb (2007: 62) has termed the “narrative fallacy”. This 
premises that once a powerful discourse has been constructed, and the interactions 
between constitutive parts organized into a coherent structure, however dynamic or 
impermanent, that the discursive narrative of that discourse may take on logics of its own. 
                                                          
180 Beck contends that a national perspective and methodology for understanding the political use of risk is  
    insufficient because the, “threat to humanity from self-generated risks of technological civilization…  …brings  
    with it an autonomous source of global political legitimation for domination”, which “occurs when actors not   
    only states, but advocatory movements from civil society and, not least, corporations as well – are able to   
    claim that they are working to avert or counter the risks facing humanity from technologized civilization.”  
    (2002: 252-3). However, it is the counterclaim of this research, that such influences from civil society and   
    corporations (or the market as a whole) are highly nationalized in character, and as such Japan’s   
    recalibration of risk in response to North Korea is most effectively conceptualized through a nationally-based  
    methodological approach. 
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More concretely, due to essentially biological tendencies in human psychology, actors (or 
agglomerations of actors) will seek to theorize and make connections between events 
regardless of their empirical connections or the statistical likelihood of similar future events. 
This can be clearly exposed in the case of discourses relating to Tokyo‟s interpretation of 
North Korean actions.181 Indeed, the presence of cognitive causal theorizing, associating 
highly intangible linkages between events identified as symptomatic of Pyongyang‟s policies, 
lends additional weight to the pertinence of examining Japan‟s framing of and responses to 
the DPRK. Congruently, this is so in terms of them being primarily based upon a socially 
constructed discourse, which illuminates how risks have been repeatedly recalibrated.182    
 
2.14. Explaining realist tendencies 
Within the essentially constructivist framework outlined above, the intensified reliance upon 
risk as a key explanatory factor in the processes of interaction between the state, market 
and society, which lead to Japan‟s national responses toward North Korea, means that an 
explanation of the seemingly realist-heavy policy tendencies which emerge as a result is 
required. As discussed throughout Chapter 1, many leading scholars of International 
Relations, such as Green (2001) and Samuels (2007), have noted that Japan has moved, 
albeit incrementally, towards a realist national position in the restructured post-Cold War 
                                                          
181 The narrative fallacy is evidently problematic to comprehensively prove as a social or material reality, but  
     what is significant for the purposes of this thesis is Taleb’s exposition of how unexpected events (such as a  
     North Korean nuclear or missile strike against Japan) may be interpreted in radically different ways,  
     depending upon their presence in contemporary discourse. As he succinctly states, “…there are two   
     varieties of rare events: a) the narrated Black Swans, those that are present in the current discourse and  
     that you are likely to hear about on television, and b) those nobody talks about, since they escape models…    
    …the incidences *are+ overestimated in the first case, but severely underestimated in the second one.”  
    (2007: 77). This understanding is of key relevance because it evinces both the socio-politically constructed  
    nature of salient risks, and the empirical and statistical inaccuracy of how they are identified and  
    interpreted,  hence allowing considerable capacity for their multifaceted recalibration.   
182 See Michishita’s exposition of the DPRK’s “cybernetic policies” (2009: 110-7), reviewed in Chapter   
       1, Section 1.2, for an appraisal of how the Pyongyang regime deliberately alters and scrambles its  
       internationally directed actions, particularly vis-à-vis Japan.  
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geopolitical environment of the region. Not least, this has been interpreted as a means by 
which to counter a range of perceived (as material, but defined here as socio-politically 
constructed) risks.  
    In addition, the global proliferation of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005), whilst overtly seeking 
to promote liberal values and the associated modalities of international relations, as 
representative of ideologies posited by the likes of Immanuel Kant, Ernst Haas and, more 
recently, Francis Fukuyama, has in reality been more reminiscent of those projected by 
Thomas Hobbes and Hans Mogenthau. Within this, protectionism against exogenous (as of 
the individual sovereign state) risks, resulting from a world of anarchy based, in Carr‟s terms, 
on the intervention of “Darwinism in politics” (1981: 46-9) holds sway. Thereby, it is posited 
that a combination of natural (biological) competition and socially galvanized and 
agglomerated understandings of economic wealth and power at societal and national levels, 
has increasingly led to the domination of zero-sum, realist-based national postures and 
policies. Theoretically, such are founded, broadly, on the primary socioeconomic logics of 
fundamentalist laissez-faire thinking, stretching forth from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman. 
Moreover, they are adopted strategically, it is contended, as a means through which to 
ameliorate salient, impending and prospective risks. As such, Japan is no exception to the 
realization of predominantly realist socio-political, economic and, in finality, military-based 
responses to risks it perceives to be prevalent within its international relations. Therein, 
these have been increasingly framed against the DPRK.     
    However, such an observed pseudo-realist positional movement at the national level 
neither excludes the existence of its own socially constructed causality, nor confirms that a 
more ratio-materialist theory need be adopted. Concurrently, the process by which Japan 
has recalibrated risk in response to North Korea can be investigated as interactions between 
domestic and external elements that result in a particular, in Wendt‟s terms “cultural” (1999), 
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construction of national interest which may, un-problematically, increasingly contain 
prominent realist elements.183  
    In this respect, revision of the theoretical application of risk from a theological standpoint 
is also fruitful in explaining such tendencies. Indeed, in order to reaffirm the ultimate salience 
of a risk-based approach, it is apt to review the origins and conceptualization of risk. From a 
theological perspective, risk has extensively formed the basis for rational thought based on 
probability calculus, which has in many ways supplanted a reliance on divine pre-
determination. Therein, contemporary understandings of risk in international relations have 
assumed that any omnipresent overpower (i.e., God) can, even if existent, be calculated 
against, or assumed to accept calculations made by their mortal subjects.184 Although this 
has become an almost universal (or common sense) appraisal of how risk is manifest in 
decision making processes (Luhmann, 1996: 5), including those of foreign policy and 
international security discourses, it might be argued that Japan‟s highly secular cultural 
norms and national identity further enhance this conception and diffusion of risk. Indeed, 
Japanese policy makers would be unlikely to gain public support or domestic acceptance for 
security policies promoted in the name of religious righteousness. Moreover, they would 
doubtless be particularly unpopular if there were salient risks that any such policy 
implementation might encounter or incur. It is, then, within this conception of risk, that the 
DPRK becomes an accessible target against which to not only frame risks, but also to 
recalibrate them in rationalized (as having been calculated through probability) terms. 
Therein, although North Korea is framed negatively in ideological terms, as discussed in 
                                                          
183 A significant element of realist tendencies is the phenomenon of neo-nationalism in response to  
    external threats – such as can be seen in Japan’s responses to North Korea. However, while this  
    dissertation accepts that nationalism is an important function of Japan’s recalibration of risk in  
    response to the DPRK, it contends  that nationalist tendencies per se are not privileged as the sole,  
    or even necessarily primary, causal factor of such a phenomenon, and as such limits references to  
    nationalism largely to implicit understandings. For an excellent discussion of nationalism in relation  
    to Japan’s perceptions of Korea and Koreans, see Abe (1989). 
184 This is assumed whether the unitary categorization of would be subjects is the individual, an  
     institution or, most pertinently, the nation state. 
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Chapter 4, Section 4.7, it is primarily as a risk-laden external entity, rather than solely as a 
source of evil (as opposed to a religious conception of good) per se. This contrasts to the 
conception of responses which should be taken to counter that which challenges the divinely 
condoned or envisaged.185  
    In concordance with this established modus operandi, the process of risk recalibration, 
resulting in increased realist concerns, as opposed also to prioritizing more conceptually 
positive cultural norms – specifically in response to North Korea – is captured by Kliman‟s 
term, “Transitional Realism” (2006: 146-62).186 Indeed, this concept helps to illuminate how 
constructivist approaches to risk can explain the emergence of realist policy trajectories, 
which result from the “complex interaction between systemic changes and sub-systemic 
variables” (Kliman, 2006: 162). In essence, realist national tendencies may result from the 
recalibration of apparently salient risks, but both the processes by which those risks are 
recalibrated, and the risks themselves, are essentially socially constructed. Moreover, they 
are reliant on the structure of interactions and resulting inertia generated by domestic 
elements, which realist-based theories are comparatively ill-equipped to explain (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.2, above). 
    As such, each of the case studies identified within Japan are approached in terms of how 
the resulting interactions influence essentially realist policy trajectories at the national level. 
However, this dissertation assumes that their impact stems not solely from the aggregation 
of rational actions imposed by the vested interests of individual actors, but from a multiplicity 
(i.e., variable and not necessarily predetermined by the material interests of those agents) of 
socio-cultural structures, or roles, embedded within macro-level socially constructed cultural 
                                                          
185 An obvious contemporary example of the latter would be jihads, justified on grounds of religious 
     righteousness.   
186 In Japan’s case, such norms include developmentalism, economic expansion, and cultural  
     expansion (or prestige), all of which are more readily pursuable in times of lessened external  
     geopolitical risks (e.g., during the relatively stable geopolitical structure present during the Cold  
     War). 
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norms and identities.187 Furthermore, it is posited that any such norms are, increasingly, 
reliant upon, and constructed in relation to, competition over shared understandings of 
perceived risks. How those perceptions are mediated (e.g., through public sphere 
discourses) between entities such as the state, market and civil society is, thus, of particular 
significance.188 
 
2.15. Conclusion: reaffirming the salience of a risk-based theoretical approach 
Amid the historico-cultural context outlined above, resulting from, among other candidates, 
the intense and as yet not fully known consequences of globalization, risks have then, as 
explored by Beck (2009), become increasingly prevalent and salient across almost the 
entirety of socio-political reality. Therein, risk has become, whether explicitly defined as such 
or not, a key component to understanding a vast majority of domestic, transnational and 
international phenomena which involve processes of human interaction and confrontation.189 
As observed from the review of available literature accessed in Chapter 1, all theoretical 
strands contain implicit considerations of risk, and analyses rely largely on an understanding 
                                                          
187 The term role is included here in order to note the distinction between a neorealist or rationalist  
    conception of agents viewed in terms of being totally analogous with (or actually amounting to)  
    the individual rational actor, and a constructivist approach which recognizes a variety of    
    institutional and organizational actors which affect national structure through their adherence to  
    (and interaction with) cultural norms.  
188 Once again it should be reiterated that market does not refer purely to a single (or multiple)  
     financial institution which is separate from the state or civil society, but rather is used to convey a  
     loose affiliation of economically motivated actors and forces which are inextricably linked to the  
     causal agents which likely  influence any processes concerning national posture (including Japan’s    
     recalibration of risk), such as those identified in the case studies of mass media, as well as policy elites,  and  
     civil society stakeholders. 
189 As noted in Chapter 2, core strands of IR theory, such as those derived from realist, liberal and 
constructivist perspectives do not use the term risk, even when it is the unarticulated focus of discussion. 
This lacunae in explicitness, it is argued from the perspective adopted herein, often times serves to 
obfuscate the causal role which risk plays in justifying policy. More concretely, the risks perceived to be 
posed to Japan by North Korea are left in danger of being either reified from situations into objective threats 
(realist), talked of in economic terms as though not fully connected to (or not interactive with) military or 
geopolitical issues (liberal), or left partially unexplained in discussions of cultural or ideational transitions 
(constructivist).   
116 
 
of international relations which justifies actions and policies in relation to the risks which they 
seek to ameliorate.190 However, there is a particularly heightened degree of salience to a 
focus on risk with regards to the case study of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to 
North Korea. This rests, centrally, upon its explicit operationalization within justifications of 
national policy, and the degree to which it has been employed in, or at least integral to, the 
shifts in cultural norms that shape such policy.  
    The above assertion can be justified with reference to the massive amounts of media 
material alerted to in Section 2.10, the reorientation of societal stakeholders, such as those 
relating to resident Koreans, covered in Section 2.9 and Chapter 4, Section 4.11, and the 
open ended nature of national (governmental) statements. All of these elements reaffirm a 
framing of risks identified with North Korea which evinces their continued proliferation as 
both unavoidable and inevitable. Amid this, the resulting policy trajectory can be observed, 
as confirmed in Chapter 5, Section 5.10, amongst other sources, through examination of 
successive National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG) documents. This emerged as particularly evident in the NDPO of 2005, 
which outlined a series of new contingencies, stemming primarily from North Korea (Fouse, 
2005)191 that were interpreted as requiring a response in the form of urgent policy reforms 
that could facilitate the state‟s ability to counter those new risks.192 Hence, while standard 
conceptualizations of national security policy (and often times IR as a whole) tend to locate 
                                                          
190 It is intriguing, once again, to note Taleb’s retort to the assumptions of those such as Beck,  
        and in differing degrees the majority of political and social science scholars, who assume that such  
        an endeavour can be meaningfully undertaken. He posits, with reference to the “unadvertised  
        structural limitations on our ability to predict” that, “…we tend to both tunnel and think  
        ‘narrowly’ (epistemic arrogance) and our prediction record is highly overestimated… …These  
        limitations may arise not from us but from the nature of the activity itself – too complicated, not    
        just for us, but for any tools we have or can conceivably obtain” (2007: 165).   
191 See also, online version of Asia Pacific Security Studies (2005). 
192 The focus of the delayed 2010 NDPG, released under the Hatoyama administration, is less overt  
        in its assertion of policy prescriptions and their justifications identified with specific threats, but  
        nonetheless maintains an emphasis consistent with the theme of recalibrating risk, which  
        continues to frame the DPRK as a source of multiple and salient risks, which require national  
        policy provisions to be made in response. For full translated text, see MOD (2010). 
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risk as a function of policy decisions made in relation to national security, this dissertation 
adopts a phantasmagorical approach; assuming that both the domestic processes and 
corresponding international relations observed, in this instance through Japan‟s responses 
to North Korea, are ultimately a function of the construction, mediation, and recalibration of 
risks.193 As such, this dissertation examines how such a process has been facilitated through 
the framing of the DPRK in Japan.   
    Further, with regards to the related shift in national and international norms, the concept 
can be understood in terms of how a tension exists between domestic and externally 
focussed norms within Japan, which in Katzenstein‟s terms,  
…lies not in the decentralization or centralization of power but in the number of people 
and the density of institutions involved in defining, interpreting and reinterpreting different 
kinds of norms (1996:20). 
 
Concordantly, this dissertation asserts that all such actors do so through processes which, 
inevitably, involve mediating and recalibrating their perceptions of risk. In other words, 
regardless of discrepancies in the density of institutions involved, and those made between 
domestic and national levels, the so-called cultural norms that are constructed and 
transformed as a result, are contingent upon the conceptualization of risks being posed to 
any such institution. Within this, it is important to reemphasize the distinction between the 
risks themselves (under investigation in this dissertation), which are internalized decisions 
carrying a responsibility to respond to potentially infinite uncertainties, and the concrete or 
tangible dangers and threats which are framed against an external source of potential harms. 
In this case, these apply to such identified with the DPRK from within Japan. This can be 
clarified and reaffirmed through Luhmann‟s conception, which posits that, 
                                                          
193 Phantasmagorical is used in the metaphorical sense adopted by anthropologist, Carlos Castaneda  
        (1972: 143) to describe a reality that is the inverse of what might initially be logically interpreted  
        or intuitive. 
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Since decisions are always operations of a system, be it an individual person or a social 
system [or state], we can characterize risk by the internal attribution of possible harm. A 
possible harm caused by the environment [or in this case another state] has to be 
external and can be called danger (1996:6) 
 
Hence, Luhmann‟s argument illuminates how an acute appreciation of the socially 
constructed nature of risk, and its distinction from danger/threat, can be applied fruitfully to 
the analysis of interstate relations, as well as to the domestic processes which underpin 
them.194  Furthermore, the distinction between risks (and/or uncertainties) and dangers 
(threats and harms), and how they are calibrated, becomes crucial to any such analyses, 
because it exposes how dynamic situations, such as those present in international relations, 
are evaluated and acted upon through processes of decision making which are distinct from 
those observed only in the individual (objective) calculation of threats. Moreover, the 
mediating processes which assign responsibility and justification for such decisions, taken 
on the basis of an evaluation of the inherent risks, form a central area of competition from 
which emerges the formulation of intersubjective knowledge. Hence, it is within these 
subjectively contested bodies of so-called knowledge that parameters for national norms, 
which ultimately delineate the bounds of policy formation and implementation, are created 
and realized.195  
    In sum, the methodological framework discussed in this chapter fuses an essentially 
constructivist theoretical approach with an understanding of the salience of risk in all 
transactions. This is consistent whether located at domestic or international levels, and 
enables the creation of testable hypotheses which intersect both spheres. The hypotheses 
                                                          
194 The fundamental advantages to this approach for the use of risk in IR theory were posited  
     convincingly by Piers Williamson, when asked by fellow panelist, Andrew Oros at the 2010 ISA   
     Convention in New Orleans to justify the use of risk-based terminology as opposed to that of   
     threat perception, already much used by academics and security analysts, particularly, it was  
     claimed by Oros, in the US (see also Oros, 2008: 149-69). 
195 For further discussion of how risks can be understood in terms of decisions taken under the   
      premises of  responsibility – as opposed to tangible objective dangers, see Luhmann (1993: 102-   
      24).  
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addressed in this dissertation, therein, essentially draw their explanatory power from the 
conception that national policy creation and implementation is administered in line with 
cultural norms which are reliant upon a mutually constitutive group of entities (actors) 
intersecting the state, market and society. These interact to create a delineation of norms 
representative of national identity and interest (Weldes, 1999: 10-13). A central research 
goal of this dissertation is, therefore, to elucidate how those norms are driven by such an 
interactive process. Specifically, it seeks to expose how the agency of constitutive actors is 
reliant upon their conception and (re)calibration of risk. This is achieved through an 
examination of the related socio-political processes observed in the case study of Japan‟s 
framing of and responses to North Korea. The following chapter examines how the initiation 
of such a process can be observed in relation to the missile test firings of 1993 and 1998. 
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Chapter 3. Japan’s recalibration of risk in response to early post-
Cold War events and North Korean missiles: normalization talks, 
nuclear crisis, and the 1993 Nodong -v- 1998 Taepodong 
  
    “Now, more than ever, Japan must take measures to convince North Korea that it 
is both wasting its time and hindering its own interests by firing missiles and such like. 
If, due to its constitution, Japan is not allowed to make provisions to counter-
aggression,  then all the more reason why it should establish a robust defence 
posture and take every step possible to prepare itself for a contingency”   
Sakurai Yoshiko (1999: 131)196 
 
3.1. Pivotal events in a converging recalibration of risk: identifying key areas of 
structure, agency and norms 
The August 1998 Taepodong 1 test missile launch probably acted more than any other single 
event or action as the most significant catalyst in the processes driving Japan‟s post-Cold 
War recalibration of risk vis-à-vis North Korea.197 As such, the precursors to the launch, and 
the reaction by key actors to it, form a logical starting point from which to examine how the 
process of risk recalibration was embedded in discourse. Moreover, such an examination 
needs to be undertaken with respect to central structural transformations occurring in the 
                                                          
196    Although Sakurai is well-known as a hard-line right-winger, her statement is significant in as much as it is 
representative of growing discourses associated with North Korea’s framing in the post-Cold War era. 
197   The first Taepodong launch was identified as such independently by, amongst others, representatives of 
the Institute of International Policy Studies (IIPS), National Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies 
(GRIPS) and Research Institution for Peace and Security (RIPS) in both open discussions and single 
interviews on the subject (Appendix A). This is a striking concurrence, considering that all represent 
independent academic bodies which focus on this field, and gives weight to the impetus for scrutinizing the 
actors which facilitated the deployment of this event in such a process.       
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post-Cold War security environment of East Asia, and has to be contextualized in relation to 
a number of prevailing norms which influence how risks are mediated between the state, 
market and society in Japan. In addition, it should be made clear that the Taepodong launch 
was by no-means an isolated incident, and has to be placed in the context of precursory 
events and on-going political discourse, particularly that which surrounded the break-down of 
Japan-DPRK normalization talks in the early 1990s, Pyongyang‟s withdrawal from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which sparked the so-called nuclear crisis of 1993-
1994, and increasing public and political attention to the abduction issue. Most pertinently, in 
terms of understanding the recalibration of risk, reaction to the Taepodong 1 incident can be 
illuminatingly analysed in stark contrast to the relatively indifferent response shown within 
Japan to the comparable Nodong missile test launch of May 1993. This chapter elucidates 
the extent of the gap between the two events; as illustrative of the process of framing North 
Korea, and the consequent recalibration of aggregated risks in Japan.       
     At the outset, Chapter 3, below, outlines specifically how, in the wake of the first 
Taepodong launch, the agents identified above initiated and affected an accelerated process 
of risk recalibration through the framing of North Korea. It next explains how the key political 
actors involved intersect and interact with Japan‟s media and civil society, i.e., how risk has 
been mediated through the public sphere, in ways that have exerted a powerful influence 
upon the on-going political process. Concretely, the focus is on how and to what extent 
actors outside, as well as inside, of party politics can be seen as representative of a single 
policy making structure, which mediates risk in Japan. As described earlier, in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.8, the encompassing core units of national policy formation are termed “policy 
communities” (Campbell et al., 1989: 86-94), in order to convey their permeable and 
dynamic nature, and malleability in terms of their vulnerability to the effects of perceived 
risks. This term is also adopted to avoid the limited view of Japan‟s state-level policy making 
as being solely a fixed, reified, iron triangle of business, bureaucracy and big-time politicians, 
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which, is not congruent with the findings of this research.198 The issue of central concern is 
how the perception of risks, such as those emanating from Pyongyang, is used to shape 
national norms and justify policy innovations. This is addressed specifically by employing an 
epistemology based on constructivist theories, as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, above, 
to explain how the conceptualization of risks within Japan‟s policy communities has been 
recalibrated. 
    In order, then, to identify the key agents of power within this context (vis-à-vis North 
Korea), the bare bones of what can be conceived of as the core of Japan‟s policy community 
in this area is first sketched through a contemporary-historical account of how it has 
developed since the end of the Cold War and the first North Korean nuclear crisis.199 How 
that policy community has shifted its calibration of risk via the framing of the DPRK is then 
traced up to and after the key event of Pyongyang‟s test missile launch in August of 1998. 
Making use of discourse analysis, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.12, this is 
tackled chiefly, as extrapolated below, through scrutinizing statements within the National 
Diet and corresponding coverage in news sources and academic debate relating to 
Pyongyang‟s movements and actions.200 The tangible impact of civil society stakeholders 
and mass media upon the political core of the policy community is, therein, discussed in 
depth prior to and following the pivotal events of the 1993 Nodong and 1998 Taepodong test 
launches.201 These analyses elucidate qualitative and quantitative data which evince the 
conclusion that a complex process constituting a distensible recalibration of risk took place 
                                                          
198   Business in this sense refers to leading, domestic, commercial pressure groups, represented by large 
agglomerations of enterprise networks such as Keidanren, military equipment firms and energy companies. 
199  It is argued here that isolating a policy communities, which relate solely to North Korea policy, is  
      problematic. However, because the focus of this chapter, and indeed the dissertation as a whole, is that of  
      Japan’s responses to the DPRK, discussion is concentrated on elements of state-level policy elites which  
      have specific impact and or authority in this area. 
200   For full details and justifications for data sources, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, above. 
201 While due attention is given here to the interactive processes by which such actors may influence the  
     policy community as a whole, extended discussion of these elements as an on-going source for the sustained 
     recalibration of risks is tackled in greater depth throughout Chapters 4 and 5. 
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between the end of the Cold War and the end of the millennium. In addition, it is contended 
that this has been facilitated through responses to actions and political posture orchestrated 
and assumed by a negatively framed DPRK. 
 
3.2. From the “red peril” to fear of the Kims: ideological change and the role of 
risk in priming a frame for the new enemy 
When considering Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea, it is necessary to 
consider both how novel that process is and to what past or present empirical models it can 
be compared. The precedents to Japan‟s socio political recalibration of risk through the 
framing of the DPRK might logically, then, be found, as examined in Chapter 2, Section 2.7, 
in its framing of previous highly-calibrated external entities perceived as the source of salient 
risks, such as the USSR during the Cold War. Indeed, in the same way that it is questionable 
as to what practical, geo-military, function the development and dispatch of BMD PAC-3 anti-
missile launchers by Japan could realistically be likely to have in countering risks from North 
Korea, Tokyo‟s stationing of large-scale land forces on Hokkaido during the Cold War, on the 
grounds that they would prevent a Soviet-led land-based attack, would also appear to 
represent an erroneous calibration (at the state level) of risk. Indeed, as one leading expert 
confirmed (14 December 2010a, Appendix A), the perception that an imminent contingency 
would occur in either case was “ridiculous.”202 
       In this respect, corroborative expertise accessed for this dissertation (Appendix A) 
confirms that the Taepodong incident of 1998 was critical in propelling proactive debate (and 
ultimate purchase and introduction) on the subject of BMD systems to counter risks identified 
                                                          
202   It is also noteworthy that the same source cited not only individual political capital targeted by specific 
politicians or administrations as the motivation for Japan’s raising of risk levels and subsequent deployment 
of SDF forces in these cases, but also posited the need for the state to ostensibly demonstrate its 
international presence in relation to regional players, regardless of the accurate evaluation of short-term 
risks which they may pose. 
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with North Korea‟s missile development programs. This was made possible also because of 
the uncertainty of those risks. While statistically being (undeniably) minimal and largely 
understood by policy makers as such – as the empirical data below will demonstrate – the 
mere possibility, aided by Pyongyang‟s continual sabre rattling, justified the ultimate 
deployment of the BMD system PAC-3s to Akita in 2009, as explained in Chapter 5, Section 
5.10. Likewise, there is little doubt, retrospectively (though probably also understood at the 
time), that the Soviet forces would only have been interested in a potential strike on the US‟s 
Japan-based forces, and would have been extremely unlikely to attempt a gruelling landing 
on Hokkaido, which surely promised little strategic or political gain. However, as covered in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.7.i, Japan‟s domestic framing of such external entities as the Soviet 
Union, as being capable of such action, warrants attention when assessing the processes 
behind the contemporary recalibration of risk in response to North Korea.203 
    Indeed, in terms of Japan‟s media and political reaction to the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War, coverage analysed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.i generally exhibited a number of 
characteristics comparable to that of how the negative image of North Korea has been 
created and mediated during the post-Cold War era. However, one contrast clearly visible in 
the political debate and media coverage of the later Cold War years, as compared to that 
expressed in reaction to today‟s North Korea, is the broad-range of disagreement and 
variance between parties and actors of the time. The prevalence of this tendency, particularly 
within the political elite, is captured by the media in headlines such as “„Defence White 
Paper: Tendency Towards Becoming a Military Superpower, Opposition Parties Criticize 
Government Stance” (Asahi, evening edition, 14 September 1984). The above article reports 
on the fact that four of the leading opposition parties oppose the LDP-led administration‟s 
proposals to exceed the agreed 1 per cent of GDP budget limit on defence spending in 
                                                          
203 The theory of Japan’s highly politicized use of troop deployments and military apparatus, and their 
comparative relevance to the historical and contemporary utilization of recalibrated risk, was outlined in an 
interview by one of Japan’s most experienced political scientists (19 October 2010, Appendix A). 
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response to a perceived latent threat from the Soviet Union, and warn to varying degrees 
against being led by “The Nakasone Cabinet‟s clear trajectory of a dangerous path towards 
military strengthening.”204 The trend of overt political competition over taking the toughest line 
against Pyongyang (as opposed to contestation over whether or not to take a tough line 
against the Soviet Union) has been one of the most illustrative political features of Japan‟s 
framing of North Korea and its according recalibration of risks, and has escalated during the 
first decade of the 21st Century, as demonstrated by the evidence exposed in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.6 and Chapter 5, Section 5.2.i. However, the general policy community 
convergence on how Japan should respond as a state towards the DPRK is, as discussed 
below, visible from the time of the 1998 Taepodong launch – evincing the existence of a (at 
least partially) novel process in the post-Cold War era, by which risks pertaining to the same 
external entity (the DPRK) are almost universally assigned similar agency across the political 
spectrum in this sphere.   
    Nevertheless, aspects of precedents to such a process do appear visible from historical 
analysis of reaction by Japan to risks identified with the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the 
potency of missiles as both a symbolic and tangible means by which to recalibrate risks in 
this manner bears a degree of resemblance in the two cases (Asahi Shimbun, 7 and 9 
August 1984).205 Conversely, however, the perception of North Korea as a source of such 
diverse and salient multiple risks, not only per se but also as specifically targeted at Japan, 
is a development – initiated in the wake of successive missile launches in 1993 and 1998 –
that cannot be found to the equivalent degree in political elite and media discourse 
pertaining to the Soviet Union of that time.206 Indeed, though numerous sources in Japan 
                                                          
   204 At the time, the four opposition parties included the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshu-Shakaitō), Socialst    
        Party (Shakaitō), Communist Party (Kyōsantō) and later to be coalition partner Clean Government Party    
        (Kōmeitō). 
205 See articles such as “Soren, shinmisairu wo kaihatsu: bei MX ni taikō koji” and “Soren taiheiyō misairu    
      jikken” (respective dates, anonymous authors). 
206  Such a gulf in risk calibration made between the Soviet and North Korean threats is particularly pertinent 
in consideration of the comparative scale of former Soviet forces and their undisguised status of being 
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identified the risks associated with Moscow‟s weapons programs as something of growing 
concern, the highly emotive rhetoric used to describe the Kim dynasty‟s Pyongyang regime 
and the consequent recalibration of risks framed against North Korea is disproportionate to 
that which was visible in the late 1980s vis-à-vis the former Soviet administration.207 This is 
particularly so when comparing reaction in newspapers and on the Diet floor. 
     Concerns over risks to Japan posed by a Soviet military build-up were, moreover, largely 
discussed and framed in terms of entrapment by the US, which was locked in an arms race 
with Moscow, and how Tokyo should negotiate to avoid a resulting military contingency.208 
Such debate in the political and media spheres can be observed throughout the Cold War 
era, and at no time exhibited the calibration amounting to the kind of socio-political furore 
expressed through the modern-day framing of North Korea. Hence, while the Soviet Union 
remained a constant reference point for external risks and a justification for foreign policy 
trajectories across Japan‟s state, market and society (and mediated within the public sphere) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
locked in a Cold War with Japan’s sole ally. Yet, the move towards framing Pyongyang as a source of risk 
equal-or-in excess of that posed by Moscow is also identifiable through opinion poll questions from the 
respective periods. Opinion poll data in themselves, while illuminating, are very much dependent upon how 
questions are framed. In that respect, as North Korean issues first rose to a degree of prominence within 
the public sphere in Japan during the early 1990s, leading polls contained questions such as, “How much of 
a threat, if any, do you think North Korea poses to the national security of Japan...?”  and “If North Korea 
has nuclear weapons, would you favour or oppose Japan developing its own nuclear weapons? ” (Roper 
Center, 2009).  The above, then, demonstrates how the North’s framing, as constitutive of risks posed 
directly to Japan, is primed – replacing questions that were previously targeted at the Soviet Union with, at 
times (in the case of that pertaining to nuclear weapons, above) even more antagonistic terminology 
targeted toward the DPRK.   
207 The poll items cited in the preceding footnote are a case in point. Not one of them identifies the Soviet 
      Union as posing immanent, pressing risks, or as a direct threat to Japan – as opposed terms referring to 
      Japan’s security and the threat (kyōi) continually identified with North Korea in comparable articles of the 
      post-Taepodong era. Greater length and use of emotive language and personal description are also more 
extensive in the articles relating to the DPRK. 
208  For chronologically illustrative examples of Diet debates on the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and 
their relevance to Japan, see statements made by Okada Sōji (Honkaigi, 2 November 1957, 37: 3), Nagasue 
Eīchi (Honkaigi, 15 May 1964, 46: 25), Senaga Kamejirō (Special Committee for Okinawa and the Northern 
Territories, 20 December 1973, 72: 45) etc. A counter-argument (though also highlighting the then converse 
emphasis on not framing external states as enemies) to the trend of concern over US entrapment is 
provided, with incidental reference also to North Korea, by Hiranuma Takeo (4
th
 Special Security Committee, 
24 April 1984, 101: 6). 
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in the post-War era, North Korea – particularly following its 1990s missile tests – became 
framed in such a way as to provide a far more overt, and universally accepted, political tool 
with which to recalibrate risks. This is so in terms of the feasibility and probability of a 
combination of potential cumulative harms to be exacted upon Japan by a specified external 
foe. Indeed, as will be observed in Chapter 5, Section 5.6, below, quantitative examination of 
media and Diet materials relating to North Korea in the post-Cold War period – as opposed 
to those pertaining to the Soviet Union during the Cold War – bear out this comparison. 
Moreover, as expressed by Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, below, the pivotal role of the 1998 
Taepodong launch in the framing of the DPRK and resulting recalibration of risk becomes 
apparent.              
    One key area which can be attributed at least partial causality for the form in which the 
framing of North Korea within Japan‟s public sphere has taken place to such an extent, is 
that of a shift in ideological emphasis. During the Cold War, for instance, the Soviet Union 
was framed as a risk to Japan in terms not only of military contingencies, but as the source 
of an ideology which restricted freedoms and compromised the dominant norms of Japan‟s 
post-war social democracy. Likewise, comparison between how social movements and 
groups in Japan targeted the military regime of post-World War II South Korea and how their 
contemporary post-Cold War counterparts direct fears towards the North is illuminating in 
this respect. The framing of the ROK‟s militarized junta or of Soviet socialism, as an 
underlying source of ideological risks posed by Japan‟s newly formed post-War neighbours, 
as opposed to individualized criticisms of Kim Jong-Il, or of specific acts he is deemed to 
have presided over, highlight the apparently individualized ideological shift within civil society. 
This is suggestive of a shift towards an atomized perception of risks identified with specific 
incidents and individuals, rather than risk recalibration as a function of coordinated social 
movements based on ideological principles (Ōta, 2003: 139-43). Put simply, responses to 
North Korea are framed less in Japan as right versus left or, capitalist versus communist. 
Rather, they are placed in a context which amplifies fears of a range of risks which will 
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directly affect the individual as a function of the state (of Japan). Furthermore, it is suggested 
that these will be perpetrated by an isolated external individual, framed as a malevolent 
entity (Kim-Jong-Il‟s DPRK), who‟s intentions are uncertain – though perceived certainly as 
the source of those risks.209 In this sense, for Tokyo, the post-Cold War framing of the North 
has, in combination with insecurity over risks arising from a changing regional power 
structure and drives to reaffirm (US) bilateralism, been a key factor in facilitating an 
ideological shift, which has given momentum towards embracing a more robust security 
stance (Soeya, 2005: 174-9).  
 
3.3. The first Pyongyang joint declaration: before the risks were recalibrated 
In September of 1990 Japan‟s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party 
(JSP) and the Korean Workers Party (KWP) issued a joint statement at the Three Party Talks 
led by Deputy Prime Minister, Kanemaru Shin in Pyongyang – effectively stating that Japan 
and North Korea would move towards a diplomatic normalization process. In the present day 
climate (framing) of North Korean affairs in Japan this could have been expected to have 
been a publicly focal and ultimately momentous political event. Yet, in the sessions of the 
Diet during the preceding year, the DPRK was addressed a total of only seventeen times. It 
is also notable that much of such discussions mentioning Pyongyang related to North Korea 
only in as much as it was identified as one of a number of ideologically distinct, yet 
potentially perceivable as non-confrontational or not regarded as enemy (tekishi de nai) 
states, in terms of Japan‟s continued efforts to promote economic prosperity and 
development within the East Asia region.210 Indeed, the DPRK was predominantly framed at 
                                                          
209  This is the so-called mad dictator thesis. As we have seen from the analysis provided by Michishita and 
others (see, Chapter 1, Section 1.2, above), the internationally targeted strategy adopted by Kim’s regime 
has been rational if nothing else – and as such, while often times not as successful as claimed by those who 
seek to depose it, can be seen as no more or less mad than any number of politicians and administrations 
the world over who adopt comparable power-mongering tactics design to support regime survival. 
210  I.e., the DPRK was addressed by government sources as part of a communist ideological block, including  
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this time, not as a threat which posed a multitude of salient risks to the security of Japan, but 
rather as one half of a troubled peninsula for which Japan could play an almost philanthropic 
role in softening the détente (kinchō kanwa) between the Northern and Southern halves. To 
this end, the central focus of discourse was geared towards tackling how politico-ideological 
problems could be overcome in order to secure a sound platform upon which to initiate a 
process of effective normalization (seijōka). As part of which, former Prime Minister, 
Takeshita Noboru‟s apology for Korean suffering under Japanese occupation, made in March 
of 1989, can be seen as a significant precursory event to this process. Such sentiments 
were also reiterated by Prime Minister, Kaifu Toshiki in his address to the main chamber 
(honkaigi) of the Diet on 12 October 1990, in which he preceded his apology to the Korean 
people with a statement which evinced Japan‟s equidistant policy towards the two Koreas 
and a playing down of risks associated with Pyongyang‟s gun-g-ho attitude towards external 
relations – including the capture, and imprisonment of Japanese nationals. Kaifu asserted 
that, 
With regards to relations with North Korea, the multi-party envoy has been successful 
in realizing the return of the two persons of concern and resolving the No.18 Fujiyama-
maru issue.
211
 In addition, I welcome the establishment of bilateral dialogue between the 
respective authorities, with respect to moving towards full normalization between Japan 
and the DPRK (119: 19). 
 
Such a conciliatory and all-embracing (dove-ish) approach – which minimizes the calibration 
of risks – towards the North serves to illustrate a stark contrast to the kind of framing and 
criticism Pyongyang can now expect to receive from all corners of Japan‟s political elite, as 
spotlighted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2 and Section 5.5. Certainly, taking anything other than a 
hard-line against the detention of Japanese nationals, particularly when imprisoned on highly 
dubious grounds by North Korea, has come to run the risk of likely political suicide – 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
             states such as China, the former Soviet Union and Vietnam, rather than as an independent geopolitical or  
             geo-strategic threat, which might harbour multiple and salient risks. 
211  The No.18 Fujiyama-maru incident involved the seven year detention of two of the ship’s crew members, 
Beniko Isamu (Captain) and Kuriura Yoshio (Chief Engineer), by North Korean authorities on (denied) 
suspicion of subversive activities. 
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particularly, as noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, following exacerbation of the abductions 
issue in the wake of Koizumi‟s 2002 visit to Pyongyang. 
    Conversely, although concerns were raised by members of the Diet‟s Security Committee 
(anzen hoshō iinkai) and opposition parties over the potential risks of a Euro-American 
reduction in East Asian regional military power at the turn of the Cold War, in juxtaposition to 
that posed by the out-going communist block‟s continued armament (including North Korea), 
the DPRK was not forcibly identified as either the key player in such a movement, nor as a 
likely combatant adversary to Japan. This was particularly so in terms of representing an 
independent military contingency – or as posing major risks to Japan‟s security. Hence, the 
potential risks emanating from North Korea were evidently not highly-calibrated (or as of 
then not made accessible in the public sphere) by Japan‟s policy community of the late 
1980‟s and early 1990s – including its risk entrepreneurs.212 
    Following the final collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia, then, the Pyongyang 
Joint Declaration was representative of this political leaning towards normalization with the 
North. Indeed, the greater part of relevant Diet minutes reflect an overtly low-calibration of 
risk by Japan‟s political elite in response to the DPRK. Such a stance was reflected across 
the chambers, and on 13 March 1991, during a session of the Special Security Committee 
(anzen hoshō tokubetsu iinkai), Social Democratic Party spokesman, Seki Haremasa 
contended that,   
Whether as a representative of the LDP or as of my own party... ...today, as the 
government indeed, we are building constructively in our dealings with the DPRK. 
Therefore [given the alleviation of the previously perceived Soviet threat] I believe it is 
time for us to draw a line under the era when our nation was inclined to expand the 
budget for defence, and continued to rely on the US (120: 160). 
 
                                                          
212  Risk entrepreneur – essentially derived from the concept of norm entrepreneur – is used herein as a means 
    by which to express actors who seek to manipulate knowledge attached to potential risks in order to justify   
    or legitimate policy reform or implement reactive measures. This is based on the use of risk as a means to    
    purport scientifically backed knowledge, and hence administer power, as explored in-depth by Beck (1992). 
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Moreover, the potential, and necessity, for Japan to provide aid to a North Korea 
precariously trapped by its reliance upon the former communist superpower, is also pushed 
forward by LDP ministers as part of a restructuring of the East Asia region. Such an initiative 
was to include full and rapid normalization of political relations between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang.   
 
3.4. Media responses to the DPRK within Japan in the early post-Cold War years 
As Japan specialist, John Creighton-Campbell has stated, “Everyone around the Japanese 
government seems to read three papers a day and to take from them his or her own notions 
of what problems facing the nation deserve attention and what might be done about them” 
(Krauss and Pharr, 1996: 187). Yet, mass media reaction – including that of national 
newspapers – in Japan to the first joint declaration made between Tokyo and Pyongyang in 
1990 was limited, inferring that the policy community might not feel the need to do that much 
with regards to North Korea. This is particularly so if compared to the kind of public sphere 
fervour surrounding events such as Koizumi‟s visit to Pyongyang just over a decade later. 
 However, coverage of the DPRK in the early post-Cold War years was by no means 
absent. Indeed, responses to the delegation of the LDP and JSP led by then political heavy 
weight, Kanemaru Shin, demonstrate subtle precursory signs of the norms that have come 
to govern the media‟s responses to Japan‟s North Korea policy in the present era. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government (and the political elite as a whole) were keen to 
rapidly improve relations with Pyongyang in a North East Asian region that was undergoing a 
considerable degree of inter-state political restructuring (or realigning) following the 
aftermath of the Cold War (Fouse, 2006: 137). However, the media were already, albeit in an 
understated manner, seemingly seeking a way to forge a new national identity, espousing a 
greater degree of autonomy, which could appeal to large sections of Japan‟s populous. The 
prevalence of this phenomenon within the media, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, has 
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come to be a source of intense debate over Japan‟s identity, which is consistently juxtaposed 
vis-à-vis the negative framing of the DPRK. Furthermore, the extent to which the negative 
framing of North Korea has been created in the past two decades can be gauged to a 
degree by the types of language being used to discuss normalization efforts of the time. 
Illustratively, the Asahi Shimbun‟s evening edition commentary section (kaisetsu) of 8 
September 1990, for example, announces that, 
   The fact that both the LDP and JSP, and the North Korean authorities, have agreed upon the 
delegation to visit the DPRK (North Korea) demonstrates that, at long last, relations between 
Tokyo and Pyongyang, which have been effectively severed since the separation of the 
Korean Peninsula, have the potential to move towards normalization. 
Going on to assert that, 
The fact that the North‟s supreme leader, Kim Il-Sung, has agreed in advance to hold talks 
with the delegation evinces the firm resolution of the North Korean authorities to pro-actively 
seek real improvement of relations between Japan and the DPRK.   
 
However, even the Asahi does not omit mention of the various stumbling blocks to 
normalization, and the likely rocky road (uyo kyokusetsu) such a process will face. As 
suggested above, the Asahi exhibits the greatest swing in risk recalibration among the 
leading quality newspapers in terms of how North Korea is framed. Concordantly, such 
concerns are more vigorously aired by other news sources, including the Yomiuri Shimbun, 
which assesses the Pyongyang visit as containing both “expectation and uncertain 
concerns” (kitai to fuan) (16 September 1990) – a position which has shifted to focus almost 
entirely on the uncertain concerns in the present day. As such, although public opinion and 
media coverage alike were optimistic about the possibilities of Japan forging a new 
relationship with North Korea, the apparently over conciliatory nature of the Kanemaru 
team‟s approach to negotiations with then leader, Kim Il-Sung‟s regime, drew criticism – 
particularly retrospectively – in the public sphere as dogeza gaikō, or grovelling diplomacy 
(Sankei Shimbun, 21 October 2004, evening edition).213 Nevertheless, the Asahi was highly 
                                                          
213 Though Fouse identifies a greater long-term political and economic influence for Japan in a potentially      
unified Korean peninsula as the underlying motivation behind Japanese government efforts made towards     
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critical of extremist right-wing groups and their associations with organized crime syndicates 
(yakuza) which sought to hijack the normalization process initiated through the envoy to 
Pyongyang led by Kanemaru (see editorials, 10 and 23 September 1992). In this sense, the 
paper rapidly became a largely isolated – and indeed ridiculed by the right-of-centre media – 
bastion for playing-down risks posed by North Korea, and promoting a less uncompromising 
normalization process. This was a stance which, as illustrated by the analysis provided in 
Section 3.14, below, of its comparative reactions to the events of 1993 and 1998, began to 
shift substantially towards a recalibration of those risks.     
    Hence, while at this stage in the early post-Cold War years risks were not being calibrated 
as particularly high-level in terms of those posed to Japan by the DPRK, it might be seen as 
already having been primed as a potential target for negative framing. This was due not least 
to the North‟s overtly left-of-centre (communist) stance, harbouring of suspected terrorists, 
and unwillingness to return Japanese detainees.214 Indeed, positive mainstream media 
coverage of the early post-Cold War bilateral diplomatic initiatives made between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang was premised on the idea that North Korea would, indeed, have to change its 
communist ideology and political structure in order to survive in the newly created East Asian 
environment (Watanabe, 1990) – something which it can now be accused of not having done, 
and hence further exacerbating the way it is framed within a convergent right-of-centre main-
stream media in Japan. Within this, although the framing of North Korea may be more 
overtly promoted by traditionally right-of-centre print-media such as the Yomiuri Shimbun or 
Sankei Shimbun, and right-wing politicians and activists, even sources which initially 
contended a more measured approach to Pyongyang‟s sabre-rattling, such as the Asahi 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the DPRK at this time, it is clear that individual, short-term political capital was also at stake for Kanemaru. It     
might also be argued that any meaningful autonomous bilateral advancements were always likely to be     
curtailed by US foreign policy and security interests in the region (McCormack, 2007).     
214 The timing of the LDP-JSP mission to Pyongyang came soon after the end of the Cold War at a time when 
Japan’s high calibration of risks against a communist threat were still ideologically fresh in the mind. Hence, in 
one sense, associations with a strong communist-based ideology held weighty negative influence upon     
perceptions in the public sphere (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.i, above). 
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Shimbun, have been swayed. This has been driven by a process which combines pressures 
of state, market and society towards the recalibration of risks perceived to emanate from the 
DPRK; leading the Asahi, ultimately, towards a stance on North Korea which is closer to its 
ostensibly right-of-centre counterparts – particularly in the wake of a series of pivotal events 
(as discussed sequentially in sections and chapters below) framed as hostile acts 
undertaken by North Korea. 
 
 3.5. Normalization talks stumble: the precedents of risk recalibration emerge 
After seven rounds of sluggish, though promising, normalization talks between the 
delegations of Japan and the DPRK, the process finally hit a major stumbling block during 
November 1992 in the form of the Japanese side‟s allegations over an abduction case. A 
woman, known in North Korea as Ri Un-Hye, it was suspected, had been abducted from her 
home town in Japan for the purposes of teaching Japanese language and culture in North 
Korea.215 This issue, combined with rumblings over Pyongyang‟s increased military build-up, 
in particular that which involved nuclear developments, brought about the first clear signs of 
risk recalibration and a negative framing of the DPRK in the Diet. Then Minister of Defence, 
Nakayama Toshio warned, during a session of the Diet Security Committee on 18 February 
1993, that the development of “nuclear-related facilities and extension to the range of 
intercontinental missiles” (126: 2) in North Korea represented a major cause of instability in 
the region (ōki-na fuantei no yōin). However, it is striking that the “abduction issue”, or rachi-
mondai, had not taken full hold in the mass media, and was yet to be pushed forward within 
public discussions in the Diet at that time. Indeed, concerned voices pointing to potentially 
expanding risks emanating from the North were almost entirely cased in technical concerns 
over Pyongyang‟s nuclear facilities and (non)cooperation with the International Atomic 
                                                          
215 Details of this case remain contested, but it has been confirmed by corroboration from within the DPRK  
      that this woman is Taguchi Yaeko, who was kidnapped from Japan sometime in the early summer of 1978     
         (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2009a). 
135 
 
Energy Authority (IAEA).216 This was termed as the “nuclear development suspicion” or 
kakukaihatsu giwaku, but not yet re-standardized as “kakukaihatsu mondai” (nuclear-
weapons development problem).217 
    Nevertheless, the fact that the North began to be the target of criticism and blame within 
political circles and the mass media in Japan did come to the fore, and can, once again, be 
seen as part of a process of priming the DPRK to be framed as an entity warranting the 
recalibration of risks. The Asahi Shimbun‟s editorial of 8 November 1992 displays signs of 
this phenomenon, by both maintaining its promotion of the Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization 
process, but at the same time blaming the North directly for stalling negotiations because of 
its lack of flexibility and transparency – particularly over the nuclear issue. The article, 
entitled “Don‟t stall Japan-North Korea negotiations!” states that, 
North Korea has begun to show some signs of flexibility, but they are as yet still 
insufficient. We need them to consider matters carefully at this time. The primary reason for 
this malaise [in the negotiation process] is North Korea‟s rigid stance and the suspicions over 
its nuclear programme. North Korea‟s nuclear development will have a serious impact upon 
the security of Asia and the Pacific. 
 
    Commentary from the Yomiuri Shimbun a day earlier is less understated in its criticism of 
the North Korean authorities. Therein, the DPRK is accused of causing the rupture in 
normalization talks due to its aggressive negotiating style, on-going nuclear suspicions, 
playing for time in order to assess the changing political situation in surrounding states, and 
possible domestic competition (7 November 1992). 
    In this sense, North Korea was framed not as the source of absolute evil which can be 
seen as portrayed in the public sphere of today‟s Japan (particularly with regards to the 
abduction issue, see Chapter 5), but was painted more as an unknown, though perhaps 
dangerous and potentially volatile problem, which needed to be nipped in the proverbial bud 
                                                          
216 See discussions in the Foreign Ministry Committee between Ikeda Tadashi and Kubota Manae, 7 December 
     1992. 
  217 Further discussion of the kakukaihatsu mondai is reserved for the succeeding section, and is dealt with  
       more extensively in terms of the transformation of media terminology in Chapter 4, Section 4.7. 
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through proactive (sekkyokuteki) addressing of the immediate stumbling blocks. These, it 
was still largely being argued, were a prerequisite for the ultimate – and expected – 
establishment of full diplomatic normalization between Tokyo and Pyongyang. 
 
3.6. North Korean nuclear crisis: the policy community’s initial response 
On 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced that it was to withdraw from the nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), following a series of demands made by the IAEA and the US 
government to allow special inspections of its processing and other facilities. This provided 
political fuel for the initial creation of the foremost foundations of Japan‟s risk recalibration 
process. The framing of North Korea as not just an awkward and suspicious anomaly, but as 
a prolonged and serious cause of concern (warranting an all-reaching recalibration of risk) 
began to take shape, though it was yet to be fully developed or escalated – something which, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the abduction issue, multiple missile launches, 
and nuclear tests were particularly pivotal in achieving. In the Diet, on 25 March 1993, 
Foreign Minister, Watanabe Michio referred to the “nuclear development suspicion problem” 
(kakukaihatsu giwaku no mondai), representing a strikingly tortured piece of terminology that 
would seem to epitomize the midst of a transition from one calibration of risk to the next.218 
He also described the North Koreans‟ withdrawal from the NPT as presenting a “major 
source of concern” and a “challenge to the framework of non-proliferation” (126: 2). The 
terminology used to predicate discussion of the DPRK within the Japanese Diet at this time 
is of interest here, because it points to a recurring theme of indicating an increase in risk and 
uncertainty about how best to deal with issues attached to North Korea. At the same time, 
there was growing certainty behind the premise that legitimate provisions must be made to 
ameliorate those risks. This process was facilitated not least by Cabinet discussions 
following the North‟s NPT pull-out, which also began to frame the DPRK as a bastion of 
                                                          
218 I.e., from the rather vague (lower risk) sounding “suspicion” to and obvious risk presented by a “problem”. 
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unknown, but distinctly negative features – i.e., as a clear source of risks. These include 
increasing references to the totalitarian regime, the lack of knowledge about the North‟s civil 
society, and the dangers of potential socio-political instability in a regional neighbour.219 
Further concerns were also voiced about early indications that long-range missiles may have 
been exported and questions asked of how Japan could counter these emerging sources of 
risk – including the possibility of imposing sanctions.220   
    The tone of both Diet discussions and coverage in the media was still markedly less 
accentuated, however, than can be observed in the post-Taepodong 1 period, up to the 
present – and, indeed, unlike the more recent clamours to impose sanctions and take 
preventative measures against Pyongyang, focused as much or more on the necessity for 
dialogue as for concrete actions vis-à-vis North Korea.221 Yet, the elements to begin such a 
process of risk recalibration, mediated between the state and society, were, retrospectively, 
identifiable. The tipping point between an optimistic outlook with regards to the DPRK and its 
extensive negative framing is exemplified in an article carried in the Asahi Shimbun on 27 
May 1993, in which former ambassador for disarmament at the Institute for International 
Policy Studies (IIPS), or sekai heiwa kenkyūjo (research centre for world peace) in Japanese, 
Imai Takayoshi posted a piece calling for domestic debate on North Korea‟s nuclear 
weapons. The article highlights the use of nuclear and missile development as part of a 
political game being played out by the regime in Pyongyang, but despite such an 
understanding also stresses the potential risks that such a strategy adopted by the North 
poses to Japan. Imai posits, with regards to the DRPK that, 
    It is one of only a handful of third world states which exports weapons. With the introduction 
of a little know-how from elsewhere, it would be possible for them to build a missile with a 
                                                          
219 See discussions between Ikeda Osamu and the Cabinet Committee (126: 144-9). 
220 Government ministers, and prominent speakers such as Ikeda, assumed a sympathetic stance to such  
      inquiry and requested understanding that information on North Korea’s unknowns was uncertain and  
      problematic to obtain – yet of increasing national concern. 
221 For examples of more hysterical (accentuated) reactions to the North Korean issues within the Diet, see  
Chapter 4, Section 4.6 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3. 
138 
 
range of 600km carrying a 500kg warhead. In response to the „possible danger‟ [risk] that 
Japan finds itself within range of a North Korean nuclear missile, it needs to think more 
seriously about its options for a possible means of response, with regards to its security. 
 
    The Yomiuri Shimbun presented a more urgent slant on the issue, but was also broadly of 
a similar voice in terms of espousing how risks presented by North Korea‟s withdrawal from 
the NPT amounted to a future source of potential, but as then not clearly calibrated, harms 
for Japan. In his commentary for the standard edition of 16 March 1993, Ikeda Toyoharu 
simply lines the risks up together, stating that “The DPRK (North Korea) has pulled out of the 
NPT treaty.  With the proliferation of WMD being the new threat of the post-Cold War era, it 
presents a grim state-of-affairs for the security environment of East Asia.”222 Here again, the 
risks are stressed, but not calibrated to the point where a broad range of specific state or 
societal actions are being prescribed. Indeed, media reports and Diet records from 1993 
remained largely devoid (or at least only implicitly prescriptive) of proposals for particular 
sanctions, practical military contingency plans, or the introduction of sophisticated BMD 
systems and so forth. Moreover, the targeted framing of North Korea in a consistently 
negative manner as a means by which to justify such measures had not taken an 
established form, and, despite the understanding of its associated risks having been 
instigated as a broad concept, was maintained as a relatively background (creeping) 
phenomenon until the Taepodong launch of 1998. 
    In terms of the all-encompassing process of recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea it is also notable here that the Kim dynasty (Il-Sung and Jong-Il) were, as with the 
issue of suspected abductions, yet to receive widespread mention in the Diet or, moreover, 
the mass media. This reflects their then still not fully established framing in the public sphere 
                                                          
222 It is noteworthy that the article also identifies the Kim dynasty’s need for regime survival as the primary 
rationale behind its desire to procure nuclear capabilities, as a deterrent against external aggressors – though 
there is little attempt to personalize or demonize the Kims per se, i.e. to overtly frame them as hate figures. 
This kind of subtle referral can also be seen as illustrative of how the Kims, particularly Jong-Il, came to be 
framed in a more specific and personalized way over time, oft-times in order to represent and emphasize the 
salience of risks associated with North Korea in Japan. 
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as hate figures – covered in greater detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.8 and Chapter 5, Section 
5.7. Indeed, this was an image less prevalent amid the early days of the Japanese policy 
community‟s recognition of the DPRK as a source of negative framing. In addition, however, 
the interactive process of mediation between media and political elite (forming a significant 
section of Japan‟s policy community), as representative of that which led to the ultimate 
candid framing of Kim Jong-Il and the DPRK as a whole, could already be observed in the 
Cabinet discussions noted above, as also outlined in Section 3.12, below. Most overtly, 
members of the Diet repeatedly referred to reports in the newspapers about the state of 
North Korea, in terms of the risks it might pose to Japan. In other words, therefore, if Diet 
members can be seen as important members of the policy community, and their information 
is based to a large degree on that which is sourced from the national news-print media, then 
Japan‟s political elite can be expected, interactively, to have been considerably influenced by 
mass-media currents.223   
 
3.7. Sowing the seeds of risk: the 1993 Nodong missile launch 
Given the clear design of North Korea‟s first Nodong test missile launch on 29 May 1993 as 
being geared toward a possible direct attack upon Japan, the related risks were, at least in 
the public sphere, interpreted in a relatively understated manner by the political elite in Tokyo, 
as well as across the vast majority of civil and market actors and stakeholders.224 This is 
something which is also reflected by the minimal media coverage, displayed in Table 3.1, 
                                                          
223 It is also of interest to note here that as North Korea was increasingly framed negatively and risks 
     recalibrated against it, the salience of the US-Japan alliance as a counter to such risks and an emphasis 
     on the norm of bilateralism was stressed in the inter-political dialogue, including that referenced within the 
     Diet. 
224  This should not be misconstrued to mean that the DPRK regime ever actually intended to launch a missile 
strike upon Japan. The point of interest here is the fact that far greater shock-waves (and a more tangible 
consequential recalibration of risk) were caused in Japan by the Taepodong launch of 1998 than that of the 
Nodong in 1993, despite the fact that in terms of design and range the Taepodong was clearly developed as 
a weapon capable (and ultimately made as such with the Taepodong 2) of striking US targets, whereas the 
Nodong only has the capacity to strike those within Japan or the ROK (Yoshida, 2008: 168). 
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below, and is in total contrast to the massive impact and resulting rapid re-calibration of risk 
triggered by the 1998 Taepodong 1 event, discussed in Section 3.14, below. Additionally, it is 
striking that what language was used by politicians in the Diet following the test-launch of 
1993 bore resemblance, albeit with a far less fervent tone, to that used to discuss the 
Taepodong launch of 1998, but was, at that stage, qualitatively less risk-oriented (or risk-
obsessed) and more measured. The same kind of qualitative linguistic and voluminous 
quantitative gap can be observed in reactions within the media, as tackled in terms of 
comparative newspaper reactions in Section 3.14, below. Indeed, there were as few as 
twenty entries listed on the National Diet database for comments of any kind made on the 
1993 Nodong launch in the months immediately following it, and targeted searches bring up 
only three magazine articles throughout the whole of 1993 which cover the incident in itself. 
In fact, according to established academic data-bases, only nine recognized magazine and 
periodical publication articles covered North Korean missile issues in Japan during the entire 
period from 1993-7. The figure for 1998-9 reaches sixty four.225 Nonetheless, in terms of 
sowing the seeds of risk recalibration – which were metaphorically brought to fruition some 
five years later by the 1998 Taepodong test launch – by way of initializing the identification 
and framing of North Korea as a persistent source of multiple risks, NHK news reports from 
the same year pinpoint the policy community‟s shift at this time. A news article of 30 July 
1993 stated that, 
   Today‟s Defence Agency white paper raises the problem of North Korea (DPRK)‟s new-
model missile development, stating the grave concern that „if this missile development is 
combined with the development of nuclear weapons it may present an extremely dangerous 
situation.‟ 
 
The above article goes on to express how the Defence Agency has specifically identified 
North Korea as a source of risks (given the new missile‟s range, covering almost the entirety 
                                                          
225 Based on targeted searches of The Complete Database of Japanese Magazines and Periodicals from the    
     Meiji Era to the Present (Zasshi kiji sakuin shūsei dētabēsu Meiji kara genzai made sōgō zasshi kara chishi   
     made). 
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of Japan), in an otherwise improving East Asian security environment. In this way, the above 
article directly presents how and when the state initiates its recalibration of security risks to 
Japan through the framing of North Korea. 
    Among the few Diet commentators on the Nodong launch, the most outspoken statement 
came from former JSDF officer and LDP minister, Tamura Hideaki, who sought to emphasize 
the risks posed by such a missile from North Korea – inciting concern by way of questioning 
what Japan was practically capable of doing in response to such an attack, and conflating 
the missile issues with that of nuclear development. Most pertinently, Tamura also stood out 
at this time; as a Diet member who was willing to openly identify and frame the DPRK as a 
hostile state – something which he became far less unique in following the Taepodong 
launch of August 1998. On 10 June 1993, during a session of the Cabinet Committee 
(naikaku iinkai) he stated (126: 193) that, 
   North Korea‟s Scud missile range has been extended to operate at a further 1000 kilometres 
(the Nodong 1). If it succeeds in producing nukes it could attach them to the missile. It is 
absolutely clear that North Korea is not a country which is benevolent towards us. In such a 
case as the North finds some reason or other to launch a missile at our country, at present do 
we have the defence capabilities to shoot it down or not? What are your considerations for 
such a case? What provisions and countermeasure have been made?  
 
Therein, while the precursors for the recalibration of risk can be seen to have been 
crystallized at this time, as explored further below, the gap in calibration between reactions 
to the events of 1993 and 1998 is clearly observable. Once again it should be understood 
that specific events, such as the above, are used as focal points to initiate and perpetuate a 
process which has led to the compounding of a range of risks framed against North Korea – 
as was the case with Tamura‟s combative statement above, which introduces the idea of a 
North Korean nuclear warhead, something which nearly twenty years later is as yet still to be 
realized officially.226 
                                                          
226  “compounding” is used here to refer to the manner in which events such as the Nodong and Taepodong 
launches are used by politically interested actors in order to make reference, oft-times in the same breath, 
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    In 1993, the early precedents of such a discourse of risk framed against the DPRK can, 
then, be observed in a small number of statements from the policy community, here 
conflating the two issues of nuclear development and missiles, although the terminology 
does far less to frame North Korea or Kim Jong-Il‟s regime in specifically demonized form 
than that which began to take hold following the Taepodong launch five years later.227 For 
instance, on 11 November 1993, using uncertainty over relevant information available for the 
Nodong launch during a session of the Diet Security Committee, Minister of Defence, 
Nakanishi Keisuke further highlighted the potential risks to Japan if the DPRK‟s nuclear and 
missile threats were coordinated. He posited that, “...the docking of nuclear-armaments on 
missiles would be something of serious concern to Japan”, going on to stress that the Prime 
Minister is “...very concerned about such points” (128: 7). However, while this was also used 
to justify the “...need to make provisions for national security”, the terms used to describe the 
level of such risks framed against North Korea are predominantly limited to those of 
“concern” (ki ni naru), and attention or interest (chūi, kanshin). The comparable event of 
1998 was greeted not only with a more rambunctious response in terms of the quantity of 
statements made in reference to the DPRK, but was, as detailed in Sections 3.10 and 3.14, 
below, extensively cased in emotive language and framed North Korea more universally as a 
stipulated source of animosity (evincing a portrayal of evil). In this sense, examination of key 
events, and the discourse attached to them, demonstrates a qualitative and quantitative 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to other risks, such as those stemming from abductions or elicit economic activities, framed against the 
DPRK – regardless of their actual or tangible links. 
227  The media’s role in priming the framing of North Korea is also, as noted above, expressed through the 
types of terminology and responses which came to be adopted in leading opinion polls during the period 
between the Nodong and Taepodong launches, such as those conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi 
Shimbun and NHK. In addition to the questions highlighted in Section 3.2, above, including terms such as 
“threat”, “danger” and “attack”, these included highly subjective and loaded items such as the Yomiuri’s “Is 
your impression of North Korea very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?” (January 1995) 
and the Asahi’s “Do you like or dislike North Korea, or is it difficult to say?” (June 1995). Responses show a 
gradual inclination towards negative public perceptions (Roper Center, 2009). While such questions are also 
posed pertaining to other countries, those linked to North Korea are juxtaposed with articles which 
highlight risks perceived to emanate from Pyongyang – such as those regarding missile, nuclear and 
incursions issues – and so escalate the process of risk-related reconfirmation bias, identified by Gardner 
(2008: 120-8, see also Chapter 2, Section 2.7.ii ). 
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recalibration of risk between, and after, the key events of 1993 and 1998.228 
Table 3.1.  Impact of the 1993 Nodong Test Launches in the Media and Diet 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to  May 1993 
Nodong 
Missile 
Launches 
Numbers of articles/items post 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~ ~3 ~6 ~12 
Asahi 1374 659 445 375 736 1964 
Yomiuri 1089 576 406 346 663 1889 
Mainichi 1383 649 423 380 746 2060 
Sankei 927 691 478 410 786 2252 
NHK News 435 240 198 149 285 900 
Diet 71 60 38 10 42 91 
Magazines※ 35 16 13 11 23 52 
Source: author 
Figures shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※ Based on a selection of national magazines, primarily 
sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
NB: kitachōsen has been selected as the key search term on account of its overwhelming usage in both media 
and Diet materials (i.e., as opposed to equivalent terms such as chōsenminshushugijinminkyōwakoku etc).  
 
                                                          
228  Quantitative, not least, in terms of the number of statements made by political figures during Diet sessions 
which followed the Nodong and Taepodong launches. Eighteen referrals to North Korean missiles were 
made in the six months following the 1993 launch, as opposed to 68 in the same period after the 1998 
incident (Kokkai Kaigi Roku Kensaku Shisutemu, 2010).   
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 3.1, above. 
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3.8. Re-framing North Korean residents in Japan 
The key events of the Nodong and Taepodong launch, in consistency with the hypotheses 
outlined in the Introduction, Section 0.1, clearly contributed, then, to an internalized 
recalibration of risk. This is further evident in terms of how resident North Koreans in Japan 
came to be framed. In order to illustrate the process by which such a recalibration of risk 
took place, it is again worth exposing the tangible precursors and causal factors to many of 
the issues which have come to exert political influence in this area. As posited in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.9, the negative framing of North Korean elements in Japan, including resident 
Koreans allied with the DPRK, and specifically Chōsensōren, has been something which 
developed through a transitional phase over the course of the Cold War, in line with 
domestic and US foreign policy interests.229 In order for politically motivated actors to realize 
such a framing of resident North Koreans, and recalibrate the risks attached to them, 
appropriate sources of risk have had to be identified.230 One such area is the scrutiny and 
governance of remittances sent from Japan to the DPRK. Indeed, as concerns about the 
North‟s nuclear programs began to take hold during the early 1990s, statements were 
already being submitted to the Diet voicing alarm at the volume of funds being remitted 
through Japan‟s “money pipeline” to Pyongyang (Eberstadt, 1996: 523). Moreover, the initial 
response by the state to Japan‟s North Korean-allied residents, in terms of them being 
perceived as the source of security risks, also reflects the broader proliferation of risk 
recalibration pitched and justified through the negative framing of all that is associated with 
                                                          
229  As such, being driven largely by the norm of bilateralism under the framework dictated by the US-Japan 
Security Treaty (e.g., see Hook et al., 2005: 253). 
230  The realization of such a process has undoubtedly been expedited by the predominantly unguarded and 
publicly accessible alliance maintained between Chōsensōren and Pyongyang. Such an alliance has at times 
been misconstrued (deliberately or otherwise) with the more broadly expressed close affiliation held 
between Japan’s resident Koreans and the Korean peninsula as a whole – which can be more 
uncontroversially referred to (e.g., see Yan, 2001: 133). 
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the DPRK.231 
    By the time the Taepodong launch of 1998 had catapulted the calibration of risks identified 
as a whole from North Korea, the issue of resident North Koreans as a kind of latent threat 
lying within the body of Japan, and specifically the risks posed by their remittances to the 
DPRK, were ripe for further recalibration – and the policy community‟s political and media 
arms rapidly exacted such a process accordingly.232 In the Diet, on 10 September 1998, 
Nishimura Shingo (143: 327) described North Korean residents regularly coming and going 
between the DPRK and Japan as the “money carriers” (kinsen no hakobiya), and noted with 
concern their substantial unchecked transfer of funds to the North from Japan. Six months 
later, citing his information source as Aera Magazine, on 3 March 1999, during a session of 
the Security Committee (145: 6), Sakaue Yoshihide further raised the appraisal of risks with 
his statement apprehending that the government had not taken full account of the potential 
influence exerted by North Korean remittances. He asserted that, in addition to the direct 
remittances sent from Japan to the North through the banking system, Japan represented 
the DPRK‟s second biggest trading partner after China, with a total value of some 
￥58,000,000,000,  and went on to suggest that as such Japan was in effect aiding the 
funding of North Korea‟s nuclear and WMD programs. Indeed, Sakaue insisted that, “It has 
been observed that a number of Russian technicians are involved with North Korea‟s nuclear 
development program. It is these remittances which, reportedly, are effectively being used to 
provide their salaries.”233 No specific proof of such a process was outlined, but the inference 
                                                          
231  For details of the practical measures that have been taken by the state and private actors in Japan against 
resident North Koreans in the decades that have followed, see Chapter 4, Section 4.11 and Chapter 5, 
Section 5.10. 
232  This can be seen as representative of what Shigemura has termed “Japanese Orientalism”, in terms of an 
 underlying prejudice towards Koreans, which shifted during the post-War era from generic towards    
 targeting the South, and which has, ultimately, in the post-Cold War era been redirected against a framing   
 of the North (2011: 24-9).   
233  It is significant, in terms of noting a sustained process of political and media interaction, that Sakaue 
quotes Aera, because the publication is produced by the Asahi Shimbun – and indeed its articles are 
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and implications of Japan fuelling risks emanating from the DPRK was clearly stated and 
provides and illustrative example of how media sources and politicians combined to mediate 
risks within the public sphere through the framing of North Korea.   
    Intriguingly, at this stage of the risk recalibration process, resisting such a trend of 
converging policy community mediation was not, necessarily, tantamount to political suicide, 
as in the current climate of anti-North Korean framing within Japan. As such, controversial 
statements made by certain counter-administration sources offer a further illuminative data-
source in terms of highlighting how deliberate, and or (state) orchestrated, such a process of 
risk recalibration may have been. For instance, on 14 May 1999, later to be Social 
Democratic Party Leader, Fukushima Mizuho demanded to know the details of a report 
suggesting that government sources and police had deliberately constructed a criminal 
investigation targeting North Korean (Chōsensōren) run Pachinko parlours in Japan, 
recognized as the route of funds for providing remittances to the DPRK. The controversy 
was caused by the alleged existence of a secret document, entitled “Plan to  Promote 
Measures to Deal with Illicit Remittances to North Korea” (Kitachōsen e no fusei sōkin 
taisaku suishin keikaku), which outlined how internal actors with links to Pyongyang were to 
be dealt with. 
    The implication exposed by Fukushima‟s address to the Diet, was that state forces were 
willing from a relatively early stage to frame (by fair means or foul) all North Korean elements 
within Japan as being representative of a broad base (range) of risks, which could be 
identified with the DPRK as a whole – and to justify taking coercive measures against 
them.234 Moreover, the use of remittances as a political target is illustrative of how the policy 
community has been able to seize upon uncertainty over the extent of risks identified with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
included in the Asahi’s own historical data-base archives; in a sense, therefore, his statement indirectly 
evinces a representative shift in risk calibration within the Asahi Shimbun. 
234  Revelations about the above named document emerged in the June 1999 edition of Sekai magazine in an 
article entitled, “The domestic contingency framework is at the ready” (Kokunai no yūji taisei ga junbi 
sarete iru). 
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Pyongyang in order to recalibrate them. For instance, direct remittances in the second half of 
the 1990s were purportedly estimated to be upward of ¥200,000,000,000, but due to the 
inability to access North Korean sources from Japan, there is a scarcity of concrete evidence 
to demonstrate how much, where and for what purposes any such remittances were actually 
being used (Han, 2002: 221-2). The combination of suspicions regarding the illicit means of 
remittance from Japan to the DPRK and opacity of information regarding the quantity and 
final usage of any such funds, therefore, left the issue open to a high degree of subjective 
interpretation and speculation.235 The result was the further creation of an element in the 
negative framing of North Korea, manifest in potential risks posed to Japan. This was initially 
termed the remittance suspicion (sōkin giwaku) and later recalibrated to a remittance 
problem (sōkin (giwaku) mondai). The recalibration of risk was, then, here realized through 
an interactive process driven by politically motivated actors and mediated through conflation 
with other issues attached to the DPRK in Japan‟s public and political spheres.236     
 
3.9. Abductions, drugs and starvation: the risks from North Korea spread 
Conclusions submitted to the Diet by the police authorities in May 1997, which confirmed 
that seven cases, involving ten people, amounted to suspected North Korean abductions 
additionally served to reignite the risk recalibration process. The timing of the police‟s 
announcement came at a particularly pivotal juncture, as during November of the same year 
high-level delegates from Tokyo and Pyongyang attempted to restart the scheduled 
normalization process. However, with North Korea‟s overtly negative framing taking shape in 
                                                          
235   For example, risk recalibration based on speculative information regarding North Korean elements can be  
observed in Japan’s responses to the collapse of the Chōgin bank, for which it is estimated that  
approximately 1,400,000,000 yen of public funds were invested. This effectively allowed speculation up to 
that amount as to the extent of Japanese tax-payers money being transferred to North Korea, potentially 
for use in Pyongyang’s weapons and nuclear programs. It is also pertinent here to note the bank’s 
awareness of North Korea’s increasingly negative framing – as it removed the chō (Korea) from all of its 
official titles following restructured opening. For further details, see Chōgin tte nani, kōtekishikin tte nani 
(2011). 
236  For illustrative examples of discourse representing this phenomenon, see Nomura (2002: 19-103). 
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the public sphere within Japan, the process of risk recalibration reverberated through the 
following Diet sessions. This was exacerbated by a perception of socio-economic instability 
in the North and further revelations regarding Pyongyang‟s possession and development of 
ballistic missile capabilities.237 The result was a heated and oft times conflated debate, 
whereby more than one issue was brought to the fore. These included not only the abduction 
issues, and those of the so-called Japanese wives, but also narcotics importation into Japan, 
the continuation of fears of a North Korean military build-up and concerns over the 
impending collapse of the country as whole, particularly in the wake of a chronically 
desperate humanitarian crisis caused by prolonged food shortages.238 
    Destined-to-be prime minister and emblematic critic of the regime in Pyongyang, Abe 
Shinzō epitomized this method of multiple risk recalibration vis-à-vis North Korea. On 4 June 
1997 (140: 16), during a discussion initially focused on the remittance issues discussed 
above, he predicates his concerns over financial assistance from Japan to the North by 
warning the Foreign Ministry Committee with regards to the DPRK that,   
In terms of Japan‟s security too, it [North Korea] has previously been viewed with 
suspicions over nuclear issues, so in a sense it has become an extremely salient threat. 
Furthermore, there are also the suspected abduction cases and so on, and there is the 
issue of the Japanese wives. Recently too, there has also been a problem with narcotics. 
 
The overall shift of emphasis observable from within the Diet discourse during this time, was, 
indeed, one of a range of risks, perceived to be spreading within and from the DPRK. The 
number of references to the “suspected abductions issue” (rachigiwaku mondai), for 
example, rose to some twenty-one specific addresses in the period immediately following the 
1997 police report, in comparison to only a handful of individual statements from Diet 
                                                          
237  Attempts by experts such as Okonogi Masao were made during advisory sessions to the Diet (1997, 141:  
      11)to try to avoid conflation of issues surrounding North Korea, but appear as a small minority among the  
      background of a growing political animosity and competition over a strength of stance against what was  
      rapidly becoming a perceived evil in Pyongyang. 
238 The Japanese wives issue concerns the repatriation of Japanese nationals married to nationals of North  
     Korea who it was agreed could return home for brief periods to visit family and friends as part of the Japan –  
     DPRK normalization process, see World News (1997). 
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members in years that had passed since the incidents had supposedly taken place.239 
Moreover, the pros and cons of attempting to administer food-aid to a country in which state 
authorities apparently had unscrupulous and total control over internal resources raged.240 
    The shift in perceptions of the Pyongyang administration from within Japan‟s policy 
community at this time is particularly noteworthy in light of it occurring despite a combination 
of peripheral and, where present at all, largely optimistic references to Japan-DPRK relations 
outlined in the major parties‟ 1996 election manifestos.241 Among which, for instance, the 
SDPJ offers the most pro-active statement, but still limits direct reference to the North to only 
three lines, concisely positing that “Normalization with the DPRK will be promoted, making 
every effort to realize successful four-party talks between the US, China, South Korea and 
North Korea, with a view to being developed into six-party talks including Japan and Russia” 
(1996: 7).242 Moreover, although the ruling LDP‟s manifesto document, which referred 
vaguely to “monitoring movements on the Korean peninsula” (1996: 53) and “measures for a 
contingency in areas surrounding Japan” (1996: 54), does exhibit greater wariness toward 
the potential risks posed by the DPRK, it does not significantly deviate from the general 
mood across the political spectrum at this time, which was one of optimism and expectancy 
over normalization of Pyongyang–Tokyo relations. Furthermore, as is made evident from the 
content of both Diet statements and manifesto contents up to the revelations of the 1997 
police report, the attention paid to North Korea in any form was minimal, even after the 
Nodong launch of 1993 and nuclear crisis of 1993-94. As unearthed below, the impact of the 
Taepodong test was comparatively gargantuan in this respect, in terms of stimulating the 
                                                          
239  The suspected abduction cases which took place within Japan occurred between 1977-1980. Two cases of 
         Japanese nationals snatched from Europe in the early 1980s also emerged. For details, see Headquarters  
         for the Abduction Issue (2009). 
240 The primary concerns being that Japan should not be assisting a state which had violated its sovereignty 
      with abductions and incursions, and that resources may be channelled into elicit pursuits or nuclear  
      facilities. 
241 The major parties of the time amounted to the LDP, SDPJ (having been formed as a succession to the 
former JSP), DPJ, Shin-shintō, Shintō Sakigake, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). 
242  Manifestos referenced herein are predominantly sourced from Keio World Manifesto Forum (2007). 
151 
 
recalibration or risk – internalized from the “super-sized” (Hughes, 2009a) threat – framed 
against Pyongyang.243 
     In the period preceding the Taepodong launch, the incremental intensification of North 
Korea‟s negative framing, and the significant part played by the public sphere, particularly in 
terms of mass media, is once again represented by Diet members‟ referrals to such media-
news sources as their reference point for information. For instance, in Takano Hiroshi‟s 
single short address to the Diet on 3 June, 1997 he frames the DPRK as a source of piracy, 
sovereign infringement, humanitarian crises, abductions, and criminal organizations, citing a 
quality daily newspaper to illustrate his concerns.244 In this way, on-going concerns such as 
nuclear and abduction issues can be seen both to have primed the public sphere for a 
particularly intense reaction to the Taepodong missile test of 1998, and also to have been 
further revamped by it. Moreover, as discussed further in Chapter 4, Section 4.6, this 
counter-ratcheting up of risks played off between single shocking events, such as missile 
and nuclear tests, against a background of continued disquiet over the uncertainty of 
persistent, unresolved, issues can be seen to have actually created an environment where 
media and public opinion interactively drive foreign policy vis-à-vis Pyongyang (Hirasawa, 
2004: 22-4).245 Indeed, the salience of risks posed by the North Korean state have, as a 
                                                          
243  Indeed the magnified impact of the Taepodong event, even in comparison to revelations about abductees, 
becomes clear through examination of the (pre-Taepodong launch) 1998 upper-house election manifestos 
(e.g., LDP, 1998: 48, SDPJ, 1998: 26), which demonstrate little policy change – or increase in volume of 
reference – toward the DRPK from those highlighted in 1996, despite growing voices in the public sphere 
and on the Diet floors over the risks Pyongyang may harbour. 
244  In fact, Takano acknowledges the conflation of too many issues, but in doing so presses home a negative 
       framing of North Korean issues himself. For Takano’s statement and reaction to it, see Diet records (140: 41, 
         3 June 1997). This includes foreign minister, Ikeda Yukihiko’s assertion that issues need to be considered in  
         general terms – once again highlighting the conflated nature of issues framed against the single target of  
         North Korea within Japan’s policy community. 
245  Hirasawa also points to the impact of specific events (primarily Koizumi’s 2002 visit to Pyongyang and 
Kim’s admission of the abduction cases) – comparable to missile or nuclear tests – which have resulted in a 
shift of agency driving North Korean policy issues, from that which was contained almost entirely within 
government and diplomatic channels to a phenomenon driven by mediated public-political sphere reaction. 
In other words, the recalibration of risk framed against North Korea has gained such momentum that to a 
certain extent it has taken the ability of policy makers to set the agenda out of their hands. 
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result, been aired as a justification for imposing a more state-led (provisionally to be 
orchestrated by MOFA) method of public diplomacy, or “media approach” (Harada, 2005: 
133-48) in order to avoid Japan‟s foreign policy becoming hijacked by an errant media.    
    Conversely, however, the interactive process between state and mass media represented 
by a proliferation of the recalibration of risk in response to North Korea is also evinced from 
the very sources quoted by political spokespeople (politicians in the Diet) which, contrarily, 
cite government as the basis for their information. For instance, in the first Yomiuri article to 
cover the revelations of the suspected abductees on 1 May 1997, reports pertaining to the 
cases refer to statements supplied by MOFA, Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and National 
Police Authority (NPA). Similarly, in general concordance with Abe‟s position (cited above); 
concerned with the multiplicity of risks emanating from the DPRK, media sources also 
conflated a parallel plurality of issues – framed against North Korea.246 Indeed, as noted by 
one prominent Japanese journalist specializing in the Korean peninsula (27 August 2011, 
Appendix A), the close overlap of information and, moreover, core political standpoints 
observed between politicians, ministries and leading newspapers is unsurprising given the 
fact that most reporters are closely tied to specific officials or Diet members and – through 
the notorious system of close connections present within the Japan Press Club (JPC) – are 
totally reliant upon those actors for up-to-date data with which to compose and publish 
articles. 
    The Asahi Shimbun‟s coverage of North Korean affairs immediately preceding the 1998 
test launch was still, however, comparatively liberal and defensive in its use of discourse 
regarding Japan‟s appropriate responses to problems linked with the DPRK at this time, 
                                                          
246  See also Yomiuri  Shimbun, 11 October 1997 (‘Kim Jong-Il jidai no kitachōsen’: nicchō seijōka kitai to 
fushin) for an example of how the cross interaction and dissemination of information between different 
sections of the policy community, specifically the inclusive elements of the political elite and mass media, is 
manifest within discourse in the public sphere. The above article is additionally relevant because it shows 
the early signs of a stigmatization of Kim Jong-Il, something which proliferated in the years that follow and 
helped to facilitate the demonic framing of North Korea as a whole – something also present in other 
leading newspapers and news sources (see Section 3.14, below). 
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cautiously referring repeatedly to the goals of improvement (kaizen) and normalization 
(seijōka) of links between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Nonetheless, the broader converging tide 
across the policy community, espousing a multitude of risks, being recalibrated through the 
framing of North Korea in the public sphere, became visible, too, even within the pages of 
the Asahi. For instance, in its morning issue of 11 October 1997, an article entitled, 
“Focusing on Security Strategies: The Un-paintable Picture of Normalization (How will things 
progress under the Kim Jong-Il regime)”, reference is made to a variety of government and 
other sources in a combined discussion of abduction, nuclear, missile, Japanese wives and 
famine – all posited as risks identified with the DPRK which pose a potentially negative set of 
contingencies for Japan.247 
    In this way, reaction by the state and mass media to a range of risks beginning to be 
established within a public sphere frame encompassing everything which is linked to the 
DPRK, started to develop a consistent pattern. Examination of this interactive process prior 
to the first Taepodong test launch, then, exposes a reiterated phenomenon of conflating 
issues associated with risks framed as North Korean, which primed the policy community 
and public for an event which could take the recalibration or risk to completely new levels. 
    
3.10. Taepodong 1 flies over Japan:  risk recalibration sky-rockets 
North Korea‟s launching of the Taepodong 1 missile in August 1998, part of which flew over 
Japan and splashed into the Pacific, could not have come at a more apt time for Japan‟s risk 
entrepreneurs.248 In June of the same year, the North Korean Red Cross had categorically 
confirmed that none of the suspected remains of abductees were those of Japanese citizens. 
                                                          
247  The article’s Japanese title was “Anpo seisaku jūshi: egakenu kokka seijōka (dō susumu kitachōsen 
Kim Jong-Il taisei)”. 
248  Debate remains over the definition of the Taepodong because it was claimed by the DPRK to have been 
launched as a means to set a satellite in orbit – not as a test of a military missile (weapon) designed for 
offensive purposes. Indeed, it was also, initially at least, recognized as such by US military intelligence 
sources (Yoshida, 2008: 160). 
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This combination of perceived economy in revealing the truth about abduction cases and 
aggressive geo-military sabre-rattling prompted a fierce response from Japan and catapulted 
North Korea‟s negative framing to a point of national fervour. The process by which this 
happened can once again be observed through examination of how Japan‟s interactive 
policy community mediated the affectation of risk recalibration. The ensuing discourse from 
the Diet was representative by then, not just of a political issue influenced by civil society, but 
more obviously of a growing national phenomenon, which the Taepodong launch served to 
bring to fruition. The test firing galvanised the framing of North Korea as a pressing and 
salient threat in the public sphere, and as such recalibrated the risks associated with it. The 
resulting reaction from Japan‟s political upper echelons was virtually instantaneous and far 
reaching, and was tangibly expressed by Japan‟s imposition of sanctions and the 
suspension of signing for the cost-sharing agreement of the Agreed Framework‟s Light 
Water Reactor (LWR) project, until November of 1998. In the months and years that post-
dated the Taepodong launch, the risks assigned to the missile threat were repeatedly 
referred to when justifications were made to revise Japan‟s security posture and apparatus. 
Indeed, in arrant contrast to the manifestos of 1996-98 highlighted above, the LDP‟s first 
lower-house election manifesto following the Taepodong event contained an entirely new 
section entitled “dealing with new problem situations and the promotion of provisions for a crisis 
management framework” (arata na jitai e no taisho to kiki kanri taisei no seibi no suishin), 
which was unprecedented in its targeting of the DPRK, stating that, 
  There are major causes for instability in the areas surrounding our country, such as 
those manifest in the problems of the Korean peninsula. With the occurrence of events 
such as North Korea‟s ballistic missile launch of two years ago and its suspicious ship 
incursion into the Sea of Japan last March, we are engaged in policy resolutions for 
national security and crisis management as issues of utmost urgency. (2000: 41)
249
 
 
In this sense, the political gravity of the 1998 Taepodong launch is illuminated, and 
                                                          
249  The culmination of security-policy revisions made in reference to North Korea, and justified as a means by 
which to ameliorate risks posed to Japan by the DPRK can be viewed in Section II of the FY 2005 National 
Defense Program Guidelines (MOD (then JDA), 2004).   
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elucidates the extent to which it was a pivotal event in the process of Japan‟s framing of 
North Korea. Moreover, reaction to the launch at the highest state-level spotlights how risks 
perceived to arise from Pyongyang had come to be recalibrated. 
    Not surprisingly, the number of statements made by Diet members regarding the DPRK 
after the Taepodong incident increased dramatically in comparison to previous events 
identified with actions initiated by Pyongyang. In addition, the two temporally influential 
issues of missile launches and suspected abductions were then not being mixed in with 
other concerns about nuclear proliferation, EEZ incursions, humanitarian crises and socio-
political instability. Rather, they had at once been effectively compounded by the Taepodong 
test-launch in to a multi-prong set of risks which were, in a sense, being recalibrated as a 
single unit – i.e., equated with the entity of North Korea. Amid this, the initial emergence of 
the abductions issue, in particular, offered a supplementary means to whip-up nationalistic 
and moralistic, or as one political analyst put it, “emotional” (29 September 2011, Appendix A) 
sentiment across Japan, framed in crude terms as good versus evil – as exposed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.250 The other pre-eminent concerns presented tangible 
military contingencies, which could be manipulated to open a discourse on a broader range 
of Japan‟s national security issues – and the Taepodong represented a tangible object with 
which to justify successive policy revisions. Indeed, on 2 September 1998, for the first time 
simultaneously, both missile and abduction issues were to be found on the official agenda of 
                                                          
250  The extent to which North Korea, and specifically Kim Jong-Il, became demonized (or framed as an evil 
and high-risk assailant to Japan) can be crudely gauged by qualitative and quantitative examination of the 
content of Japanese language publications on the subject in the post-Cold War era which offer such a 
portrayal.  For example, searching major electronic databases of online book stores using terms such as 
“Kim Jong Il” (金正日), as many as 953 titles (Amazon.co.jp, 2010) can be found for a single source; many of 
them showing photos of Kim overwritten with titles depicting him in such a light. These include direct 
condemnation, such as Kim Jong-Il’s Great Crimes (Kim Jong-Il no taizai) and Accusing Kim Jong Il (Kim Jong 
Il wo kokuhatsu suru), as well as those implicating him with other terrorists or evils, featuring the likes of 
Kim Jong Il and Bin Laden (Kim Jong-Il to binradin). There also seems to be a marked attempt by a number 
of authors to stress that Kim Jong-Il is even more war-like and dictatorial than his father and predecessor, 
Kim Il-Sung. 
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the Foreign Ministry Committee session.251 In the months that followed, unlike previous 
debates where vociferous opposition parties had aired concerns about entrapment into US-
led military initiatives justified by the North Korean threat, now attention almost unanimously 
focussed on assessing the scale of risks posed by the DPRK and how best to ameliorate 
them. A number of questions, akin to that posted during the Foreign Ministry Committee 
session of September 1998 (143: 6) by Sakaue Yoshihide (though himself a LDP member), 
who demanded to know what the Government of Japan (GoJ) would do should a North 
Korean missile go off-target and mistakenly land on Japanese territory, were duly asked.252 
Representing the DPJ in the upper house‟s main debate (honkaigi) of 3 September (143: 6), 
for example, Hironaka Wakako expressed her “intense outrage” (hageshii ikidōri) at the 
“rogue state‟s violent aggression”, and in raising a list of the North‟s various (albeit not all 
directly related to Japan) terrorist activities, demands to know what the government will do to 
counter the multiplicity of associated risks.253 She also frames the DPRK as the source of 
fear and uncertainty, by stating that, 
   Every citizen must have felt a shiver go down their spine in fear when they found out 
the reality of what had happened... ...this country [DPRK], of which we have little idea 
about what it is up to, sits on our border... ...the [Japanese] people‟s sense of insecurity 
and fear is unimaginable...  Hironaka goes on to demand, 
  ...what on earth is the government going to do in order to protect our state security and 
the lives of our citizens from such a country” – and posits that, “...the North Korean 
missile launch has brought up serious questions about our preparedness for state 
defence and the status of our crisis management framework. 
 
    The point of critical interest here is that dialogue which discussed the risks posed by North 
                                                          
251  The abduction issue was listed as a carry-over from the committee’s session on August 28. For details, see     
  Gaimuiinkai (143). 
252  Sakaue’s questioning of the GoJ was followed by a response made by government committee 
     representative, Kondō Yō, Which involved identifying the “ballistic missile threat” (dandō misairu kyōi)  and 
     once again citing close ties with the “technically capable” US government as means by which to counter the 
     ensuing risks (18 September 1998, 143: 6-10). Similar question were also asked regarding the GoJ’s ongoing       
     response to the North’s continual denial of the suspected abduction cases. 
253  Concretely, Hironaka refers to the risks of part or all of missiles, even if not directed at Japan, landing on 
     Japanese territory and the difficulty in accurately confirming when and what was launched from the DPRK. 
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Korea shifted dramatically following the Taepodong 1 incident.254 As discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5, this reverberated not only as a direct response taken by the policy community in 
Japan, but as a growing phenomenon of risk recalibration and framing of North Korea across 
the entirety of its media and civil society. The full extent of this phenomenon can be 
observed not only in the qualitative shift in focus and language used in discourses within the 
public sphere, but also quantitatively in terms of media and civil society attention paid to 
issues concerning Pyongyang‟s every move – as revealed by Table 3.2, and also in Section 
3.14, below. 
    This framing of North Korea, as observed further in the case of the abduction issue, also 
posited in Section 3.9, was reflected within the political elite, both in terms of the volume of 
DPRK-related references in Diet sessions, and through the types of discourses and 
terminology being presided over. The abduction issue, for instance, was no-longer an 
awkward stumbling block that acted as an impediment to normalization talks, but rather 
became almost unanimously referred to as the “abduction problem” (rachi mondai) and 
framed as an assault on national sovereignty (tōchiken no shingai).255 At the same time, the 
potential risks of a North Korean missile strike were recalibrated as an exigent military threat 
(gunjiteki kyōi) and the DPRK regime was framed as culpable for imposing military 
intimidation (gunjiteki dōkatsu).256 However, it is also important to note that in terms of 
personalizing the risks emanating from Pyongyang the process was far from complete. The 
full demonization of DPRK leader, Kim Jong-Il, fulfilled this function, but was as yet in its 
early stages, and little direct mention was afforded to him in the Diet sessions which took 
place in the aftermath of the Taepodong 1 test firing. Ultimately, however, as a result of the 
                                                          
254 As noted above, the timing of the missile launch, coming little more than two months after the North    
     Korean Red Cross’ denial of the abduction cases, presented a particularly potent cocktail for framing the 
     DPRK. 
255 It is particularly noteworthy that Diet references to the abduction issue in the months following the     
      Taepodong 1 launch were actually higher than those in the same period following the DPRK’s denial of 
      Japanese abduction victim remains. 
256  See Diet session (18 September 1998, 143: 12). 
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negative framing attached to all aspects of the DPRK, the image of the eccentric head-of-
state, as likened to an evil villain (who was possibly one dong short of a full missile), became, 
as extrapolated in Chapters 4 and 5 below, a key focus point for the continued recalibration 
of risks in response to North Korea. 
    What is more, it is also significant that the political and social norms which have come to 
dominate the agency of how Japan‟s North Korea relations are formed, most ostensibly in 
the negative framing of Pyongyang‟s regime and recalibration of associated risks, appear 
even to have out-weighed the would-be prevailing economic market interests within Japan 
when it comes to dictating policy generation and counter-measures vis-à-vis the DPRK. 
Indeed, while it is an arduous task to accurately locate the cross-interaction between Japan‟s 
political and economic elites, large-scale stakeholder enterprises would surely have little to 
gain from such a negative framing and political trajectory made in response to the North.257 
However, as explored in the next section, market influences upon Japan‟s post-Cold War, 
and post-Taepodong, recalibrations of risk in response to North Korea are at once more 
complex and less capricious than they may appear at first glance.   
 
3.11. Market responses to the Taepodong: the power of political influence 
 As expressed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, this dissertation takes the position that, to whatever 
extent, there will be market influences (outside those already noted pertaining to commercial 
media) upon the processes mediating Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea – indeed, such a process clearly intersects the state, market and society. However, in 
terms of locating how a recalibration of risk – achieved via the framing of North Korea – 
                                                          
257  As noted by one expert on Japan’s domestic and international policy formation (26 October 2010, 
Appendix A), it can be unyielding to explain policy formation and implementation in Japan in concrete 
terms because of the intense reliance upon informal connections between various parties and actors. While 
close scrutiny has come to be paid to the donations of big business to political parties, particularly following 
the 2009 scandals surrounding then DPJ Chairman, Ozawa Ichirō, there remains a myriad of political ties 
made through gift-giving and social networks which obfuscate a more straightforward understanding of the 
agency behind political and economic interests.   
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might benefit Japan‟s leading stakeholder enterprises, as represented by organizations such 
as Nippon Keidanren and Keizai Dōyūkai, the trend would appear to be reversed. Minimal 
public reaction was expressed by Keidanren members and representatives to North Korea‟s 
initial Nodong launch of 1993 and, more notably, during the period immediately preceding 
and succeeding the Taepodong 1 test. Furthermore, the organization consistently sought to 
prevent the DPRK‟s nuclear development program and withdrawal from the NPT from 
subverting efforts to establish more stable economic relations with the North. Moreover, 
Keidanren openly cited its intentions to develop enterprise initiatives in North Korea as the 
primary reason for avoiding the escalation of tensions between Tokyo and Pyongyang. In an 
article for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 14 June 1994, Keidanren president Toyoda 
Shōichirō stated, with regards to the discussion of possible economic sanctions being 
imposed against the DPRK due to its nuclear development program, that, 
   It is a serious problem facing Japan‟s national security. We hope that North Korea will 
rapidly come in to line with the international community, and that the imposition of 
economic sanctions can be averted. 
 
Conjointly, Keidanren continued to oppose the majority of sanctions, even following staunch 
reaction across political, societal and media spheres to the Taepodong launch of 1998.258 
The economic benefits for Keidanren associates and other business groups, in terms of 
opening up North Korea‟s markets and taking advantage of potentially cheap (and 
promisingly submissive) labour seem clear. It is, therefore, no surprise they have 
predominantly sought to resist a process of rampant risk recalibration in response to North 
Korea – or at least to ensure that it does not subvert their financial interests. More puzzling, 
at first appraisal, is why the likes of Keidanren, and other potential economic stakeholders of 
the DPRK‟s untapped market within Japan, have not been more successful in such an 
endeavour. 
                                                          
258  This stance – failing to fully recalibrate risks against the DPRK – has been interpreted by some political 
factions as part of a drive by Keidanren to exploit cheap labour conditions in the North – hoping, effectively, 
to economically colonize parts of the DPRK (e.g., see Mizuno, 2010). 
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    At least three major factors would appear salient in explaining the inability of such market 
interests to stem the tide of risk recalibration manifest in North Korea‟s negative framing 
within Japan. Firstly, while groups such as Keidanren would, indeed, surely benefit from an 
open, accessible market in the North, the total value and capacity of any such market to 
Japan is in fact extremely limited and its exploitation is fraught with logistical difficulties, 
especially when compared to rival international markets.259 This has most likely contributed 
to the fact that there has, for the most part, been a lack of highly prioritized motivation to 
mount a concerted effort with which to influence policy makers, media sources and other 
societal stakeholders in this sphere.260 Furthermore, without wholesale administrative 
change in the DPRK, Japan‟s enterprises face the immutable threat of commercial assets 
and funds being appropriated by the North Korean state – and may find themselves at the 
mercy of North Korean authorities in terms of regulatory impositions, corruption and 
embezzlement. 
    In addition, perhaps because of business groups‟, such as Keidanren‟s, limited practical 
interest in DPRK affairs, powerful actors within the policy community have, generally, been 
able to resist what market forces do oppose the negative framing of North Korea – as an 
entity deemed bad-for-business. Conversely, they have gained proportionally from 
emphasizing the existence of risks emanating from Pyongyang, in terms of political capital 
                                                          
259  For instance, while in 1998 Japan held a total share of North Korea’s external trade in excess of 15 per cent  
(accurate/precise figures are illusive due to the large degree of informal trade), it still amounts to less than 
1 per cent of Japan’s total external trade. By 2004 Japan had slipped to providing just 7.1 per cent of North 
Korea’s dwindling foreign trade – and moved to being only its fourth largest trading partner. It was second 
prior to 2001 (Lee, 2005 (Korean Institute for International Economic Policy)). In addition, North Korea’s 
poorly developed infrastructure, culture of military infringement and lack of accountability, provide poor 
business conditions for would be investors. Furthermore, the North’s image as a source of illicit financial 
and trade practices (according to the US State Department (2003) the DPRK was found to be the source for 
35 per cent of all seizures of methamphetamine in Japan between 1998-2002) is damaging for the 
reputation of Japan’s established enterprises hoping to extend operations in North Korea. 
260  A position upheld, when interviewed (14 December 2010b, Appendix A), by one of the US’s leading 
experts on Japan’s international relations and security policy.   
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seized through adopting a tough stance vis-à-vis North Korea.261 Concordantly, as 
documented throughout this chapter, the media have additionally played a core role, 
interacting with the political elite, in creating a powerful momentum behind a process 
intersecting the state and society which mediates the recalibration of risk through the 
negative framing of North Korea. The story-like imagery and dialogue attached to 
Pyongyang, manifest in the media‟s depictions, is also evidently an effective means by which 
to maintain the Japanese public‟s interest in DPRK affairs and, perhaps more pertinently, the 
sale of news-media products which carry related stories. 
     Finally, there are powerful commercially motivated groups outside of the media who stand 
to gain enormously from recalibrating the risks posed by North Korea to Japan. Most 
obviously, with the collapse of the Cold War framework that identified the Soviet Union as a 
sustained source of risks which required large-scale military provision to counter, Japan‟s 
arms industry was left needing to rapidly find a suitable replacement for Japan‟s sole source 
of immediate geo-political animosity. The DPRK filled the enemy state void. Furthermore, 
along with arms developers and manufactures, Japan‟s military itself faced an immediate 
lacuna, which if left unfilled, Umeda (2007: 72-9) argues, would have resulted in the financial 
and dimensional downscaling of the JSDF – an outcome which might also have had serious 
repercussions for US forces stationed on Japan and the US-Japan Security Treaty as a 
whole. The rapid identification by such actors of Pyongyang as a source of salient, uncertain 
and frightening risks, including those of potential geo-military contingencies cannot, therefore, 
be easily dismissed as coincidental. Indeed, the explicit (collusive) relationship between 
Japan‟s political elite, domestic (and US) arms producers and the recalibration or risks 
following the missile launches of 1993 and 1998 is exposed in an article contained in the 
Yomiuri Shimbun of 20 December 2003. Having singled-out North Korea‟s Nodong and 
                                                          
261 Most notoriously, Koizumi Junichirō (though initially for promoting improved relations with the DPRK), Abe 
Shinzō and Asō Tarō all maximized such a strategy for personal political gain (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4 and 
Section 4.9,  and Chapter 5, Section 5.1 for discussion).   
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Taepodong missile threats as the primary motivation for improving Japan‟s defence 
capabilities, it states, in reference to the introduction of Japan‟s  $9bn (ultimately rising to 
$11bn) ballistic missile program (developed, and now deployed, in collaboration with the US) 
that, 
    Due to the inability of Japan to export weapons, purchasing customers for domestic 
defence industry manufacturers are limited to the Defence Agency.
262
 Tanks and 
defensive apparatus are produced in small quantity at high cost. Defence Agency Chief, 
Ishiba [Shigeru] stated during the October session of the Diet that „We can buy six 
American tanks for the price of one Japanese tank‟. Large-scale defence industry 
manufactures also claim that, „because domestic demand is limited, we want to open up 
a means by which to export to the US and expand our sales outlets.‟    
 
By emphasising the need for an expensive BMD system in order to ameliorate the missile 
threats posed by Pyongyang, the above statement once again evinces an interactive 
process of risk recalibration, mediated between the state and market, and expressed by 
news media in a form which justifies to society the resulting policy revisions.263 Such a 
combination of powerful vested interests, then, have garnered a significant degree of 
influence in terms of how market actors have indeed affected the process of Japan‟s 
recalibration of risks in response to North Korea – having been successful, both literally and 
metaphorically, in the buying and selling of risk.264     
 
                                                          
262 In addition to Japan’s three principles of non-nuclear proliferation and nominal 1 per cent budget cap for 
defence spending, the GoJ maintained an anti-militarist set of guidelines which included the non-export of 
weapons and weapons parts – with exception of certain weapons technology to the US (Drifte, 1998: 74) – 
during the Cold War. Hence, the North Korean missile threat was used by advocates of a more robust 
defence posture, such as former JDA chief, Ishiba Shigeru, in order justify revision of the legal framework 
which supported such principles. As a result, Japan’s domestic arms manufacturers stood (along with their 
American counterparts) to gain enormously from the ability to extend their market overseas – especially 
given an increase in demand for weapons that could counter a hostile regime in the DPRK.   
263  In this case, the Yomiuri article quoted above points to the necessity for speedy revision of the three 
principles governing weapons exports (bukki yushutsu san gensoku no sōkyūna minaoshi mo hitsuyō to 
naru). 
264  The initial role of the media (represented by the Asahi Shimbun’s article of 29 July 1995) in emphasising 
the need for a “new threat” (North Korea) and the significance of such an entity for the maintenance and 
justification of Japan’s security forces in the post-Cold War era is discussed in detail by Umeda (2007: 72-6).   
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3.12. The Taepodong as a focus-point for fear, uncertainty and the selling of risk 
Political reaction in Japan to the Taepodong launch of 1998 bore all the hallmarks of Beck‟s 
risk, science and uncertainty matrix (Beck, Adam and van Loon, 2000) which, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, plays on the fact that there are potentially cataclysmic risks, which 
require counter measures (based on scientifically justifiable information), but which 
maintains the ultimate uncertainty of the size and salience of those risks. This uncertainty 
allows an on-going process of subjective recalibration of risk, which is mediated between the 
state, market and society.265 In concrete terms, political actors recalibrate risks and stress the 
need for counter-measures, without necessarily specifying precisely how they are to be 
finitely ameliorated or expunged – i.e., they do not clarify explicitly at what point those risks 
can be adjudged to have been nullified. This reconfirms the significance of focusing analyses 
on risk recalibration as opposed only to threat perceptions, because, as Luhmann – covered 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.14, above – demonstrates, risk is concerned with how a threat such 
as the North Korean Taepodong missile is internalized into a series of responsibilities.266 
These require appropriation, usually by delegation or outsourcing of the responsibility for 
those risks, from the state to either its own policy making organs, or to sections of the 
broader market and civil society; or indeed, where deemed necessary or beneficial to the 
state, directly to the individual citizen.267    
                                                          
265  Once again this idea of risk as an on-going, dynamic yet uncertain, force which has to be controlled for, 
demonstrates why it is not sufficient simply to discuss “threat perceptions” – as such terminology tends to 
deal narrowly with concrete sources of harm, as opposed to the diverse appropriation of responsibility for 
employing a given set of choices with which to alleviate resulting and unwanted adverse circumstances. 
266  Media opinion polls, such as that conducted in October 1998 by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research 
Institute, reflect how this is internalized to the level of individual citizens, asking, “After the incident in 
which North Korea launched a missile, Japan and the United States have agreed to cooperate in developing 
technology to detect missiles using satellites and shoot down an enemy’s missiles from land or sea. Do you 
think these countries should cooperate in developing such technology, or is there no need?” Once again, 
the subtle juxtaposition of North Korea and enemy is illustrative of the direction in which discourse drives 
the framing of an external entity, such as the DPRK, particularly after the Taepodong launch. 
267  For instance, North Korea has also been associated with the aiding and abetting of terrorist organizations 
and activities, and, particularly following George W. Bush’s stigmatization of the DPRK as a rogue state, with 
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    For instance, speaking to the Financial Stability Special Committee (kinyū anteika ni 
kansuru tokubetsu iinkai) on 1 September 1998 (143: 2), LDP representative, Yamamoto 
Kōzō states in reference to the missile flying over Japanese territory that, “As the government 
we must seek to work with other countries, making all necessary provisions to ensure that our 
people are not thrown into a state of uncertainty”. The nature of the limits to all those 
provisions is omitted, allowing the potential for risks to be assigned an indefinite calibration, 
and responsibility for them appropriated to potentially any conceivable range of actors, from 
the international community to the individual citizen in Japan.268 
    Nevertheless, as discussed in the following sections, most comprehensively Section 3.15, 
in fact the measurable recalibration of risk following the Taepodong 1 incident to a higher 
level – one against which a tangible hardening of Japan‟s stance in relations with Pyongyang 
and, ultimately, a number of policy revisions could be justified – was far from uncertain in 
terms of its resulting practical application. Hence, there is a contradiction between the 
uncertain and subjective manner in which the policy community recalibrates risks, and the 
objective – justified as scientific – prescriptive form in which it makes policy adjustments to 
counter them. 
    During the lower house‟s Foreign Affairs Committee (gaimu iinkai) on 2 September 1998, 
the discourse representative of this process is visibly (or aurally) played out through the 
discussions of the various associated government members in the Diet. Epitomizing this 
dialogue, committee member, Yoshikawa Takamori (143: 13) urges his foreign minister to 
provide a “message for the people from the MOFA” regarding what happened up to and after  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the use of more diverse illicit means. As such, Japanese citizens are asked by the state to be on their guard  
for suspicious situations, ranging from unidentified bags on railway stations or carriages and forged 
       currency, to possible North Korean agents operating within Japan’s shores. 
268  In this sense, leaving a certain scope for the retrospective defence of statements made is commonplace in 
the Diet. This makes the increasingly strong language and specificity of policy provisions promoted by 
speakers following later missile launches and nuclear tests (See Chapters 4-6) all the more striking in terms 
of their starkness compared to previous reactionary statements made with regards to, for example, the 
1998 Taepodong launch. 
165 
 
the Taepodong launch. Prior to the above demand, he re-quotes the government statement, 
of the preceding day, asserting that, 
   The ballistic missile fired by North Korea which flew over our national territory and 
landed offshore from the Sanriku coast represents a situation which absolutely cannot be 
left as it is in terms of provisions for our national security. Along with all the citizens of this 
country [Japan], we express our strong anger in strictly condemning this action. These 
actions taken by North Korea seriously threaten the peace and security of the East Asia 
region, and amount to an aberration which has raised tensions among the entire 
international community. 
 
Foreign Minister, Kōmura Masahiko (143: 14) responds (and recalibrates further) by 
repeating the assertion that the Taepodong 1 incident amounts to “an extremely grave (taihen 
shinkoku na) situation which poses a great menace (taihen na kyōi) to our country‟s security and 
threatens the security of East Asia”, going on to also posit that, “it also has to be considered as 
posing a challenge to the non-proliferation of WMD”. These dialogues demonstrate a 
remarkable consistency in terms of highlighting the grave, and yet uncertain, harms 
harboured by risks emanating from the DPRK. The Taepodong test launch, then, acted as a 
clear focus point for political actors addressing the risks perceived to be posed by 
Pyongyang, and featured extensively in how they were justifiably recalibrated (appropriately) 
in the public sphere. 
    The use of the 31 August 1998 Taepodong launch as a means by which to justify the 
recalibration of risk, in terms of being a response to a negatively framed North Korea, was 
also striking by way of its distinct veracity across a broad span of Japan‟s policy community. 
Indeed, as noted by Yoshida (2008: 161), although the governing LDP administration reacted 
angrily to the test firing and was quick to demand policy revisions accordingly, in terms of 
scaremongering over a possible threat from North Korea, it was in fact then opposition 
leader, Kan Naoto, who was “the most active” (ichiban sekkyokuteki) in promoting, for 
instance, Japan‟s investment in four surveillance satellites to monitor the skies over Japan 
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and its neighbour(s) across the Japan Sea.269 In this sense, while there were still dissenting 
voices, as seen in Fukushima Mizuho‟s Diet statement quoted in Section 3.9, above, the 
Taepodong 1 launch can be considered to have been a pivotal event in creating a 
momentum of overtly perceived fear and uncertainty, which allowed risks to be disseminated, 
or sold (largely through top-down mediation), in a recalibrated form across the political 
spectrum. Moreover, there is little argument that it is the recalibration of the risks exposed (or 
portrayed to have been exposed) by the Taepodong test firing which served to justify a 
multitude of counter measures, rapidly proposed and implemented by the state. Furthermore, 
indeed, with such risks having been recalibrated effectively, the presiding actors of Japan‟s 
policy community, who proposed and authorized measures against the DPRK, faced minimal 
questioning or resistance to the subsequent revision of state-level North Korea policies. 
 
3.13. Policy revisions to counter the risks brought by the Taepodong 
Japan was distinct among neighbouring states in terms of its public, media and political 
reactions to the Taepodong test-launch, and to the policy revisions that were made in order 
to counter the perceived risks which had been newly recalibrated in its wake.270 Initial 
measures justified with direct reference to the Taepodong 1 launch included refusal to re-
enter normalization talks with the North, prohibition of public sector staff visits to the DPRK 
and the termination of charter flights between Nagoya (and Niigata) and Pyongyang, and the 
cessation of major trade links (Yoshida, 2008: 158). As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, below, 
                                                          
269  The suggestion that leading opposition parties were almost as fervent in their recalibration of risks 
following the Taepodong launch as the LDP government raises at least two important points; the fact that 
there was apparently overwhelming, if not total, convergence over the manner in which risks were 
recalibrated and mediated by the policy community in Japan, and that that policy community  apparently 
has little consistent, coherent divide over Japan’s grand strategy in foreign policy trajectories vis-à-vis the 
DPRK – rather operating on a case by case basis, as various factions compete for political capital.     
270  In addition to the Taepodong launch being given comparatively little media attention within other 
stakeholder states, it was, as noted above, not framed as an imminent geo-military security concern (e.g., 
by the US, PRC, Russia or the ROK). Therefore, the risks associated with it were not given the same level of 
calibration or precedence as they were in Japan. 
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the Taepodong test launch can, furthermore, be interpreted as a key event in terms of 
initiating a process via which risks perceived to be posed by North Korea have maintained a 
high calibration in Japan. Therein, in combination with the recalibration of risks associated 
with North Korea‟s nuclear development program and the persistently inflamed abduction 
issue, this resulted in the justification and ultimately successful implementation of the 
Foreign Currency and External Trade Bill (gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku bōeki hō) which 
allowed Japan to impose direct unilateral sanctions upon North Korea as a (legally) 
“necessary means to maintain national peace and security” (Park, 2005: 261).     
    The speed and severity of the unilateral sanctions imposed upon North Korea by Japan 
following the August 1998 Taepodong incident, coming as they did less than two days after 
the suspected missile test, were also a striking illustration of the recalibration of risk that took 
place in the five years which interposed it from the first Nodong launch. This is particularly so 
considering that, as noted in Section 3.16, below, it took two weeks before details of the 
Nodong firing were even officially confirmed. Furthermore, the range of justifications for the 
compilation of measures applied, showed a clear shift in what Japan‟s policy community was 
willing to project as sovereign defence, and how it could do so with relative impunity in the 
public sphere through the negative framing of North Korea. For instance, cancellation of the 
minimal charter flight service (amounting to approximately 80 flights per year271) from 
Nagoya to Pyongyang was justified on the grounds that North Korea‟s Taepodong launch 
violated the conditions of aviation security laid down by the Chicago Convention, which 
Pyongyang signed in 1977 – a far cry from the alleged risks to national security outlined as 
the central premise behind other proposed measures, such as the freezing of normalization 
talks.272 
    Further, it was in the aftermath of the first Taepodong test launch into the Japan Sea that 
                                                          
271 See, Asahi Shimbun, 3 September 1998, “Nicchōkan no chātā bin mitomezu, seifu ga tsuika seisai dandō   
        misairu jiken de”. 
272 For details of ascensions to the Chicago Convention, see Convention on International Civil Aviation Signed at     
         Chicago on 7 September 1944 (2005). 
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Japan‟s DPRK-aligned community also began to emerge as the target for framing new risks 
and adopting counter-risk policies accordingly. Indeed, in combination with the measures 
outlined above, the ruling LDP administration also officially considered sanctioning North 
Korean sympathisers within the resident Korean community by imposing a sweeping ban on 
remittances and authorising means by which to freeze individual assets (Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 
September 1998). In the arena of quantitative concrete policy revision too, then, the 
Taepodong 1 launch can be identified as a crucial event amid a creeping process of 
qualitative risk recalibration, mediated via the framing of Pyongyang – a process driven, 
sustained and perpetuated, not least, by the cumulative interactive actions of state and 
media in Japan.     
 
3.14. Media reaction to the Taepodong: a stark shift in risk recalibration 
Media reaction to the North‟s 1998 Taepodong test launch was monumental, and pivotal in 
itself in terms of sensationalization and amplification of issues attached to the DPRK in 
Japan; particularly in terms of how North Korea was framed in the public sphere and how 
risks emanating from Pyongyang became perceived and re-calibrated. While this 
dissertation seeks to address a broad range of news media sources through a qualitative, 
targeted (case-specific) perspective – as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.10, it focuses 
most intensely on the Asahi Shimbun and (subordinately) the Yomiuri Shimbun newspapers 
as its central media case studies (barometers), in order to delineate a consistent mixed-
media (quantitative and qualitative) measurement of how risk calibration has undergone a 
tangible shift through the altered framing of North Korea during the post-Cold War era.273 
This is deemed empirically applicable because the Asahi has traditionally had a left-of-centre, 
or at least comparatively liberal, standpoint which has historically attempted to play down the 
risks posed by the DPRK and the North Korean community in Japan, as opposed to the 
                                                          
273  I.e., in contrast to news media sources which have consistently looked to emphasize the potential risks  
posed to Japan by North Korea (Sankei Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun etc.). 
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Yomiuri which has projected a more consistently right-of-centre viewpoint.274 Indeed, a Korea 
specialist at one of Japan‟s leading political think-tanks posited (29 August 2011, Appendix 
A) that the 1998 Taepodong launch was pivotal in as much as it marked the traditionally 
North-supporting Asahi‟s unequivocal switch to criticism of Pyongyang – and a recalibration 
of associated risks. As illustrated by Table 3.2, below, a quantitatively distinct comparison 
between media sources is at first glance difficult to extrapolate. However, as analysed in this 
section, close scrutiny of articles‟ discourse content reveals that, in qualitative terms, the 
Asahi‟s coverage of the Taepodong test firing of 1998 is particularly illustrative of a swing 
toward what would more consistently be expected from the pages of the Yomiuri in this 
respect. 
Table 3.2. Impact of the 1998 Taepodong Launch in the Media and Diet 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to August 
1998 
Taepodong 
Launch 
 
Numbers of articles/items post 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~ ~3 ~6 ~12 
Asahi 1538 665 367 733 1216 2318 
Yomiuri 1403 564 295 647 1153 2388 
Mainichi 1873 683 381 985 1700 3085 
Sankei 1820 723 392 878 1927 4273 
NHK News 608 224 124 414 661 1270 
Diet 134 84 14 48 97 228 
Magazines※ 58 27 12 32 43 68 
Source: author 
Figures shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi database, Yomiuri database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※ Based on a selection of national magazines, primarily 
sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
                                                          
274  Therein, such an assertion is made in terms of comparison to its nearest rival, and most widely read 
newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, and to the wealth of more linguistically extreme right wing dailies in 
national circulation within Japan. 
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 3.2, above. 
 
    The Asahi‟s editorial of 1 September 1998 frames the Pyongyang regime as being the 
source of multiple and uncertain threats and makes direct comparison to the Nodong launch 
of 1993 – recalibrating the associated risks accordingly.  Moreover, as discussed further in 
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Chapter 5, Section 5.9, below, the Asahi editor‟s standpoint can be seen as typical in terms 
of how highly-educated and academic discourses in Japan have, at the very least indirectly, 
served to justify the broader recalibration of risks across public and political spheres in 
response to North Korea. This is realized through an analytical understanding of the North‟s 
ultimate intentions, which typically cites politically motivated actions on the part of Kim Jong-
Il‟s regime, but which is predicated with reference to the, nevertheless, potentially 
catastrophic (however unlikely) implications for Japan of possible strategies to be adopted 
by Pyongyang.275 As a case in point, the article referenced above states that, 
    North Korea‟s missile test heightens the tension within our country and the East Asia region 
as a whole, and is, as such, unacceptable.  
Also questioning what the aim (nerai) of the launch might have been, it expresses strong 
condemnation of the test and posits that,  
without any prior announcements…  …it was as if it were a test which directly targeted 
Japanese territory. It seems this was not the Nodong of 1993, but an improved model with 
greater range, known as the „Taepodong‟. 
 
Moreover, the article goes on to discuss how, whatever the ulterior motives might be, the 
North‟s missiles do represent a salient threat, and efforts should be made to reduce the risk 
level that they pose, implicitly implying that the risks had, following the Taepodong launch, 
already been substantially heightened. In this way, as confirmed in an interview with one 
former Asahi Shimbun editor (3 June 2011b, Appendix A), the Asahi Shimbun‟s position can 
be seen to have shifted fundamentally after the Taepodong test in terms of laying the 
foundations for a more substantial and consistent recalibration of risks framed against the 
DPRK in the successive years. Indeed, in quantitative terms too, the Asahi covered North 
Korean issues in 521 articles during the month that followed the Taepodong launch, 
compared to just 132 in the case of the 1993 Nodong launch, for which the missile launch 
                                                          
275  The point here is, essentially, that even comparatively moderate media sources such as the Asahi Shimbun, 
which looked at the broader reasons behind provocative DPRK actions, responded to the Taepodong launch 
in terms of it representing a new kind of risk that had as yet been unseen. 
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isolated in itself was barely covered.276 277 This is significant, not least, because, as 
previously alluded to, the Nodong was actually a missile being developed by the DPRK with 
the assumed purpose of a potential strike against South Korea or Japan – as opposed to the 
Taepodong, which is a longer ranger missile, ultimately conceived of, particularly in its latter 
forms, as a means by which to threaten a strike on the US mainland.278 In 1993, while a 
considerable amount of coverage was given to articles discussing (primarily US-DPRK) 
negotiations over the ensuing nuclear crisis, the first articles confirming the missile launch 
did not appear in the Asahi until almost two weeks after the incident, on 11 June. Not only 
does this demonstrate the extent to which missiles fired by North Korea were not calibrated 
as bearing intensely grave risks, but also illustrates how the DPRK was yet to be so candidly 
framed as the focus of a clearly identified risk recalibration.279 
    However, the precursory process of how Japan‟s political elite came to frame Pyongyang, 
as being identified with multiple and salient risks, mediated through the public sphere (in this 
case through quality newspapers), is clearly visible in the limited number of articles which do 
cover the 1993 Nodong launch story in the Asahi. As a case-in-point, one article of the 11 
June evening edition conflates the issues concerning risks of nuclear armament and missile 
launches, stating that, 
   Concerning North Korea‟s missile test launch, the government has confirmed that it took 
place immediately prior to high-level US-DPRK talks over the nuclear issue. It [the ruling 
administration] is taking the position that „the launch was probably intended as a means to 
constrain how the US entered the high level discussions‟. Additionally, government officials 
                                                          
  276  Based on searches using the Asahi Shimbun online Visual Database with the search term “kitachōsen”;   
observing headlines and first page text for content (Kikuzō II bijuaru, 2010). 
  277  Using the same search method, the equivalent figures for the Yomiuri Shimbun are 337 and 135 
respectively (Yomidasu Rekishikan, 2010), with the Nikkei Shimbun covering 352 and 160, and the Mainichi 
Shimbun 573 and 132 in turn (Nikkei Telecom 21, 2010). 
   278  Indeed, such an understanding is largely implied by Japan’s BMD provisions adopted by the MOD (2010b). 
279 It  should also be noted that surveillance technology of the time did not necessarily provide the kind of 
     instant and comprehensive analyses made possible by following technological advances. However, the idea 
     that it would take two weeks to be informed of a North Korean missile launch into the Japan Sea by US 
     intelligence authorities is now unthinkable. Indeed, it would no doubt cause a major scandal in Japan’s 
     public sphere if such a test went unreported for so long, due not least to the risks attached to the DPRK 
     having been recalibrated so extensively. 
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stated the following, should economic sanctions be imposed in the case of high-level 
discussions between the US and DPRK breaking down, „If the US moves to impose sanctions 
we will likely have to align ourselves with them. A nuclear armed North Korea represents a 
grave threat to Japan‟. This expresses the position that the Government of Japan will 
cooperate with the US in imposing economic sanctions, should US-DPRK talks fail. 
 
This kind of discourse itself illustrates how the process – as identified in the Introduction and 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 – combining high-risk perception concepts and the framing of them 
at one source (North Korea) can, then, be seen as stemming back at least as far as the 1993 
Nodong test launch. Furthermore, the launch acted as the starting point for establishing 
North Korea‟s missile capabilities as a target which could later be more fully assigned to the 
attachment of salient and pressing risks. These then became identified as something which 
required tangible policy measures in order to alleviate the uncertain harms that might be 
exacted by them upon Japan. The Asahi Shimbun‟s coverage is once again revealing in as 
much as it represents a barometer for the (non-extremist) public level of framing assigned to 
North Korea and the perception of its cumulative risks. On 12 June 1993 an article (one of 
only a handful of Asahi pieces covering the issue) entitled “A New Threat for Japan, 
Government Urgently Seeks Confirmation on Details of North Korean Missile Test Launch”  
highlights, without any counter criticism, that for the first time the government is, 
    …urgently seeking to confirm the precise details of North Korea‟s missile development 
program, which it perceives as a new threat to the security of Japan. Due to almost the 
entirety of Japanese territory from Nagoya westward being within range of a potential 
missile deployment, it will need to make a comprehensive review of its security position.   
 
As discussed in the chapters below, the intensity, quantity and range of how such a 
threat has been internalized into risks which have been both quantitatively and qualitatively 
recalibrated through an interactive process which intersects the state, market and society in 
Japan can, thereafter, be delineated through the examination of reaction to subsequent 
missile launch events. As this chapter has exposed, the first clear-cut example of this 
process rapidly accelerating (following the 1998 Taepodong launch) can be observed at 
source through micro analysis of the precursors laid-in-place by reaction to the Nodong test. 
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Although such precursory reactions were quantitatively minimal in number and scope, it is 
argued that they, ultimately, facilitated the higher recalibration of risk adopted after the 
Taepodong incident of 1998. 
 
3.15. Conclusion: the Taepodong launch as a lesson in risk recalibration 
Reaction to the Taepodong launch of 1998 and the manner in which information pertaining to 
it was mediated between the different sections of Japan‟s state, media and other market 
elements to the wider (civil) society offers, then, an illustrative example of the process of 
socio-political risk recalibration, and why it is significant, particularly with regards to Japan‟s 
regionally embedded relationship with North Korea.280 This chapter has demonstrated how 
dormant risks can be quite dramatically recalibrated at the state level in a short (indeed, 
almost instant in the Taepodong‟s case) space of time in relation to specific events. This is 
particularly so if the background conditions have already been primed, which in this case 
includes an encompassing mediation of a specific negative image, or framing, associated 
with the DPRK and its leaders.281 While reaction to the 1993 Nodong incident was delayed 
and comparatively cautious, it contributed to set in motion a particular kind of political 
discourse directed at the DPRK within Japan. Combining multiple issues (missile, nuclear 
weapons, abduction etc.) related to North Korea, such a discourse then began to become 
prevalent and was expressed through statements in the Diet and initially somewhat 
                                                          
280 Risk recalibration is a significant topic here, not just in terms of unearthing the process itself, but also for    
       the relevance it provides to studies of international relations which seek to expose more than solely a shift    
          in threat perception – here looking at the effects of mediating risk through discourse to create a particular   
     status-quo within society which facilitates behavioural change at the state level. Once again, refer to 
     Luhmann’s explanation with regards to the distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ (see Chapter 2, Section 
     2.14, above). 
281 Discussion of the specifics of how Kim Jong-Il’s demonization played a significant role in this process is 
covered more extensively in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, particularly with regards to how the attachment of a 
negative framing to Kim (and most notably its association with the abduction issue) served to intensify 
public-sphere attention to North Korean affairs and further politicize the abductions cases – thereby 
increasing its influence upon the policy community and constricting its ability to set the agenda for resulting 
North Korea-targeted measures at the state-level.   
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indifferent, though increasingly loaded, reporting of the political elite‟s reactions in the mass 
media. Quantitative levels of coverage and recalibration of associated risks then sky-
rocketed in reaction to the Taepodong launch of 1998. 
With regards to Pyongyang‟s continual brinkmanship diplomacy it is, in fact, problematic to 
make a clear-cut case which points to a measurable escalation of hostile or provocative 
actions towards Japan during the first decade of the post-Cold War era (Michishita, 2009: 
117-131).282 However, when the Taepodong test launch took place, the precedents (e.g., the 
Nodong test launch) and socio-political risk climate were already ripened, allowing pivotal 
actors to interpret information and (re)calibrate risks as they saw fit – not least to further their 
own vested political agendas for policy revisions. In light of the above, the salience of risk 
recalibration in this processes is evident in that, although individuals will react to information 
gained from the public sphere with varying degrees of scepticism and extremity, a 
culmination of continued exposure to a particular external framing of risk (i.e., as associated 
with North Korea in Japan) buttressed by specific key events is a highly effective 
collaboration when it comes to realizing such a process. In short, in Japan, while many 
individual citizens may have little interest in North Korea, and their responses to the risks it 
reportedly poses may be minimal, the gradual accumulation of a perception that a number of 
serious risks are represented by the DPRK, propagated by so-called experts in the field, can 
facilitate the society as a whole being manoeuvred into a position, or societal state, of panic 
(Nakayachi, 2006: 29-31).283 Ultimately, this leads broad sections of that society into a 
                                                          
282  Michishita refers to a “chronological continuity” (2009: 131) in terms of documenting how the North has 
sustained a largely consistent pattern of brinkmanship diplomacy and provocation throughout the entire 
period of its military campaigns from 1966 to the present. In this sense, North Korea’s actions cannot be 
seen to have escalated in sync with Japan’s recalibration of risk in response to them. It is noteworthy that 
Michishita is, himself, a self-professed advocate of Japan’s normalization and has numerous close associates 
within the military. As such, it seems a logical premise to assume he would look for such a synchronism if it 
were possible to convincingly project the idea of a proportional reaction to Pyongyang by Japan. 
283  With reference to the propagation of a given calibration of risk by experts in Japan, Nakayachi notes that 
while it is often assumed that civil society or mass media sources exaggerate or misconstrue the extent of 
risks and their salience – having then to be corrected by experts – in fact, it is predominantly the use of 
ambiguous language used by specialists and those recognized as having scientific authority which facilitates 
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tendency of willingness to respond to those risks through altered behaviour and support (or 
at least non-resistance) for policy provisions, justified in light of the recalibrated risks; 
proposed and implemented via an interactive process by a loose affiliation of powerful actors 
within the policy community. 
  In this way, the empirical evidence examined here regarding significant factors prior to 
and immediately after the Taepodong event of 1998 demonstrates the salience of the 
theoretical and analytical frameworks developed in Chapter 2. Therein, the process of how 
Japan has come to recalibrate risks in response to North Korea can be effectively explained 
in terms of how a number of tributary norms concerning Japan‟s defensive identity, and fear 
of the externally unknown and risk-endowed, have been created and converged in response 
to on-going issues, such as those of abductions, nuclear development, and the construction 
and use of WMD by Pyongyang‟s ruling administration, stimulated by high-profile events 
such as the Taepodong launch. These have resulted in the formation of a norm cascade 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 887-917) amounting, in effect, to the internalization of a norm 
of anti-North Koreanism – as distinguishable from more generic xenophobia or exclusionary 
nationalism – in Japan, which has been galvanised by a series of key events.284 Those of 
missile and nuclear tests, in addition to specific revelations over the abductions issues, have 
been particularly pivotal in this respect, though realization of the process initially came to 
fruition in the aftermath of the first Taepodong test launch into the Japan Sea.285 Moreover, 
through careful observation of changes in the discourses which mediate such socio-political 
norms, it is possible to delineate specific tipping points and alterations to ideologically 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the misconception and manipulation of risks by politically motivated actors (2006: 56-7). Hence, such a 
process can be seen to be present within Japan’s recalibration of risk propagated via the, risk-loaded, 
framing of North Korea. In addition, Nakayachi (2004) also argues that the contemporary trend of seeking 
zero risk is a key causal agent in the proliferation of this phenomenon. 
284  This process is elucidated more clearly with reference to Kim’s growing profile as a negative figure within 
Japan’s public-political sphere, which escalated following Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002, and the 
aggregated impact of reaction to North Korea’s successive missile and nuclear tests conducted up to 2009 
(see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).   
285  For a distinct, though related, discussion of the significance of norms in Japan’s contemporary foreign 
policy construction, see L. Hughes (2007). 
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established positions within the policy community and society in Japan, fore-mostly through 
the examination of such events. Pertinently, as discussed throughout Chapter 2, it is once 
again made apparent via this kind of event-based analysis that a constructivist-based 
understanding of the creation and proliferation of norms such as anti-North Koreanism 
(expressed through the DPRK‟s negative framing within Japan) can be convincingly applied, 
and measured in terms of how the (re)calibration of risk identified with North Korea operates 
as the primary agency for such a process to evolve. 
  Furthermore, by utilizing the comprehension of risk recalibration, as a central agent in 
such socio-political processes, illuminating analyses can be achieved not only in terms of 
qualitative examples of how risks have come to be interpreted and perceived differently by a 
variety of specific stakeholder actors, but also in quantitative terms. As demonstrated above, 
these are most ostensibly provided in the case of the two missile events at hand by Diet 
(political discourse) and newspaper coverage records, and a myriad of background sources, 
which objectively document how, and the extent to which, Japan recalibrated risk through its 
framing of North Korea in the immediate post-Cold War era. The following chapters elucidate 
how this process has been further extended and perpetuated during the first decade of the 
21st Century up to the present. 
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Chapter 4. Re-recalibrating risk: the impact of more missiles and a 
nuclear test 
   “Japan‟s policy makers have reacted increasingly strongly towards North Korea‟s 
military provocations since the 1990s. The first North Korean nuclear crisis of the 
mid-1990s, the North‟s Taepodong-1 missile test of 1998 and missile tests in July 
2006, and the nuclear test of October 2006, coupled with bilateral tensions over 
North Korean incursions into Japanese territorial waters and the abductions of 
Japanese citizens, have spurred shifts...”   
Christopher Hughes (2009a: 292) 
 
4.1. Escalating processes of risk recalibration in Japan’s responses to North Korea 
Hughes‟ statement, above, succinctly identifies a number of the key events and factors up to 
the nuclear test of 2006 which facilitated North Korea‟s negative framing in Japan. However, 
how the “policy makers” he points to were able to recalibrate the risks associated with each 
of those factors requires further scrutiny in order to generate a more comprehensive analysis 
of the constitutive process therein.286 As seen from the discussion of Japan‟s framing of the 
DPRK following the 1998 Taepodong launch in Chapter 3, one of the clearest measures of 
how risks have been recalibrated by Japan‟s policy makers can be viewed through their 
                                                          
286 I.e., in order to extend analysis beyond an essentially neo-realist model, which leans towards interpreting 
Japan’s responses to North Korea in terms of a rational actor reacting logically to concrete events, the use 
of recalibrated risks within a policy community represented by a multiplicity of socio-economic and political 
actors requires further examination; principally to answer three core questions relating to the events dealt 
with below: 1. Why did the GoJ take the specific policy steps that it did towards the DPRK? 2. Why then? 3. 
Why those policies and not others? The above were adapted from questions posed in an interview (8 
February 2011b, Appendix A) by a leading American commentator on Japanese affairs. In essence, an 
elucidation of how (through what politically contested and socially constructed process contingent upon the 
(re)calibration of risk) the specifics of Japan’s framing of the DPRK in response to such events as the North’s 
admission of state-sponsored abductions, continued missile test-firings, and first nuclear test emerged is 
required.    
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responses to North Korean missile tests. The events that unfolded during 2006, however, 
presented a second, additional element, with which risks framed in the context of the 
DPRK‟s weapons programmes could be further compounded and recalibrated. In addition to 
the multiple rocket launches in July, which served to remind and re-confirm the risks framed 
against Kim Jong-Il‟s provocative regime, the nuclear test in October of the same year 
elevated their calibration to a yet higher level.287 Once again this can be observed across a 
sphere that intersects the state, market and society – mediated to the citizen through a 
broad range of information sources; including mainstream newspapers, television and other 
electronic sources.288 
    This chapter examines the key events of 2006 (nuclear and missile tests) in the context of 
reactions within Japan to a series of preceding incidents and issues that continued to 
stimulate the recalibration of risk through the framing of North Korea in the period after the 
1998 Taepodong launch. These include the “suspicious ship” and “spy boat” maritime 
incursion incidents of 1999 and 2001, and the furore surrounding the abduction issue. The 
latter is shown to have pivotally hinged on political party and media responses to former 
Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō‟s, historic visit to Pyongyang and the ensuing admission 
by Kim Jong-Il that the DPRK had, indeed, abducted a number Japanese citizens during the 
1970s and 1980s. Exploration of how leading actors in Japan utilized these high-profile 
elements as a means by which to frame the North and recalibrate risks pertaining to it 
accordingly, elucidates a consistent process by which discourses in the public sphere prime 
a particular external object (Kim Jong-Il‟s North Korea), making it highly susceptible to the 
                                                          
287 As noted in the discussion of Japan’s response to the missile test-firing of 1998, it is the process behind 
the extremity of how Japan reacts to a continuing sequence of North Korean actions which is of particular 
interest. Indeed, while beyond the remit of this dissertation to attempt a full comparative analysis, the 
significance of such is evinced by the “difference in temperature”, or ondosa (Oe, 2007: 33) between Japan 
and other stake-holder states in their responses to North Korea. 
288 It should be born in mind that while certain information sources may be limited solely to the internet, 
there is widespread usage and readership of internet-based TV channels and newspapers, which 
predominantly carry a similar content to their printed or television forms. These included, for instance, 
Asahi.com (www.asahi.com), Yomiuri Online (www.yomiuri.co.jp/), and NHK Online (www.nhk.or.jp). 
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justification and implementation of sudden and oft times reactionary measures in light of 
particularly conspicuous events. The amplified reaction and policy revisions shaped within 
Japan in the aftermath of the missile and nuclear tests performed by Pyongyang in 2006 can 
be seen as representative of this process, i.e., in terms of state-societal level justifications 
made on the premise of ameliorating highly (re)calibrated risks.            
    Within this process, then, the extremity of Japan‟s framing of, and responses to, North 
Korea, and the use of risks as a justification for policy provisions and implementations is a 
recurrent theme. Furthermore, how leading governmental actors were once again able to 
utilize the framing of North Korea to gain political capital for their own individual ends, as well 
as those of broader political agendas is spotlighted.289 In the wake of events unfolding up to 
the end of 2006, the combined result of the above was a complex convergence of domestic 
and external actors and interests attempting to maximize the malleability or risks mediated in 
reference to the negatively framed entity of North Korea. Amid this, as Umeda (2007: 17) 
states in his comprehensive criticism of then Chief Cabinet Secretary (and soon to be Prime 
Minister), Abe Shinzō‟s administration, “The only [stakeholder state] where government and 
mass-media united to demand and implement sanctions was Japan.” Indeed, illustrative of 
this process, was the combination of Abe‟s unilateral statements regarding Japan‟s 
worsening security environment, as a result of the risks posed to it by a range of North 
Korean threats, and the right-of-centre print media‟s ratchetting-up the mediation of risks 
within the public sphere – optimised by the Yomiuri Shimbun in an editorial ultimately laying 
the blame at Pyongyang‟s door for Japan being in its “worst security environment since the 
end of the Second World War” (4 January 2007: 3). In addition, television coverage of the 
issues surrounding the DPRK‟s provocations in the week following the nuclear test boasted 
                                                          
289 Most overtly, Abe Shinzō used the North Korean issues in an attempt to both demonstrate strong 
foreign-policy leadership skills and to forward his agenda of military normalization and constitutional 
reform in Japan – i.e., as opposed to former Prime Minister Koizumi and later Prime Minister, Asō (See 
Section 4.4 and Chapter 5, Section 5.1, below), both of whom fore-mostly utilized the North Korea 
phenomena in order to create a political distraction from their own specific domestic woes, though at least 
in Asō’s case, also to push a right-of-centre policy restructuring agenda. 
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seven times that of its nearest rival (Umeda, 2007: 21).290 Furthermore, the full dissemination 
of this interactive risk recalibration within broader sections of Japan‟s political elite and 
media elements (constituting a core policy community) can, again, be traced in considerable 
detail with reference to reaction in the Diet and Japan‟s other nationally distributed 
newspapers. Moreover, it can be fruitfully analysed through a successive, comparative, 
examination of events during the period preceding the 2006 tests. As this chapter reveals, 
these laid the foundations for Japan‟s re-recalibration of risk in the years succeeding North 
Korea‟s 1998 Taepodong 1 launch, which, as observed in Chapter 3, demonstrated how 
missile test firings served to catapult an already creeping process of risk recalibration vis-à-
vis the DPRK.291 
 
4.2. Suspicious ship or spy-boat: reaction to the events of 1999 
Outside of the ongoing rumblings over nuclear proliferation and unresolved abduction cases, 
one of the most clearly identifiable issues associated with the negative portrayal of North 
Korea in Japan has been that of incursions into Japan‟s declared sovereign territory made 
by DPRK agents and other North Korean actors – suspected to be for the purposes of 
conducting illicit activities which pose risks to Japan‟s security.292 The two incidents of 1999 
and 2001, involving direct confrontation between North Korean vessels and Japan‟s state 
forces (primarily the JCG and MSDF) highlight the extent to which such events serve to 
facilitate an escalating process of risk recalibration framed against the DPRK, and also 
                                                          
290 Twelve hours and fifty-six minutes of coverage, as compared with one hour and forty-six minutes for the 
second most covered issue/news item of the same period (Tokyo Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 2007). 
291 This is observable, regardless of whether or not any of the North Korean missiles/satellites were aimed at 
or towards Japan. In fact, at no stage has Pyongyang’s regime or official media sources stated or suggested 
that missiles were being tested in response to, or targeting, Japan. Indeed, they have denied that any such 
test-firings pose any risk to Tokyo. For general comment on the North’s position on test-firings, see related 
news coverage (BBC News, 2009). 
292 Most notably these include the smuggling of narcotics produced in the DPRK into Japan – primarily in 
association with domestic criminal gangs (bōryokudan), formerly known as yakuza. 
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provide a tangible measure of how such a recalibration of risk affected the introduction of 
practical counter measures in the interim (see also Section 4.8, below).   
    The comparatively limited extent of reaction in Japan to the first incident, in March of 1999, 
involving Japanese state authorities‟ pursuit and firing of live warning shots over, but not at, a 
suspected North Korean spy vessel, illustrates both how such risks were then yet to be so 
highly calibrated and how the failure to deal more robustly with them could be used as a later 
means by which to justify the recalibration of those risks.293 Further, this process, as in the 
case of previous incidents, such as the missile launches of 1993 and 1998 (examined in 
Chapter 3), can also be observed by way of the comparable, interactive, reactions of the 
political elite and mass media to the two events.294 
    In terms of priming a given external target in order to recalibrate risks framed against it, 
the assessment of Japan‟s relevant strategy for dealing with such incidences as the 
suspected spy ship incursions (particularly following the 1999 case) by government officials 
is striking in its immediate referral to possible future contingencies – pertaining to the risks 
posed by North Korea. The rhetoric of heightened risks and necessary counter measures 
was led by, amongst others, then government minister, Norota Hōsei, who asserted during 
the main Diet session of 24 March (145: 10) that, 
   In the 45 years since the JSDF‟s inauguration in 1954, this is the first time that Article 82 of 
the Self Defence Law has had to be employed in order to facilitate defensive maritime action, 
and the result is that the suspicious [North Korean] ship escaped because of the strictness of 
the law, which constrained effective usage of weapons and the like. I am, however, convinced 
that, we showed, both domestically and internationally, our country‟s resolute determination, in 
response to this kind of incident, demonstrating that when the Coast Guard is incapable alone, 
the Self Defence Force will also be deployed for such tasks. This will provide the greatest 
deterrent against the future occurrence of this kind of incident.     
 
                                                          
293    Namely, as a full-scale, potentially highly grievous, national security concern, which required punitive 
action at all costs – as contrastingly demonstrated by the response to the comparable situation of 2001. 
294    The recalibration of risks attributed to North Korea by Japan, despite a lack of discernible alteration to 
the threat posed by Pyongyang’s specific capabilities can also, as discussed further below, be observed in 
relation to comparative measures taken by the GoJ in response to the DPRK’s 1998 and 2006 missile tests 
(see Section 4.5).    
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As noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (and discussed further in Chapter 5, Section 5.10), the 
JCG has been beefed up to form effectively a fourth arm of the military, complete with a 
range of sophisticated weaponry and security equipment. Norota‟s statement, above, 
highlights the process of justification for such a strengthening as it emphasizes risks which 
are identified with a hostile North Korean state.295 Indeed, this process is further cemented 
through the inclusion of direct reference to “suspicious ships” in the LDP‟s upper-house 
election manifesto (Article 18, Paragraph 3);296 placed within the context of more effectively 
utilising the security alliance‟s new defence guidelines in order to undertake joint military 
exercises with the US, and further develop BMD systems as part of a security policy which 
includes provisions against the risks of nuclear, biological, chemical, and cyber attacks.297 It 
is also significant here that a converging shift towards an almost universal recalibration of 
risks posed by the DPRK is observed across the political spectrum, with, for example, both 
DPJ and Kōmeitō Diet members essentially supporting the ruling LDP‟s response and policy 
imposition after the suspicious ship incident of March 1999.298 It is also pertinent, however, 
that North Korean affairs were still some way from peaking in terms of their weighting within 
public discourses in Japan – once again something which can be seen, retrospectively, to 
                                                          
295  The change in policy directive following the 1999 incident is documented in the JCG’s pertaining  
annual report (JCG, 2000). 
296  For full details of North Korea-directed policies at the time, see Article 17 and 18 (Keio World  
Manifesto Forum, 2007b). It is once again noteworthy here that a higher calibration of risks framed  
against the DPRK is combined with an emphasis on strengthening security initiatives with the US – therein, 
as discussed further below, the norm of bilateralism continuing to demonstrate considerable causal 
influence in this sphere. 
297  These refer to the “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines” released publicly in New York on 23    
        September 1997. 
298  Although the Kōmeitō was a coalition partner in the GoJ – and so would be largely expected to back 
       LDP policies, its manifestos, while aligning broadly with the LDP, did not whole-heartedly support its leading   
       partner on all security issues. For full details of the position of each party vis-à-vis the actions undertaken 
       by state security forces – focussing on the JCP and SDP as the only dissenting voices – and the  
       government’s official position, see the evening edition of Asahi Shimbun (24 March 1999: 2). 
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demonstrate how the recalibration of risks attached to the DPRK facilitated the focusing of 
greater debate and political attention onto issues associated with Pyongyang.299 
    Further, it is illuminating to note here the transitional process manifest in how North Korea 
is framed. Therein, while Japan‟s leading political figures had begun to lump together the 
various issues that bore risks perceived to emanate from Pyongyang and project them into 
the public sphere, the primary goal of full normalization with the North remained very much 
at the forefront of discourse at the highest levels.300 However, the combination of an 
increasing recalibration of risks (expedited by the 1999 suspicious ship incident) as a 
compounded (multifaceted) phenomenon, vis-à-vis early indications that normalization 
efforts would ultimately be de-prioritized, is illustrated by then Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizō‟s 
conciliatory address to the Special Committee for the Purpose of Japan-US Defense 
Cooperation (nichibei bōeiryoku no tame no shishin ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai) on 26 March 
1999, in which he states (145: 33) that, 
     Furthermore, for Japan too, it is important to be proactive in engaging with North Korea. In 
this respect it is very troublesome that there has been events such as the recent missile 
launch over our air space, and prior to that the suspicions over abduction cases. Most pressing 
of all, is the previously mentioned problem of two suspicious ships apparently escaping into 
North Korean waters. As such, we are in a situation where it is very difficult for us to deepen 
relations with the North. 
 
    The predominantly consistent, interactive, overlap between media sources and political 
speakers, in relation to how North Korean actions were discussed and how pertaining risks 
were evaluated, is, furthermore, reflected by leading newspapers‟ reaction to the events of 
                                                          
299   Symptomatic of the proportionally lesser weighting (specifically, prior to the high-profile events of  
2002 and 2006) of North Korea on the political agenda; only two of the major parties (LDP and SDP) made 
direct references to a policy vision for dealing with Pyongyang in their 2000 manifestos (Keio World 
Manifesto Forum, 2007c, 2007d). 
300  The use of mass media, specifically television reports and newspapers, as a source of information is once 
     again illuminated by numerous Diet speakers’ referrals to reports from such when making statements       
     regarding the suspicious ship incident. For illustrative examples, see Akagi Norihiko (Special Committee for   
     the Purpose of Japan-US Defence Cooperation, 26 March 1999, 145: 2), Saitō Tsuyoshi (Foreign Affairs   
     Security Committee, 25 March 1999, 145: 39). 
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1999. In this respect, while the Asahi Shimbun takes a cautious line on the incident, noting 
that the activation of “maritime security action” (kaijō keibi kōdō) and firing of warning shots 
were very unusual occurrences, it nevertheless introduces the inevitability of revising policies 
towards North Korea as a result of the DPRK‟s illicit activities. Moreover, in addition to 
expressing the implications of how a revised legal debate would likely be influenced in terms 
of dealing with future maritime security contingencies (kongō no hōan shingi ni mo eikyō 
shikanenai), the paper also provisionally bundles in the previous year‟s missile launch – 
hence compounding the framing of North Korea as a source of multiple risks. Furthermore, 
the Asahi documents the broad consensus among leading political actors, which assumes 
that Japan will play a more active and cooperative role in North East Asian security affairs 
under the new guidelines laid-out within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
(Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 2).301 
    The issue is more forcefully pressed by the Yomiuri, which, in addition to linking the 
growing risks posed by a militarily assertive North Korea with the revised US-Japan security 
agreement guidelines, highlights the potential role of provocative North Korean activities in 
swinging public opinion behind constitutional reform.302 Indeed, support for constitutional 
reform is also inferred through the noting of a rise to 70 per cent backing in opinion polls for 
clarifying the status of Japan‟s “right to self defence” (jieiken), something documented, the 
paper asserts, “even prior to the fiasco over the North Korean suspicious ship” (Yomiuri, 9 
April 1999: 16).303 Here too then, as previously noted, the significant impact of highly 
scrutinized events upon discourses mediating risks between the state and society identified 
                                                          
301  See details of endorsement for the guidelines and emphasis on US-Japan cooperation with regards to  
       North Korea in the Diet debates immediately following the 1999 suspicious ship incident, such as those  
       from which extracts are referenced above (main session and committees, March 1999, 145). 
302  Although discussion largely omits direct references to revision of Article 9, attention towards  
 reconsideration of debates over the abandonment of war and right to self-defence are prioritized. 
303  For an emphatic exposition of the Yomiuri’s full-blooded support for legal reforms in response to  
the security risks perceived to be posed by North Korean incursions – and in order to “make provisions to 
prevent such a crisis recurring” (kiki no sairai fusegu sochi wo), see special feature (Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 May 
1999: 8). 
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with North Korea is evinced. These included the 1999 suspicious ship chase, which 
spotlighted such a phenomenon in the public sphere within Japan.304 
    Furthermore, the risks pertaining to the DPRK identified in the wake of the 1999 
suspicious-ship incursion were quickly seized upon by Japan‟s security forces as a suitable 
justification for the greater strengthening and modernization of military equipment. Most 
notably, this was led by the JCG, which headlined its 1999 Annual Report with the 
suspicious-ships incident occurring in March of the same year; claiming widespread public 
support for a range of counter-measures designed to deal with such incursions. The report 
(Kaijō hoan repōto (heisei 11 nen)) states that, 
The responsibility of the coastguard to deal with the existence of suspicious ships 
and this kind of grave situation in the seas surrounding our country is widely 
recognized by the public. The coastguard has taken firm steps to completely review 
measures for suspicious ships, including conditions for the use of weapons and the 
strengthening of patrol-boat capabilities.305 
 
Through its justification of public support and emphasis upon the necessity of practical 
revisions in order to effectively deal with perceived security risks, the above statement once 
again highlights the interaction between various arms of the state and the broader civil 
society. Within this, the highlighting of risks posed by suspicious ships was, once again, in 
keeping with the norm of bilateralism, contextualized within the US-Japan alliance, which 
was consistently stressed by all but those on the far-left as the core framework from which to 
engage North Korea and tackle risks emanating from it – including during the ensuing 
aftermath of the March 1999 suspicious ship chase. 
    Yet, at the same time, prioritization of bilateralism was supplemented with repeated 
discussion of a new world order, and Japan‟s potential leadership role within a dynamic East 
                                                          
304  The types of discourses which have become established in right-of-centre debate over North Korea policy, 
propagating the salience of risks posed by Pyongyang, also emerged more prominently at this time in 
academic texts. For an illustrative example, see Nakajima and Fukada (1999: 28-37). 
305  For extended contents of the JCG’s annual reports dating from 1998-2008, see the official Japan Coast  
Guard homepage (JCG, 2008a). 
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Asia in the post-Cold War security environment, which also pervaded almost all parties and 
elements of the broader policy community. Indeed, such concepts continued to play a 
prominent role in central political discourses almost a decade after the conclusion of the 
Cold War. There is little doubt, then, that within that socio-political context, North Korea‟s 
growing presence (and evolving framing), highlighted not least by maritime incursions, as a 
provocative and hostile external state, influenced the course of such discourse. This is 
particularly so, in terms of providing a negative frame against which Japan‟s policy 
community could juxtaposition its regional identity in a comparatively positive, and justifiably 
pro-active, light.306 
 
4.3. 2001 spy-boat shoot-out: the risks from North Korea close in 
The second North Korean maritime incursion, or spy-boat engaging with the JCG, 
represented an important milestone in Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK. 
Not least, this is because it showed a clear differentiation from previous risk calibrations and 
(risk-tackling) counter-measures, such as those applied in the 1999 incident. Therein, in the 
2001 incident, the risks of violating Japan‟s constitutional constraints and international 
maritime law, and those of escalation into a full-fledged military contingency, were re-
prioritized subordinately to those of North Korea making further sovereign violations – i.e., 
based on the justification of ameliorating apparently greater risks being posed to national 
security by vessels illegally entering Japan‟s EEZ (Black, 2006). In essence, the December 
2001 sinking of the DPRK-registered vessel demonstrated that Japan had not only 
recalibrated the risks framed against North Korea, but also that it was willing to justify 
                                                          
306  The oft times conspicuous absence of North Korea in academic debate over Japan’s identity at the end of 
the 20
th
 Century, however, illustrates how this process was only realized in earnest via the escalation of risk 
recalibration during the first decade of the 21
st
  Century – e.g., see Tamamoto (2003: 191-212), Nau (2003: 
213-41). 
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assertive responses and actions towards them, based upon a perception of their increasing 
salience.307 
    When the Diet resumed in the early months of 2002, North Korea was very much an issue 
at the forefront of parliamentary debate. Yet, direct references to the spy boat incursion were 
still limited in scope and volume when compared to the flux of vociferous addresses made in 
the wake of successive events in the years that followed.308 However, the shoot-out had 
clearly allowed the framing of the DPRK to pick up pace within Japan‟s policy community, 
and was, thereafter, rolled into a snowball of rapidly increasing size. Through the first half of 
2002 this included abduction (though far more so post-September 2002), nuclear 
proliferation, ballistic missile, spy-boat incursion and humanitarian issues which were 
regularly lumped together as “all the North Korea problems” (kitachōsen no shomondai). 
Representative of this position, and adhering closely to terminology expressed by then Prime 
Minister, Koizumi Junichirō (main session, 4 February, 154: 9), in her address to the Security 
Committee on 26 February 2002 (154: 21), government minister Kawaguchi Junko listed the 
2001 “armed suspicious ship” (busō fushinsen) incidence as a central element in the 
dangers facing the regional security environment, sandwiching it between those stemming 
from the multiple 9/11 terror attacks and the proliferation of WMD.309 This demonstrates a 
remarkable recalibration of risk in response to North Korea, towards which, conversely, the 
                                                          
307  Sinking refers here to the fact that there was an exchange of fire between the JCG and the North Korean 
vessel, which sank. The actual sinking was caused not by the JCG’s offensive weaponry, but by the 
detonation of an explosive device activated by the North Korean crew, having realized it was unable to 
escape the JCG’s patrol boats. For a chronology of events leading up to the sinking and discussion of each 
parties’ tactics – including those related to the various contingent risks, see Gotō, Ogawa and Shigemura 
(2005: 78-91).    
308  There were a total of 44 direct references to the Spy-ship incident in the Diet during the six months that 
       followed its occurrence. For comparative responses, see Table 4.1, below, and Chapter 5, Table 5.3. 
309  Various terms were used to describe the two incursions of 1999 and 2001, of which armed suspicious ship 
is a particularly awkward rendering. However, as explored by Leheny (2006: 158-64), the broad shift in 
usage from suspicious boat/ship (fushinsen) used generally to refer to the 1999 incident, to the widespread 
references to a spy boat/ship or special operations boat (kōsakusen) with regards to the 2001 vessel 
demonstrate a marked recalibration of risk expressed through the prevailing terminology of public 
discourses – i.e., due to the fact that in the latter case the boat had been salvaged, so could be publically 
identified and defined as such by official sources. 
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subject of diplomatic normalization was relegated to a brief statement buried later in her 
passage. Furthermore, the springboard provided by the 1998 Taepodong launch and 
following years‟ maritime incursions (1999 and 2001) are suggestive of how specific events 
were used, metaphorically speaking, as increasingly large dots which could be joined 
together in creating and inflaming an image which framed the DPRK as an expanding source 
of multifaceted risks (attached to nuclear, abduction, WMD etc. issues). The combination of 
such risks was then mediated between the state, market and society at increasingly higher 
calibrations, as a single phenomenon, to the point where Japan was apparently required to 
tackle the North Korea problems head-on.310 
     In addition, evidence that the political tide had begun to flow steadily, at the national level, 
in the same general direction; i.e., that of greater sensitivity towards Pyongyang from within 
Japan, is corroborated by the fact that opposition parties were also notably quick to combine 
issues in their framing of North Korea and recalibrate risks accordingly. Further, indeed, 
extra-governmental actors were already clamouring for a tough, or intensified, response to 
risks posed by the DPRK‟s incursions in combination with demands for a more 
comprehensive crisis management system for contingencies relating to national security as 
a whole. During the main Diet session of 7 February 2002 (154: 4), for instance, the Liberal 
Party (LP), or Jiyūtō contended that North Korean missiles and international terrorism 
represented the greatest threats to Japan‟s security; having proceeded to press the 
government over more robust ways to deal with the incursions issue. LP representative, 
Tsuzuki Yuzuru criticized that,   
                                                          
310   While in one sense this can be seen purely in terms of an interactive domestic process affecting the       
        calibration of external (identified with the DPRK) risks, the salience of US influence upon such a process    
        should not be underestimated. Indeed, while Japan’s policy community may have recalibrated risks   
        pertaining to North Korea in such a way as to stress Japan’s requirements to alter policy provisions, security    
        measures were still taken very much within the framework of the US-Japan alliance – in adherence to the   
        1999 New Guidelines, which were initially negotiated for by US foreign policy advisers, such as Joseph Nye, 
        who were concerned about Japan’s preparedness (or lack there-of) to deal with potential risks emerging on 
        the Korean peninsula (Shinoda, 2006: 77-8). 
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No lessons have been learnt from the escape of the North Korean spy-boat which 
escaped in 1999 having violated our sovereign waters off the coast of the Noto Peninsula. 
And now, again, the lack of the government‟s ability in crisis management is there for all 
to see. 
 
Conversely, however, according to then JCG commander, Gotō Mitsuyuki, it was due to the 
fact that the risks posed by North Korean incursions had been recalibrated which allowed his 
team to take more robust action against the “spy-ship” of 2001, having, he claims, learned 
the lessons from the failure of the “suspicious-boat” incident of 1999 (Nishioka et al., 2005: 
80-4).311 Hence, to that end, there was likely a temptation to blow up the cases. Indeed, in 
the wake of the 1998 Taepodong launch and their inability to deal effectively with the 1999 
maritime incursion, the JCG had been equipped with the ability to engage unauthorized 
ships with 20mm Vulcan machine guns from behind a reinforced bullet-proof bridge. This, 
therefore, illustrates the gap between the policy community‟s perceptions of Japan‟s 
vulnerability to risks framed against the DPRK, and the already more than proportional 
equipping of Tokyo‟s security forces, justified as an appropriate means by which to 
ameliorate them.312  
The JCG‟s 2002 Annual Report (pertaining to the events of 2001) is also illuminating in 
this sense, particularly in terms of tone and terminology, when compared to the equivalent 
report made in response to the incursion incident two years previously (see Section 4.2, 
above). Though unchanged in the initial report, the North Korean vessel was later re-termed 
from suspicious-ship (fushin-sen) to spy-boat (kōsaku-sen), and in addition to justifying the 
                                                          
311 It is also significant that in the same interview, albeit with an element of bravado, Gotō cites the risks of 
the North Korean vessel escaping and of inadvertently inflicting casualties on the North Korean side as his 
primary concerns, having “calculated” (shōsan) that the JCG patrol boats would easily out-gun the DPRK’s 
vessel. This calibration of risks is counter, then, to those portrayed in Tokyo’s public and political spheres, 
which highlighted the risks such ships posed to citizens within Japan. 
312  For a full breakdown of the JCG’s then weapons capabilities, see table, “kōsakusen tsuiseki ni shutsudō 
shita junshisen”, Nishioka et al. (2005: 82). The extent to which the JCG’s hardware (now comparable to that 
of light military vessels) has been upgraded further in the years that followed – officially as a response to 
the risks, and injuries to crew members, faced during the 1999 and 2001 incursions, though pertinently not 
implemented until 2006, can be seen in the JCG’s 2006 Annual Report (Japan Coast Guard, 2007). 
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affirmative action taken against the vessel as the result of “having learned lessons from the 
1999 incident”, the report sets a JCG precedent by conflating North Korean maritime 
incursions with the broader risks apparently posed by terrorism. Therein, by stating that anti-
terrorism measures amounted to the JCG‟s most highly prioritized operation, and 
sandwiching the assertion that key nuclear and other coastal facilities had to be defended 
between direct reference to the incursions issue, a clear cognitive link was made between 
the DPRK and security risks per se (JCG, 2002).313 This projection of risks sourced in North 
Korea was further compounded by succeeding events, such as those concerning the 
abduction issue, discussed further in Section 4.4, and the salvage of the newly termed spy-
boat, or kōsaku-sen in 2002. In the latter case, due to the recovered cargo containing a 
variety of weapons and narcotics, an additional selection of risks posed to Japan and its civil 
society were identified specifically with Pyonyang‟s operations by the JCG, including the 
potential risk of “accomplices working within Japan” (kokunai ni kyōryokusha ga iru) 
facilitating multiple and grievous crimes (JCG, 2003). Such terminology used by the JCG, 
alluding to those who might aid and abet a negatively perceived DPRK regime, therefore, 
further reaffirms the significance of the North Korean community within Japan, in terms of 
how, even indirectly, risks recalibrated as a function of Pyongyang‟s framing also became 
attached to the shifting public sphere identity of all that is framed as North Korean. 
    Retrospectively, then, the incursions of 1999, and particularly 2001, gave greater 
momentum to the trajectory of recalibrating risks and implementing revisionary policies in 
response to North Korea; something which the Taepodong launch of 1998 had, as discussed 
in the preceding chapter, clearly laid the foundations for. Nevertheless, prior to the 
revelations over abductions which emerged in 2002 and, moreover, the impact of further 
missile and nuclear tests conducted in 2006, there remained a substantial area of political 
contestation over North Korea within Japan‟s policy community. Indeed both the DPJ and 
                                                          
313  The report’s same leading paragraph concludes with the succinct statement that, “This year the JCG has 
accelerated efforts to combat suspicious-ships and spy-boats, and counter terrorism” (JCG, 2008b).   
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SDP opposed Koizumi‟s combative style over the 2001 incident. In the same (as above) 
main session of the Diet on 8 February 2002, SDP representative, Fukushima Mizuho called 
for an integrated, international response, rhetorically asking the Prime Minister (154: 25), “Is 
normalization of relations with Japan not the best way to insure national security?  Is making 
peace, and not creating a military contingency, not the responsibility of politicians?” The 
DPJ‟s Yanagida Minoru (154: 17) also proposed a regionally coordinated strategy, and, re-
quoting Koizumi‟s statements regarding the potential risks posed by incursions – which 
stated that, “It has again been made clear that forces exist which pose potential harm to 
people‟s lives” – pertly demands to know, “what on earth do such forces amount to?”. As 
examined in Section 4.4, below, and further in Chapter 5, the degree to which such 
conspicuous political resistance to a hard-line against Pyongyang could be maintained in the 
mainstream of Japan‟s political elite diminished considerably following the events of 2002 
and 2006 – something which the events of 2009-10 have provisionally extended up to the 
present. In this respect, targeted close examination of how risks were (re)calibrated following 
each of the missile launches is particularly illuminating in terms of measuring how North 
Korea‟s framing has taken hold in Japan, because each of the events offers a clear-cut 
comparison to that which preceded it. In addition, however, it is also necessary to 
incorporate analyses of the surrounding events and issues, such as the maritime incursions, 
abductions and nuclear programmes, in light of the fact they play an integral part in the 
extending process – in terms of maintaining the established level of recalibrated risks. 
    Once again, media responses are further revealing in this area, particularly in the case of 
the 2001 spy-boat incursion, because they too are indicative of a shift within an inclusive 
policy community, towards a higher calibration of risks framed against the DPRK. Quality 
print news-media, however, remained comparatively moderate in this respect, prior to 
recalibrating risks more dramatically during the early 2000s and then catapulting the 
calibration higher still following the missile launches and nuclear test of 2006. The regular 
front-page commentary piece (tenseijingo) of Asahi Shimbun‟s 2001 Christmas Day edition, 
193 
 
for instance, reflects this – initially subtle – creeping recalibration of risk. While the text ends 
with a call to be wary of over-reaction (kajōna hannō wo imashimeru), it highlights the 
unusual and dangerous nature of the incident, and draws readers‟ attention not only to the 
huge amount of explosives on the ship, but also to the potential for North Korea to be the 
source of massive quantities of narcotics entering into Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 25 December 
2001: 1).314    
    The re-terming of North Korean ships invading Japan‟s coastal waters (from suspicious to 
spy), in combination with their association to other risks perceived to be posed by the 
Pyongyang regime, and the broader uncertainties of a risk-afflicted regional security 
environment as a whole, can be seen, then, to have held considerable sway in expediting 
convergences of discourses, mediated between the state and society, resulting in a 
recalibration of risks framed against the DPRK within Japan. In addition to the specified 
events of 1993, 1998, 1999 and 2001 (involving missile tests and incursions) and the on-
going concerns over the unresolved nuclear proliferation issue, the considerable emotional 
impact of the abduction cases, particularly concerning new evidence that had come to light 
in the public sphere (see Section 4.4), was also reflected in its repeated isolation by Diet 
members as an issue which had to be solved before any headway could be made on 
normalization between Tokyo and Pyongyang.315 Hence, the combination of a series of geo-
strategic, objectively identifiable events, and subjectively charged on-going issues with 
uncertain implications, can be seen to have primed the domestic environment within Japan 
                                                          
314  The piece also refers to the inhumane (hijō) nature of the crew members’ mission and fate – here 
indicating a precedent for how the DPRK’s regime, and particularly the socio-political system administered 
by Kim Jong-Il, as whole came to be framed (in implicit contrast to Japan) as both hostile and cold-blooded. 
315 The new evidence concerned the case of Arimoto Keiko, who is suspected of having been abducted by 
      North Korean agents in central Europe during 1983, allegedly having died thereafter in a gas accident with 
      fellow abductee Ishioka Jun, see “12.  Shōwa 58 nen (1983) 7 gatsu goro” (Headquarters for the Abduction  
Issue, 2009). The use of this and the other abduction cases as a means of recalibrating risks from the North  
and justifying a tougher stance in relations with Pyongyang, including no progress on normalization  
initiatives until the cases are resolved, is further demonstrated by Kawaguchi Junko in her address to the  
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, or Gaikō bōei iinkai on 19 March 2002 (154: 354). 
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prior to the 2006 missile and nuclear tests – resulting in another wave of risk re-recalibration 
in their wake, as outlined in Section 4.5 ~ Section 4.12, below. 
    In addition, it is once again pertinent to note the continuing impact of the norm of 
bilateralism and influence from the US in the process of North Korea‟s framing, and the 
resulting re-calibrations of risk.316 Indeed, following the DPRK‟s designation by the 
Whitehouse as part of an “Axis of Evil” (State of the Union address, 29 January 2002), even 
without quoting Bush‟s famous term itself, Diet speakers consistently began to refer to 
international issues of terrorism and the risks that they posed, framed as emanating from 
“countries like Iran, Iraq and North Korea.”317 Moreover, a tougher line in dealing with the 
DPRK was demanded for and accepted as a national responsibility by opposition and ruling 
ministers alike.318 This stance and framing of North Korea was epitomized in the remarks 
made by then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda Yasuo, who in the newly formed International 
Terrorism Prevention Special Committee, resolved to “step up efforts to work more 
resolutely”  towards dealing with the Pyongyang regime (issō kitachōsen ni taishite tsuyoku 
hataraki-kake) (29 March 2002, 154: 42).319 Fukuda‟s statement and the risks it identified 
with North Korea‟s policy makers were then given an altogether different level of calibration 
                                                          
316  In general terms, specifically in light of the militarization of the JCG noted above, this runs in general   
       convergence with an apparent weakening of pacifist and anti-militarist norms. 
317  The significant point here is that, although in fact a great deal of attention and dispute arose in the Diet 
       with regards to President George W. Bush’s designation of an Axis of Evil, particularly over concerns about 
       the prospect of being entrapped into ill-advised wars in the Middle-East, the focus on North Korean risks 
       was, conversely, overtly highlighted via the American president’s speech, and the inclusion of them within 
       such an axis raised few eyebrows among Tokyo’s political elites – rather, it provided further support for 
       actors seeking to recalibrate risks associated with Pyongyang. 
318  Official policy revisions (prioritizing cooperation with the US) based on an increasingly overt identification 
of risks emanating from North Korea are also evident from the contents of the LDP’s 2001 Upper House 
election manifesto, which directly references both missiles and suspicious ships as a justification for, 
“strengthening self-defence force functional capabilities in order to ensure the people’s safety” (kokumin no 
anzen kakuho no tame no jieitai no kinōkyōka). It is also noteworthy that the same section contains 
mention of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and warns against cyber-terrorism – all in effect being 
added to the framing of North Korea (Keio World Manifesto Forum, 2007b: 40-41). 
319 It is also notable – in terms of a broad-reaching qualitative recalibration of risk – that it was Fukuda making   
      these remarks, particularly given his attempt to re-engage the North into negotiations during his later short   
      tenure as Prime Minister (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). The committee’s full title is rendered in Japanese as     
      kokusai terorizumu no bōshi oyobi waga kuni no kyōryoku shien katsudō nado ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai. 
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in the wake of Kim Jong-Il‟s admission that the DPRK had – albeit decades earlier – indeed 
abducted citizens from Japan.    
 
4.4. The Pyongyang Summit: public backlash intensifies the policy community’s 
recalibration of risk 
The first summit meeting held between then Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichirō, and North 
Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, in Pyongyang on 17 September 2002 was in many ways a 
historic event in the two countries‟ contemporary international relations. In terms of how 
Japan‟s policy community was competing over the recalibration of risks as a function of the 
North Korea-problem‟s framing, it allowed Koizumi to use his political skills to leverage 
popular support over his dealings with Pyongyang by using a combination of the North 
Korean issues; that is both as a diversion from potentially damaging domestic criticism on 
other fronts and as a means to create and frame a highly calibrated enemy, utilized to 
demonstrate his strong leadership in opposition to it.320 
     Indeed, one aspect of the attempt to gain political capital from an assertive foreign-policy 
stance can been seen from Koizumi‟s declaration during the LDP election campaign of April 
2001 to visit Yasukuni Shrine, which clearly indicated his intention to take an unwavering line 
on foreign policy issues, including those sensitive to North Korea, and maintain a strong 
international stance as a means by which to rally domestic support.321 Furthermore, when 
Koizumi suffered a blow to his popularity, and required some form of diversion from domestic 
criticism, following his sacking of popular former Foreign Minister, Tanaka Makiko, he seized 
                                                          
320 Though Koizumi’s motives may have been primarily concerned with gaining personal political capital, it    
        should nevertheless be stressed that his initial intention was, indeed, to normalize relations with North    
        Korea – through an improved interpersonal relationship with Kim. However, due to the unforeseen   
        admission of abductions by the North’s leader, and the ensuing domestic backlash within Japan, Koizumi   
        had to adapt his stance quickly and assume a more combative position vis-à-vis the DPRK. 
321 For an overview of the issues surrounding Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, see: “Koizumi keeps Yasukuni 
      pledge” (Japan Times On-line, 16 August 2006) [accessed 6 June 2010], also Breen (2008). 
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upon public sensitivity to the abductions issue, and the prominence of concerns directed at 
the DPRK.322 Therein, by making a historic visit to Pyongyang, receiving an oral apology 
from Kim Jong-Il, and securing the return of abductees and the Pyongyang Declaration, he 
not only scored a major foreign policy success for Japan, but also served his own political 
interests, including those of attenuating risks posed to his domestic popularity. Relevantly, 
his particular means of doing so would, thus, not have been possible – i.e. could not have 
been deemed such a significant success – without the pre-existence of perceived risks 
which had already been recalibrated through the framing of North Korea in Japan.323   
    Nevertheless, it is hard to say to what extent Japan‟s former premier calculated the 
magnitude of domestic public attention that became focused on Pyongyang or the degree 
that related issues could act as a diversion from other personal criticisms, and it is certainly 
very unlikely that Koizumi had foreseen Kim‟s admission of the abductions, let alone the 
nationalist backlash that pressured him to further demonize the DPRK in Japan – at one time 
reportedly describing the North as an “unpardonable country” (Reuters, 2002). Following the 
summit, the Diet was awash with anti-North Korean sentiment and calls for a tough line 
against Pyongyang, which reflected a public sphere rife with outrage, anger and fear of the 
by then multiply recalibrated risks sourced from the DPRK.324 
    This political atmosphere clearly presented an unrivalled opportunity for right-wing factions 
of Japan‟s policy community to recalibrate risks against North Korea further in order to justify 
the toughening of Tokyo‟s stance within the East Asia region (most explicitly against the 
                                                          
322  The damage done to Koizumi’s popularity following the sacking of Tanaka is well-documented in the  
       English language press and is combined with the perception that Japan’s foreign policy and regional  
       diplomacy had lost international credibility at the time. For a succinct summary, see Murakami (2002). 
323  That is to say, Koizumi was able to convince the relevant sectors within the state, market and society of  
       the gravity of risks emanating from Pyongyang. 
324  It is also noteworthy that Kim Jong-Il’s status as a super-villain became crystallized following the 2002 
       summit and his admission of a number of the abduction cases. This was highlighted by a mass of media 
       attention focused on the two leaders (see Section 4.8), but also by a marked increase in direct references    
       made to the North Korean leader by name (54 times in the six months following the September 2002 
       summit) in the ensuing Diet sessions. 
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DPRK), and lay down the groundwork for the pushing through of revisions to defence related 
policies.325 The argument for such was, essentially, that without re-militarizing, or at least 
normalizing, Japan faced an uncertain cocktail of ongoing and salient risks emanating from 
Pyongyang in a position of extreme vulnerability. The manifestation of this process was 
clearly visible within the discourse of Diet minutes from the last quarter of 2002. The central 
discourse of risk recalibration was, therein, quintessentially epitomized by the statement of 
former Minister for Defence and so-called neo-conservative hawk, Ishiba Shigeru, made to 
the Diet‟s Defence Committee on 29 October, 2002 (155: 8). Although Ishiba stopped short, 
on this occasion, of verbalizing a particular framing of leader, Kim Jong-Il (i.e., only alluding 
to such – as the evil mastermind behind the proliferation of these risks), he identified the 
North as a source of multiple and salient risks in a way that set the tone from that period 
onwards. Therein, the DPRK was framed not only in terms of a particular threat, but as all at 
once representing a mixed combination of risks, which when agglomerated together formed 
a kind of super-risk.326 This, it was argued by Ishiba and his allies, threatened the very 
foundations of Japan‟s peace-state status and national sovereignty. Indeed, by predicating 
the body of his address with the assertion that a military facedown (gunjiteki taiji) was 
continuing on the Korean peninsula, and that Japan faced the pressing problems of 
“abductions, spy ships, nuclear proliferation and missiles” Ishiba managed to both convey 
the perceived gravity and hostility of North Korea‟s geo-military movements, and at the same 
time conflate the various issues which could be mediated as a source of risk associated with 
                                                          
325 For detailed discussion of who constitutes a number of the core members of a converged right-wing edge  
      of Japan’s policy community, see Samuels (2007: 158-84). Further to the actors identified by Samuels, 
      one of Japan’s most high-profile analysts of North Korean affairs noted in an interview (14 December  
      2010a, Appendix A) the significance of the abduction issue in galvanising coalitions of leading political  
      figures, extremist pressure groups and civil society organizations, resulting in a force possessing sufficient  
      agency to significantly influence policy directives and public opinion. 
326  The aggregation of the North Korea problems (Kitachōsen mondai) can also be observed in the LDP’s 2003 
election manifesto (Keio World Manifesto Forum, 2007e: Statement 6, Page 38), which headlined the need 
to take an inclusive (hōkatsuteki) approach and at once announced plans to establish the Headquarters for 
the Abduction Issue (Rachimondai taisaku honbu) – therein attaching the abductions issue inextricably to 
other perceived sources of risk represented by North Korea, in a form that has proved crucial to the 
sustained negative framing of the DPRK in Japan. 
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the regime in Pyongyang.327 This worked to portray an increasing range of highly calibrated, 
exponential risks expanding from the DPRK, for which Japan, it was argued, must act with 
speed and resolution in order to counter effectively.328 
    Ishiba‟s statement in the Diet also points to a combination of the two phenomena of 
domestic political competition and beiatsu, observed in detail in the critiques of McCormack 
(2007) and Wada (2009) exposed in Chapter 1, Section 1.6. There is little doubt that his calls 
to review Japan‟s defence posture and pressure the North Koreans into a more conciliatory 
position represent an appeal to factions of the LDP, other political actors and the public at 
large, who had been primed to potentially pledge their support behind resolute and assertive 
foreign policy figures, regardless of other matters of immediate domestic concern.329 In 
addition, however, Ishiba‟s largely unchallenged referral to a strengthening of ties and 
military operational capabilities within the bilateral framework, confirms the continuation of 
bilateralism as an influential norm applied to and by the vast majority of Japan‟s political 
elite; though particularly many of those who sought a more militarily assertive Japan. This 
was expressed succinctly by his positing that,  
in order to deal effectively with all kinds of problematic contingencies, the government will, 
in addition to building-up the Self Defense Force to a suitable level of capability, work 
closely within the agreed US-Japan framework so as to improve integrated operational 
capacity.
330
 
                                                          
327  (Though likely unaware of the theoretical implications of his statement), in constructivist terms Ishiba 
thereby established the inter-subjective identities of Japan and the DPRK and, having identified a series of 
threats attached to North Korea, internalized them as risks posed to Japan – i.e. his statement is illustrative 
of the process of risk articulation identified by Luhmann (1996: 6), as observed in Chapter 2, Section 2.14, 
above. 
328  See also Ishiba’s follow-up address to the aptly named “Special Committee Concerning Provisions for 
Contingencies of Military Aggression” (busō kōgeki jitai e no taisho ni kansuru tokubetsu īnkai) on 11 
November of the same year in which, predicated by the listing of an elongated set of risks framed against 
the DPRK, he posits that, “We must maximise our power of deterrent, which amounts to our tangible 
defence capability, in order to preserve the country’s security” (155: 6).       
329  I.e., National Diet and media attention focused on foreign policy issues, particularly those relating to    
         Pyongyang, which doubtless worked to weight North Korean issues heavily in terms of the extent of their  
public prioritizing vis-à-vis concerns over the domestic economy, education, and corruption scandals etc. 
330  Suffice to say, regardless of whether convinced by Samuel’s argument (2007) that Japan is tactically  
      hedging 
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    Statements from opposition parties also exhibited the impact of the Kim-Koizumi summit, 
and demonstrated the further shift towards a higher calibration of risk through the framing of 
North Korea as a source of multiple harms. Typifying the increasing tendency of non-
government parties to demand a harder line vis-à-vis North Korea, during the main session 
of the Diet on 22 October 2002, LP representative, Fujii Hirosaki criticized Koizumi‟s overly 
conciliatory negotiating style, and the omission of content in the Pyongyang Declaration to 
ensure Japan‟s security from the various risks deemed to be posed by North Korea. He 
stated (155: 5) with regards to the wording of the final document that,   
There is absolutely no reference to problems of grave concern relating to the peace 
and security of our nation and our people, to which North Korea should have been 
obliged to make promises for. There isn‟t even a single written word to confirm the 
existence of abductions, spy-ships, or nuclear development. What is more, there is no 
agreement on the cessation of missile development, testing and deployment, which 
already puts Japan within its target-able range.331 
 
Further, in addition to a mood swing, representative of Fujii‟s statement above, caused within 
the political elite by revelations to come out of the Pyongyang Summit, media analyses 
concurrently witnessed a sea-change. This is something which, as discussed in Section 4.7, 
below, also resulted in the priming of state, market and societal spheres for the substantial 
recalibration of risk then witnessed in the aftermath of succeeding events, including the 
multiple missile and nuclear tests, which unfolded during 2006. 
         Therein, while the Asahi Shimbun‟s initial reaction to the 2002 leadership summit was 
positive and urged for the promotion of normalization of diplomatic ties between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang, it also criticized Kim Jong-Il‟s regime in an unprecedented fashion, and stressed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
       between the US and China, partly through means of a right-wing conservative elite making use of US 
       pressure to facilitate military expansion and or constitutional revision, or by McCormack’s view (2007), 
       which depicts Japan as a “client state” meekly submitting to US-led geo-political will, the result has been a 
       clear upward recalibration of risk by Japan’s policy makers, expressed, not least, through the transforming 
       discourse on North Korea in Japan’s Diet chambers and elite political committees. 
331  For a more fervent expression of similar sentiments, see also Koike Yuriko’s address to the same session  
       for the Japan Conservative Party (155: 15). 
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the multiple risks that it posed to Japan‟s security. For instance, the editorial of 18 
September (2002: 2) stated, having predicated the ensuing discussion with mention of Kim‟s 
role in the state sponsorship of terrorism, that, 
Having flaunted international rules, North Korea stands accused of developing 
nuclear weapons. It has also tested missiles, which passed over Japan. Suspicious 
ships with uncertain purposes regularly appear in our waters. As the abductions 
problem has made clear, North Korea represents a dangerous state for the people of 
Japan.    
 
In this sense, the Asahi both highlighted the risks framed against Pyongyang, and only 
condoned normalization as a possible means of ameliorating those risks.332 333 
    As would be expected, the Yomiuri took a less diplomatic line, and recalibrated the risks in 
a more indubitable form. The paper‟s 20 September 2002 editorial was entitled “The North 
Korean Threat” (Kitachōsen no Kyōi) (2002: 18), going on to assert that, 
For Japan, the threat from North Korea amounts to the infiltration by spies and 
destructive spy activities conducted via suspicious ships, as well as the development of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the 
development and deployment of missiles which provide the means to deliver them.  
 
While the Yomiuri‟s right-of-centre stance, highlighting risks posed by the DPRK and 
advocating firm measures to deal with them, was not unpredictable, the level to which those 
risks were recalibrated, as illustrated by the terminology (infiltration, destructive, North 
Korean Threat etc.) of the above statement, is noteworthy. This is particularly so when 
contrasted to previous pieces carried by the paper, i.e., in terms of mediating the response to 
North Korea‟s provocations, as examined in Chapter 3, above. The full impact of the events 
                                                          
332  While the Asahi’s editorial also proposed a regionally coordinated approach, it is nevertheless noteworthy, 
once again, how, aside from the far left (Communist Party etc.), even Japan’s so-called left-of-centre 
newspapers, such as the Asahi, promoted US-Japan bilateralism (though in this case also with South Korean 
involvement) as the cornerstone by which negotiations with the DPRK should be undertaken. 
333  Indeed, the above noted sea-change in political momentum was also highlighted by the defensive posture 
of even the Communist Party, which in retort to allegations of close ties (to a negatively framed) DPRK, 
insisted that it was not in intimate association with the Kim Jong-Il regime and had been a harsh critic of all 
of Pyongyang’s provocative actions (see, Shii Kazuo, main Diet session, 155: 8). 
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of 2002 upon reactions from the policy community‟s political and media arms can also be 
gauged from the quantitative analysis of coverage, as explicated in Section 4.8, and 
expressed in Table 4.1 (Fig. 4.1(a) and Fig. 4.1(b)), below.334 In this sense, a progressive 
process, linking back most ostensibly to the Taepodong launch of 1998, but ultimately to the 
1993 Nodong test-firing, can be observed in both qualitative and quantitative terms, 
elucidated through analysis of reactions to the 2002 summit and the fall-out from Koizumi‟s 
political theatre, or Koizumi-gekijō, played-out via intersecting socio-political and media 
spheres in Japan – as an increasingly coherent response to North Korea.335 The primary 
agency and key actors involved in the continuation of this process can, thereafter, be 
delineated in further detail through micro-analyses of the pivotal events unfolding during 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
334  With regards to media sources, the most striking quantitative impact upon North Korea’s framing within  
Japan as a result of the 2002 summit can be observed in the change of coverage levels exhibited by the,  
relatively (in comparison to the Yomiuri) moderate, Mainichi Shimbun. In this respect, while in qualitative  
terms the Mainichi continued to make reference to normalization, despite previous missile and incursion  
incidents,  its prescribed conditions for doing so altered dramatically (e.g., see editorial, 28 September 
2002: 5) – in line with its massive increase in North Korea-related issues and their associated risks (e.g., see 
editorial, 18 September 2002: 7) following the revelations over the abduction cases.  
335  For a timely (coming on the day of the Koizumi-Kim summit) summary of how the political elite was 
perceived to have altered its approach to North Korea in the period following the missile launch, including a 
citation from then Defence Spokesman, Nonaka Hiromu stating that,  “This is a situation which is of the 
gravest direct concern to Japan’s security. Our North Korea policy has to be reassessed, and it is necessary 
for us to take a firm stand and implement harsh measures”, see NHK News report, “Shushō hōchō: 
kitachōsen no misairu hassha jikken to sono go no taiō” (17 September 2002). 
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Table 4.1. Impact of the 2002 Koizumi-Kim Summit in the Media and Diet 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to Summit 
Meeting ; 
Pyongyang 
Declaration
, and Kim’s 
apology 
over 
abduction 
cases. 
 
Numbers of articles/items post 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~ ~3 ~6 ~12 
Asahi 2079 1399 824 2660 4604 7626 
Yomiuri 2428 1661 922 2823 4861 7808 
Mainichi 2716 1940 1179 3738 6383 10180 
Sankei 3956 2587 1338 3003 5629 9701 
NHK News 1459 1172 704 2033 3535 5626 
Diet 214 142 31 102 168 354 
Magazines* 62 31 15 134 176 250 
Source: author 
Numbers shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” * Based on a selection of national magazines, primarily 
sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 4.1, above. 
 
4.5. The impact of multiple missile tests upon the risk recalibration process 
When North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the 
Taepodong-2, over a two day period spanning the 4th and 5th of July, 2006, risks framed 
against Pyongyang in Japan were, as outlined above, already highly ratcheted-up.336 It is 
true that there had been a relative lull in the perceived risks of immediate military 
contingency stemming from the North in the period which followed the 2001 spy-boat sinking, 
but the abduction issue and suspicions over the DPRK‟s nuclear development program 
ensured that progress at the Six Party Talks was sluggish and faltering, preventing any major 
                                                          
336 The other six tests included a combination of short and medium-range Scud-C and Nodong ballistic    
      missiles launched from the Kittaraeyong test site. Although the tests of the six short-range missiles appear    
      to have been successful, the Taepodong-2 failed less than a minute after its launch. A 4 July 2006 State 
      Department press statement describes the launches as a “provocative act” that violated North Korea’s 
      voluntary moratorium on flight-testing longer-range missiles, which Pyongyang had observed since 
      September 1999. Japan responded by imposing independent, unilateral sanctions on North Korea (see   
      Section 4.9, below). 
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downward recalibration of risk within Japan‟s policy community.337 Moreover, the ensuing rise 
to power of Abe Shinzō, on the back of an election campaign which placed resolution of the 
abduction issue at its fore, meant the hawkish side of the political elite maintained its 
momentum of risk recalibration in a relatively consistent manner (Chanlett-Avery, 2008: 3). 
    In the period immediately preceding the 2006 test-firings, Japan‟s political elite, lead by 
vociferous Prime Minister, Koizumi, and Foreign Secretary, Asō primed the following 
mediation of reactions by Tokyo through their emphasis on the potentiality of risks contained 
in the possible actions being planned by Pyongyang (Son, 2010: 177).338 After which, the  
materialization of North Korean sabre rattling in the form of technologically enhanced 
missiles fired eastward across the Japan Sea was all that was needed by proactive right-of-
centre actors from the political elite in order to maximize the recalibration of risk, particularly 
in terms of identifying concrete external sources of harm and justifying military re-
strengthening as a counter-measure.339 The apparent possibility of an actual military 
contingency in combination with the emotional impact, and outrage, of citizens being 
snatched from their own shores left little room for a softer line on North Korea, and pushed 
                                                          
337  Whether for personal political gain of the kind noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.10, above, or for the national    
      interest, Koizumi returned to Pyongyang in 2004 in an attempt to press for the return of remaining   
      abductees to Japan. However, although successful in securing a second summit with DPRK leader, Kim Jong- 
             Il, the North apparently falsified a number of documents and death certificates relating to the cases (see  
 Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2009b) which was instrumental in further perpetuating an image of     
 unreliability and hostility in framing North Korea. Such allegations were, therein, additionally utilized by   
 both conservative elements of the policy elite and diffused widely across the media and society in Japan. 
338  As Son notes, the discourse relating to such risks was articulated by Japan’s policy community by way of 
debate over the possibility of convening an emergency meeting of the UNSC and the consideration of pre-
emptive strikes against North Korea’s missile batteries within the DPRK (Asahi Shimbun 19 June 2006). 
339  Pertinently, while much was made of the fact that North Korea had further developed its upgraded 
Taepodong missile, the government-sponsored research institute, Japan Institute of International Affairs 
(JIIA), while attempting to justify the further development of Japan’s US-coordinated Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) system on the grounds of its ability to ameliorate pressing risks identified with Pyongyang ’s 
missiles, itself conceded that, “The primary threat posed to Japan by North Korea’s missiles lies in its 
deployment of over 100 Nodong units. In such case as the Taepodong missile is further developed and its 
range extended, it is hard to consider that that in itself poses a particular menace to Japan. Although 
deployments of the Taepodong within North Korea place Japan inside its range, there is no change to the 
existing risks identifiable with such a threat.” (Morimoto (ed.), 2002: 13).      
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the policy community as a whole towards identifying all that was associated with the DPRK 
as hostile and loaded with risks, framing it as an unpredictable and alien assailant. 
    Once again, reaction from the Diet was intense and, in terms of an immediate 
recalibration of risk in response to the missile tests, clear cut. On 6 July 2006, then Foreign 
Secretary, Asō Tarō stated that the government had raised the level of danger pertaining to 
information concerning North Korea (kiken jōhō wo hikiage), and that restraint was advised 
to all those planning to travel anywhere within its borders. This was combined with an 
announcement that the rapid implementation of strict (kibishii) sanctions to restrict 
movements and remittances to and from North Korea had been put in place, and that an 
Emergency Headquarters for Countermeasures (kinkyū taisaku honbu) was to be 
established to gather further information (164: 4). Indeed, the absence of almost any kind of 
strong opposition to the tough measures taken against North Korea is apparent across the 
majority of parties and speakers in the Diet. Ruling coalition partners also showed a resolute 
and unwavering support for the LDP‟s more hawkish factions. Kōmeitō representative, Satō 
Shigeki, announced to the Diet Security Committee that his party, too, had established a 
“North Korea Missile Problem Counter-Measures Headquarters” and that the party was 
“determined to take a robust approach to dealing with the problems” following the North‟s 
“outrageous actions” (bōkyo) against Japan and the international community‟s will (164: 19). 
    This suggests a trend of consensus, or at least convergence, among leading political 
figures as to the legitimacy and uniformity of recalibrating risks perceived to emanate from 
Pyongyang. The point is illustrated by remarks made in the International Terrorism 
Prevention Special Committee a month later, on 11 August 2006, by Nagashima Akihisa, 
representing the then leading opposition party, DPJ. Nagashima (141: 120) actually praises 
Asō and Abe for their swift, hard-hitting response to the North Korean threat, apparently 
representing a new form of Japanese diplomacy, which could be demonstrated to the world 
(atarashī nihon gaikō no arikata wo sekai ni shimesu). Moreover, Nagashima also presses 
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the Foreign Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary to explain how they would deal with a 
contingency where it would be necessary to use force against North Korea, an option which 
they did not rule out if unavoidable (141: 124-6).340    
   The discourses of emergency, counter-measure, and military provision (gunjiteki sochi) 
proliferated in discussions within the Diet during the months which followed the 2006 
Taepodong-2 launch, demonstrating not only how Japan‟s policy community had converged 
upon a marked recalibration of risk vis-à-vis the DPRK per se, but also how this process 
appeared to have been facilitated by a broad weakening of the pacifist norm. With both 
ruling and opposition parties discussing the possibility of military contingencies, and public 
anger and fear charged by the media‟s constant coverage of all issues connected to North 
Korea, it was, therefore, an unproductive climate for resistance against the adoption of a 
more assertive defence policy – and continued recalibration of risks. 
  In addition, even closer adherence to the norm of bilateralism was once again stated and 
restated as a core, and absolutely necessary, means by which Japan could ameliorate the 
risks posed by North Korea. Indeed, the emphasis of coalition with the US increasingly 
switched from a standard ally, to one which involved a tight relationship (kinmitsu na kankei). 
The risks pertaining to the DPRK were then framed as immediate and concrete, and 
requiring of a pro-active international response, led by Japan. This was a position particularly 
reiterated by spokesmen and figure heads of the then ruling LDP party, such as Asō and Abe, 
but was also present as a prominent idea which intersected vast swathes of the state‟s 
political elite, market and society. Indeed, the quantitative impact of the 2006 test launches, 
particularly in conjunction with North Korea‟s first nuclear test, across these spheres is also 
                                                          
340  The inference here is that, although the likes of Abe and Asō are keen to articulate language in terms of 
       constitutional legality, they seek to frame risks associated with North Korea as sufficiently grievous to allow 
       discourse considering the necessity of constitutional reform, or extra-constitutional acts, in order to 
       effectively counter those risks.  
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evinced, once again, in terms of the types and volume of media coverage, as expressed in 
Table 4.2 (Fig.4.2(a) and Fig.4.2(b)), below. 
 
Table 4.2. Impact of the 2006 Missile Test Launches in the Media and Diet
341 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to  July 2006 
Multiple 
Missile 
Launches 
Numbers of articles/items post 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~ ~3 ~6 ~12 
Asahi 2338 1125 684 1118 2793 4335 
Yomiuri 2501 1213 749 1271 3196 5014 
Mainichi 2478 1173 700 1179 3003 4653 
Sankei 3904 1948 1100 1625 3676 6193 
NHK News 1917 975 588 971 2576 4266 
Diet 201 143 67 17* 141 305 
Magazines※ 100 43 29 40 123 173 
Source: author 
Numbers shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※Based on a selection of national magazines, primarily 
sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
*The apparently low figure of 17 references in the months immediately following the multiple missile launch 
can be attributed to the scarcity of Diet sessions during the summer period. When calculated as a percentage 
of the total, North Korean issues amounted to over one third of all entries between 4 July 2006 and 4 October 
2006; as compared to the three months prior to the test-firings, in which equivalent discourse relating to the 
DPRK totalled well below 15% (17/50 -v- 67/549). This summer holiday effect can also be seen, therefore, to 
have had a spill-over impact upon the other succeeding figures.    
                                                          
341  As with quantitative reaction to other events, such as the Taepodong 1 missile launch and 2002 leadership     
       summit, media and Diet coverage is only designed to offer a rough gauge, and clearly does not account for   
       other overlapping events. This is particularly pertinent in the case of the July 2006 missile launches, because   
       they were followed only three months later by the nuclear weapon test. An attempt is made to control for 
       this – as expressed by Table 4.3, and explained in Section 4.8, below. Nevertheless, the clarity with which the     
       various events related to Japan’s responses to North Korea exhibit peaks in coverage, followed by a level of   
       attention which is higher than the previous trough, certainly supports the argument that there has been an   
       overall incremental recalibration of risk, facilitated in terms of wave-like reactions to the DPRK’s actions and   
       state-sponsored policies within Japan. 
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 4.2, above. 
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    Full appraisal of the extent and significance of media reactions to the events of 2006 is 
covered in Section 4.7, below. Such are further analysed in terms of their interaction with the 
political elite before and after the additional impact of the North‟s first underground nuclear 
weapon test, executed just three months after the multiple missile launches of early July. 
 
4.6. The first nuclear test: multiplying the recalibration of risk 
The DPRK‟s first underground testing of a nuclear device in October of 2006, coming little 
more than three months after its multiple missile launch, was not exclusively used by Japan‟s 
political elite or neo-conservative factions; it provided security entrepreneurs the world over 
with a viable rationale with which to elevate the salience of risks framed against North 
Korea.342 However, nowhere was this felt more intensely than in Japan. Indeed, the impact 
upon Japan‟s policy community was, cognitively speaking, analogous to a second surge of 
momentum within an already escalating process. As a result, the recalibration of risk in 
response to the DPRK‟s weapons programmes reached an all time high – as discussed in 
Section 4.8, and illustrated by Table 4.3 (Fig. 4.3(a) and Fig. 4.3(b)), below. 
    Reaction in the Diet chambers was vehement. The number of specific direct references 
made to North Korea as a whole broke the two hundred mark in the six month period 
following the test (see Table 4.3), and activity within security committees, particularly the 
International Terrorism Prevention Special Committee, proliferated accordingly.343 Much of 
                                                          
342 For a concise summary and representation of global reaction to the test, see Herman (2006). A wide range  
of comparable articles are available from news agencies across Western, Asian and other media, though the 
level of risk recalibration was most strongly observed in Japan’s right-wing press, e.g., in particular extremity 
by the Sankei Shimbun. 
343  The speed and severity of reaction and high calibration of risks was also politically materialized by the joint 
resolution proposed on 10 October 2006, condemning the test and demanding the North’s complete 
abandonment of all nuclear weapons and programs, made as a twelve person signatory affiliation headed 
by Aisawa Ichirō (main session, 165: 0).   
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this focussed on counter-DPRK rhetoric, and the now apparently multiplying risks posed by a 
combination of nuclear, abduction, incursion and missile contingencies. The Diet‟s Security 
Committee (anzen hoshō iinkai) reflected the now established pattern of recalibrated risk 
and eagerness to implement measures against an entity conceptualized as a diplomatic and 
geo-military foe (the DPRK). The statement given to the committee by Defense Minister, 
Kyūma Fumio on 17 October 2006, provides an illustration of how discourse concerning 
North Korea became attached to multiple and salient risks. This is partly achieved through 
predicating discussion of risks posed by the DPRK with various references to other security 
related concerns, such as international terrorism. Kyūma cites non-state terrorist 
organizations, WMD, and missile proliferation, among other elements, as a set of new risks 
posed to the peace and security of Japan, which were, apparently, of pressing urgency in 
terms of a situation requiring counter-measures (rendered in Japanese as, “...arata na kyōi 
ya heiwa to anzen ni eikyō wo ataeru tayō na jitai e no taiō ga… …sashisematta kadai to 
natte orimasu”) (165: 8). This spiel was followed with an explication of how North Korea‟s 
activities (now widely termed as the North Korea problems, or kitachōsen mondai) amounted 
to a kind of compounded, pressing risk, which must be dealt with in all urgency.344 In this way, 
a conflation of issues that present a range of risks became associated with the DPRK within 
a central strand of political discourse at the core of Japan‟s policy community. 
    Indeed, the extent to which the October 2006 nuclear test acted as a powerful force in 
shaping how the DPRK was framed within Japan is also further evinced in terms of its 
impact upon any form of coherent opposition, which might seek to take a more moderate 
stance vis-à-vis the risks identified with Pyongyang‟s regime. In essence, almost the entire 
policy community‟s reaction became one of competition over who could demonstrate the 
sternest position in response to risks, which had, apparently, reached a critical level. 
                                                          
344  It is worth noting the term kitachōsen mondai, because it is symbolic of how individual problems went  
       From isolated suspicions, termed by language such as giwaku or fushin to a combined label which framed  
       all issues relating to the DPRK as a problem (mondai). 
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    Even given a weakening in the salience of the anti-militarist norm in Japan (Hook et al., 
2011), however, a strong reaction to any form of close-quartered or proximate nuclear test 
across the political spectrum is doubtless not unexpected. What is of interest, particularly in 
terms of an events-based process which has lead to the recalibration of risk through the 
framing of North Korea, is the ability of the 2006 nuclear test to galvanise a set of risks, 
which could be associated (or conflated) with that of the North‟s perceived increasingly high-
risk nuclear weapons program, within political and public spheres.345 This is highlighted 
illustratively by way of the final form which was given to the inter-party Diet resolution 
adopted after the test – and its interpretation – which not only gained support from the 
leading opposition party (DPJ), but also secured agreement from the SDP and Japan 
Communist Party (JCP). 
    Furthermore, it is expressed forthrightly by LDP spokesman, Ichikawa Ichirō, who in his 
statement explaining the inter-party support for and content of the resolution, made in 
response to the nuclear test, also used the opportunity to restate the perceived salience of 
other risks represented by North Korea. Therein, during the main Diet session of 11 October 
2006 he asserted (165: 3) that,     
     North Korea has also continued to demonstrate a dishonest attitude over the problem 
of Japanese abduction victims. Not only has it refused to respond to our country‟s 
demands to solve the abductions problem, it forcibly went ahead with the test-launch of 
ballistic missiles in July, and then proceeded to announce a nuclear test. Despite a 
variety of measures, starting with the international community‟s UN statement, which 
sought to persuade North Korea to act with restraint, it ignored these efforts and 
conducted the nuclear test. There is no justifiable reason for this action, and our country 
utterly condemns this reckless and outrageous violation. 
 
    The consistency with which the norm of bilateralism is reiterated in such discussions, 
particularly among LDP members, is also striking. Kyūma, for instance, adhered to this rule, 
                                                          
345  So much so, indeed, that it primed the socio-political environment to the point where central right-of-   
      centre political actors felt able to articulate the previously taboo subject of debating Japan’s possible 
      nuclear armament (for discussion and critique of the resulting arguments, or nihon kakubusōron, see Asahi 
      Shimbun, 19 January 2006: 12, for academic analysis and historical background, see Yoshida, 2008: 141-3).  
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positing that efforts to counter the North Korean issues must be implemented by US-led 
international initiatives. Indeed, it may seem obvious that Japan would look to its only official 
ally and security partner in times of perceived crisis, particularly given the high US troop 
deployment on the Korean peninsula and across the Japanese archipelago, but the extent to 
which Diet discourse focuses on risks posed to Japan by the DPRK as a US-Japan problem 
is notable in terms of the oft times lack of independence attributed to Japan‟s responses.346 
Moreover, the influence of bilateralism as a key component in Japan‟s recalibration of risk in 
response to North Korea is noteworthy, not least because it suggests US foreign-policy 
interests are not only highly influential upon Japanese domestic politics, but also that, in 
effect, the US administration instrumentally acts as a significant element of Japan‟s policy 
community itself; i.e., leaning towards the model outlined by Gavan McCormack‟s client-state 
thesis (2007, see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6, above), particularly in the areas of national 
defence and security, and specifically vis-à-vis North Korea.347 
 
4.7. Recalibration of risk as a media phenomenon: the framing of North Korea 
The recalibration of risk by Japan‟s domestic media probably represents the most clearly 
definable example of North Korea‟s framing in terms of how it has been increasingly 
identified with a growing number of grievous and unquantifiable risks.348 Significantly, in 
                                                          
346 Representative examples of the emphasis placed upon a US-Japan joint response to North Korean issues in    
      the Diet are provided by, amongst others, Okada Naoki (26 October 2006, 165: 78) of the Foreign Affairs and  
      Defense Committee and Nagashima Akihisa (20 December 2006, 165: 166) of the International Terrorism  
      Prevention Special Committee. 
347 For a counter-argument suggesting that, in fact, Japan acts independently, and has used the security 
alliance, conversely, as a means by which to justify its own more assertive or controversial security 
measures without breaking the agreed one per cent budget cap on defence spending, see comments made 
by Tanaka Hitoshi on the NHK’s “50 Years of the Security Treaty (Nichibei anpo 50 nen)” (NHK, 2010). 
348 From this perspective, the recalibration was immediately highlighted when the author returned to Japan to  
 complete the field research for this dissertation. When first visiting Japan in 1995, newspaper and TV   
 coverage, and public sphere attention to North Korea stories was minimal – with no recollection of any in an   
 entire six-month stay. Fifteen years later, during the early days of the research period in 2010, both     
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terms of the interactive relationship between the state and media which has resulted in the 
recalibration of risk in response to North Korea, it can be argued that, in a sense, the media 
plays a dominant role, in so far as they do not face the same kinds of pressures as those felt 
by politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats; i.e., to make balanced decisions for which they 
can be held responsible – particularly when adjudged to have acted outside of the national 
interest.349 Conversely, media sources‟ primary pressure is that of the market, in terms of 
requiring stories of interest that can be sustainably sold to the mass public. In essence, 
when conceived of as a fourth arm of the policy community, the media itself faces the least 
public scrutiny and criticism (Tanaka, 2009: 218-9).350 The media‟s resulting portrayal of 
North Korea in Japan, in terms of being a manufactured, or at least massaged and 
accentuated (i.e., sensationalized) phenomenon, demonstrates the manner in which such 
risks have been mediated and framed as a function of these influences in the public sphere. 
The thrust of this argument is captured aptly in the following passage authored by the 
prominent Japanese TV pundit, Itō Terii, as a rare dissenting voice to the continuation of 
such a media framing of North Korea. Itō critiques that, 
 
   Information about North Korea flows everyday like a flood; from escapees, from all 
kinds of experts and all kinds of folk. They over-size the Nodongs and Taepodongs and 
try to guess when they‟ll next be fired. It‟s claimed that after Iraq, North Korea will be next. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
newspaper and TV media covered some aspect of the DPRK, all with a like-minded negative framing and risk-
centric content, in multiplicity every day. For instance, in a five day period of relatively little notable activity 
within Pyongyang, between 15-19 August, television pieces included a high-profile political affairs program 
highlighting the risks posed by the DPRK, news stories on the desperate and unstable state of North Korean 
society, as well as Pyongyang’s malicious use of Twitter and collusions with Beijing, and a variety celebrity-
quiz show glorifying the JCG’s heroism in repelling North Korea’s hostile spy-boat aggression of 2001 (in 
chronological order: “Hidaka Report”; TV Aichi (15 August, 2010), “Korea Report”; Tōkai TV (16 August, 
2010a), “Denomi-go no Kitachōsen”; Mētere (17 August, 2010), “Koreda 1, 2, 3”; Tōkai TV (18 August, 2010b), 
“Tōkai TV News”; Tōkai TV (19 August, 2010c). 
349  Of course, such an argument does not exclude the obvious influence of powerful actors from the political 
elite upon the media, which, as discussed by Hyung (2006: 483-508, see also Chapter 2, Section 2.10), 
exercise considerable agency and are themselves contingent upon large groupings of convergent market 
interests. 
350  The remaining, conventional, three arms of the policy community, specified as the standard branches of 
government by Tanaka, are constituted by the legislature, executive and judiciary. For discussion of the 
interactive relationship between each branch in Japan, see Upham (1987). 
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It‟s time to guess when they‟ll attack and discuss how Japan can respond. But when you 
stop to think about it, exactly what are these analysts basing their analyses on? For 
example, baseball pundits are usually former players so they know how it feels to be out 
there on the field of play. Most North Korea commentators have never been to the DPRK. 
Can they really give an expert opinion without feeling the slightest sense of hypocrisy? 
              (2004: 3, author‟s italics) 
 
Indeed, while Itō‟s critique may suffer from a broad generalization and lack of theoretical 
foundation, it is poignant in as much as it illustrates the far-reaching escalation of Japan‟s 
risk recalibration in response to North Korea. In this respect, the double events of 2006 
worked to maximize the influence of the media in this sphere. Furthermore, reaction to the 
multiple missile and nuclear tests can be seen as illustrative of the phenomenon criticized by 
Itō, in terms of media-based experts being unable to accurately represent risks attributed to 
North Korea due to a lack of internal knowledge – particularly regarding competing domestic 
socio-political, military and economic factors within the DPRK (Lee, 2009: 100-6).351 
    Once again, the Asahi Shimbun is illuminative here in qualifying evidence which 
elucidates a broadened recalibration of risk. As noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.16, while the 
Asahi demonstrated far greater concern over the Taepodong launch of 1998 compared to 
that of its coverage assigned to the 1993 Nodong test-firing, reaction to the multiple launch 
of 2006 saw an extensively more concrete re-evaluation of heightened risks identified with 
the DPRK. Additionally, this brought the paper firmly behind support for stricter sanctioning of 
the Pyongyang regime – once again combining (and, arguably, conflating) multiple issues 
associated with risks sourced in North Korea. For example, in the editorial of 7 July 2006, 
                                                          
351  Lee, who has extensive first-hand experience of the North, highlights the fact that large sections of Japan’s 
media (and academic) analysts failed to accurately explicate the incidents of 2006 – initially predicting that 
missile and nuclear tests would not go ahead because they would not be sufficient to fulfil the North’s 
supposed aim of drawing the US into bilateral negotiations, and then retrospectively identifying such as the 
primary motivation for the tests being carried out (2009: 101-2). Conversely, he posits that, in fact, the 
primary agency for both missile and nuclear tests in 2006 came from a desire by North Korea’s military-
aligned wing of the political elite to counter rival factions within the Pyongyang regime, specifically those 
seeking to switch power towards economic reformists. Hence, Japan’s recalibration of risk in relation to 
such events can be seen as incongruent, or decoupled, in terms of the discrepancies between how North 
Korea’s intentions are portrayed and the primary causal agents underlying Pyongyang’s actions. 
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the position advocated was for swift, firm action by the GoJ to meet the pressing menace 
posed by North Korea, asserting that, 
   Fortunately, Japan is now chairing as the non-permanent member of the Security 
Council. It [Japan] is directly affected by North Korea‟s missiles and possession of 
nuclear capabilities. It would be desirable to be in a position to praise the government‟s 
stance, with it having taken rapid affirmative action on what kind of protest should be 
voiced by the international community. The resolution‟s message should be clear; missile 
test-firing threatens the international peace and must cease and be frozen with all 
urgency.  
 
In this way, the Asahi had moved to a position where North Korea was not only identified 
with multiple and grievous risks which impacted upon Japan, but to one where the DPRK 
was itself portrayed in terms of an assailant juxtaposed with Japan – warranting tough 
measures to be taken against it at the international level.352 The impact of the nuclear test in 
October of the same year served to compound the Asahi‟s repositioning and recalibration of 
risk in response to North Korea. Moreover, it acted as the catalyst to complete and 
emphasize a wholly negative framing of the DPRK, previously associated only with the more 
right-of-centre of Japan‟s mainstream media sources. In the editorial of 11 October 2006 
(two days after the test), entitled “The North Korean Nuclear Test: Strong Protest against [the 
North‟s] Outrageous Aggression”, the editorial writer portrayed the North as both deceitful 
and dangerous – and attached Pyongyang to a string of potentially salient risks.353 Critically, 
the article stated that,   
   Having dabbled in state-administered crimes such as abduction, and even lending its 
hand to terrorism, it is a country which has come to flaunt international rules. The nuclear 
card has surely been played as a means to try and force its hand through the use of 
menace. For that reason, it has been isolated from international society and provokes the 
UN; threatening world peace and security. This outrageous offence cannot be allowed.     
                                                          
352  The Asahi’s editorial (also of 7 July 2006: 3), focusing on the breakdown of relations between Mindan and 
Chōsensōren, explained as having been exacerbated by the unruly actions of the North Korean state, clearly 
identified the Pyongyang regime as a negative cause of concern – particularly for Japan’s North-allied half of 
the resident Korean community, which faces the risk of being associated with them. 
353  The editorial’s original Japanese title was “Kitachōsen no kakujikken: Bōkyo ni tsuyoku kōgi suru”. An 
article on the front page of the 11 October 2006 edition also noted that the majority of public opinion (62%) 
was behind sanctions as opposed to dialogue with the DPRK, and that over half the population feel 
threatened by North Korea.   
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The Asahi‟s coverage of the events of 2006 is particularly significant here, specifically in 
terms of measuring how risks framed against the DPRK were recalibrated through 
interacting discourses in the public and political spheres, because it demonstrates a 
traceable trajectory of transition – whereby the Asahi effectively caught-up with more 
traditionally right-of-centre media sources in the wake of multiple missile and nuclear tests. 
Indeed, although other news media also exhibited a recalibration of risk, they can be seen to 
have already been in positions more predisposed to the negative framing of North Korea – 
and to emphasizing the incumbent risks. For instance, having pro-actively escalated already 
highly recalibrated risks following the 1998 Taepodong launch, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
interpreted the 2006 multiple missile test-firing in a manner that exposed how it had already 
primed a maximizing of potential risks which were to be identified with a negatively framed 
North Korea – i.e., by pre-emptively emphasizing the pre-eminent risks of a combination of 
missile and nuclear capabilities. This was central to the paper‟s voluminous discourse on 
North Korean risks, positing (editorial, 6 July 2006: 3) that, “If [North Korea] succeeds in 
developing a nuclear warhead which can be attached to the missile, of course Japan, and 
the entire international community, would be placed  under the most grievous of threats.” 
Therein, having already established the DPRK as a source of multi-pronged, pressing and 
grievous risks, prior to the October 2006 nuclear test, the Yomiuri could essentially do little 
more than reiterate its already risk-loaded stance in the wake of the test‟s occurrence. 
Indeed, although its language is, in the main, somewhat more emotive and hard-hitting than 
that of the Asahi, the two papers carried predominantly convergent editorial stances in a 
number of their prescriptive political commentary sections throughout the editions of early-
mid October 2006.354 Likewise, akin to the Asahi‟s recalibration of geo-military risks posed by 
North Korean weapons capabilities, the Yomiuri also stated that, “Japan is a country 
                                                          
354  For examples, see Asahi editorials of 13, 16, and 20 October 2006 and Yomiuri editorials of 13, 18 and 20  
October 2006. 
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exposed to North Korea‟s nuclear threat. As the chairing country of the UNSC, it must make 
every effort in order to move the Security Council towards taking unified and stiff measures” 
(editorial, 11 October 2006: 3), once again calling for fast and firm action by the GoJ, 
apparently in order to ameliorate risks posed by the DPRK.               
    As with Itō‟s scathing attack (cited above) on how North Korea is framed in the media 
within Japan, analysis of quality newspaper coverage, thus, provides an accessible 
exemplification of how predicative language, such as that referring to weapons capabilities, 
has been used (and, arguably, misused) by media sources in Japan to allocate legitimate (or 
scientific) value to the manner in which risks are (re)calibrated against the DPRK. 
Congruently, returning to Beck‟s understanding of socio-politicized risks, as addressed in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5, it is the ability of powerful vested interests mediated between the 
state, market and society, to assign scientific expertise to the calibration of risks which allows 
them to be packaged as such within the media, and disseminated with greater effect across 
political and societal spheres. 
    It is, therefore, necessary here to build on the observations sketched in Chapter 1, Section 
1.7, Chapter 2, Section 2.10, and throughout Chapter 3, so as to more accurately analyze 
how media responses to North Korea have changed, particularly with respect to the impact 
of the multiple missile launches and nuclear test of 2006. These can be assessed through 
mixed-method analyses in terms of both qualitative illustrations of the types of discourse 
prevalent in the aftermath of these key events, and by way of quantitative estimations of the 
volume and weight of influence affected by mass media sources during this period, which 
utilize a number of indicators such as frequency and specificity of content (see Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3). Moreover, in consistency with Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 (below), this can be 
examined within the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, which considers the 
interactional impact upon civil society and the policy community (as an integrated, 
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permeable unit) with regards to the process of risk recalibration – and how it is contingent 
upon the framing of North Korea within the media in Japan.  
    The content of the DPRK‟s framing within the media in Japan, then, primarily revolves, as 
stipulated above, around its stereotyping as an increasing and continuing source of salient 
risks, which are proliferated and realized by the omnipotent power of a hostile regime 
represented by the Kim legacy. As noted in Section 4.4, revelations over the abductions 
issue following the Koizumi-Kim leadership summit were crucial in this respect, particularly in 
terms of setting the parameters for mediating how risks were perceived within consequent 
public sphere discourse (see also Section 4.8, below). This, ultimately, led to a situation 
where what had once been an issue predominantly contained and dealt with internally, 
primarily by diplomats and government officials, became dominated by media influence and 
public sphere outcry – something which also worked to conflate a number of other risks 
attributed to Pyongyang‟s governing forces. By the time of the 2006 missile and nuclear tests, 
the resulting interactive process, intersecting the state, market and society, which had 
already served to substantively recalibrate those risks, had also reshaped the issues relating 
to the DPRK as a whole. As a result, Japan‟s diplomatic dealings with, and policy towards, 
North Korea was, in one sense, being led by the media – and further driven by a locus of 
opinion polls administrated by various media-sources (Hirasawa, 2004: 22-4; anonymous 
Japanese political scientist (interview), 20 September 2011, Appendix A).355 
 
                                                          
355  While some notable studies, such as those compiled by Krauss and Pharr (1996) and Hyung (2006: 483- 
       508), have attempted sweeping analyses of how media in Japan shapes public opinion and policy  
      formulation, there is a striking dearth of quantitative analyses that seek to directly identify the causal  
      links between a cross-section of media sources with societal, other market, and political elements. This can  
      be attributed largely to an inability to effectively compile and categorize such sources in a meaningful and   
      coherent fashion. As such, this dissertation draws from selected qualitative examples, also provided by  
      other studies in this area, in order to generate informed, though at times (unavoidably) generalized  
      hypotheses (for a succinct justification of such an approach, see also Wittig, 2005: 1-5).  
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4.8. Quantifying public sphere recalibration of risk: sustained and increased levels 
As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.10, the examples of the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri 
Shimbun (newspapers‟) coverage have been spotlighted as a primary focus for the 
illustrative purposes of this dissertation, primarily because they are national, widely 
consumed (popular) in a multiplicity of formats (printed, visual, internet etc.), and have 
maintained a considerable degree of attention toward Pyongyang‟s activities, which may be 
rendered as representational of Japan‟s mainstream. Moreover, in terms of assessing 
interactive processes across different sections of Japan‟s policy community, both papers 
conduct numerically-based opinion polls, and are regularly cited as sources of information by 
Diet members – as well as being cited by publications which cover North Korea. These 
features are particularly salient in terms of quantifying risk recalibration in relation to events 
in the first decade of the 21st Century because it means that state, media and societal 
aspects can be measured in comparative terms. In addition, quality newspaper coverage 
can be seen as, essentially, representative of a quantitative shift in media-standpoints 
towards a starkly negative framing of the DPRK – in the case of the above; from a left-of-
centre and right-of-centre perspective respectively. Furthermore, quantitatively speaking, 
both were significantly affected by the events leading up to and during 2006. 
    Therein, these newspapers‟ reactions to the missile test launches show a marked and 
increased recalibration of risk in response to Pyongyang‟s actions. While the numerical 
increase in volume of coverage between the events of 2006 and 1998 is less extreme than 
that observed between the Taepodong and Nodong firings of 1998 and 1993, the discourse 
prevalent across the major editions evinces a clear bolstering of anti-North Korean sentiment, 
and widespread, though with varying degrees of implicitness, support for a tough, proactive 
policy response from the state.356 Indeed, the validity of such an assessment, interpreting 
quantitative levels of media and Diet attentions as a barometer for the degree of risk 
                                                          
356 The number of articles in the Asahi Shimbun covering North Korea in the month immediately after the    
      multiple missile launch of 2006 was 684. The equivalent Yomiuri statistic stands at 780. 
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recalibration vis-à-vis North Korea, is further supported by the results of random qualitative 
sampling across these sectors (see Appendix B).357 Within this, the intensity of coverage 
centred specifically on the single event of the missile launch, but incorporating (or conflating) 
other associated risks also shows an apparent escalation of risks from the preceding decade. 
The extent of coverage evincing this recalibration of risk can be extrapolated via a 
comparison of Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 (above) with Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3 (below). 
 
Table 4.3. Impact of the 2006 Underground Nuclear Test in the Media and Diet
358 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to October 
2006 
Nuclear 
Test 
Numbers of articles/items post 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~ ~3 ~6 ~12 
Asahi  
   
Omitted due to overlap with 
Table 4.2 (See above). 
1690 2567 3887 
Yomiuri 1963 2923 4573 
Mainichi 1854 2733 4261 
Sankei 2071 3469 5692 
NHK News 1636 2658 3917 
Diet 125 207 308 
Magazines※ 83 106 166 
Source: author 
Numbers shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※ Based on a selection of national magazines, primarily 
sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database.  
                                                          
357  Random sampling has confirmed that, although there are a small minority of articles and Diet  
references relating to the DPRK which are of a generally neutral content, the overwhelming majority of all 
stories directly or implicitly frame North Korea as either the source of salient risks (pertaining to missiles, 
nuclear weapons, abductions etc.) or as a negatively portrayed entity juxtaposed with Japan (alluding to 
social inequality, poverty, human rights abuses etc). As such, any increase in quantity of coverage can 
effectively be seen to represent an increase of intensity with regards to the recalibration of risks sourced in 
the DPRK – and compound its negative framing.  
358    For further quantitative comparison and a full breakdown of form and volume of reaction to North Korea- 
              related events in Japan up to 2011, see Chapter 5, Table(s) 5.1 – 5.3, and Figure(s) 5.1 – 5.5, Chapter 6,  
  Figures(s) 6.1 – 6.3.   
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 4.3, above. 
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    As noted above, the close proximity (overlap) of missile and nuclear tests in 2006 makes 
accurate quantitative differentiation between reactions to the two events problematic, 
particularly in terms of extended media and Diet chamber coverage over the longer term. 
However, as can be observed in Table 4.3, it is clear that the double impact of the events of 
2006 served to push responses in the public sphere to unprecedented levels, as a reaction 
to the North‟s geo-military actions, in the months following the nuclear test.359 Indeed, while 
the backlash to Kim Jong-Il‟s admission of state-orchestrated abductions in 2002 may have 
created the highest overall levels of media and Diet chamber coverage for North Korea-
related affairs (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1), the extent to which risks posed by 
Pyongyang‟s regime were spotlighted after the 2006 nuclear test is significant in this respect, 
because it demonstrates a clear recalibration of risk in terms of how the North‟s weapons 
programmes were re-interpreted within Japan.360 The expected extension of public sphere 
spotlighting on North Korea following the composite events of 2006 is not the only aspect of 
specific interest in this regard – though the degree to which it evinces a recalibration of risk 
is compelling. It is also, rather, more Illuminating in terms of quantifying the process, that the 
volume of media attention assigned to North Korea in the months preceding the 2006 missile 
launch was comparable to that of the reaction after the 1998 Taepodong launch – itself 
demonstrating higher levels of preceding media and Diet attention compared with the 
                                                          
359  As displayed in Section 4.4, Table 4.1, in terms of sheer volume of media and Diet reactions, the months 
following Koizumi’s 2002 summit meeting with Kim Jong-Il demonstrate a zenith in public sphere attention 
to North Korean issues. In this respect, random sampling (see Appendix B) has revealed that the negative 
framing of North Korea had already been established across media and Diet spheres, primarily as a result of 
the portrayal of incursion, missile and nuclear issues, prior to 2002.  Relative quantitative increases in 
coverage can, therefore, be utilized as an approximate barometer for the recalibration of associated risks. 
360  In this sense, the September 2002 summit can be viewed as a significant stimulant in priming the North 
Korean frame; particularly for the broader recalibration of risk realized in relation to Pyongyang ’s 2006 
missile and nuclear tests. In concrete, quantitative terms, Kim’s admission of abductions caused a 
mainstream shift in media and public sphere perceptions; from a “suspicion” (giwaku) to an “act of war” 
(sensō kōi). As a result, despite their small number (a total of thirteen cases) and historical context 
(abductions committed in the 1970s and 1980s), the prevailing image of North Korea within Japan became 
one of a country which perpetrated acts that violated Japan’s national sovereignty (Hasegawa, 2003: 44-7) – 
i.e. as a general source of risk; something which, as identified by multiple experts when interviewed (e.g., 1 
August 2011, Appendix A; 25 July 2011, Appendix A), also resulted in the rapid loss of domestic support for 
the DPRK in Japan. 
223 
 
coverage in the period following the Nodong test launch of 1993. In essence, in addition to 
the qualitative data which displays shifts in the descriptive language and negative framing 
assigned to North Korea (see previous section and Section 4.11, below), quantitative 
analysis of public sphere reactions exhibits an intensification of focus upon the DPRK, which 
demonstrates that key events propelled North Korea‟s framing from their pre-event troughs, 
which were themselves, actually, already calibrated at levels comparable or in excess of 
previous post-event peaks (in terms of risk (re)calibration measured by levels in the volume 
of attention directed towards Pyongyang within Japan).361         
 
    Both opinion polls and literary publications further reveal the extent to which North Korea 
became negatively framed in the public sphere, following actions interpreted as provocations 
or transgressions by Pyongyang. Furthermore, the degree to which, as a result, risks 
associated with the DPRK were recalibrated within Japan‟s broader society, to the point 
where legal changes to Japan‟s security framework were publicly advocated, is evinced. 
Indeed, after the 1999 suspicious-ship incursion incident, a majority of 64 per cent of those 
polled were in favour of revising maritime security laws, which then gave authority for 
defence to the Maritime Safety Agency, as opposed to the proposition of it being assigned to 
the Maritime Self-Defence Force (Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 July 1999).362 363 The impact of the 
                                                          
361  For instance, the Asahi covered the 1993 Nodong launch with only a handful of articles. Its North Korea 
coverage had rocketed to the far higher total of 367 items in the three months prior to the 1998 Taepodong 
launch. The total of 733 articles in the three months post-Taepondong is then, however, only marginally 
higher than that of the period of three months preceding the 2006 missile launch. The post-2006 missile 
launch total again rising dramatically. Indeed, the same phenomenon can be observed extensively across 
the major newspapers – ultimately evincing a process whereby risks are recalibrated upward following 
major incidents, but exhibit a limited drop-off, despite comparative lulls in the number of such high-profile 
events (See Chapter 3, Table 3.1 and Table 4.2 (above)).   
362  Once again the loaded phrasing of questions in influencing poll results is notable here, with the inclusion 
of potentially emotive terms such as, “North Korea*‘s] invasion of Japan’s territorial waters” and 
“...protection of our territorial waters” which allude to the necessity of making legal changes – prior to the 
question actually being asked.   
363  With reference to public opinion on North Korea, the Yomiuri claims in discussion of the second 
suspicious-ship incursion incident (of 2001), that, “now special military provisions are being called for to 
deal with suspicious ships” (28 September 2002). 
224 
 
abductions issue coming to prominence, in terms of turning public opinion firmly against 
North Korea – and creating a negative framing – is also apparent from polls conducted 
during the years post-dating the 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit. The events of 2002, further, 
acted as a means by which to conflate a number of issues pertaining to North Korea in the 
public sphere. For instance, in successive questions, interviewees overwhelmingly (79 per 
cent) disapproved of Pyongyang‟s behaviour with regards to the abduction issue, while 
feeling very anxious (fuan wo ōi ni kanjiru) (73 per cent) about the North‟s nuclear 
programmes (Asahi Shimbun, 6 November 2002). Further, the elaboration, or direction, of 
questions pertaining to North Korea in the government‟s Cabinet Office polls is illuminating in 
this respect. Questions prior to the 2002 summit asked only of the extent to which 
interviewees were interested in the DPRK. In the polls conducted after the leaders‟ meeting, 
a range of items, including those attached to the risks posed by nuclear, missile, abduction 
and suspicious-boats issues were included. Respondents consistently list the abductions 
issue as that of most interest with regards to all concerns relating to the DPRK.364 Once 
again, the close interaction between public opinion and news-media is made evident here 
from the high-percentage of participants citing newspapers (79 per cent) as their source of 
information on North Korean issues (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2010).365 
 
    The combined impact of military sabre-rattling and the high-profile of the abduction issue 
upon Japanese language publications, in terms of how North Korea, and specifically Kim 
Jong-Il, became framed in the public sphere can also be elucidated by way of a shift in the 
volume and calibration of perceived risks. In comparison to the 577 literary items listed under 
                                                          
364  By 2004, in a total of 16 items offered, close to 90 per cent (83 per cent in 2002) of those polled were 
interested in the abduction issue – followed by nuclear (56 (49 )per cent), missile (52 (43) per cent) and 
suspicious boats (43 (59) per cent) (Cabinet Office of Japan, December 2004 (2002)). Here too, the fact that 
the issues of nuclear development, suspicious-ships, missiles and abductions are listed together is, in itself, 
indicative of the consistency with which North Korea came to be framed as the source of a compilation of 
pressing risks in Japan’s public and political spheres. 
365  A full list of annually produced polls and poll results conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan relating to 
North Korea is available for the period between from 1997 to the present (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2010). 
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searches for “Kim Jong-Il” in the publication years between 1991-2001, for instance, 3500 
are accessible for the post-2002 years (Googlebooks, 2011).366 When “abduction” is included 
as a search term, the equivalent search-period results in a ratio of 1 to 83, for “missiles” it 
stretches to 1 to 101, and for “nuclear”, 1 to 242. Further, the magnitude of the impact of 
both revelations regarding the abduction issue and reaction to the 2006 missile and nuclear 
tests is also evinced when comparing year on year statistics, with new titles on Kim jumping 
from less than 30 up to 2002, to over 90 for each subsequent year until 2006, after which a 
peak of 142 was reached in 2007, before dipping slightly prior to its re-establishment in the 
aftermath of further tests in 2009 (see Chapter 5).367 Once again, a sustained recalibration of 
risk is evident, because the drop-off levels after recent events are consistently higher than 
those of preceding incidents – ultimately creating troughs which are as high as previous 
peaks (see also, Chapter 6, Figure 6.1). Sample qualitative analysis of the content and 
portrayal of Kim, not least the numerous satirical depictions of him on front covers, also 
clearly corroborates the quantitative increase in volume of negative framing, in terms of 
highlighting a demonizing of the DPRK‟s leader and all that is North Korean.368 
                                                          
366  Advanced searches are conducted in Japanese using the terms: “rachi”, “misairu” and “kaku” for books 
(shoseki) displaying part or all of their content. According to Amazon.co.jp, books including “Kim Jong-Il” in 
their title are listed as a total of 944 (post-dating 2002) and 139 (pre-dating). Using extracted terms only, the 
equivalent comparisons are: 9 – 39 (abduction), 37 – 575 (missile), and 60 – 813 (nuclear) 
(www.amazon.co.jp, 2010).      
367  There is an obvious lag between the timing of an event and publications which address it – hence peaks in 
the North’s negative framing observable in literary publications predominantly appear in the publication 
year following that of the event.  In this sense, the above are consistent with the overall pattern of risk 
recalibration evinced by the sampled media and Diet responses to the same events, which do not contain 
the stated anomaly of time-lag as a result of delayed release or publication and editing procedures.   
368  Illustrative examples include: Shinpan Kim Jong-Il: shitataka de kiken na jitsuzō (Kōdansha Purasuarufa 
Bunko, 2002), Fushō Miyajima: Kim Jong-Il wo nerae! (Bungeishunjū, 2003), and Kim Jong-Il no shōtai 
(Shōgakkan Bunko, 2006). In comparison to titles which do emphasize the risks posed by Kim and his 
Pyongyang-based regime prior to 2002 (though notably published after the 1998 Taepodong launch), such 
as Nazo no dokusaisha: Kim Jong-Il – tepodon, tero, chōhō, rachi (Bunshun Bunko, 1999) and Kim Jong-Il 
daizukan – nihon wo imada obiyakasu “muhō kokka – kitachōsen” wo tettei kaibō (Shōgakkan, 2000), a 
majority of titles covering Kim (post-September 2002) in light of further weapons developments and 
revelations over the abductions cases visually frame the North’s leader in a negative and/or danger-laden 
portrayal on their covers – reinforcing the framing of his image as both representative of North Korea and a 
range of risks which are potentially harmful to Japan. 
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    Nevertheless, in comparison to the overt reaction in the aftermath of the 2002 Kim-
Koizumi summit, the impact of the North‟s nuclear test in the public sphere is less clear cut, 
particularly on first observation of the relevant poll data. However, it does in fact represent a 
significant shift, in terms of a recalibration of risk countering the salience of the previously 
established anti-militarist norm – particularly in regards to the “nuclear allergy” (Aldrich, 
2008: 123) associated with Japan‟s position on the possession of nuclear weapons.369 
Traditionally, public, media and political opinion has been firmly against revision of Japan‟s 
anti-nuclear stance, yet in the aftermath of Pyongyang‟s 2006 underground test, only 34.8 
per cent of those polled disagreed with having a discussion on whether or not Japan should 
possess nuclear weapons (Yomiuri, 11-12 November 2006) – an argument propagated as 
justified in light of the North‟s test by a number of senior LDP Diet members, including then 
Foreign Minister, Asō Tarō.370 The December 2006 Cabinet Office poll further demonstrates a 
marked increase in concerns over nuclear (80 per cent) and missile (72 per cent) issues, 
while the newly included item of “illicit actions such as narcotics smuggling” (into Japan by 
the DPRK) supplants “suspicious-ships” in fourth place. Pertinently, however, while these 
poll results suggest that the risks associated with missiles and nuclear weapons were 
recalibrated to higher levels (in addition to the added emergence of others such as illicit 
smuggling), concerns over abductions and suspicious-ships did not waver significantly. This, 
therefore, evinces an aggregate recalibration of the combined risks perceived to emanate 
from Pyongyang – reinforcing its negative framing as that identified with all of the above. 
Furthermore, the fact that the domestic testing of a nuclear devise by North Korea was able 
– following the series of highly-profiled preceding post-Cold War events identified as 
                                                          
369  In legal terms, this is further made concrete by the GoJ’s policy of the three nuclear principles; not 
producing, possessing or allowing the introduction (into to Japan) of nuclear weapons. 
370  Public evaluation of the prospects for the Six-Party Talks being an effective mechanism by which to solve 
the North Korean nuclear issue also reached a low point, with 74 per cent of respondents polled being 
pessimistic, and only 20 per cent expectant of its success (Yomiuri, 11-12 November 2006) – see also 
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation (2009).    
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provocations by Pyongyang – to trigger a pre-cursory national debate on nuclearization is a 
clear indication of the degree to which the DPRK‟s framing, as a source of salient risks, 
came to facilitate shifts in the boundaries of public and political discourses within Japan.371 In 
addition, as delineated in the section below, it serves to illustrate how such a framing and 
heightened recalibration of risks influenced the revision and implementation of security 
policies.  
 
4.9. Policy revisions to counter North Korean missiles, nuclear weapons, incursions 
and abductions: uncertain targets for uncertain risks 
As referenced in Section 4.5, above, the policy community‟s response to the 2006 missile 
test launches was both swift and far reaching. These were led by then Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Abe Shinzō, who, in light of a possible North Korean missile launch, had already 
prepared a set of sanctions and measures to be implemented with immediate effect. 
However, Abe delayed announcing these measures on the same day of the firings, waiting 
until full confirmation of the launches had been gained on the afternoon of 5 July 2006.372 In 
addition to the reinstating of prohibition on Japan-DPRK imports and exports, denial of 
access to North Korean ships entering Japan‟s ports, the termination of charter flights, and 
refusal of re-entry for DPRK officials returning into Japan, the measures included open-
ended directives which allowed for the “further tightening” of the above and “consideration of 
                                                          
371  In addition to the emergence of a reinvigorated debate on Japan’s nuclearization, North Korea’s missile 
and nuclear tests, conducted in close proximity, sparked a wave of contested (and inconclusive) public and 
academic discourses over the risks and feasibility of Pyongyang attaching a nuclear war-head to a Japan-
bound missile (e.g., see Matsumura and Takakusagi (eds), 2007: 271-93) – once again highlighting the 
importance of assigning scientific/expert interpretation to a given (security) risk (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5), 
in order to justify its recalibration; therein facilitating a maximising of that (re)calibration if the 
(unattainable) target of zero-risk cannot be achieved without taking extensive counter-measures. 
372  Abe’s aggressive style (making three press conferences on the day following the launches), advocating 
strong action and punitive sanctions, can be seen as characteristic of his use of a negative framing of the 
DPRK as a tool to gain political capital – as seen most clearly in his involvement with the abductions cases. 
Abe became Prime Minister on 1 September 2006, just two months after the Taepodong-2 test-launch. 
228 
 
additional measures” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. (ed.), 2006:132-3). Thereafter, in reaction 
to the North‟s Nuclear test three months later, Japan led the way among regional 
stakeholders in calling for a UN Resolution accompanied by harsh sanctions to be imposed 
against the DPRK (NHK News, 12 October 2006) – ultimately leading to the adoption of a 
watered down version of Tokyo‟s initial proposal, in the form of UN Resolution 1718.373 
   Japan‟s policy response essentially sought, therein, to use its established unilateral 
sanctions framework as the basis upon which to recalibrate the risks posed by Pyongyang‟s 
nuclear test and define the measures called for in a UN-backed resolution.374 This is 
significant in terms of elucidating a cohesive, causal process of risk recalibration vis-à-vis the 
DPRK through a series of events, because the manner of the response, made harsher in 
2006, had been provided with its mandate on the basis of reactive policy revisions and 
counter-measures taken in the wake of the first Taepodong launch in 1998 – as outlined in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.15, above.375 Furthermore, the rapidity and specificity of sanctions 
imposed by Japan, particularly under the pre-Abe administration in 2006, is consistent with 
the hypothesis that risk was recalibrated in a highly structured form; one which appears to 
have been predisposed to maintaining North Korea‟s negative framing within Japan.376 
                                                          
373  UNSC Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted on 14 October 2006, having removed Japan’s calls for 
the inclusion of strict sanctions against the movement of North Korean goods and personnel (UN Security 
Council, 2006a). 
374  For MOFA’s official position on such, including verification that actors within the GoJ consciously envisaged 
Japan’s unilateral sanctions as a model precedent for UN equivalents, see related report (MOFA, 2006). 
375  The extent to which risks were successfully recalibrated by Japan between 1998 and 2006 – particularly in 
terms of establishing the negative framing of North Korea – is evident from the fact that while Japan had to 
accept a diluted content for UN Resolution 1718 in October 2006, in August 1998 Tokyo’s efforts to 
persuade regional stakeholders of the risks posed by Pyongyang’s missiles resulted only in a (comparatively) 
legally impotent UN Press Statement – for which China stated that “under normal circumstances the issue 
(of a satellite launch by the DPRK) should not have been brought to the UN” (Ōe, 2007: 34). 
376  The reference to a “pre-Abe”, as opposed to “Koizumi” administration is given significance here due to the 
fact that while Koizumi, as demonstrated in this chapter, utilized risks attached to North Korea in an attempt 
to demonstrate strong leadership (and, indeed, effective risk-management), Abe can be seen to have 
managed the events of 2006 in order to directly recalibrate North Korean risks and the justifiable policy 
measures taken to tackle them – something which was maintained after his election as the leader of the 
LDP and Prime Minister.  
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    Indeed, the specifics, in terms of concrete policy measures directed at Pyongyang, of 
such a recalibration, can be clearly observed in relation to each of the events discussed in 
the chapters above, ultimately traced back to the 1993 Nodong test firing. Both the joint 
statement of April 1996 and the new defence guidelines released in September of 1997, for 
instance, express the requirement of Japan (and, indeed, the US) to take measures to 
counter risks resulting from North Korean actions.377 These risks were then crystallized, and 
the counter-measures extended and implemented, through the justification of a response to 
the perceived increase in risk-level made apparent by the 1998 Taepodong launch. 
Thereafter, risks were subsequently spread and recalibrated further, manifest in additional 
legal revisions made in the wake of the 1999 and 2001 incursions. The media attention given 
to the abduction cases, particularly following Koizumi‟s 2002 visit to Pyongyang, then 
provided additional weight to forces which framed North Korea as a source of salient and 
uncertain risks, influencing the decision in December 2003 to introduce a full-scale BMD 
programme and the enactment of additional laws, such as the Citizens Defence Law, or 
Kokumin hogo hō (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. (ed.), 2006:150), as well as priming the 
political environment to facilitate harsher and more wide-reaching policy directives and 
sanctions following the events of 2006. Within this, while evidence of an additional 
recalibration of risk in terms of further counter-measures in the wake of events unfolding 
throughout 2009-2010 is far from absent – as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.12 – 2006 
appears to exhibit an acme in terms of establishing a norm of negative framing imposed 
upon North Korea, particularly by way of political and media saturation of DPRK related 
issues within Japan, discussed in Section 4.8, and Chapter 5, Section 5.6, which has 
empowered  those within the policy community who seek to impose harsh directives against 
                                                          
377  Once again the power of bilateralism with regards to Japan’s North Korea policies is evinced by the 
content of the guidelines. Moreover, they represent a clear indication of how risks posed by the DPRK 
(though combined with those emanating from China) were recalibrated in order to justify the restructuring 
of Japan’s security policies – in close cooperation with the US. Indeed, at this stage more liberal media 
sources such as the Asahi were predominantly more concerned with risks of entrapment into US-led wars 
than those associated with actions orchestrated from Pyongyang (United States Information Agency, 1997). 
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North Korea.378 Therein, the “super-sizing” (Hughes, 2009a) of North Korean risks which 
allow a variety of security (and other) policy directives to be justified may have reached a 
zenith. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the high calibration of risk 
assigned to North Korean issues in response to the missile and nuclear events of 2006 has 
resulted in a situation whereby even when media, civil societal and the political elite‟s 
attention exhibits a degree of fatigue towards Pyongyang‟s provocations, there is little 
indication that policy directives taken against the North will, in the short term at least, be 
softened.379 
    In fact, however, while the measures imposed at both national and UN levels against 
North Korea in reaction to the events occurring during the second half of 2006 can be seen 
to represent an extensive, concrete, manifestation of risk recalibration – in terms of the level 
which risks were evaluated up to – in one sense they can be interpreted as merely the 
intensification of policy directives already set in motion by the NDPO of 2005. Indeed, in 
terms of practical measures targeting Pyongyang, the NDPO of 2005 is highly significant in 
this respect, because for the first time it directly identified North Korea as source of 
potentially expanding risks, and alluded to the increasing range of risks identified with the 
DPRK;380 in effect framing North Korea as a sufficiently dangerous entity to warrant the 
                                                          
378  It could be argued that, in fact, the peak in terms of perceived levels of risk framed against the DPRK 
actually falls somewhere during 2007, on account of the lag between when events such as the missile and 
nuclear tests of 2006 occurred, and when their resulting impact was fully mediated between the state, 
market and society (e.g., see also discussion of Japanese language publications, Section 4.8, above). 
379  That is to say, there is essentially a lag-time between the implementation of policies (sanctions etc.) made 
against the DPRK due to a high calibration of risks perceived to be posed by Pyongyang (such as those of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile magnified during 2006), and the juncture when the political climate 
becomes sufficiently altered to allow those policies to be revised, following a downward recalibration of risk. 
Further, as discussed in Section 4.4, and Section 4.12 (below), this phenomenon has been intensified by the 
inability of political actors to overcome the abductions issue – which acts as a preventative factor in 
effectively engaging with other issues associated with risks identified with North Korea. 
380  Potential contingencies which were identified as requiring counter-provisions included; “Ballistic Missile 
Attacks,  Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attack, Response to the Invasion of Japan’s 
Offshore Islands”, and “Violation of Japan’s Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and 
Other Similar Vessels” – once again highlighting the significance of the events (particularly those of missile 
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maintenance of Cold War levels of defence spending, and the adaptation and diversification 
of Japan‟s security forces (Umeda, 2007: 86-7).381 In this sense, the 2006 missile launches 
and nuclear test served primarily to confirm the North‟s framing as a potentially aggressive 
and risk-laden entity, and reconfirm the necessity of revisionary security policies – outlined 
(and thereby primed) in the preceding year‟s NDPO.     
    Therein, as hypothesized in the Introduction, Section 0.1, the revisionary policy shifts 
observed over the course of events, stemming back to the 1993 Nodong launch, have been 
made possible through interactive processes mediated among the state, market (particularly 
in terms of its influence upon the media, see Section 4.7) and society. What is more, this 
was propagated and sustained in the first instance by the cooperative activities of a coalition 
of prominent right-of-centre politicians (figure-headed from 2006 by Abe), right-wing activists, 
such as the leaders of the Sukūkai (NARKN), and the families and supporters of the 
abductees (Kazokukai etc.), who both affected and benefited from a tailwind of media 
attention given to the abductions issue in order to revise and implement a range of policy 
measures and legal reforms directed at the negatively framed entity of Pyongyang.382 In 
addition, the norm of bilateralism and the gravity of beiatsu has been a further propagating 
factor in the process of risk recalibration. In 2006 this was manifest both in terms of Japan‟s 
right-of-centre political elite, led by Abe, seeking to cooperate more closely with the US in 
order to increase the impact of measures taken against Pyongyang (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1998) and incursions (1999, and 2001)) discussed above in affecting policy provisions vis-à-vis North Korea 
(MOD, 2008).   
381  Umeda posits that, in this respect, risks attributed to North Korea were in effect recalibrated to replace 
those previously identified with the former-USSR (see Nakamura, 1985: 56-73), in order to justify the 
maintenance of Japan’s defence forces – and ultimately to facilitate the continued expansion of their 
activities overseas. 
    382  The idea of a coalition of distinct actors which have seized upon the abductions issue for a variety of   
           ideological interests, resulting in the politicization of all issues attached to the DPRK and subsequent  
           recalibration of risks, was also posited by one of Japan’s leading North Korea analysts when interviewed (14  
           December 2010a, Appendix A). Key to this process has been the ability of nationalist and anti-North Korean  
           politicians, such as former NARKN leader, Satō Katsumi (originally a member of the JCP), to use the  
           humanitarian issue of abductees to prevent more moderate or progressive voices gaining salience in  
           mainstream dialogue concerning policies directed at the DPRK. 
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Inc. (ed.), 2006:132) and in the US‟s fanning of the flames concerning the negative framing 
of the DPRK in Japan; used as a means by which to encourage cooperation from Tokyo over 
American troop realignment in Japan, and investment in US technology and joint 
development for BMD systems (Yoshida, 2008: 142). The framing of North Korea as such 
has, then, been used in multiple contexts as a politico-ideological stimulant to generate a 
higher calibration of risks associated with a generalized negative image of all actions 
associated with and perpetrated by the DPRK – effectively morphing such a framing into a 
phenomenon, equitable to a norm (anti-North Korea-ism), which is able to proliferate 
effectively at the level of national policy generation, particularly in tandem with the norm of 
bilateralism, and in spite of the now declining salience of anti-militarism. 
 
4.10. Tightening remittances and recalibrating energy security: the market’s weak 
response 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.9, the control of remittances to North Korea has been 
increasingly tightened and the amount of funds allowed to flow into the North steadily 
reduced. Despite the absence of official political relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang, 
and the already comparatively low level of economic exchange between Japan and the 
DPRK, the risks of supplying the North Korean “money pipeline” continued to be recalibrated 
within Japan. The most striking evidence of this movement is not only the increasing and 
tangible level of legally binding financial restrictions mediated by the state via economic 
institutions such as banks, but also the publicly visible content of such measures, evincing a 
wider impact upon societal perceptions of such risks. A striking example of this is the 
requirement for those seeking to remit transfers, of above the stipulated limit of funds from 
Japan to the DPRK, being required to openly declare to the given financial institution (bank) 
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that the transaction is not destined for North Korea or any direct or indirect purpose 
connected to the DPRK or its activities.383 
    Further to the tightening of restrictions upon financial beneficiaries to North Korea, Japan 
has seen a notable increase in measures designed to contain terrorism; not least those 
which are specifically identified as being sourced from the DPRK. This recalibration of risks 
includes civil energy security, and is mediated by the state through directives laid down to 
companies operating and supplying, amongst other energy sources, nuclear power. For 
example, it is now mandatory for all those of non-Japanese citizenship to carry their passport 
with them when entering on-site nuclear facilities.384 In addition, according to the manager of 
one regional electricity supplier, North Korean terrorists have been identified in recent years 
as representing a specific risk to nuclear security, because of Pyongyang‟s threatening 
statements made towards the ROK. Concretely, this refers to the North‟s open hostility 
expressed with regard to South Korea‟s initiatives to increase their percentage of domestic 
nuclear energy supply through the construction of a number of new nuclear plants. The 
same manager stated (21 July 2010, Appendix A) that, “of course we cannot discuss what 
security measures have been put in place, because they are strictly confidential, but I can 
tell you that the government has instructed us to implement a number of cautionary counter-
terror and security strategies to deal with those risks.”  While energy companies themselves 
are not permitted to hold weapons for the purposes of defending plants from potential 
assailants, armed police surround nuclear facilities and the JSDF are on standby for any 
counter-terror information, which could lead to an immediate dispatch to a given plant. These 
                                                          
383    This is conducted in the form of a sheet of instructions (available in English and Japanese) stating that the     
person remitting should complete sections of the remittance form to indicate that funds are “None 
related  to North Korea” or can be abbreviated to “NNK” (see Appendix C, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 
remittance form, “Cross-Border Remittance and Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act of Japan”). 
384    Commercial (business) and educational visitors wishing to view the interior sections of nuclear facilities   
must also gain invitation from the presiding company. As a leading official from one nuclear plant noted in  
an interview (10 August 2010, Appendix A) “it is very unlikely that a North Korean passport holder would  
be invited!” 
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measures form part of a five-point counter-risk strategy which, albeit indirectly, identifies 
North Korea as the source of “potential” and “political” risks.385    
    However, while the above measures clearly highlight how risks which the state has 
recalibrated are mediated by its military arms through market actors and organizations, the 
extent to which such counter-risk directives are not arbitrary, but, conversely, constructed by 
the state, precisely in order to demonstrate risk recalibration within market and public 
spheres, is also worthy of attention. Indeed, as observed above, while nuclear plants in 
Japan have a variety of ostensible external checks and overtly apparent security features, 
there is a sense in which these appear to have been deployed in order to provide a visual 
demonstration that security risks exist and are being countered, rather than as logistical 
provisions implemented to supply a practical means by which to prevent a realistic (high-risk) 
contingency.386 For example, although prior submission of passport details, to be checked on 
arrival, is a prerequisite for foreign visitors wishing to observe the equipment and design of 
nuclear reactor cores, passport numbers (at least in the case observed) may be checked by 
anyone, from low-ranking, inexperienced workers to the tea-maker!387  Furthermore, while 
security is immediately apparent around the exterior of plants, the sole measure observable 
within some facilities amounts to a lone police car, made visible from all viewing decks, 
                                                          
385  The five-point plan is completed by “investment, social and regulation” risks. It is noteworthy, therein,    
         that the same company, and comparable others, operate a transparency policy which explains the  
         measures taken to counter these risks, but are highly secretive with regard to security risks, such as those  
         posed by North Korea – thus, effectively, calibrating them at higher level. Moreover, while the DPRK is  
         framed as posing potential nuclear risks due to its weapons tests (e.g., those conducted in 2006 and  
         2009), North Korea is omitted from domestic charts which display international nuclear comparisons on  
         the grounds that it has not been officially (e.g., by the UN or other international organizations and  
         governments etc.)  recognized as a civil nuclear power – despite Pyongyang’s stated objectives of energy  
         provision.  
 386  External security provisions include barbed wire exterior fences, external surveillance cameras, two layers    
         of ID security (one for office staff, prior to second level entry into on-site facilities such as the nuclear   
         reactors themselves), internal vehicle check, patrolling police, private security guards, airport-style body  
         scans and x-rays, air-lock access doors, prohibition of photos, and passport checks for visitors. 
387  Prior to being escorted through two levels of staff security phases (without any checks being carried             
         out on ourselves), passport numbers were briefly checked against a clip-board list held and carried out by   
         a member of staff whose other visible duties amounted to serving tea and greeting guests. 
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patrolling the interior access roads. Many sections have no internal surveillance cameras 
installed to check or monitor staff activities, even inside the reactor apparatus. Not only do 
internal security provisions appear minimal, the facilities can be visited by numerous student 
and business parties – which are given direct access to observe nuclear facilities and 
machinery in detail, and question on-site staff freely.388 389 
    Facilities generally have a family-friendly feel once inside, and there is little sign of 
concern regarding external or national security risks related to the protection of nuclear 
secrets or energy holdings from potential overseas assailants. Corroboratively, when 
questioning staff about the risks of an attack from North Korea, reaction was generally that of 
surprise and bewilderment – and universal rejection of the idea that it would be possible, let 
alone probable.390 All those asked about security risks were confident that the plant was 
entirely “risk free” with regards to being attacked or infiltrated (visit, 20 August 2010). Proof 
that the state is strategically manipulating pivotal areas of infrastructure in order to 
recalibrate risks within society is clearly difficult to prove. However, the above example 
illustrates the observation that the calibration of risks by the state in relation to nuclear and 
energy facilities, specifically in terms of protecting them from an external threat such as the 
DPRK, appears disproportionate to those calibrated by independent experts, energy 
company staff and other members and related stake-holders within the market and civil 
society. 
    It is also significant, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.11, that the possibility of 
potential economic exchange and financial investment which could be gained as the result of 
normalization of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang remained insufficient to 
                                                          
388 According to management staff, some key sections of the central core and reactor facilities do have        
somewhat tighter security measures applied to them. 
389 Despite a verbal ban on photography within the second phase of security, there is no restriction on note-          
        taking or sketching within any of the plant’s facilities. No checks on paper-based materials were carried out. 
390 It was asserted that the three metre thick reinforced concrete walls of the reactor could easily withstand             
        any missile or aircraft impact – i.e., resulting from a North Korean attack. 
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counter the tide of risk recalibration against North Korea within Japan – up to and beyond 
2006. Given the fact that Keidanren and other powerful market actors were influential in 
driving the initial normalization process during the early 1990s (interview, 26 October 2010, 
Appendix A),391 this further suggests that market influences (particularly vis-à-vis the state) 
were comparatively weak when measured against those of leading political actors in this 
sphere. This is particularly notable in terms of their inability to improve or counter an 
escalation of North Korea‟s negative framing, which undoubtedly damaged the potential for 
Japan‟s enterprises to enter into untapped markets within the DPRK and expand existing 
trade links with Pyongyang (Yoshida, 2008:252-4).392        
    The influence of prevailing norms, particularly bilateralism, should also not be forgotten 
when assessing both the calibration of market-related risks posed by North Korea and the 
counter-measures taken to ameliorate them.393 Indeed, Japan was willing to support US-led 
statements as early as 2003, which specifically identified North Korea‟s production and 
distribution of fake US dollars, and other various illicit activities as a major source of risk – 
particularly in terms of their use in the production of WMD. Fraudulent US currency issues 
were evidently perceived as low-priority risks to Japan, though calibration of such as a high-
risk were left unchallenged in Tokyo‟s official press releases – not least in order to (i.e., in 
                                                          
391 The interviewee referenced did, however, also predict the gradual expansion of market influence upon  
        North Korea policy in Japan, particularly as Tokyo’s economic interactions with its East Asian neighbours    
        become increasingly decoupled from those of the political sphere. The ultimate waning of the abduction  
        issue (as public sphere interest decreases over time and political shifts reduce its potency within the policy  
        community) as a potent force strangulating progress at the Six Party Talks, and other initiatives made  
        towards bilateral relations, is, he argued, also likely to act as an expedient to this process. 
  392  In addition to noting the minimal levels of trade between Japan and the DPRK, Yoshida highlights the              
          economic inefficacy of sanctions, or “kōka no nai nihon no keizai seisai” (2008: 252) imposed by Japan            
          following the missile and nuclear tests of 2006. Indeed, his documentation of such reveals that not only           
          did the sanctions have a negligible effect on Pyongyang’s position, due to the North ‘s comparative market          
          reliance upon China and South Korea as trade partners, but that in fact they served, primarily, to nullify the 
 ability of Japan’s import enterprises to access North Korean goods. In an interview (1 August 2011,  
        Appendix A) one leading Japanese political scientist noted that while policy makers are aware of this     
        inefficacy it is politically untenable (due to the North’s public framing in Japan) to show weakness towards    
        the DPRK by removing imposed sanctions.  
393 There is oft times an unclear distinction between bilateralism and beiatsu – for arguments emphasising     
 the former, see Michishita (2009, 2010) and Tanaka (2009), for positions contesting the latter, see    
 McCormack (2007), Hirama and Sugita (2003). 
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return for) maintain the abduction issue as an item to be tabled at interstate-level 
negotiations with the DPRK, including the Six Party Talks. The motivation for such, 
however, was further seen to lie in positive appraisal of government-led diplomacy vis-à-vis 
the DPRK, if it could be achieved, not only from Washington, but also within media and 
public-sphere circles in Japan (Harada, 2008: 152-61).394 These forms of media and societal 
agency in foreign policy directives, and the extensive influence of the US, again evinces the 
powerful impact of cross-interaction between distinct sections of Japan‟s policy community, 
concerning how risks emanating from North Korea were recalibrated – and demonstrates 
how that process is embedded within a context of prevailing norms. 
 
4.11. Internalization of recalibrated risks: intensifying the framing of North Korean 
elements within Japanese society 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, Section 3.8, Japan‟s escalating recalibration of risk attributed to 
actions, and the potentiality of actions, perpetrated by North Korea was in one respect 
manifest in a hardening of state and public sphere attitudes towards resident Koreans and 
their organizations, such as Chōsensōren, which became negatively identified as being 
integrally allied to and supportive of the administration in Pyongyang. This phenomenon was 
intensified rapidly in the wake of the events which occurred throughout 2006. Most ostensibly, 
as with the case of remittances discussed above, the financial capabilities of Chōsensōren 
were targeted as a means by which to reduce the perceived latent risks posed by the DPRK 
which existed within channels inside Japan.395 Therein, amongst other measures following 
                                                          
394  Harada also points to the powerful vested interests of central US-based actors involved in emphasising the   
         risks posed by North Korea’s illicit financial activities, and advocating economic sanctions, at this time.    
         These included assistant to the US Under Secretary of State, and former hedge fund manager, David Asher, 
         who, Harada posits, in addition to numerous other high-ranking US government officials, moved back and 
         forth from private and public sectors within the American elite, seeking to persuade Japan to publicize 
         risks which might potentially hinder his individual career, and the US’ broader-based business objectives.   
 395 The targeting of Chōsensōren by Japan’s state-administered authorities in the wake of the North’s 2006    
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the multiple test missile launch of July 2006, Japan‟s Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication ordered all regional and national offices of Chōsensōren to clarify and prove 
that they had complied with a high-court ruling which effectively removed the automatic 
status of their 243 affiliated facilities as being eligible for tax exemptions – demanding that 
the organization clear a number stringent checks; a move which clearly appeared designed 
to constrain the interpreted risks of Chōsensōren possessing the ability to function freely as 
an economic arm, or supporter, of the DPRK (NHK News, 6 July 2006).396 Further measures, 
such as the raiding of Chōsensōren offices and affiliated facilities in November of 2006, were 
also taken by Japan‟s state authorities – based on legal grounds which maximized the 
flexible interpretation of a series of laws relating to finance, labour and trade used to target 
North Korean elements.397 As the deputy head of the Resident Koreans History Research 
Centre (zainichichōsenjin rekishi kenkyūjo) stressed in an interview (8 February 2011, 
Appendix A), pertinently, the powerful links and cross-interaction between the state and 
media were also made clear at this time in the form of a full cordon of media representatives 
and press photographers who were moved into position prior to the raids. According to the 
above source, the police were then mobilized in huge numbers in order to maximize the 
framing of Chōsensōren as a high-risk (to Japan) organization – and moreover reinforce the 
image that it amounted to an arm of Kim Jong-Il‟s North Korea.398 399        
                                                                                                                                                                                    
        tests is emblematic of a process of re-framing the DPRK, which, as one former MOFA official noted in an  
        interview (20 December 2010, Appendix A) has seen the association’s status slip, from that of a de-facto   
        North Korean embassy within Japan, into a minor representative body analogized with a terrorist  
        organization.  
396 It is of interest here that domestic judicial proceedings were, in effect, used to enforce state-level sanctions    
        against North Korea – which were then publicized in Japan’s Media. Once again this demonstrates the 
        interactive mediation of risks between state, market and societal spheres pertaining to the DPRK within  
        Japan, and how public sphere discourses expressed the process by which such interactions reinforced the  
        framing of North Korea; i.e., as that identified with a negative entity. For an excellent discussion of the role  
        of the judiciary in enforcing state governance, see David Harvey (2005: 64-86).    
397 These include legal actions and prosecutions taken against violations by family members carrying medicine   
         to the DPRK (ringeru yakujihō ihan), tax irregularities (zeirishihō ihan), and employment terms (rōdōsha 
         hakenhō ihan). 
398  The above source noted that not only were hundreds of police not necessary, finally no charges were  
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    The persecution of children of Korean residents – and those attending Korean schools – 
also intensified in the wake of the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 
November 2006: 35), highlighting the process by which all aspects associated with North 
Korea, including children (who had no connection to nuclear or missile programmes), came 
to be framed as in some way bearing risks posed to Japan.400 In terms of how risks were 
recalibrated on the basis of such a framing this is, indeed, a pertinent example; not least 
because it reaffirms how, as Hook and Takeda (2007: 93-123) posit, the risk to state security 
and, moreover, protection of the state‟s identity, becomes prioritized over that of the citizens‟ 
interests, rights and well-being (i.e., including Korean residents persecuted within Japan), 
who are expected to exercise self-responsibility (jikosekinin) in avoiding risks which may be 
brought to bear against them as the result of the state, or an external state‟s, actions. 
Ironically, from shortly after the beginning of the repatriation movement, this fundamental 
raison d‟etat actually contributed towards the subsidizing of the Pyongyang regime, by way 
of North Korean residents in Japan who were left no option other than to pay extortionate 
sums of money – in cash as money carriers, or hakobiya, to the DPRK‟s state authorities – 
in order to visit friends and relatives who had returned to the North but were unable to return 
to Japan (Han, 2002: 220-3); due in no small part to the lack of formal state-level relations 
between Tokyo and Pyongyang.401 Indeed, an accentuation of the phenomenon of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
         pressed against the research centre – ultimately, he posited, demonstrating the state’s agenda of framing  
         all and any elements and parties connected or associated with the DPRK in Japan.   
399  The same source was at great pains to highlight the huge difference between the DPRK and Chōsensōren –  
         arguing that not only were the organizational structures of both totally de-coupled, but also that they  
         were no longer financially inter-reliant in the vast majority of their operations, and, furthermore, that the  
         number of staff at Chōsensōren who were legally North Korean citizens was negligible at most. 
400  According to the Yomiuri’s report, on the day after the missile tests (6 July 2006), there were 13 malicious   
         phone calls, including a threat to kill five high-school students, within one week. A similar escalation of   
         threats followed the nuclear test. The vast majority of such threats seem to have been made by extremist 
         right-wing groups and do not represent the broader base of Japan’s populous or policy community.   
         However, they nevertheless expose how such actors were able to exploit an increasingly negative image of 
         the DPRK – and the risks that could be attributed to it – in order to publicize their own political agendas. 
401  It should also be noted that during the 1970s and 1980s Kim Il-Sung’s government was particularly keen to     
         avoid those who had repatriated to the DPRK returning to Japan with stories of abject poverty in North 
         Korea. According to Han, visiting fees for their families (for a controlled two week stay in the North) were 
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state-centric risk shifting certainly appears prevalent with regards to reaction towards North 
Korea‟s missile test-firings and nuclear test of 2006; whereby schools, local organizations, 
individual families and, ultimately, individual students were expected to play the leading role 
in taking steps to avoid facing unnecessary risks posed to themselves by right-wing 
organizations and actors in Japan, while government initiatives were targeted primarily at 
expanding provisions designed to protect state security from the apparently increased risk of 
the DPRK‟s missiles striking Japan (e.g., see, Asahi Shimbun, 6 July 2006: 15). 
        
4.12. Conclusion: a quantified recalibration of qualitative risk 
This chapter has, then, clearly identified a quantifiable recalibration of risk mediated between 
Japan‟s political and public spheres through the framing of North Korea. Moreover, this 
process, having been orchestrated around a series of events, traced in the first instance 
back to the 1993 Nodong missile test-launch addressed in Chapter 3, Section 3.7, can be 
seen to have been instrumentally affected by the double impact of further missile and 
nuclear tests during 2006. In addition, the emergence of the abductions issues as a central 
element in national political discourses emanating from Tokyo has worked as a stimulant 
which galvanized a combination of other perceived risks, in terms of associating a 
stigmatization of all that is identified with North Korea against potential harms posed to 
Japan. As one leading analyst noted in an interview (14 December 2010a, Appendix A), 
“Japan‟s relationship to North Korea has been taken hostage by the hostage issue.”402 
Indeed, in light of the considerable interactive influences observed between the political elite 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
        in excess of ¥10,000,000 per group (2002: 223) – amounting to a significant source of state income. 
402 Although the terminology itself (nicchō kankei ga rachi mondai ni rachi sarete iru) has become something 
        of a media catch-phrase, the above source noted that it had resulted in what he described as a “spiral 
        of silence”, or chinmoku no rasen, because anyone making too much noise over the recalibration of risks 
        by Japan was likely to find themselves less fully employed by mainstream media sources, particularly 
        following the events of 2002 – in the wake of Koizumi’s return from Pyongyang. As a result, Japan’s 
        relations with its cross-sea neighbour were largely left to fester in the public sphere. 
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and mass media, the mediarization of North Korean risks in Japan, can be seen to have had 
a significant impact in terms of shaping the policy community‟s tangible response to the risks. 
As a result, the abductions issue has been officially included as a further justification for the 
imposition of multiple sanctions in the wake of the events of 2006; imposed without clear 
distinctions as to which measures are assigned to a given issue for what specific purpose – 
including which risks they are expected to ameliorate.403 The example of the impact of the 
2006 missile and nuclear tests, in combination with the entangled abductions issue, 
demonstratively illustrates, then, how the socio-political agency of recalibrated risks, and the 
momentum they generate, is able to act in deviating policy and diplomacy away from what 
might be considered its logical course; i.e., in the case of Japan‟s dealings with the DPRK, 
the gradual removal of unilateral sanctions and the promotion of diplomatic normalization, in 
order to secure resolution of the abductions issue and the two-stage abandonment of North 
Korean nuclear programs (Okonogi (ed.), 2006: 9).404 This has effectively meant that 
initiatives to promote any rapprochement between Tokyo and Pyongyang are both criticized 
domestically for being conciliatory towards a wrong-doing adversary (North Korea) and face 
the further practical hurdle of having no means by which to offer a softening of punitive 
measures without resolution (on Japan‟s terms) of the abductions cases.405 
                                                          
403 Following the events of 2006, Japan both proposed and supported UN-led sanctions against the DPRK, and   
        imposed its own set of unilateral measures against Pyongyang. The abduction issue was raised in relation 
        to both, and although not specified in UN Resolution 1718, Japan’s representative to the UNSC officially 
        stated that Pyongyang’s administration was “a regime known for reckless irresponsible behaviour”, 
        implicitly referring to the abductions issue – and, once again, emphasising an indefinite set of risks framed 
        against the DPRK (UN Security Council, 2006b). 
404 Two-stage abandonment of the North’s nuclear programs amounts in this sense to “re-freezing” (sai-   
        tōketsu) and “complete abandonment” (kanzen hōki), as opposed to the “prior-abandonment” (senkō   
        hōki) or complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement (CVID) proposed by the George W. Bush   
        administration. 
405 The full realization of this process during the last decade is discussed further in Chapter 5, but can be   
        contrasted with Funabashi’s prescription for what Japan and other parties should have done after the  
2002 leadership summit. He asserted that, “For the time-being there will doubtless be numerous 
aggravating issues, such as the incidents of Japanese abductions and spy-boat incursions, but the defining 
factor will likely be the establishment of a multilevel framework to tackle North Korea by surrounding it; 
within which Japan-US-ROK cooperation is sustained, and Japan, the US and China, as well as Northern and 
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    In addition, the limited involvement of other powerful market actors and their general 
cooperation with the state – predicated by commercial interests‟ lessened motivation in the 
wake of the North‟s economic collapse – has worked to facilitate a process intersecting the 
state, market and society which has aggrandized the recalibration of risk in response to 
North Korea. This process, which instrumentalizes risk at the state level in Japan, has also 
been consistent by way of adhering to the prevailing norm of bilateralism, in terms of 
predominantly maintaining close alignment with the US – or at least being significantly 
affected by its pressures (beiatsu) and Washington‟s directives vis-à-vis Pyongyang. 
Furthermore, although the salience of anti-militarism as an active norm in Japan‟s state-level 
policy may have receded in response to the recalibrated risks framed against North Korea, 
the framing of the DPRK has, conversely (and counter-intuitively), in one sense also allowed 
utilization of the anti-militarist norm in terms of a juxtaposition of identity, which portrays 
Japan as being justified in taking defensive geo-strategic measures (e.g., via re-evaluation of 
the anti-nuclear (weapons) principles in the wake of the North‟s 2006 missile and nuclear 
tests) in order to secure itself against the uncertain risks posed by an external aggressor.406 
Therein, the process of risk recalibration, can be seen to have manifest itself in Japan‟s 
reinterpretation of such norms and of its military affairs, by way of “attempts to throw-off its 
anti-militarist shackles” (Chun, 2009: 207-8), observable through a range of legal and geo-
military revisions made against a heightened perception of North Korean security risks 
attributed to the events of 2006. Moreover, these have also been perceived as being posed 
within an increasingly uncertain geo-political environment in the East Asia region. Thereafter, 
the broader implications of the recalibration of risks framed against Pyongyang, in terms of 
the developing trajectory of Japan‟s state-level identity, prevailing norms, and resulting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Southern halves of the peninsula work together, in addition to Russia. As part of such, Japan must reconcile 
over its history with the DPRK” (2002: 188). 
406 I.e., Japan has conflated an anti-militarist normative stance with that of anti-North Korean sentiment to   
        frame the DPRK’s military provocations as posing a risk to the maintenance of Japan’s anti-militarist (non-       
  offensive, or peace-loving) identity.   
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security policies, is examined further in the following chapter – and is evaluated in light of 
data analyses covering a series of additional key contemporary events up to 2011.407  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
407 One leading analyst suggested in an interview (14 December 2010b, Appendix A) that the influence of   
        extremist and right-of-centre political actors upon this process can, ultimately, be reduced to an  
        understanding of the portrayal of Japan’s identity; as one which remains weak – so much so that it can be    
        threatened by puny North Korea – and requires strengthening in order restore itself to its true    
        international standing (For a historical comparison, see also Benedict, 1946: 20-42). The recalibration of  
        risk can be seen, then, as an on-going socio-political tool in such an endeavour. 
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Chapter 5. Reinforced framing of North Korea: the impact of 
additional events upon Japan’s recalibration of risk 
 
“We must maintain consistent policies without responding to the country‟s hard-line 
stance with conciliatory policies” 
Endō Tetsuya 
(On “how Japan should deal with North Korea”, 29 March 2011)408 
. 
“The media and papers are always trying to sensationalize everything to do with 
North Korea in Japan, but ordinary people in society don‟t think anything about it”409 
Nuclear specialist at a leading Japanese power company  
(20 August 2010) 
5.1. More missile and nuclear tests: the further recalibration of risks 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of the 2006 missile and nuclear tests, 
the perceived risks associated with North Korea – galvanized within Japan‟s political elite 
                                                          
408   Endō (2011) made the above statement for AJISS Commentary. The short (less than ten full paragraphs) 
piece reads as highly representative of how Tokyo has reinforced its framing of North Korea as an external 
assailant representing a range of highly-calibrated, on-going, risks posed to Japan. The prescription of 
bilateral and tri-lateral (with the ROK) strengthening and a hard-line stance from Tokyo can also be seen as 
representative of the process observed throughout Chapter 3 ~ Chapter 5 – in terms of adhering to 
prevailing norms in this sphere.   
409   The above quote is relevant in as much as it represents a kind of double-doubt phenomenon within 
Japan’s public sphere recalibration of risk. Therein, the majority of non-specialist (in relation to DPRK affairs) 
interviewees and discussants participating in or influencing this dissertation – including workers at a nuclear 
plant equipped with anti-terror measures to counter a North Korean attack (see Chapter 4, Section 4.10) – 
identified Japan’s responses to North Korea as inflamed by the media and political leaders. Yet, opinion poll 
results suggest that the DPRK nevertheless remains framed as the source of salient risks by the greater part 
of Japan’s populous. It is also evident from such, that a majority of respondents use mass media formats as 
their primary source of information (see Section 5.7, below). 
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and mediated to the wider society (primarily through the mass media) – were enough to 
maintain Pyongyang‟s negative framing in the immediate months and years that followed. 
The phenomenon of a conspicuous emphasis upon the recalibration of risks framed against 
the DPRK was also sustained through the lack of a satisfactory resolution to the abduction 
issue and continued speculation over the specifics of the nuclear programs in the Northern 
half of the peninsula. This chapter elucidates how, in the wake of further missile and nuclear 
tests during 2009, the process of risk-recalibration in response to North Korea largely 
maintained its momentum up to the aftermath of those events. Ultimately, however, the 
empirical evidence analysed here, particularly with reference to Pyongyang‟s further 
provocations in 2010, also points to the emergence of a phenomenon of saturation across 
political, media and societal spheres. This is witnessed in terms of the reaction from each of 
these sectors in response to the kitachōsen mondai in Japan – and appears to have 
manifest itself in the establishment of a new equilibrium with regards to how North Korea is 
now framed, and how risks associated with the DPRK are calibrated – discussed fully in 
Section 5.6 and Section 5.12, below. Furthermore, the sections below reveal how this has, to 
a certain extent, countered the continuing upward trend of risk-recalibration and resulting 
counter-measures and policies, made primarily against North Korea on the basis of 
ameliorating those risks. Once again, a complex interactive process, involving key political, 
market, and societal actors is evinced – and the salience of predominant norms, particularly 
the powerful influence of bilateralism, is demonstrated.   
    As a precursor to this process, the rise to power of Fukuda Yasuo as Prime Minister, 
following the resignation of the more hawkish Abe Shinzō in September of 2007, offered a 
potential, albeit brief, opportunity for a re-evaluation of Japan‟s North Korea policies – and 
potentially a less extreme calibration of pertaining risks (Pempel, 2010: 18).410 Nonetheless, 
                                                          
410 Abe came to power largely on the basis of his tough line against North Korea and promises to find a 
resolution to the abduction issue which would see abductees returned to Japanese soil. Indeed, Abe 
continued to use a hard-line on North Korean issues to gain political clout and leverage throughout, and up 
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momentum created primarily by the combination of the 2006 nuclear test and the nationwide 
fervour whipped up over the abduction issue, not least by Abe and his rightist allies and co-
operators, as exposed in Chapter 4, Section 4.9, ensured that there was little, if any, down-
sizing of the risks associated with North Korea within Japan‟s policy community in the period 
preceding April of 2009. During the interim, Fukuda had already resigned, and the 
premiership was once again taken by a right-of-centre politician looking to leverage domestic 
support through an assertive stance toward foreign-policy issues, and a tough line against 
Pyongyang. Indeed, incoming Prime Minister, Asō Tarō, had already been outspoken on 
North Korean affairs during his tenure as Foreign Minister and wasted no time in attempting 
to shift the political spotlight onto a focus on responses towards DPRK activities – fore-
mostly as a means by which to distract attention away from pressing domestic troubles 
which saw the premier‟s popularity plummet rapidly after selection as party leader. 
Pyongyang‟s multiple missile launches and second nuclear test during the spring and 
summer of 2009 facilitated Asō‟s and others‟ aims in this regard, and represented another 
key phase in the process of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea.411 As 
with the previous phases, examined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the policy community‟s role 
– in terms of interactive constitutive elements and actors intersecting the state, market, and 
society – was pivotal in maintaining and reinforcing the by then well-established framing of 
the DPRK.    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the conclusion of, his reign in 2007, e.g., see AFPBB News (2007). 
411      Asō’s public support sunk to a record low of 13 per cent in the second half of February 2009, recovering 
gradually during the period preceding and following the April test launches. For discussion, see 47 News 
(2009). Notably, however, the LDP-led coalition’s attempts to utilize risks supposedly posed by North 
Korea’s weapons as a means to distract attention from domestic unpopularity was, ultimately, unsuccessful 
(in terms of election failure). Not least, this can be seen as due to the opposition demanding an equally, or 
even firmer, hard-line against Pyongyang, which nullified the Asō Cabinet’s emphasis (see Section 5.2.i, 
below). Once again, this can be seen as representative of the political contestation over North Korea 
policies, stimulated by market-driven media interests and civil society pressure groups, which resulted in 
few dissenting voices to counter the continuation of recalibrating risks in response to North Korean actions 
across these sectors. This was particularly visible in the wake of the 2009 nuclear and missile tests (see 
Section 5.5 and Section 5.12, below, for further discussion). 
247 
 
5.2. April 2009 missile launch: reaffirmation and convergence of recalibrated risks 
5.2.i. Diet reaction to the 2009 missile test 
The initial report provided by Foreign Minister Nakasone Hirofumi as a statement to the 
Diet‟s Security Committee following the DPRK‟s 5 April launch, made on 9 April, 2009 (171: 
4) is symbolic of the formulation, as outlined in the preceding section, in which risks are 
recalibrated within Japan‟s political elite. Concurrently, North Korea was identified and 
reaffirmed as the source of grave, multiple and unquantifiable risks (i.e., those internalized 
from nuclear and missile threats, or kaku ya misairu no kyōi), and was referenced within a 
predication of reiterating the salience of the norm of bilateralism. Therein, the taking of 
actions symbiotically with the US, or looking to follow their lead, i.e., with the US expected to 
front North Korea initiatives (america wo hajime to suru) taken by the powerful states of the 
international community, was advocated. In addition, not only were a multiplicity of geo-
military risks identified by Nakasone, the abductions issue – despite having little apparent, 
immediate, connection to the missile launch of the time – was once again raised in the same 
statement; thus demonstrating the continued influence of the unresolved abduction cases 
upon how risks sourced from Pyongyang are framed, in totality, within Japan. 
In concurrence, during the main session (honkaigi) two days earlier, on 7 April, 2009 (171: 
25) leading opposition spokesman for the DPJ, Ōhata Akihiro, made a remarkably 
comparable statement, requesting an equivalent stance and follow-up action from the ruling 
LDP administration. Ōhata also fused nuclear, missile and abduction issues in his response 
to North Korea‟s multiple launches, and highlighted the incumbent risks – illuminating how a 
converged inter-party process of risk conflation occurred within the policy community in 
Tokyo in order to frame the DPRK as an aggressor (vis-à-vis Japan as a victim) and justify 
the recalibration of risks pertaining to it.412 Indeed, prior to an unrelated, though overtly 
                                                          
412     In this sense, the governing LDP administration faced fierce criticisms from opposition parties on almost 
all other issues, including on economic, domestic and foreign-policy initiatives within the same statement 
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scathing, policy criticism of then Prime Minister, Asō, for his inability to provide practical 
ideas – as opposed only to a cash injection – as a counter-measure to address the pressing 
financial crisis (the primary reason for Ōhata‟s statement), he then asserted that he would 
make independent reference to North Korea. Therein, conversely, and in general 
concurrence with the LDP (and particularly Asō) administration‟s existing policy initiatives, he 
stated that, 
 With the United Nations playing the central role, North Korea‟s provocative challenging 
of the international community must be stopped, the abduction issues resolved as 
urgently as possible, and the complete abandonment of nuclear programs and removal of 
missile threats realized. I strongly urge the government to take resolute measures and 
employ a strong line of negotiations to this end. 
 
The above is a striking statement in the story of the framing of North Korea in Japan and 
how risks have been recalibrated against the DPRK, because it is representative of how 
amid a melee of attacks from all sides against almost all quarters of government policies, 
Pyongyang‟s risks are given special treatment – with evidence of broad intra-party 
convergence being observed.413 That is to say, a general exception to immediate inter-party 
opposition became politically acceptable when discussing the external risks perceived to 
emanate from North Korea. Within this central discourse, as also expressed by Figure 5.1, 
below, a majority of intra and inter-party factions converge in terms their identification with a 
single identity, which is represented by the conception of defending Japan from increasing 
risks – and the framing of the DPRK as the source of such risks. Furthermore, most 
evidently in responses to the 2009 tests, such was widely evaluated as requiring a level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
made by Ōhata. However, in terms of how it calibrated risks emanating from North Korea, the ruling party 
was only encouraged to raise alert levels – without major criticism being levied at central policy directives 
implemented to target Pyongyang. 
413    See also the statement made during the honkaigi of 8 April, 2009 (171: 11) by Hirayama Kōji, who again 
questioned what the government planned to do to protect Japan in a state of crisis, following the “heinous 
aggression, which threatens the peace and stability of the international community” carried-out by the 
DPRK. It is also noteworthy that Hirayama and other opposing speakers claim to be representing four 
leading opposition parties, including that abbreviated to Japan Party (nippon-tō), and allocate this as the 
final frame, as if to stress the emphasis on Japan -v- North Korea. 
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calibration sufficient to compete over the toughness of measures required to alleviate those 
risks above and beyond other domestic political struggles – i.e., as opposed to political 
competition over what form of overall policy approach should be adopted vis-à-vis North 
Korea.414 As such, what could be termed the reaffirmation of risk recalibration in response to 
the DPRK is observable. This effectively amounts to a continuation of the process, initially 
identified in Chapter 4, Section 4.5 and Section 4.6, following the North‟s missile and nuclear 
tests of 2006, whereby a standardized (cross-party) position which almost uniformly frames 
Pyongyang‟s regime as the cause of a range of multiple and salient risks posed to Japan is 
assumed – and political contestation is largely limited only to competition within the 
parameters of such a framing. 
 
                                                          
414    As previously noted among Japan’s leading parties, the Japan Communist Party has historically called for 
a more restrained stance towards North Korea. However, both the JCP and more moderate Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), or shamintō, show a considerable degree of risk recalibration in-sink with rival 
parties (see Figure 5.1). Further, as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, it is also pertinent that leftist 
elements of Japan’s policy community have been weakened considerably in terms of media sources and 
their role within civil society, despite the continued publication of the JCP’s Shimbun Akahata 
(http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/). The loss of left-of-centre political power has also been noted by a number 
of scholars and analysts as an important factor in facilitating right-of-centre political competition over the 
recalibration of risks pertaining to the DPRK – and the resulting hard-line policies; e.g., as posited by 
multiple experts in interviews (12, 13 April, 3 June, 25 July, 2011, Appendix A). 
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Source: author  
Adapted from data accessed via the Keio World Manifesto Forum (2007) and political party homepages (post-
2007 manifestos). Coded qualitative levels of risk calibration are evaluated based on content translated and 
summarized from the original documents (see Table, Appendix D).  
UEM = Upper House Election Manifesto, LEM = Lower House Election Manifesto 
 
5.2.ii. Media reaction to the April 2009 missile test 
Following the events of 2006 – having gradually been affected by an accumulative process 
relating to a number of key post-Cold War events – it was noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.7, 
that, in congruence with the majority of Diet speakers, leading (print) news media in Japan 
also exhibited a high-degree of convergence in terms of how risks emanating from North 
Korea were recalibrated. This phenomenon was particularly pertinent to the Asahi Shimbun, 
251 
 
as representative of an extensive mainstream shift in how DPRK-related issues were framed. 
Likewise, the Asahi‟s reaction to the missile test of April 2009 suggests the continuation of 
such a process – exhibiting extensive comparability (and compatibility) with traditionally 
more uncompromising right-of-centre media sources, including its leading competitors, such 
as the Yomiuri Shimbun. Therein, while the Asahi has consistently advocated the use of a 
diplomatic strategy with which to engage Pyongyang‟s regime and reduce the risks attributed 
to it, the reaction and rhetoric used to predicate discussion of such initiatives bore a 
remarkable degree of open hostility and emotive language assigned to North Korea in the 
wake of its April 2009 test launch.415 The editorial of 6 April 2009, for instance, stated that, 
...this launch is absolutely unacceptable. One feels intense anger at such an outrageous 
provocation which runs counter to calls by Japan and the international community to 
exercise self-restraint.  
 
The article went on to concretely recalibrate associated risks – which were extended to the 
North‟s role in the global increase of security risks, and, once again, further conflated with 
the abductions issue. In a section entitled “Escalating Dangers of the World” (kasoku suru 
sekai no kiken) the same piece, having highlighted the fact that Japan‟s geographical 
position places it within range of North Korea‟s targeted missiles, asserted that,       
Nuclear and missile technology and materials whirl around the world. North Korea is at 
the very forefront of this reality. This grave situation has to be brought to a permanent end 
forthwith (editorial, 6 April 2009: 3). 
 
    In this sense, close comparisons can be drawn to the Yomiuri Shimbun, which portrayed a 
congruous framing of the North and maintained its focus on the already high calibration of 
risk attached to the DPRK in its reaction to the missile launch. The Yomiuri Shimbun‟s 6 April 
                                                          
415    In this respect, as observable from the articles covered below, the Asahi did maintain a tangible degree of 
policy differentiation from the Yomiuri – in terms of the extent to which it was willing to promote a pro-
active diplomatic approach – but provided strikingly similar coverage of the April 2009 missile launch, both 
in terms of its criticisms of Pyongyang and the extent to which it emphasised a multiplicity of risks posed to 
Japan; attached to a combination of, oft-times conflated, North Korean issues. 
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2009 editorial labelled the North Korean “ballistic missile” launch, as a “reckless and 
dangerous provocation which damages peace and stability, and heightens tensions across 
the international community.”416 The recalibration of risks attributed to North Korea in Japan‟s 
leading newspapers can, then, be seen to have reached a point after the events of April 
2009 where, although a degree of differentiation between policy prescriptions still existed, 
the harsh criticism and negative framing of the DPRK, and its cross-association with a range 
risks, was largely consistent.417 
 
5.3. May 2009 nuclear test: reaffirmation and extension of recalibrated risks 
5.3.i. Diet reaction to the May 2009 nuclear test 
Reaction from Diet members to the North‟s nuclear test of 25 May, 2009 was not dissimilar 
to that observed after the April test launch of the same year, in terms of how both governing 
and opposition political parties were eager to stress a firm-line against Pyongyang, and how 
the high calibration of risk framed against North Korea was a prominent feature of the central 
political discourse as a whole. Government spokesman, Itō Shintarō (171: 7), for instance 
launched a scathing verbal assault against the DPRK‟s actions, stating that, 
The latest nuclear test conducted by North Korea, when considered in combination with 
the North‟s increasing ability to deploy ballistic missiles as a means of delivering 
weapons of mass destruction, is a grave threat to our nation‟s safety. The test starkly 
impinges upon the peace and security of East Asia and the international community, and 
as such is totally unacceptable. In response to North Korea, we fiercely object to their 
actions and sternly condemn the test.  
   
Akin to previous remarks scrutinized above, the LDP administration speakers went on to add 
missile and abduction issues to the risks they identified with North Korea in the same 
                                                          
416    The two papers’ supportive stance of UN-led, internationally coordinated, efforts to increase economic 
sanctions against the DPRK was also largely equivalent (e.g., see Yomiuri, editorial, 11 April 2009: 3). 
417  Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Yomiuri editorial quoted above actually had no mention of the 
abductions issue, something which was placed firmly within the discussion of North Korean-based risks in 
the Asahi editorial of the same date. 
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statements. Therein, rather than isolating specific risks born by the nuclear test, it was used 
as a means by which to refocus attention on a broad range of risks – apparently amounting 
to pressing concerns for Japan posed by the regime in Pyongyang. 
    In opposition, DPJ statements were again represented by criticisms of the government‟s 
apparent inability to deal effectively with actual contingencies presented by the range of risks 
framed as emanating from the external North Korean threats – i.e., as opposed to an attack 
on the policies implemented to deal with those risks per se. For instance, in both the Foreign 
Affairs Defence Committee (gaikō bōei iinkai) of 26 May and the main session of 27 May, 
Kazama Naoki (171: 18, 171: 9), speaking on behalf of the DPJ-led shadow-coalition, raises 
the issues of an ineffective national defence structure – juxtaposed against the pressing and 
unacceptable risks posed by a nuclear-armed DPRK. In this way, the opposition‟s focus was 
not placed on a fundamental criticism of government policies to deal with Pyongyang‟s 
provocations, nor did it question the extent to which risks attributed to North Korea‟s actions 
actually represented a feasible or probable contingency for Japan. Rather, having accepted, 
and indeed having contributed to, the GoJ‟s recalibration of risks and negative framing of the 
DPRK, leading rival politicians and parties primarily contested only the logistical means by 
which those risks could be pro-actively ameliorated – competing predominantly in order to 
demonstrate the strength of their stance vis-à-vis the North.418 
 
5.3.ii. Media reaction to the May 2009 nuclear test 
Examination of news-media sources‟ reactions to North Korea‟s second nuclear test also 
                                                          
418
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, an important element of this framing of North Korea’s nuclear-based risks  
by Japan’s policy makers can be seen in its justifying of taking measures which are ultimately concerned with  
risks posed by a more assertive, nuclear armed China. Moreover, as stated by Samuels (2007: 171) the DPRK’s 
provocative behaviour and weak international position facilitates such a framing. Therefore, as seen in the 
ultimately conciliatory response to China’s recent maritime incursions off the Pinnacle Islands, fear of  
antagonizing China can also be seen as a significant element in maintaining a high calibration of risks framed  
against Pyongyang.    
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evinces the further progression of a process, intersecting core media, societal (see also 
Section 5.7) and political elements of Japan‟s policy community, which suggests an 
increasing convergence upon the recalibration of risks perceived to be posed by the DPRK, 
and reaffirmation of Pyongyang‟s negative framing in Japan. Moreover, additional evidence 
that a conflation of risks has occurred is also present in the data pertaining to the 2009 
nuclear test. The Asahi Shimbun, for instance, in its concluding paragraph of the 26 May 
2009 editorial, states that, “[Japan] is in a situation where it has to take in to account that 
North Korea‟s nuclear tests and the abductions issue represent a serious threat.”419 
Furthermore, the piece is predicated with a sentence which asserts that, “It is a dire situation 
for the World‟s security and most obviously for the security of Japan” (26 May 2009: 3). The 
conflating, or at least lack of disentanglement, of the abductions issue with that of the 
nuclear test, which was evaluated by the Asahi as posing risks recalibrated to the levels of 
national and global security, is of considerable significance here because it elucidates the 
extent to which the abduction issue became attached to a broader framing of North Korea – 
i.e., as that which is associated with multiple and increasingly salient risks.420      
    In addition, the Asahi Shimbun‟s Tensei Jingo column reaffirmed the recalibration of risk 
established in the aftermath of 2006 – further emphasized in April of 2009 – in combination 
with a derogatory framing (labelling) of Pyongyang. Furthermore, the paper actually 
recalibrated further; suggesting that North Korea‟s emergence as a new nuclear-armed state, 
might, “ultimately, lead to the obliteration of humankind” (West Division, 28 May 2009: 10). 
Moreover, while the Asahi continued to stress the use of non-violent means and avoidance 
                                                          
419  The issue of missile testing was also introduced in association with the nuclear test earlier in the article. 
420  While the Asahi’s position on the promotion of diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis North Korea remained 
essentially unchanged, as did its emphasis on US-led (supporting the norm of bilateralism) and regional 
initiatives, it is noteworthy that military action against the DPRK was only ruled-out on the grounds that it 
was logistically unrealistic – as opposed to political, socio-economic or ethical grounds for avoiding 
confrontation. In this sense, particularly in light of the paper’s repeated labelling of Pyongyang’s regime as 
“dangerous” (kiken), “unlawful” (muhō) and “reckless” (mubō), and its assertion that nuclear tests 
represented, “not only a threat to security, but to the future of mankind” (26 May 2009: 3), the 
recalibration of risk is clearly realized through intensification of the North’s negative framing. 
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of escalating a potential regional arms race, there was a sense in which its increased 
condemnation of the North, and stressing of various associated risks, diluted such a 
message. Indeed, the Asahi‟s tangible recalibration of risks (i.e., to the level of ultimate 
Armageddon) attributed to the DPRK was equal to, and at times even in excess of, that 
presented by rival print-media sources associated with more rightist stances – as were 
elements of the Asahi‟s prescriptions for punitive sanctions. 
     The Yomiuri Shimbun, for instance, while in concurrence with the Asahi on advocating the 
imposition of increased and more extensive sanctions against North Korea, and the need for 
US-led, UN and regional cooperation efforts, was, in one sense, less sensational in terms of 
its appraisal of the potential risks posed by Pyongyang. For example, the Yomiuri‟s 27 May 
2009 editorial made no mention of the risk of “annihilation of mankind” alerted to by the 
Asahi, and employed little emotive language with which to describe the North‟s actions; 
merely stating concisely that, “Japan is the one directly at risk from North Korea‟s nuclear 
and missile threats” (27 May 2009: 3). 421 In this sense, while the Yomiuri may have, 
ultimately, advocated a more extensive range of policy revisions in response to North Korea 
than the Asahi – particularly with regards to Japan‟s re-militarization – comparative 
examination of the rhetoric employed by the two papers‟ editorial boards suggests a broad 
convergence, most notably in terms of the Asahi having presided over an extensive 
recalibration of risks emanating from the DPRK, which brought their positions closer to that 
of traditionally right-of-centre news sources. This was also present in the compounded 
framing – as a multiple source of conflated risks – of North Korea as such a high-risk entity, 
which is once again reaffirmed from a broad cross-section of media-standpoints taken after 
the 2009 nuclear test.422   
 
                                                          
421 Once again, the conflation of multiple issues (nuclear, missile) was, therein, also apparent. 
422  For concise comment, communicating broader societal and political reactions to the test in Japan, see 
news report of 25 May (NHK News, 2009). 
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5.4. July 2009 missile launches: reaffirming and converging of the recalibrated risks 
5.4.i. Diet reaction to the July 2009 missile tests 
In comparison to the magnitude of reaction, from both government and opposition parties, 
over the DPRK‟s April 2009 missile launch, and particularly its May 2009 nuclear test, Diet 
members were relatively limited in their response to the multiple test launch of July 2009.423 
Indeed, the lack of such a high-volume of response may be suggestive of a saturation-point 
for North Korean issues within Japan‟s political elite. Nevertheless, the GoJ maintained its 
prevailing trajectory of risk recalibration, realized not least in the form of justifying the 
unprecedented dispatch of PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptor batteries – initially 
deployed after the April launch in seven facilities across Japan – put into effect by raising the 
official level of alert to “high” at the time of the July launches. In a by then well-established 
pattern, the ruling LDP-led administration subsequently outlined the increased risks posed 
by the DPRK‟s on-going provocations, and introduced further plans to take practical counter-
measures, in the form of legislation, as discussed in Section 5.10, below. This recalibration 
of risks was also mediated through a reaffirmation of the North‟s negative framing in public 
spheres. Therein, this interactive process can be observed in the 9 July 2009 session of the 
Special Committee for Cooperative Activities Supporting the National Interest and the 
Prevention of International Terrorism and Counter-Measures against Piracy (kaizoku kōi e no 
taisho oyobi kokusai terorizumu oyobi wagaknuni no kyōryoku shien katsudō nado ni 
kansuru tokubetsu iinkai) immediately following the 4 July 2009 missile tests. Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Kawamura Takeo, stated (171: 1) that,     
When one considers that North Korea is strengthening its missile capabilities, which can 
become the means by which to carry weapons of mass-destruction – given its carrying-
                                                          
423  The comparatively small number of statements addressing the missile tests in the Diet does, however, 
have to be considered with reference to the Diet’s summer recess and the on-going election campaign, 
both of which no doubt had a considerable impact upon topical and on-going debates across all chambers 
and committees (see Section 5.6, below, for quantitative analysis of Diet reactions).   
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out of the nuclear test – it represents a threat to the peace and security of the 
international community. That threat is especially conspicuous for our nation, as we are 
placed in close proximity. 
 
The above statement was used as justification for introducing a legislative bill to further 
curtail funds – which might be used for such weapons programmes – being transferred via 
North Korean vessels.424 Once again, there was no fundamental questioning of the fact that 
the DPRK‟s nuclear and missile developments posed a salient and pressing risk to Japan, 
which, therefore, facilitated a maximized recalibration of risk in relation to them. 
In addition, coming at a time of intense domestic political competition, immediately prior to 
an election, the July test-firings also presented an opportunity to utilize the framing of North 
Korea and highly calibrated risks associated with it as tools by which to seek a competitive 
edge – in line with the arguments posited by Wada (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6). Indeed, 
actors within the GoJ attempted to make use of the perceived imminence of risks posed by 
North Korea to avoid then prime minister, Asō, being subjected to a vote of no-confidence – 
arguing that more pressing matters (i.e., the risks posed by the DPRK‟s missile threat) 
should be prioritized by the opposition. For instance, during the main session of 14 July 2009, 
the LDP‟s Tanigawa Shūzen (171: 2), demanded that the DPJ justify its priorities, and 
support the national cause, which he suggested was at risk from Pyongyang‟s actions if 
coordinated government attention could not be unimpeded in its focus upon them. In so 
doing, Tanigawa, accusingly asked,   
Are you going to overlook North Korea‟s behaviour of continued violations, beginning 
with abductions from our shores, and the missile launches and nuclear test? The role of 
the state is to protect its citizens‟ lives and property, and maintain its security. It would be 
equal to a dereliction of the state‟s duties and dignity not to take all measures necessary 
to counter the greatest threat to our country, which is North Korea.    
 
As discussed below, discourse emphasizing multiple risks identified with North Korea in 
                                                          
424  The bill was ultimately challenged and prevented from passing – as a political manoeuvre designed to 
further damage the LDP – only to be effectively readopted by the incoming DPJ after its election victory (see 
also Section 5.10). 
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reaction to the July 2009 missile tests – as represented by Tanigawa‟s statement above – 
was also further mediated in a general convergence between Diet and media-sources. 
 
5.4.ii. Media reaction to the July 2009 missile tests 
As consistently observed in the analyses thus far, media reaction in Japan to North Korea‟s 
multiple missile launches of July 2009 displayed a considerable degree of alignment, and 
cross-interaction with that of Diet members. Therein, the already highly recalibrated risks 
associated with Pyongyang‟s provocative actions were once again both restated and primed 
for a possible further recalibration of risk. In addition to the predictable reassertion of the 
DPRK‟s framing as a reckless (rogue) state which flaunts legitimate international rules, the 
perception of the risks pertaining to Pyongyang were subtly revised upwardly by using, not 
least, forms of passive or indirect persuasion (see also Chapter 2, Section 2.10), which 
assumed a position that included Japan as a potential target for the North‟s missiles. With 
such a standpoint taken as a given, the constitutive risks of North Korea‟s further 
development of missile programmes were then non-problematically evinced. For instance, 
the Asahi Shimbun (6 July 2009: 4) carried an article, entitled “North Korean missiles: 
Increased precision – suggestions of „demonstrating performance‟”, which alluded to such 
risks by stating that, 
Exactly three years ago [in 2006], before dawn on 5 July, North Korea also launched 
seven missiles, including Nodongs, Scuds and a long-range ballistic Taepodong. 
However, compared to that time their launching technology appears to have improved. 
 
Therefore, if the assumption that Japan was, ultimately, a potential or probable target for 
North Korea‟s missiles went unchallenged, any improvement to the DPRK‟s weapons 
programmes, particularly when conflated with other nuclear, terror, financial and abductions 
issues, acted as a cue for the extended recalibration of existing risks framed against 
Pyongyang‟s regime. 
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    Once again, the Yomiuri Shimbun offered a comparable analysis to that of the Asahi, 
calling for the further imposition of sanctions as a means to curtail the North‟s financial 
capacity, in light of the potential risk of funds finding their way into the continued 
development of an enhanced missile capability. However, forthwith, following the July 2009 
test launches, the Yomiuri returned, in its extended commentary, to use of the kinds of 
predicative language used to frame North Korea‟s actions that was present in the editorials 
of the Asahi immediately after the May 2009 nuclear test; describing the launches as, 
“provocative behaviour which, having ignored the warnings of the international community, 
threatens the peace and security of East Asia, and cannot be countenanced” (editorial, 5 July 
2009: 3). In this sense, while the extent of emotive or sensational language exhibited an 
unequal distribution across Japan‟s two leading quality newspapers in response to the 
unfolding events of 2009, their continued recalibration of risk and an unrelenting 
reinforcement of North Korea‟s negative frame – in convergence with the political elite – are 
clearly evident.       
 
5.5. Changes in the policy community and the effects of administrative changeover: 
limited impact upon the DPRK’s framing in Japan  
Until the recent advent of a DPJ-led coalition in 2010, and certainly until the electoral reforms 
of the mid 1990s, post-War state-level power in Japan was widely seen as being contained 
within an iron triangle which encompassed the LDP, government bureaucracy and 
associated big-business (Johnson, 1982).425 While it is, as yet, unclear to what extent the 
full-scale change of administration will impact upon the constitutive elements of Japan‟s 
policy community, what seems beyond doubt is that they have already been transformed 
                                                          
425 It should be noted that while the restructuring of Japan’s ministries, including MITI, which was key to     
      Johnson’s thesis, may have altered their degree of influence, it has also affected their outlook and priorities  
 rationale, particularly from internal to external factors (Mochizuki, 2007: 5). Not least, this is so in terms of  
 where the source of risks is to be located and identified – i.e., more predominantly with North Korea.   
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from the rigid structure of Johnson‟s “plan-rational system” to something far more embroiled 
in the issue networks of media and civil society (Campbell et al., 1989). It has also been 
observed that despite this apparent departure from the so-called iron triangle model, prime 
ministerial power, particularly following reforms implemented under Koizumi Junichirō, has 
been increased and the PM‟s relationship with the public sphere is now of crucial importance 
(Steel and Kabashima, 2010: 86-104). 
    Prior to this process of alterations to the policy community, the traditionally powerful role of 
the bureaucracy was both structural and legal, and was essentially premised upon the fact 
that the LDP held almost total and permanent governance and looked after the businesses 
that funded it and the civil servants that organized its administration. Moreover, this stemmed 
back to the days of the post-War occupation when the US authorities were keen to limit the 
impact of contested political forces within civil society and the established parties, but eager 
to keep bureaucracy on-side, because the bureaucrats were needed in order to perform a 
range of logistical, organizational and administrative operations in the aftermath of defeat in 
World War II (Stockwin, 2008: 137-41). However, after a partially interrupted continuation of 
the status quo in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the advent of the Koizumi 
administration offered a window of opportunity for Japan‟s political apparatus to be 
restructured. Much of it duly was, played out through what was termed the Koizumi gekijō, or 
Koizumi theatre, which dominated the public sphere – and was in no small part reliant upon 
the framing of North Korea for its foreign policy directives – as outlined in Chapter 4, Section 
4.1 and Section 4.4. 
    Large sections of restructuring which altered the policy community in Japan involved 
beefing-up effective prime ministerial power and shaking-up ministry and bureaucratic 
organization. Perhaps most crucially, this took the form of increased executive authority for 
the prime minister‟s office, or kantei, and a reduced role for the previously dominant 
influence of the bureaucratic Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB, or naikaku hōsei kyoku) 
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(Samuels, 2007:74-5).426 Koizumi and his LDP successors (Abe, Fukuda, Asō) also presided 
over the restructuring of ministries, which reshaped parts of the policy community unevenly. 
Indeed, in the field of foreign affairs and policy, this was framed in terms of adapting to 
globalization and, moreover, to the risks which it presented to Japan – including those posed 
by identified state-sponsors of terrorism, such as North Korea.427 As an ultimate result, not 
only was successive legislation passed to reform Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) roles, 
but the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was itself upgraded to the status of ministry in January 
2007, on the grounds that it needed strengthening in order to meet global security threats, 
which pose a risk to Japan and the stability of East Asia as a whole.428 Therein, the process 
leading to the justification for such a stance can be seen to have initially begun with the 
recalibration of risks following the Nodong and Taepodong launches of the 1990s, and 
sustained by Pyongyang‟s subsequent provocations – particularly the nuclear tests and 
missile launches of 2006 and 2009. 
    Indeed, prominent on the list of global risks identified by the newly shaped policy 
community was North Korea. This was an already conveniently established area of 
perceived risk. As Fujiwara succinctly acknowledges with regard to how the DPRK‟s 
adventurism impacted upon Japan‟s policy making elites of the 1990s, for instance, “For the 
policy makers in Tokyo, the prominent geopolitical risk was North Korea” (2006: 55). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.10 (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6 and Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4), the power of the media and public opinion was paramount in priming the 
normative parameters within which risk could be recalibrated by the executive arm of the 
                                                          
426  As Samuels discusses, this is significant not only because it represents a reshaping of a core part of Japan’s  
political elite apparatus, but also because the CLB has consistently been inextricably linked to key market  
agents in terms of a so-called revolving door between senior bureaucracy and large public and private   
corporations.   
 427  For discussion of Japan’s policy revisions under Koizumi as a response to challenges posed by globalization,  
 see Hook and Hasegawa (2006: 1-13), Fujiwara (2006: 55-68).   
428  The background to the JDA’s upgrading, including the influence of US policy elites in persuading a 
       recalibration of risk framed against North Korea, and its impact upon Japan’s defence apparatus as a whole, 
is discussed by Oros and Tatsumi (2007).   
262 
 
state. Hence, Koizumi‟s ascension to power effectively allowed a charismatic government 
figure-head to interact directly with civil society, largely cutting out bureaucratic and non-
media market elements of the policy community. This facilitated the delineation of 
parameters within which risks perceived to emanate from the DPRK would be framed, and 
set forth how responses would be justified and implemented through policy reforms 
rationalized in relation to them. Such reforms were, therein, made against a background of 
risks perceived to come from the threat of incursions and abductions, but ultimately 
justifiable by the realization of risks posed by the missile threat established after the 1998 
launch – and most pro-actively mediated through the public-sphere following the nuclear test 
and missile test-firings of 2009. 
 Amid this, the extent to which the mass media and public opinion essentially acted as 
powerful elements of Japan‟s policy community in their own right is highlighted by the 
manner in which, from the time of high-profile coverage of North Korean spy-boat incursions 
and abduction incidents in the early part of the new millennium, “…no Japanese politician or 
official would have dared to be seen as soft on North Korea” (Leheny, 2006: 167).429 The 
point here is that, regardless of whether primarily orchestrated top-down by prime ministerial 
leadership or neo-conservative consensus/convergence, or as part of a bottom-up 
movement, once the DPRK became identified as a powerful source of risks mediated within 
the public sphere, the recalibration of those risks was adopted by large sections of the 
market-based media, and society, which in turn held interactive influence over the policy 
community as a whole. This was so regardless of whether its policy making arm was led by 
the LDP – or is led by DPJ politicians. Put simply, Japan has a public electorate which, 
largely through media influence, as highlighted in Section 5.7, below, are seen increasingly 
                                                          
429  Leheny points to a specific recalibration of risk, observable across dialogue intersecting Japan’s state, 
market and society in response to North Korea. Not least, as he notes, this was by way of the adaptation of 
terms, from fushinsen to kōsakusen (“suspicious boat” to “operations boat” or “spy boat”) concerning 
successive North Korean incursions into waters inside Japan’s EEZ. Ultimately, this redefinition of terms is a 
function of the recalibration of risk – which can facilitate, or ease, the passing of emergency laws (2006: 
157-64). 
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to accept the recalibration or risk vis-à-vis North Korea.430 
These elements combine with a loose affiliation of political actors from the leading parties, 
bureaucracy and big business, who are also influenced by a broad range of extending issue 
networks. Such are given a voice through the public sphere, and play a part in the policy 
community, which is, therefore, devoid of the kind of clear boundaries demarcating state 
from society that would be expected in rigid iron-triangle power elites. Within this process, 
then, responses to the 1993 and 1998 missile launches – as discussed in Chapter 3 – and 
the subsequent test-firings in 2006 and 2009, have been identified as pivotal events. Not 
least, this is because they were central to setting in motion and maintaining, and 
demarcating the parameters for, so much of the political and public discourses which 
express how the DPRK has come to be framed up to the present. 
    In addition, it should be noted that the concept of reform, not just of defence posture but 
as a societal whole, has been a sustained theme of post-Cold War politics in Japan 
(Kawabata, 2006: 66-92). As a result of such reform, particularly that led by Koizumi, the 
central organs of the established policy community became truncated, and responsibility and 
authority increasingly shifted from public to private sectors moving into the 21st Century. 
Although not an obvious direct influence upon perceptions of North Korea, or the 
recalibration of risks associated with it per se, the majority of neo-liberal reforms have been 
supported by conservative consensuses within the LDP and powerful business-related 
organizations and committees, such as the Advisory Council for the Promotion of 
                                                          
430  It should, however, be restated here that mainstream media in Japan is highly embedded within the  
      political landscape – and as such cannot be conceptualized as a disentangled actor, entirely separate from  
      the state. For instance, individual journalists work closely with individual bureaucrats and politicians, in  
      order to provide acceptable stories and coverage in return for a consistent supply of information. This  
      resulted in a considerable shift in the specific staff (journalists) being assigned to government-related  
      stories following the advent of the DPJ administration, but only limited change (by way of greater access to  
      a larger number of journalists) to the system of media-based information dissemination itself. 
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Administrative Reform (Gyōkakushin).431 These forces are, likewise, broadly supported by 
US commercial and strategic interests, and form part of a discourse which includes the re-
evaluation and operationalization of security regimes. The recalibration of risk in response to 
North Korea can, in this sense, be seen partially as a function of neo-liberal/neo-
conservative convergence within Japan‟s policy community, which seeks to use the framing 
of North Korea both as a justification for the development of increased military power 
projection and as the basis by which to govern a range of internal security risks.432 
    Clearly, the advent of an, at least complicity, new political administration, in the form of the 
DPJ-led coalition, offers both to restructure the policy community further and to open 
opportunities to run a political trajectory that counters that of established US/neo-
conservative, LDP and public corporation interests, and the post-Cold War structures which 
they evolved from.433 However, the large number of former LDP members in key positions 
within the DPJ, in combination with financial and intra-coalition political constraints, and the 
continued potency of beiatsu over pivotal geopolitical issues, invites doubts about the ability 
of the present administration to effectively reinvent the existing policy community at state-
level.434 Moreover, due to continued sabre-rattling from Pyongyang, prolonging now already 
recalibrated appraisals of the risks posed by North Korea within the public sphere, any 
imminent top-down attempts to recalibrate those risks to a lower level may be perceived as a 
                                                          
431 The Gyōkakushin was first promoted under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō after it took over an  
advisory and functional role for reform measures introduced during the administration of Nakasone 
Yasuhiro within the framework provided by the Second Provisional Administrative Reform Commission or 
Rinchō (Kawabata, 2006:70). 
432  As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.11, the North Korean community provides a domestic microcosm, or 
risk-target, which can be primed and utilized for such an endeavour. 
433 Discourse pointing to the intended realization of such policy restructuring can be seen most prominently in     
      the now well-cited DPJ pre-2009 general election manifesto, which included directives of embracing an East  
      Asian Community and pursuing a more equal role within the US-Japan alliance. 
434 Former Prime Minister, Hatoyama Yukio, as well as former Party Chairman, Ozawa Ichirō, and former  
      Foreign Minister, Okada Katsuya, in addition to a number of other well-known political figures within the  
      ruling coalition, were all formerly influential members of the LDP. 
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weakening of Japan‟s position.435 These structural factors may, conversely, offer more 
opportunities to maintain the ratcheted-up calibration of risks framed against the DPRK, as 
explored in Section 5.12, below, and remain a potential means by which to garner support 
within civil society and re-stabilize the foundations of the policy community as it stands.436 
    Nevertheless, the initial DPJ-led administration leader, Hatoyama Yukio‟s forceful 
statements regarding a more equal US-Japan alliance, and his aspirations to develop 
regional foreign-policy on the basis of constructing an East Asia community (ajia kyōdōtai no 
kōchiku) did offer to challenge a number of the structural features sustaining Japan‟s 
negative framing of North Korea and contingent recalibration of associated risks.437 If 
Hatoyama‟s term as prime minister had lasted longer, this might have had a lasting impact 
upon the salience of bilateralism as a major source of agency driving such a process of risk 
recalibration. However, with Hatoyama‟s early departure, and PM Kan Naoto and new FM 
Maehara Seiji (succeeded by PM Noda Yoshihiko, and FMs Matsumoto Takeaki and Genba 
Kōichirō) announcing their intentions to rebuild a close relationship with the US, such an 
                                                          
435 Revelations during 2009-10 included confirmation that Kim Jong-Il personally ordered the abduction of 
      Japanese citizens from Japan, North Korea’s suspected torpedo sinking of the South Korean, Cheonan, naval 
      vessel, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (see Section 5.12, below). 
436  Certainly, the DPJ’s upper house election manifesto (2007f: 27) maintained it would sustain policies 
(including sanctions) implemented against the DPRK by the LDP government on account of Japan being the 
country “most at risk from North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities” and cited the abduction issue as a 
foreign policy priority – in general accordance with LDP rhetoric. For full comparison of the two parties’ 
manifestos, see Keio World Manifesto Forum (2007f, 2007g).    
437  Indeed, while Hatoyama’s lower house election manifesto (Democratic Party of Japan, 2009: 48-9) 
maintains references to the risks posed by North Korean missile and nuclear programmes, the section 
relating to the DPRK has been reduced in size from that included in the 2007 manifesto and emphasises the 
need for international cooperation (listing the ROK and Russia, in addition to the US, as key actors in such a 
process) in order to tackle the North Korea problems. The passage on the DPRK is limited to seven lines 
sandwiched between sections on strengthening East Asian diplomatic relations and the creation of world 
peace. The LDP’s 2009 manifesto, contrastingly, places its section on North Korea – highlighting the need for 
strengthened measures to deal with diversified and uncertain crisis situations – between sections on the 
strengthening of security measures and Japan’s contribution towards the War on Terror (Liberal Democratic 
Party of Japan, 2009). 
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effect appears to have been largely eliminated.438 
    Furthermore, in addition to the large disparity between the dispositions of individual 
politicians, such as Kan and Hatoyama (or Okada, Maehara, Matsumoto and Genba), as 
noted in an interview (9 May 2011a, Appendix A) by one leading expert on Japan‟s domestic 
politics, the DPJ coalition government as a whole contains wide inconsistencies in terms of 
the political standpoints of various ministries and broader areas of policy creation. Amid this, 
therefore, it is possible, particularly given the influences of public-sphere scrutiny and US 
opposition to a softening of stance vis-à-vis North Korea, for the foreign-policy and security 
arms of government to maintain a hawkish stance, including the high calibration of risks 
framed against the DPRK, even while other domestically oriented sectors and groups of 
policy makers pursue a more liberal approach.439     
    Whether, then, the above mentioned increase of public sphere participation in the state-
level policy community, combined with greater prime ministerial power and the restructuring 
of ministerial and other governmental organs, actually represents a comprehensive 
departure from the old structures of business, bureaucracy and power-politicians is still 
debatable.440 However, what can be asserted is that a combination of the collapse of viable 
                                                          
438   The bureaucratic arms of Japan’s policy community themselves also appear largely to support such a view, 
particularly in terms of North Korea policy. For instance, the MOD’s NIDS East Asian Review does contain a 
section on the “Impact of Change of Government” (2010: 246-53), but only makes reference to North 
Korea in terms of its continued presence within the new 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, and 
asserts that, “Japan’s choices for partners in dealing with problems that could lead to armed conflict are 
strictly limited, and Japan may need to rely on deterrence in the context of the Japan-US alliance” (NIDS, 
2010: 253). This once again reaffirms the strength of bilateralism as a dominant norm and evinces the 
limited impact of administration change upon the calibration of external security risks, including those 
framed against the DPRK. 
439  The above source (Appendix A) also posited that this has led to a kind of cost analysis, within which more  
       leftist sections of the DPJ coalition probably adjudge that greater impact can be made by pouring efforts  
       into domestic issues, as opposed to the relatively immovable area of foreign policy – particularly in relation  
       to a now ostensibly negatively framed North Korea. 
440  It should also be noted that many civil society groups are highly opposed to what is seen as a neo- 
       conservative agenda designed to use risks perceived to emanate from North Korea as means to enact 
       constitutional reform and normalization of Japan’s military (Oda, 2006: 391-2, Takashima, 2006: 233-8).    
       The prominence of such resistance to a broad perception of North Korea as a high-risk entity in    
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opposition parties (following electoral reform in the mid 1990s) which had opposed Japan‟s 
geo-political normalization (Kohno, 2007: 39-40), reassertion of the norm of bilateralism 
under the Bush-Koizumi and Obama-Kan/Noda administrations, and the extended 
proliferation of media as a means by which civil society can influence discourse on topics 
such as North Korea, has resulted in a broader and more permeable basis to Japan‟s policy 
community.441 In spite of this, for the foreseeable future – as outlined in Section 5.12, below 
– the prime effect appears to be a maintenance of its perceived levels of risk, in line with 
those recalibrated in relation to the highlighted events of missile and nuclear tests occurring 
throughout 2009.442 
 
5.6. Quantifiable recalibration of risk: flattening-out of Diet and media reactions 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.4, in order to give substantive empirical support to the 
range of qualitative observations made with regards to Japan‟s recalibration of risk through 
the framing of North Korea, an attempt needs to be made at each key juncture to quantify 
such a process. This is particularly so in terms of how specifically central elements of the 
state and society, such as leading politicians and media, have converged and interacted to 
influence both how the DPRK has been framed and how risks identified with that framing are 
recalibrated. Although crude in its construction, the model (Figure 5.2) below, based on 
discourse from discursive sources, continues, as with previous events, covered in Chapter 3 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
       the public sphere in many ways serves, however, conversely, to expose the limited influence of civil society 
       in this area of policy formation, and its minimal impact upon the policy community therein. 
441  In an interview (25 July 2011, Appendix A), one JCP representative suggested that the destruction of  
       leftist political forces and the creation of a comparably right-of-centre two-party political system amounted  
       to the realization of such forces deliberately creating a “farce of democracy.”  
442  Kohno’s discussion of the domestic politics of Japan’s international relations, while pointing to a shift from  
       a relatively fixed political structure and international posture during the Cold War towards a broader base    
      of political participation, is also indicative of the fact, conversely, that there is widespread convergence  
      across the greater part of Japan’s policy community with regards to how risks are framed against North  
      Korea 
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and Chapter 4, to provide an illustration of how this may be achieved in relation to the 
missile and nuclear tests of 2009 (see also Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Impact of the 2009 Missile Launches and Nuclear Test in the Media and Diet
443 
 Numbers of articles/items 
(prior to event) 
 April 
2009 
 Missile 
Test  
Launch 
Numbers of articles/items                
(post event) 
Months 12~ 6~ 3~  
(~25 May) 
~3 
(~4 July) 
~6 ~12 
Asahi 1931 974 561 492 1036 1850 2734 
Yomiuri 2455 1235 704 568 1184 2140 3091 
Mainichi 2234 1065 607 550 1167 2035 2873 
Sankei 3488 1691 959 740 1562 2723 4262 
NHK 
News 
1804 900 561 430 952 1411 1917 
Diet 181 114 66 58 108 126 251 
Magazine
※ 
85 42 11 16 37 58 111 
Source: author 
Figures shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※Based on a selection of national news magazines, 
primarily sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
*The “summer holiday effect” (see Chapter 4, Table 4.1) can be seen again in the above results, in terms of a 
reduction in the volume of Diet reaction to the July 2009 missile launches, therefore having a spill-over impact 
upon the final figure.
444
    
                                                          
   443  Even more than was the case for the July 2006 missile launches, effective quantitative analysis, in terms of  
the volume of media and Diet reaction is problematic to measure, due to the overlap of closely following    
events (i.e., May 2009 nuclear test, July 2009 missile launches). The table for 2009 has, therefore, been  
modified in an attempt to more meaningfully gauge reaction to each event. Nevertheless, the overall   
impact of the combination of events – in comparison to pre-event (pre-April 2009 levels of risk calibration)  
levels – can be estimated and compared approximately with previous events (i.e., those covered above,  
between 1993 and 2006, see tables in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and Chapter 6, Figure 6.3, for an extended  
comparison).  
   444  The final figures for all columns have also been affected by further recent events, particularly the Cheonan     
          sinking in March 2010. For a specific, short-term quantitative estimation of reaction to that event and  
          others, see Section 5.12, Table 5.2, below. 
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 5.1, above. 
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    In quantitative terms, the multiple events of 2009, once again, clearly suggest a 
recalibration of risks when comparing levels of coverage prior to and after each incidence.445 
Moreover, when this is taken in tandem with the intensification of practical policy measures 
directed at Pyongyang, discussed in Section 5.10, below, a further definitive shift, in terms of 
recalibrating risks which are framed against North Korea, does appear present. However, it 
must be noted that the actual levels of Diet and media coverage (as a measure of volume) 
for the so called kitachōsen mondai had, in fact, decreased by 2009, despite the three 
prominent events of that year – most pertinently in comparison to quantities of items and 
articles identified with reaction to the comparable events of 2006 – as ascertained in Chapter 
4, Table 4.2 and Chapter 6, Figure 6.1. In this respect, Figure 5.5, below, further supports the 
qualitative evidence discussed in this chapter, in terms of evincing an interactive and largely 
convergent framing of North Korean actions by leading Diet and media actors, intersecting 
multiple issues, during this period. Furthermore, it also supports the argument that 
quantitative levels of public and political sphere attention – which can be seen as central to 
Japan‟s framing of North Korea – have indeed receded in the period post-dating 2006. 
 
    Therein, while the missile and nuclear tests of 2009 clearly acted as the trigger to maintain 
a wave like pattern of risk recalibration in response to the DPRK‟s perceived provocations, 
the pertaining peaks and troughs were no longer able to supersede those of previous events, 
as observed, in one sense, up to 2006 (see also Chapter 6, Figure 6.2).446 Furthermore, as 
expressed by Table 5.2, below, attention to the abductions issue receded during the same 
                                                          
445  As outlined above (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3), while media, literary and Diet coverage of a given subject 
topic in itself, obviously, does not equate to an accurate measure of risk calibration, the overwhelming mass 
of coverage on North Korea frames Pyongyang’s actions as bearing multiple and salient risks – as discussed 
in the qualitative analyses above – which, therefore, justifies utilizing fluctuating volumes of coverage in 
order to estimate a perception of how risks are being (re)calibrated vis-à-vis the DPRK. 
446  I.e., in terms of the extended quantities of coverage for North Korean affairs stemming from each of the 
events examined above – spanning between the conclusion of the Cold War (essentially starting from the 
1993 Nodong test-launch) up to the public-political sphere fall-out from the nuclear test of October 2006. 
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period, which, given its stimulating effect upon all issues associated with North Korea in 
Japan, can also been seen to have resulted in an inability to further recalibrate such risks 
within the public sphere, even after additional missile and nuclear tests in 2009.447 In this 
sense, a process of media and political saturation with regards to the DPRK would appear to 
have resulted in a flattening-out of risk recalibration – which is evinced here from the 
available data that expresses a quantitative analysis of public sphere coverage. 
Nevertheless, Diet, media and news-magazine sources alone do not necessarily represent a 
comprehensive barometer by which to measure the calibration of such risks.448 Indeed, signs 
that a further definitive recalibration of risks vis-à-vis North Korea at the state level did take 
place in response to the events of 2009 are supported to a degree, not only by the 
introduction of further counter-measures administered by the policy makers, as covered 
Section 5.10, below, but also, though less definitively, by data from public opinion polls and 
other non-state actors, as discussed below. 
 
5.7. Public opinion of North Korea: recent trends of recalibrated risk 
It is difficult to evaluate definitively the precise degree to which risk has been recalibrated 
within Japan‟s civil society in response to North Korea. Not least, this is due to an inability to 
compare data like for like over time – such as throughout the post-Cold War era. However, 
as highlighted by Figure 5.3, below, a variety of opinion polls and data sources do evince 
clearly that levels of attention and risk perception assigned to the North have been 
                                                          
447  Though more complex, in terms of a number of issues being attached to a single event, levels of media-   
based reaction to North Korea can actually be seen to have peaked, in terms of pure volume, during the 
twelve months following the 2002 Kim-Koizumi leadership summit at which revelations (Kim’s admission of 
North Korean state agents abducting Japanese citizens) over the abduction issue first came to light (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4, Table 4.1). 
448  A further quantitative measure of both North Korea’s framing, and the perception of attributed risks, is, in 
one respect, accessible through the observation of literature published on the DPRK in Japanese – most 
specifically that which covers Kim Jong-Il portrayed in a repetitiously villainous form (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.8). In this sense too, a flattening-out process is apparent, with similar numbers of titles for 2009 and 2010 
(141 and 136, respectively) as those listed for 2006 and 2007 (Amazon.co.jp, 2010) – following comparable 
incidents relating to North Korea. 
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heightened increasingly through this period. This can again be analysed via the events-
based framework. For instance, the Cabinet Office of Japan‟s opinion polls, regarding issues 
relating to North Korea, exhibit a series of rises in public concern from the end of the Cold 
War up to the present.449 Further, predominant public concerns over Japan‟s state security 
have shifted from issues such as instability in the Middle East and major West–v–East 
confrontation, to the Korean peninsula (Shinoda, 2006: 156-7). This movement towards a 
societal recalibration of risk pertaining to North Korea can, therein, be plotted against the 
same series of key events as those dealt with specifically in this dissertation, which correlate 
in particular to Diet and media reaction to missile and nuclear tests – and continue to exhibit 
high calibrations of risk since the events of 2009. Indeed, the public-political framing of North 
Korea has resulted in a recalibration of risks across the broader society in Japan which has 
been maintained up to the present, as further evinced by the Asahi Shimbun/Dong-A Ilbo 
Joint Public Opinion Poll, conducted in June of 2010, which, for instance, reported that 90 
per cent of Japanese civilians felt some degree of uneasiness (54 per cent were “very 
uneasy”) about the DPRK‟s nuclear programmes.450 
 
                                                          
449  While concerns over the abductions issue remain of greatest concern (83 per cent), they quantitatively 
peaked in 2003 (90 per cent). Those pertaining to missile and nuclear issues rose consistently up to 2006 
(72 and 80 per cent), after which there has been a limited reduction and levelling-off to 57 and 68 per cent 
(2010), respectively, following a second peak in 2009 (67 and 77 per cent) (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2010). 
450  Strikingly, as many as 21 per cent of South Koreans stated that they did not feel at all uneasy, as opposed 
to   Japanese respondents, who all expressed some degree of uneasiness (Maureen and Mike Mansfield 
Foundation, 2010a) – once again highlighting the country-specific pattern of Japan’s recalibration of risks 
framed against the DPRK. 
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Source: author  
Adapted from data accessed via the Cabinet Office of Japan Opinion Polls 
(http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html). 
 
    Moreover, public opinion within civil society appears broadly to reflect that of the more 
centralized core of the policy community, in terms of taking a firm stance against North 
Korea and framing it as an aggressor – though the extremity of such a position is less 
uniform than that observed within the political elite, as explicated in Chapter 3. For instance, 
the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 2010 Telephone Opinion Poll reported that almost three 
times as many Japanese (42 per cent) felt that Japan should take a strong stance and 
increase sanctions against the DPRK, following the Cheonan incident than those (16 per 
cent) who stated that the emphasis should be on dialogue with the North.451 The Asahi 
                                                          
451   For further discussion of the Cheonan sinking and other key events which occurred after 2009, see 
Section 5.12 (5.12.ii), below. 
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Shimbun Poll of June 2010 also suggested that on average 82 per cent of Japan‟s populous 
believed it was better not to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang – once again 
reaffirming its hostile status within public framings in Japan (Maureen and Mike Mansfield 
Foundation, 2010a, 2010b). In addition, the importance of mediation via news sources to 
civil society cannot be underestimated here, as according to surveys conducted by the 
Cabinet Office of Japan, 94% of those polled cite mainstream news media as their primary 
source of information on international affairs (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2006). 
    Ultimately, therein, in congruence with the predominant findings of this dissertation, 
opinion poll data and other related sources suggest that public opinion has undergone a 
recalibration of risk framed against the DPRK in consistency with those of media and political 
spheres. Within this, however, it is problematic to convincingly determine the interactive 
causality of such a process – in terms of which actors are leading or being led. Rather, 
cross-reference of Figure 5.3, for example, with the figures expressing data pertaining to 
each of the case studies discussed above, evinces a largely symbiotic response to North 
Korea‟s actions (see also Chapter 6, Figure 6.3), intersecting the state, market and society. 
As discussed further in Section 5.12, below, and in the Conclusion, this process can been 
seen to have created a substantial recalibration of risk, observed as a function of 
Pyongyang‟s negative framing, which has now become normatively entrenched. This 
appears to have standardized the parameters for calibrating risk levels pertaining to the 
DPRK, which are being sustained – though without extensive additional recalibration – in the 
form of relative equilibrium in response to the North‟s actions moving into the second decade 
of the 21st Century.   
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5.8. Misinformation and political performances in the continuation of risk 
(re)calibration: Japan’s security norms and the framing of North Korea 
In the year following the 2009 missile and nuclear tests it seemed that the recalibration of 
risks stemming from the framing of Pyongyang might be forced into a period of temporary 
down-sizing – as the result of a dearth in incidents warranting major security concerns.  
However, suspicions were raised that the DPRK had been involved in the sinking of the 
South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, in March of 2010 at a cost of forty-six lives. For 
Japan‟s political elite, media, and civil society, this served to reinstate North Korean issues 
as a prominent feature of public-political sphere discourses and maintain their high-risk 
framing.452 Then Prime Minister, Hatoyama Yukio and foreign minister Okada Katsuya were 
outspoken in their criticism of the North and the need to take urgent and resolute action 
against Pyongyang (Itō, 2010). Nevertheless, as examined in Section 5.12.ii, below, while 
theirs and other leading political figures‟ strong reactions to the incident fuelled the 
continuation and revitalization of discussions over North Korean risks among mass-media 
sources and central political actors in Japan, the Cheonan‟s sinking essentially only 
reaffirmed existing security norms concerning the DPRK. As such, it failed to trigger an 
extensively novel recalibration of risk (as highlighted by the lack of additional counter-
measures, see Section 5.10), the like of which was observed following the nuclear and 
missile tests of 2006 and 2009.453 Indeed, it was also not as easily linked to Japan‟s security 
concerns as missiles or nuclear weapons tests. 
    In addition, however, as the media framing of North Korea and Pyongyang‟s actions (by 
                                                          
452  It is noteworthy that despite serious doubts regarding the North’s involvement in this incident, including 
their unwavering denial of any wrongdoing, the event temporarily placed related issues back at the 
forefront of media coverage, and served to maintain North Korea’s framing as a suspicious high-risk entity  
which possesses the potential for unleashing uncertain, incalculable, harms towards Japan. For succinct 
evaluation of the doubtful nature of the DPRK’s involvement, see Demick and Gilonna (2010). 
453  As noted in the chapter above, the political elite’s assertions that there was scientific grounding to the 
identification of the DPRK, as a source of tangible security risks, spilled-over into discourses in the public 
sphere, reinforcing the prevalence of norms associated with the framing of North Korea as such – and in 
turn feeding into how such information is absorbed and diffused across civil society.   
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then established as a kind of pseudo-norm) began to reach an apparent saturation-point, or 
at least media consumers appeared to be building up a metaphorical tolerance toward 
DPRK-sourced risks, formerly convicted political terrorist, Kim Yon-Hi, paid a high profile visit 
to Japan, on the premise that she had new information regarding suspected abduction 
victims.454 This event briefly restored the abduction issue to national prominence, but the 
limited scope and length of reactions within Japan also highlighted its waning influence as a 
stimulant driving the process of risk recalibration vis-à-vis North Korea.455 Little new 
information of any significance was forthcoming, and although North Korea was once again 
back in Japan‟s media spotlight, and the abduction issue was freshly reignited, the lasting 
impact appears to have been minimal.456 Nevertheless, these events once again fed back 
into the spheres of civil society and the perpetuating agenda of a contested (not least over 
strength of stance vis-à-vis the DPRK) policy community; in this sense demonstrating how 
the discourse of risks pertaining to North Korea has in fact been maintained since the events 
                                                          
454  Tolerance in this context refers to a gradual lack of effective stimulation created by media stories covering 
North Korean risks – in this sense comparable to the tolerance developed by an alcoholic to alcohol, 
whereby greater and greater quantities are required to provide effective satisfaction. 
455  One former ambassador and MOFA negotiator for North Korean affairs posited in an interview  
(9 May 2011c, Appendix A) that, while the reduction in media attention and the change of administration  
      may have subduing effects upon North Korea’s framing within Japan, until the “three hurdles” of  
abductions, nuclear and missile development, and demands for Japan’s financial compensation for colonial  
      wrong-doings can be overcome, risk-levels are unlikely to be other than maintained at a high calibration.  
The interviewee, himself largely an advocate of a hard-line stance vis-à-vis North Korea, asserted that only  
      the rise to power of a charismatic leader (in the ilk of Koizumi), who is willing to take more assertive  
political risks, is likely to facilitate a central shift on any of the above fronts. Further, he suggested that the  
abductions issue remains a potential time-bomb, should further new evidence be unearthed – arguing that,  
      the high-profiling of abductions cases in the early 2000s, more than 20 years after they took place,  
      illustrates how time does little to eliminate their potential impact. He also contended that the DPRK’s  
combination of WMD abilities in combination with an uncertain and opaque regime represents an on-going  
      source of salient risks. 
456 In this regard, one leading commentator suggested when interviewed (8 April 2011, Appendix A) that while      
      missile and nuclear issues may continue to be utilized politically to maintain a high calibration of risks   
      pertaining to the DPRK, the abduction issue is effectively redundant in this regard. Indeed, counter to the    
      evidence regarding public interest noted above (see also Section 5.7), they argued that commercial   
      television stations are no longer willing to promote the abduction issue, because of its perception as old    
      news. As such, it was contended, abductee cases will likely become an increasingly irrelevant factor in  
      Japan’s framing of North Korea – and any further recalibration of risks.   
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of 2009 – even when concentrated attention may have been diluted by other issues.457 
               Indeed, in order to understand how such a process is perpetuated, it is again worth 
considering here what has been termed the “propaganda passive” (Glen, 1991) – in terms of 
highlighting the role that an established discourse plays in sustaining the framing of 
Pyongyang.458 As noted above (see also Figure 5.2(a)), there is no dearth of direct media 
stories framing North Korea as a source of gravitas risks to Japan, in terms of those which 
link the DPRK to international terrorism, WMD and illegal and harmful activities which 
potentially threaten national security. However, across online, television, and (particularly) 
print media sources there is also the prevalent existence of stories which link Pyongyang to 
such elements indirectly – which simultaneously work to persistently keep North Korea‟s 
ideationally negative framing within the inter-subjective perceptions of a risk-centric populous 
and polity. For example, this is epitomized by the Yomiuri Shimbun‟s almost relentless 
publishing of stories which in some way maintain such an image of the North in Japan. 
Therein, in addition to printing at least one story of some description on North Korea 
somewhere within the pages of almost every daily edition, there is the common inclusion of 
indirect stories which reference Pyongyang in such a way as to reinforce its framing. For 
instance, illustrative articles range from semi-direct pieces such as those covering the 
DPRK‟s “unnecessary use” of firearms drills in the seas adjacent to the ROK (e.g., during 
                                                          
457  I.e., while the focus of security risks has been shifted somewhat in 2011 towards prioritizing maritime 
defences in the East China Sea (MOD, 2011: 5), the consistent framing of North Korea as a source of threats 
bearing potential risks to Japan has left a legacy which maintains considerable momentum; without the 
need for further additional emphasis of such to convince political, civil society and market actors. 
458  This phrase was conceptualized by linguist and political commentator, Silvio Glen in his public postulations 
regarding how British authorities recalibrated risks emanating from Iraq prior to the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Gulf Wars. 
Glen’s notion is that while obvious propaganda will meet some conscious resistance from public and 
academic spheres, a continuation of indirect, background information which reinforces the negative 
framing of an external foe will gradually encroach upon the centre-ground opinion, and thus influence 
foreign policy norms and agenda setting in a given area. This is oft-times achieved through the passive tense, 
such as “it has been confirmed by experts that...”, “analysts have stated that..”, “concerns are growing 
that...” (Glen, 1991) etc. 
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early August of 2010),459 to the publishing of a small article on the Hong Kong financial 
regulator‟s investigation of North Korea‟s international investment company (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 7 August 2010: 7). These standardize the framing of North Korea, which serves to 
highlight compounded risks (economic, military etc.) borne by the DPRK. However, the 
passive effects of articles criticizing various elements of the North Korean state are also 
supplemented with those, exemplified by an article on South Korea‟s political restructuring 
and cabinet reshuffle, which only become apparent to the process of Japan‟s recalibration of 
risk in response to North Korea when considering the lengthy and conclusive mention of the 
DPRK, and, in the example at hand, the ROK‟s decision to demonstrate a continuing hard-
line against the North (Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 August 2010: 7). In the case above, this was 
apparently demonstrated through maintenance of security and reunification positions 
designed as measures to reinforce such a stance – which makes a degree of assumption 
regarding how Japan should also interpret the potentialities of such risks. 
    In the above regard, it is also important to emphasise the use of predicated language, as 
explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.13, in the framing of North Korea  as highlighted by the 
pervasive and widespread usage of the propaganda passive. This is realized in tangible 
linguistic terms by phrases such as, “it has been made clear that” (akiraka ni natta), “it can 
be seen as” or “it is thought that” (to mirareru, to minasarete iru) and “according to experts” 
(senmonka ni yoru to). These terms are used to mediate risks to the broader society without 
necessarily specifying the basis of source details or the volume of information which evince 
underlying facts. Articles in Japan relating to North Korea are oft-times loaded with such 
structures.460 The predicative use of the propaganda passive within mass-media sources is 
by no means the only means by which the DPRK is framed in Japan‟s public sphere, but 
                                                          
459  A similar range of articles making both passive and active references to North Korea (perpetuating its 
       framing as that bearing a range of highly calibrated risks) can be observed consistently in adjacent time   
       periods (e.g., see Yomiuri Shimbun, 29-30 September 2010). 
460  For a broad range of illustrative examples, see Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 November 2010: 2, 21 December 
2010: 1; Asahi Shimbun, 13 April 2010: 1, 13 May 2010: 9. 
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represents an important illustration of how a stereotype, of the kind conceptualized by 
American journalist, Walter Lippmann, is being reinforced, which facilitates the mediation of 
Japan‟s recalibration of risks identified with Pyongyang (Shigemura, 2009: 24-8).461 
    Amid this process, the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan in March of 
2010, under suspicion that it had been undertaken by the DPRK‟s security forces, brought 
wide-spread outrage and criticisms aimed against Pyongyang from the global community‟s 
leaders. Not least, following an initial investigation which pointed firmly towards the North‟s 
involvement, Japan‟s political leadership, as noted above, were quick to express the urgent 
need to take unified and resolute action in response to what were already recalibrated risks 
being posed from the DPRK. As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, Ulrich Beck (as well as 
many of his critics and supporters) has identified the prevalent use of scientific justifications 
in the process of politicizing and reacting to external risks such as these. This was starkly 
apparent in former Prime Minister, Hatoyama‟s statement that investigations and reports 
conducted by the ROK relating to how North Korea had supposedly sunk the Cheonan were 
“objective and scientific” (Itō, 2010). This scientific information provided the basis for Japan‟s 
policy community to formulate their responses to the incident, and how related risks should 
be calibrated.462 Moreover, the incident affirms the process observed in Chapter 2, Section 
2.14, expressed in constructivist terms, whereby risks associated with a particular 
phenomenon or target develop to form the basis of norms which dictate how to counter or 
                                                          
461  In fact, Shigemura uses the example of Lippmann’s stereotypes to reject theories that highlight Japan’s 
“North Korea-bashing.” His argument posits that once a counter-stereotype such as North Korea-bashing 
has been created it threatens to obfuscate or discourage accurate information (particularly if it is of a 
negative kind) being articulated concerning a given source, such as that originating in the DPRK, as much or 
more as the original negative stereotype (Shigemura, 2009: 29-32). 
462  It should be noted that, as with the arguments presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.6, particularly those 
derived from Wada Haruki’s (2003) analysis of domestic political motivations for foreign-policy agendas in 
Japan, the DPJ coalition administration and former Prime Minister, Hatoyama, in particular were in need of 
a means to distract negative domestic attention concerning a variety of social and political ails. This was 
undoubtedly, therefore, as in the case of Koizumi’s dealings with the DPRK, a powerful contributing factor in 
motivating a re-ignition of Japan’s strong negative framing of North Korea and the perception of new risks 
which could be pinned on the Pyongyang regime; creating at once distraction and a means to demonstrate 
affirmative and effective political action – free from the shackles of domestic competition. 
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ameliorate them.463 
 
 5.9. Academic analysis: intellectual support for the recalibration of risk   
Although not an immediately novel phenomenon, the academic and intellectual arms of the 
policy community in Japan have oft-times also worked, both directly and indirectly, to 
reinforce the recalibration of risks identified with North Korea by policy makers and societal 
actors. This is realized by providing a theoretical or logistical framework with which to argue 
political standpoints and perceptions. Moreover, academia, rather than existing as an 
independent entity, is clearly constitutive of a causal actor which overlaps and interacts with 
the state and civil society – and indeed the market.464 This is of specific interest when taken 
in terms of the context and remit of this dissertation, because it highlights a further 
interactional aspect, intersecting the state, market and society which influences the 
processes of risk recalibration in relation to responses made against a negatively framed 
North Korea. 
    The theoretical basis for such arguments predominantly stems from the evaluation that 
Japan is at risk of facing the fallout from the DPRK‟s continued cybernetic tactics (Michishita, 
2009: 110-7, see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2), which contain a high-level of planning and 
strategy in order to lure, primarily the US, into direct negotiations towards a full and 
internationally recognized peace treaty.465 For instance, in the aftermath of provocative 
actions, namely missile and nuclear tests, conducted during 2009 by Pyongyang, 
                                                          
463  As discussed further in Section 5.12.ii, however, the Cheonan incident ultimately appears only to have   
       been sufficient to maintain the levels of risk-calibration established following the events of 2009 – as 
       opposed to an additional recalibration which, for example, could have resulted in the extensive  
       introduction of further sanctions or other concrete counter-measures (see also Section 5.10). 
464  If one considers the market interests of scholars, universities and students alone, not to mention their 
connections to actors within the policy community, the commercial aspects have to be of relevance. 
465  The original, and still in operation, Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed mutually, individually and 
collectively by representatives of the United Nations Command, the Supreme Commander of the Korean 
People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in 1953, but was intended from the 
outset to be a temporary agreement, until a full peace treaty could be negotiated.   
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comparisons were drawn by scholars to the way in which the North Korean regime secured 
the “agreed framework” and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
energy assistance from the US following the nuclear crisis of the 1990s; i.e., by employing 
similar brinkmanship tactics, implemented through a variety of provocations and aggressions. 
Once again, this also allowed scholars to bundle together a range of risks (nuclear, missile, 
fraud, kidnappings, etc.) into the same frame, and justify recalibrating them, on the grounds 
that they were by-products which may form part of North Korea‟s (worryingly) successful on-
going military campaigns (Abe, 2009: 79).466  As noted in review of the dynamic struck by 
policy makers between risk and uncertainty, explored in the work of O‟Malley (2004), and 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, the uncertainty surrounding North Korea‟s capabilities 
and intentions facilitates how the DPRK can be, and is, framed within Japan. This is 
particularly evident with regards to how nuclear-related risks are perceived within core 
sections of the academic community, in light of their cataclysmic potential (Takubo, 2010: 
157-61). In essence, it is argued that North Korea is being allowed to super-size its own 
potential for exercising harms associated with the risks that project over Japan through its 
ever increasing use of and reliance upon “brinkmanship diplomacy”, or setogiwa gaikō 
tactics. These are portrayed as being employed as a strategy to maintain attention directed 
towards the North and lure external actors into direct negotiations (Ōe, 2007: 31-3), but at 
the same time highlight the tangible potential of the risks themselves. 
    Amid this, it is also striking that qualitative research data collected from leading 
independent think-tanks and affiliated experts for this dissertation suggests that a large body 
of specialists on Japan‟s North Korea relations display a consistently and concertedly neo-
                                                          
466  Abe also heightened the sense of risks pervading from North Korea by noting that because no full peace 
treaty was ever reached at the conclusion of the Korean War, the DPRK is for its own part still in a state of 
war. As such, he claims, it is only logical to assume that it will try anything to scupper its enemies – 
including Japan. Furthermore, Abe evinces the theory that, ultimately, a nuclear-armed Tokyo might be the 
only means by which to fully ameliorate the risk of North Korea enacting a military aggression across the 
Sea of Japan (2009: 81). 
282 
 
realist approach to risks sourced in the DPRK.467 468 469  Therein, risks identified with 
Pyongyang are not interpreted or expressed, in the above sense, as political tools used by 
the North to garner attention and political capital, but are, rather, repeatedly and 
unwaveringly stated as tangible and pressing – and requiring of geopolitically-based policy 
provisions to be made by Japan. Moreover, academic scholars from each of the institutions 
researched protested the Japanese people‟s inertia towards military normalization and a lack 
of right-of-centre consensus as obstacles to the necessary provisions being made; also 
uniformly dismissing the idea that Japan was buckling under beiatsu that demanded a more 
normalized and active role in the East Asia security environment (Hirama and Sugita, 2003; 
McCormack, 2007). The core issues of missiles, nuclear armament, abductions and 
incursions were repeatedly posited as the key source of potential harms to Japan, 
presenting a range of on-going risks which require amelioration. In addition, the North 
Korean community in Japan was further identified as a source of socio-economic risks, 
purportedly working in association with the regime in Pyongyang to adversely impact upon 
Japan. Yet, at the same time, China was consistently identified as the ultimate source of 
longer-term risks, and framed as being of foremost real concern. 
    In addition, however, it has also been noted by a number of prominent critical scholars 
within Japan‟s academic field that pre-university education has increasingly become 
significant in terms of recalibrating risks framed against the DPRK. Concretely, as stated in 
an interview (8 April 2011, Appendix A) by one leading author on the abductions issue (and 
former high school teacher), junior and senior high-school education represents a significant 
                                                          
467  The term “independent” is italicized here to highlight the dubious nature of the term when used to 
describe organizations, particularly in terms of think-tanks, which gain funding from governmental or other 
politico-market-interested sources. 
468  Neo-realist in the sense not only of being hard-nosed and aggressive in assertions and attitudes, but 
actually in terms of theoretical position, as outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.2; referring specifically to 
frameworks involving Japan’s balancing and bandwagoning within the East Asia Region. 
469  Accessed organizations include The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS (representative)), 
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). 
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element in priming the acceptance of a high calibration of risks pertaining to North Korea.470 
Indeed, as further noted by another former high school teacher and professor of education in 
a separate interview (12 April 2011, Appendix A), the pervasive influence of a combination of 
right-wing figures and groups upon the interpretation of North Korean issues in upper level 
educational text books is remarkable. The same source posited that such a coalition has 
included prominent politicians (including former PMs, Abe Shinzō and Koizumi Junichirō), 
Ministry of Education bureaucrats and popular authors. Most strikingly, such have 
succeeded in producing officially recognized modern history textbooks, which include those 
co-authored by leading right-wing cartoonist and activist, Kobayashi Yoshinori.471 
    This kind of intellectually converging position, taken from a sector which stretches from 
high-schools to high-profile academic figures and leading think-tanks, is significant because 
it suggests that powerful elements of the academic community in Japan are influential in the 
recalibration of risks vis-à-vis North Korea, and the dissemination of information relating to 
them which is mediated to the broader society. Furthermore, while it would be over-
stretching the interpretation of data to posit that government dictates what scholars write, it 
suggests that risks perceived to emanate from North Korea, given that most such academic 
institutions receive official government funding, are indeed being maximized in collusion with 
policy makers to justify military strengthening and the normalization of Japan‟s geo-political 
(international) position. Ultimately, such a school posits that this is to be facilitated through 
revision of the constitution – and will facilitate more extensive measures designed to counter 
a rising China. Indeed, in this respect, a representative of the Research Institute for Peace 
and Security (RIPS) stated (28 September 2010, Appendix A) that,  
                                                          
470   It was posited that education is critical in priming adults’ conceptions of such risks, because it is they who 
go on to be representative citizens. The interviewee, an Emeritus Professor of Education and former high-
school teacher, fought a legal battle against the GoJ to teach a curriculum which included elements of 
history from a North Korean perspective (as opposed solely to being taught from the Japanese side). 
471   Kobayashi co-authored the high school history text book series beginning with atarashii rekishi kyōkasho 
(Nishioka Kanji, 2001). Later editions include coverage of the abduction issue and spy-boat incursions, 
which uniformly frame the DPRK as culpable of crimes which violate sovereignty (shuken ga shingai sareru) 
(Fujioka, 2005: 143). 
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  North Korea is Japan‟s number one enemy. Japan-DPRK relations are unlikely to 
normalize any time soon, at least not unless US-North Korea relations are normalized or 
the regime in Pyongyang collapses.  
 
  And, went on to assert that,  
   
  Even if the risks are somewhat played-up by the media, they are real. Sure, North Korea is 
not actually capable of attacking Japan‟s territorial domain, but they might launch a missile.  
 
  Yet, the same spokesperson also conceded that,  
 
  Actually we have to feel grateful towards North Korea, because they have provided us with 
a justification to develop sophisticated military hardware and BMD systems, which can also 
be adapted for use against a rising China.  
 
The complicit admission that a high-calibration of risks posed by North Korea can be utilized 
to make counter-measures directed at an increasingly threatening China has to be 
considered as evidence that a deliberate recalibration or risk has taken place within a 
converging area of the policy community involving powerful political and academic actors. 
Such measures are, therein, consistently justified through reference to a series of 
provocative actions undertaken by the DPRK, which can be identified with a number of 
specific key events.472 
    In fact, however, many leading scholars have actually demonstrated a strikingly measured 
and tactically aware understanding of the so-called North Korea problems, as posited in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3 ~ Section 1.7, before and after the incidents of 2009, and have 
warned against overstating threat perceptions of the DPRK and the risks posed to Japan by 
the regime in Pyongyang (Ogawa and Sakamoto, 2007; Matsumura and Takakusagi (eds), 
2007; Yoshida, 2008). The dangers of over-exaggerating the abduction issue, or conflating it 
with other perceived sources of threat and the associated risks (nuclear, missile etc.) are 
also a recurrent theme, as is the obvious politically (as opposed to practically) tactical use of 
                                                          
 472  As one political scientist posited in an interview (13 April 2011, Appendix A), in this respect, although it is 
very unlikely that North Korea would use any form of military attack (i.e., including a missile launch), 
Pyongyang’s stupidity, in terms of repeated provocative actions, has given credibility to those seeking to 
emphasise risks posed by North Korea in Japan. 
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missile and nuclear tests by the DPRK.473 The dominant schools of this discourse tend to 
emphasise that the greatest risk to Japan‟s security is, in fact, an overzealous reaction to 
North Korea, which exacerbates the facilitation of its rapid implosion, and results in turmoil 
on the Korean peninsula (Ogawa and Sakamoto, 2007: 39-41). However, due to the 
substantial inclusion of military-based information contained within such texts, which outline 
the tangible potential for actual harms to be exercised against Japan as a result of 
Pyongyang deploying and delivering WMD (in addition to employing a variety of other illegal 
and illegitimate (fraud, abduction etc) means), they leave themselves open to 
reinterpretation and manipulation – including by policy makers out of context. As observed 
above, this has been seized upon by political and market actors who stand to gain from the 
recalibration of such risks, and the mediation of them throughout civil society.474 
    It is also noteworthy, in terms of the intellectual arm (and, indeed, political and media 
coverage) of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea that Japan‟s domestic 
political issues are often times cited as a major factor in individual or administration-based 
reactions to the DPRK, but the equivalent is rarely considered as a key element in 
Pyongyang‟s actions.475 Indeed, this shows the weight of momentum built up by political and 
media actors who seek to perpetuate North Korea‟s fixed framing – as a belligerent, 
totalitarian state guided by one family‟s (Kim Il-Sung, Jong-Il, Jong-Un) quest for regime 
survival (to be obtained by gaining direct negotiations with the US) – regardless of the actual 
domestic circumstances which may direct primary agency over politically loaded decisions. 
This includes actions such as those of the missile and nuclear tests in 2009 (Lee, 2009: 103-
                                                          
473  It is also worth noting here the evolving, alternative, discourses of human security, such as that taken up 
by Okonogi and Isozaki (2009). See also Close up Gendai (2010), and Yamanaka (2011). 
474  Academic schools and theoretical strands are notoriously problematic to categorize, and it is not the claim 
of this dissertation that absolute predominance of any one particular theory associated with analyses of 
North Korea is present in Japan, merely that certain common tendencies of academic discourse allow, even 
if not intentionally, the manipulated facilitation of risk recalibration by political forces, framed against the 
DPRK. 
475  Aside from the recent historical examples of Koizumi and Abe, already discussed above, the case of Asō’s 
extreme reaction and dispatch of PAC-3s in 2009 was also widely evaluated as an attempt to bolster his 
dwindling domestic support. For discussion, see Kim J. (2009). 
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6).476 In essence, since the dominant discourse in Japan regarding motives for North Korea‟s 
actions has been established through a process of mediation (e.g., via media and academic 
sources) between the state, market and wider society, there has been little attempt or desire 
to re-asses specific causal changes on the North Korean side. 
 
5.10. Further policy revisions to counter the risks of more missiles and nuclear tests 
Japan‟s recalibration of risk vis-à-vis North Korea as a reaction to the events of 2009 was 
primarily realized, in terms of concrete policy measures, in the areas of military equipment 
and deployment, and the tightening of supplementary economic sanctions and human 
security measures.477 Furthermore, the conception and implementation of such policies was 
undertaken, in each case, within a framework and discourse which strongly reinforced the 
norm of bilateralism, and can be seen to have further weakened the norm of anti-militarism. 
 
    In April of 2009 the GoJ took the unprecedented step of dispatching PAC-3 units to seven 
locations throughout the archipelago with the stipulated purpose of intercepting North 
Korean missiles, and publicized the dispatch via mainstream media sources. In effect, this 
raised threat levels within Japan and created the widespread perception that the risk of a 
                                                          
476  Lee suggests that both the 2006 launch and tests, and the events of 2009 were likely primarily motivated 
by those within the upper echelons of the North Korean political elite who prioritize military strengthening 
over economic reform. The suggestion is that even the reasons for the particular number and type of 
missile tests was greatly influenced by domestic politics. Lee argues that the military leaders are under 
increasing pressure to reform, and stood to lose out as the result of restructuring, so attempted to hide the 
struggling Taepodong flagship project amongst a barrage of Nodong launches and a nuclear test, in order to 
bolster Pyongyang’s military prowess and deny economic reformists negotiating capital in an internal 
struggle which threatened to leave the army in an increasingly weakened position. 
477  While strengthening of the JCG has, as observed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, been a noteworthy feature in 
the realization of Japan’s recalibration of risk in response to North Korea, the degree to which the events of   
      2009 can be attributed to such is debatable – pointing rather to a shift in focus for external framing and,   
      ultimately, a reduction in the degree of novel risk recalibration attributed to the North’s actions – as 
      discussed below. 
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missile fired from the DPRK would strike Japan.478 Such perceptions were exacerbated by 
the MOD‟s official account of events, which contended the need for the PAC-3 dispatch on 
the grounds that it had been carried out to counter falling missiles (rakka ni taisuru sonae wo 
okonatta) – thereby conflating the slim possibility of parts of missiles flying over Japan 
landing on one of the Japanese islands – with that of a missile strike against Tokyo by 
Pyongyang (MOD, 2010c). Moreover, the North‟s test-firings were used by the MOD as a 
justification for the further development of BMD systems with the US and closer operational 
integration with Washington.479 
 
    In addition, as noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.9, one of the most defining benchmarks by 
which the recalibration of risks (specifically risks perceived to be posed to national security) 
in Japan can be ascertained is the once-five-yearly publication of the National Defense 
Program Guidelines (NDPG), previously made explicit through release of the 2005 National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO), or bōeitaikō. This is particularly so in terms of how the 
political and bureaucratic arms of the policy community will, in effect, set-out a normative 
rationale for the coming years through which the risks perceived to be most pressing will be 
dealt with. Therein, while more public sphere scrutiny may have been assigned to the 2005 
NDPO in this sphere, on account of it directly referring to North Korea as a tangible threat for 
the first time, in fact even greater provisions were made to issues concerning risks posed by 
the DPRK in the NDPG of 2010 (for fiscal year 2011).480 Indeed, with regard to “unclear and 
                                                          
478  In addition to the dispatch of truck-loaded units in Akita, Iwate and the metropolitan area, SM-3  
interceptor missiles were loaded on to Aegis vessels, strategically positioned in the Japan Sea (MOD, 2010c). 
479  See MOD (2011) presentation for full details of the official perception of ballistic missile issues – in terms 
of Japan’s joint cooperation with the US and the specific identification of the DPRK as a source of multiple, 
salient and increasingly pressing risks. 
480  In one sense, a distraction from how North Korean risks had been increasingly recalibrated was also 
created prior to the release of the 2010 NDPO, due to Japan’s emphasis on the defence of the East China 
Sea, particularly following the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with a JCG patrol boat off-shore of the 
Pinnacle Islands in 2010. Further, the 2010 NDPO identifies the fact that “Military modernization by China 
and its insufficient transparency are of concern for the regional and global community” (MOD, 2010a: 2), by 
way of its leading directives for areas surrounding Japan.   
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uncertain elements in the region” the delayed 2010 edition (2010: 3-4) states with concern to 
the risks posed by the DPRK that, 
 
North Korea is continuing its development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and maintains a large-scale special operations 
force. It has also repeatedly conducted provocative military actions on the Korean 
Peninsula. North Korea‟s military activities constitute an immediate and grave 
destabilizing factor to regional security. They also pose a serious challenge to 
international non-proliferation efforts (English edition).481    
 
The passage above, therefore, both maintains the mandate for implementing further 
practical policy measures vis-à-vis North Korea, and stresses the uncertainty and broad-
ranging nature of risks posed by Pyongyang.482 In this way, the norm of bilateralism is once 
again reaffirmed and adhered to, in concurrence with the general thrust of the 2010 
NDPG.483 Further, it is realized by way of advocating a coordinated approach to deal with 
such security risks. The recalibration of those risks is, therein, justified through the necessity 
of ameliorating risks posed by threats which are uncertain in terms of timing and scale, but 
definite in terms of perceived salience.484 
 
    In addition, following the North‟s missile and nuclear tests of 2009, Japan once again led 
                                                          
481  See full text for surrounding context (MOD, 2010a). 
482  Nevertheless, while the 2010 NDPO in one sense appears to represent a facilitation of risk recalibration in   
       response to the North’s missile and nuclear tests of 2009, it is less concrete in terms of identifying risks   
       associated with events such as the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel and shelling of Yeongpyeong Island 
       which occurred shortly prior to its release. For further discussion of the decreasing momentum of  
       additional risk recalibration in relation to these events, see Section 5.12, below.    
483  With regards to Japan’s bilateral coordination with “its ally”, the official FY 2011 NDPG Summary simply 
states (MOD, 2010d: 4) that, “The Japan-U.S. Alliance is indispensable in ensuring for Japan’s peace and 
security”, going on to outline Japan’s intention to deepen cooperation with the US in countering risks 
stemming from new and uncertain threats – alluding to those posed by China and North Korea. 
484  Here too, then, as outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, and Chapter 2, Section 2.7.i, the prominent role of 
uncertainty in facilitating political decisions over the governance of risks, discussed by, amongst others, 
Beck et al. (1992), Simon and Baker (2002) and O’Malley (2004), and the applicability of a resulting 
recalibration of such risks, despite a lack of statistical verification or historical precedents, as exposed by 
Gardner (2008) and Taleb (2007), is evinced as an important element in North Korea’s framing by Japan’s 
political and bureaucratic policy makers – and the continued imposition of subsequent national security 
directives.    
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the way within the regional and international community in pressing the UN to impose the 
strongest possible resolution and accompanying sanctions against Pyongyang. Ultimately, 
Japan‟s efforts to emphasise the risks posed by North Korea contributed to the adoption of 
UNSC Resolution 1874 on 12 June 2009.485 In addition to extending the measures imposed 
by Resolution 1718 in 2006, Resolution 1874 specified the further tightening of sanctions 
and provided a legal mandate for member states to impose an embargo against “additional 
goods, persons and entities” entering and leaving the DPRK – as well as being encouraged 
to inspect and seize cargo on the high-seas if suspected of containing banned substances or 
goods for import and export to North Korea.486 The significance of Japan‟s role in framing the 
DPRK as a high-risk entity within this context, then, is evinced by the manner in which Tokyo, 
despite intensified domestic competition and distraction concerning all issues over a general 
election (see Section 5.5), maintained a consistent course of risk recalibration to impose its 
own unilateral sanctions and, moreover, use such as a basis by which to push for stronger 
measures to be implemented by the UN.487 
    In consistency with the above, the JCG also continued to push for upgrades to its 
equipment and emphasized the requirement of sophisticated military apparatus to effectively 
counter on-going risks presented by suspicious ships and spy boats (JCG, 2010).488 
However, it is noteworthy here that in comparison to the JCG‟s 2007 Annual Report – which 
responded to North Korea‟s actions during 2006, no obvious new policy directives or direct 
references to the DPRK were made in the 2010 version. Furthermore, the section on 
                                                          
485  For full content of Resolution 1874, see UNSC (2009a). 
486  For details on Japan’s statements (Paragraph 13) to the UNSC regarding Resolution 1874, and an outline of 
the extensions to be made to Resolutoin 1718, see UNSC (2009b). 
487  Pertinently, the success of Japan’s representatives to the UN amid this process is demonstrated by the 
inclusion, and unanimous acceptance, of the “additional goods, persons and entities” within Resolution 
1874, something which had been unsuccessfully sought by Tokyo in the imposition of Resolution 1718 
following the tests of 2006 (see, Chapter 4, Section 4.9). 
488  It should be remembered that the JCG’s Annual Reports cover the events and topics of the previous  
       year (i.e., Annual Report 2010 pertains to events occurring in 2009). 
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suspicious ships was minimized in terms of length and position.489 In contrast, the 2007 
report not only highlighted the acquisition of four new high-speed patrol boats specifically for 
the purpose of countering suspicious ships, but also contained an entire section dedicated to 
an account of JCG staff inspecting the North Korean vessel (JCG, 2007), Man Gyong-Bong, 
which also made reference to the abductions issue and contained both subjective negative 
referrals to North Korean staff and photographs of a recovered “spy boat” (kōsakusen).490 As 
discussed further in Section 5.12, and extrapolated in Chapter 6, this appears to represent a 
shift from the additional recalibration of risks framed against Pyongyang in response to given 
events (such as those in 2006), towards only the maintenance of those levels of risk 
calibration – once established by Japan‟s policy community (particularly the executive arm of 
the state) in response to North Korea‟s on-going provocations. 
    As such, the additional measures taken and implemented as a function of recalibrated 
risks by Japan‟s policy community in 2009 can, when cross-analysed with reaction to 
succeeding events unfolding throughout 2009 and 2010 – namely further missile tests, the 
suspected sinking of the ROK‟s Cheonan naval vessel, and North Korea‟s shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island – be seen as having represented a maximising of policy directives which  
used the framing of North Korea to justify the imposition of increasingly severe counter 
measures and the propagation of hard-line rhetoric within Japan. Therein, as expressed in 
Chapter 6, Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, while the acme of media and Diet reactions to North 
Korea‟s military-based actions only extended as far as the Nuclear test of 2006, the 
momentum, created by the successive interactive process of recalibrated risks identified with 
Pyongyang, appears to have resulted in a political climate whereby even the non-extension 
of further policy directives towards the DPRK only began to be realized during 2010-11 – in 
terms of responses to those later events (see also Section 5.12, below). 
    Therefore, the process explicated above further highlights the significance of risk 
                                                          
489  Relocated within the report from the fourth (2007) to the seventh (2010) of seven sections. 
490  For full text, see Chian no kakuho, Chapter 7 (JCG, 2010) and Chian no kakuho, Koramu 7 (JCG, 2007). 
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recalibration as a phenomenon, regulated by prevailing norms, which both sets the 
parameters of policy imposition and to a large extent dictates the time period within which a 
given political (or politico-military) trajectory can be maintained. While it is problematic to 
attempt sweeping conclusions, particularly without comparison of future nuclear and missile 
tests which may be conducted by the DPRK, the existing evidence from contemporary 
events, such as those covered in Section 5.12, below, suggests that the time-lag (political 
momentum) between risk recalibration and the extent of resulting policy revisions, in this 
case, reached a ceiling in 2009 – made tangible in the form of domestic legal revisions and 
the passing of UNSC Resolution 1874. 
 
5.11. The market’s reaction: shifts in the prioritizing of domestic economic risks 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.10, the lack of economic potential for investment and 
business development (and the incumbent risks of such endeavours) in North Korea appear 
to have prevented powerful market actors in Japan, such as Nippon Keidanren, from seeking 
to de-construct the DPRK‟s negative framing in order to undertake more active initiatives 
towards engaging Pyongyang. Furthermore, Keidanren, and other related organizations in 
Japan, have openly stated their vested interests in terms of securing greater productivity and 
flexibility for the domestic defence industry.491 Within this, the high-calibration of risks 
perceived to be posed by North Korea is a crucial factor in justifying the need to procure and 
equip JSDF forces with state-of-the-art equipment and weaponry – to be manufactured in 
Japan. Indeed, in its proposal of 14 July 2009, Keidanren specifically identified the North‟s 
multiple missile launches and nuclear test of the same year as the primary cause of security 
                                                          
491   This is a point further concurred by other experts, who in interviews (12 and 13 April 2011, Appendix A)  – 
as illustrated by the case of US military bases in Okinawa – respectively emphasized the overwhelming 
influence of the interests of politicians, bureaucrats and business people on both US and Japanese sides to 
maintain a high calibration of risks framed against the DPRK; in order to assure military budgets and justify 
US marine presence (despite the Marine Corps’ lack of practical application in such case that an attack was 
to be launched against Pyongyang) in (Okinawa) Japan.    
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risks posed to Tokyo, and as the central justification for bolstering investment in the defence 
industry (Nippon Keidanren, 2009: 1). 
As such, the risk of economic ruin within the domestic defence industry and its affiliated 
subsidiaries has been considered more salient than that manifest in the possible loss of 
business caused by the continued negative framing of the DPRK across political and public 
spheres within Japan. In combination with the media‟s largely market-driven motivations to 
propagate North Korea stories – as posited in Chapter 2, Section 2.10 and Chapter 4, 
Section 4.7 – large scale commercial interests continued to play an important role in 
prioritizing the amelioration of risks posed by Pyongyang‟s actions (nuclear and missile tests) 
up to 2009. In the above sense, these risks were calibrated more highly than those of 
potential lost revenue, which could not be gained due to the inability to invest in the DPRK 
as a result of Japan‟s sustained negative framing of North Korea – and contingent inability 
to engage further with the North for the promotion of diplomatic normalization and increased 
economic exchange. 
 
5.12. Reaction to recent events: a new equilibrium? 
As with previous events identified with Japan‟s framing of North Korea and the successive 
recalibration of risks, the extent, level and trajectory of such (re)calibrations can, to a certain 
extent, be quantified through comparisons of the volume of coverage – particularly in the 
Diet and across media sources – assigned to each incidence. Table 5.2, below, highlights 
the impact of three further examples that would, in light of the case-studies observed above 
(pertaining to events occurring between 1993 and 2009), be expected to accentuate the 
established process of risk recalibration within Japan in response to North Korea – and 
further compound its negative framing.492 However, in fact, while their impact does little to 
                                                          
492  Due to the close proximity of the events covered in this period, and the null-hypothesis that, in fact, there 
has been a discernible shift towards a state of relative equilibrium (as opposed to further recalibration) – 
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evince a significant reduction in the calibration of risks attached to the DPRK, taken as a 
combined effect, it is also problematic to make an empirically convincing case for these 
events having been utilized to further recalibrate risks to a significantly higher level. As such, 
what can be seen is the tentative emergence of a new equilibrium, in terms of the process of 
risk recalibration framed against North Korea having come to fruition – and having become 
established as a kind of proxy-norm within political, market and societal spheres in Japan.493 
The absence, therein, of an additional major recalibration of risk vis-à-vis the DPRK is, as 
explicated below, corroborated by qualitative and quantitative data relating to key events 
occurring after those of the missile and nuclear tests conducted in April, May and July 2009. 
 
5.12.i. Minimal reaction to North Korea‟s October 2009 multiple missile test-launch 
Pyongyang‟s resumption of multiple missile test launches in to the Sea of Japan on 12 
October 2009, coming only three months after its July test-firings, might well have been 
expected to trigger a more raucous reaction from Japan‟s policy community. This is 
particularly so given that it was interpreted, in one sense, by the GoJ as part of North 
Korea‟s programme to refine its ballistic missile capabilities (Kitazawa, 13 November 2009, 
Diet Security Committee, 173: 7).494 However, the incident‟s almost total omission from direct 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
involving such elements as media and political saturation of North Korean affairs, administration change, 
and the maximizing of related issues as a tool to justify policy innovations – the periods prior to and after 
each event have been condensed to a one month time-span. This is designed, primarily, to target an 
assessment of the immediate impact of each incidence.    
493  One leading Western author on Japanese affairs suggested in an interview (8 February 2011, Appendix A) 
that this process is likely the result of leading steak-holder actors having effectively utilized the North Korea 
problems to the extent which they have achieved their policy agendas – e.g., such as military strengthening 
and further logistical cooperation with the US – and, hence, no-longer require a further recalibration of 
North Korea-assigned risks. 
494  While Defence Minister, Kitazawa Toshimi’s, statement to the Security Committee referred to the 
intensification of problems relating to North Korean missile capabilities (Kitachōsen no misairu mondai no 
shinkokka) as part of his drive to justify investing in improvements to Japan’s BMD systems, he actually only 
alluded to the significance of the 12 October test, given the timing of his address. Both his statement and 
those of other leading politicians for the incoming DPJ administration were, however, consistent in their lack 
of radical departure from the outgoing LDP’s North Korea policies in this sphere, and of their advocating of 
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reference in the Diet sessions which followed, and extremely limited coverage in the main-
stream press, highlights the apparent lack (without clear evidence of such a new capability) 
of motivation on the part of actors concerned to further recalibrate risks – which had already 
been extremely emphasized in the wake of missile and nuclear tests conducted earlier in the 
same year. The lack of public-political sphere interest in this incident is, indeed, also evinced 
by the short length of articles covering the event and the dearth of emotive language – 
previously employed for emphasis and persuasive effects when describing the North‟s 
actions. This was epitomized by the Asahi Shimbun‟s only national piece dedicated solely to 
covering North Korea‟s five-missile test launch of October 12.495 The article, which is less 
than ten lines long, stated merely that, 
 
North Korea already launched three KNO2 missiles towards Japan on 6 July. Due to it 
using solid fuel, the time required before launching was reduced, and the targeting 
capabilities are improved. However, in light of its short-range, no direct threat is posed to 
Japan. This launch can probably be seen as part of periodical military exercises or as a 
test used to ascertain its weapons capabilities. 
 
(evening edition, 13 October 2009: 11)   
 
Such a detached, non-confrontational style, which played down the risks posed to Japan, 
indeed, comes in stark contrast to the comprehensive criticisms and high-level of risk 
recalibration assigned to the North‟s actions by the Asahi following the missile and nuclear 
tests of 2006, and, moreover, even to its and others‟ reactions observed in response to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a comprehensive (hōkatsuteki) strategy for dealing with the multiple North Korea problems (abduction, 
nuclear and missile). For related statements made by then Foreign Minister, Okada and Prime Minister, 
Hatoyama, see Security Committee (Okada, 13 November 2009, 173: 9), main session (Hatoyama, 29 
October 2009, 173: 7). 
495  The Yomiuri, while placing the story of the DPRK missile test in more prominent positions (earlier pages) 
than the Asahi within the editions which carried it, published only two articles dedicated specifically to the 
launches. Further, in general convergence with the Asahi, despite slightly longer articles and more 
references to the possibilities of attaching nuclear armaments to the missiles, the Yomiuri used detached 
descriptive language, made no attempt to stress associated potential risks to Japan – referring rather to 
concerns raised by the US over the possibility of such technology being adapted for longer-range missiles – 
and only raised the issue of a UN resolution violation by way of reference to the ROK’s objection to the 
launches (see Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 October 2009: 7; evening edition, 13 October 2009: 1).    
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comparable events relating to North Korean missile and nuclear tests earlier in 2009, as 
outlined in Chapter 4, Section 4.7, and Section 5.3 and Section 5.4, above.496   
 
    The lack of impact made by the multiple launch upon risk calibration in Japan is also 
suggested from the quantitative evidence expressed in Table 5.2 (Figure 5.4), below, which 
shows a marked lack of reaction in comparison to the that made towards the missile firings 
of July 2009 (see Table 5.1 (Fig. 5.2(a) and Fig. 5.2(b), above). As noted, the obvious 
difference in range (i.e., the previous missiles flying over Japan) has an important role to 
play in terms of the volume of reaction witnessed from sources in Tokyo. However, given that 
neither test was carried out with the expressed aim of targeting Japan, and both violated the 
UN-imposed moratorium on the DPRK‟s missile tests, it is striking that, when measured in 
quantifiable terms, as expressed by Table 5.1 (above) and Table 5.2 (below), Japan‟s level of 
coverage in the three months post-dating the October tests was statistically equivalent to 
only one month‟s intensified coverage following the July launches. Therein, though it is not 
possible to draw comprehensive conclusions based on a single limited incident, a 
continuation of comparatively limited reactions to Pyongyang‟s successive provocations 
(including missile launches previously seen as the trigger for recalibrating risks) during the 
latter months of 2009 and throughout 2010 – as analysed in Section 5.12.ii and Section 
5.12.iii, below – does suggest that Japan‟s recalibrated risks framed against the DPRK, 
while not substantially reduced in terms of sustaining calibration at existing levels, have 
moved towards some form of equilibrium. Within this process, the series of upward waves of 
recalibration discussed in the chapters above, and illustrated in Figure 5.5, and Chapter 6, 
Figure(s) 6.1-6.3, have witnessed a levelling-off (or lack of sustained socio-political     
                                                          
496  While only so much can be interpreted from the muted reaction of the Asahi and other leading news 
sources to North Korea’s October 12 missile test – particularly given that the missiles were indeed short-
range and not capable in themselves of directly striking targets within Japan –  it infers that there is both a 
huge range of possible media response to the DPRK’s provocations and that mainstream media-sources in 
Japan have, as outlined by Hyung (2006: 483-508, see also Chapter 2, Section 2.10), a tendency to reach 
broad consensus on given issues. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the launches were in clear breach of the UN 
moratorium on the North’s missile test; for which Japan was a strong advocate. 
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market-driven momentum). This offers an explanation for why events such as the North‟s 
October 2009 missile test-firing are perceived as being comparatively insignificant and were 
insufficient to spark an additional recalibration of risks. They have also, therefore, had little 
impact in terms of further extending the public sphere framing of risks vis-à-vis the DPRK.       
 
5.12.ii. Consistent levels of risk-calibration in reaction to North Korea‟s suspected sinking of 
the Cheonan naval vessel 
Due to the initial (and continuing) uncertainty surrounding the circumstances regarding the 
sinking of the ROK‟s Cheonan naval vessel on 26 March 2010 – despite suspicions of North 
Korean involvement being present from an early stage – reaction from Japan‟s policy 
community and broader public sphere was understandably cautious and limited in scope and 
volume (e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 March 2010: 2; Asahi Shimbun, 27 March 2010: 1 
(evening editions)).497 
 
    Nevertheless, given that 46 crew members died in the incident, there was little if any 
serious provocation evident from the ROK or elsewhere, and that Pyongyang‟s military were 
suspected from the time of the event, it is notable that even once the DPRK had been 
officially identified by the international investigation team as culpable for having sunk the 
Cheonan, Japan‟s reaction was relatively limited in scale and veracity. However, having 
established that Pyongyang was indeed responsible, the by then familiar discourse – as 
discussed in Chapter 4 – of contestation over willingness by leading political actors to 
recalibrate risks identified with such an incidence to a sufficient level, and adapt policies 
accordingly, was visible in the Diet. This was highlighted by the, then new-opposition, LDP‟s 
                                                          
497  North Korea has consistently denied any involvement in the sinking and has repeatedly stated that any 
sanctions imposed as the result of an investigation carried out by an international body of independent 
experts, which found that it had indeed sunk the vessel with a torpedo, would be considered as acts of war. 
For discussion, see BBC News (2010b). 
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pressing of Defence Minister, Kitazwa (DPJ) to increase JSDF troop levels, justified partly as 
a response to risks posed by North Korea; apparently then made evident by its sinking of the 
Cheonan. To this effect, during a session of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 
shortly after the release of the investigation‟s report, on 27 May 2010, Yamamoto Ichita (174: 
5) urged that,      
The recent incidence of North Korea having attacked and sunk a South Korean naval 
vessel has occurred and...  ...China‟s navy is at present demonstrating a great deal of 
boisterous activity. Furthermore, Japan must play an active role in internationally 
coordinated activities. Amid this, once again with regards to the fixed quantities of JSDF 
troops and officers and their actual members, I am inclined to believe that we must make 
demands for a major increase in numbers.498 
 
Yamamoto‟s above statement to the Diet committee, then, suggests a continuation of the 
consistent pattern of qualitative risk calibration expressed by Tokyo‟s political elite; which 
emerged vis-à-vis the DPRK in the periods after the test launches and nuclear device 
detonations of 2006-2009. However, there is little ostensible evidence of a further 
recalibration of risk – in terms of identifying a novel threat – manifest in the Cheonan sinking. 
In general, the emphasis of reaction to the incident remained only upon increasing military 
strengthening, maintained as a focus of central discourse relating to Pyongyang‟s actions, 
and continued to frame North Korea as the source of salient risks. Such risks were, therein, 
once again utilized to justify out-bidding rival political parties and actors in order to take a 
consistently tough-line of policies, which could be revised as required to ameliorate them. 
 
    In quantitative terms, the Impact of the Cheonan‟s sinking – given the incidence‟s lack of 
clarity as a single isolated event – likewise demonstrates a consistent pattern. This resulted  
 
                                                          
498  Once again the presence of a broad convergence between ruling and leading opposition parties over how 
to deal with security risks (Yamamoto notes his general agreement (kihontekini sansei) with provisions for 
the upcoming NDPG), such as those posed by North Korea, is striking in its juxtaposition with competition 
over how best to demonstrate strength in applying measures to do so. China’s recalibration as the ultimate 
source of even greater risks beyond that of the DPRK is also, once again, made visible. 
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in the extensive, but not unprecedented, increase of coverage of North Korean affairs in the 
months that followed across Japan‟s public sphere and an extension of the DPRK‟s negative 
framing attached to a range of risks identified with Pyongyang‟s provocations.499 It is 
noteworthy, however, that statistically the phenomenon of a receding pattern of waves (i.e., a 
new equilibrium), as opposed to the model exhibiting a rising series of peaks observed up to 
2006, has been realized – as observed in Figure 5.4(a) and Figure 5.4(b), below. Indeed, as 
discussed further below (see also Chapter 6, Figure 6.1), the pattern of a new equilibrium 
also appears to be emerging in terms of the quantifiable reactions to additional high-profile 
events such as the Yeonpyeong shelling. Therein, peaks of coverage have returned to pre-
2006 levels.    
  
5.12.iii. Maintenance of the recalibrated risks: the Yeongpyeong shelling and the framing of 
North Korea as the killer of civilians 
North Korea‟s shelling of ROK-administered Yeonpyeong island on 23 November 2010, 
killing four South Koreans (two civilians) and injuring 19 others, resulted in a far more 
extensive reaction from within Japan compared to that witnessed in response to the October 
2009 missile launch or the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel in the spring of 2010.500 
Indeed, in one sense, Japan‟s policy community was quick to reinforce its demonized 
                                                          
499  As noted above, it is problematic to compare the impact of the Cheonan sinking to that of events such as 
missile launches and nuclear test-firings, in terms of how risks are then recalibrated vis-à-vis North Korea. 
Not least, this is because of the lack of clarity over the North’s involvement and the spread of dates 
between the sinking (26 March 2010) and the release of the official report implicating Pyongyang (20 May 
2010). 
500  Though it might seem anomalous, given the number killed, that responses to the Yeongpyeong incident 
were more fervent than those expressed towards the Cheonan naval vessel’s sinking, three obvious factors 
can be attributed to Japan’s comparatively strong reaction to the Yeonpyeong shelling. Firstly, the fact that 
civilian casualties were taken, secondly, that the North shelled targets on land (i.e., as opposed to maritime 
skirmishes) inside ROK territory, and finally, that the incident was calibrated as particularly significant by the 
international community, including Japan’s sole official ally, the US. For examples of international news 
coverage, see BBC News (2010c) and Eagle World News (2010). 
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framing of the DPRK – not least as an aberrant aggressor willing to unapologetically kill 
civilians in neighbouring states. However, the associated risks expressed in central political 
and public sphere discourses bore more evidence of a maintenance of interpreted risk-levels 
(i.e., with that already established in response to North Korea‟s provocations between 2006-
09, examined above), in terms of how they were calibrated, rather than a full-scale 
recalibration of risks propelled to an unprecedentedly higher peak. 
 
     Moreover, reaction from within the Diet to the Yeonpyeong incident was comparatively 
limited in terms of scope, volume and intensity. Nevertheless, it should be re-emphasised 
here that the process of risk-recalibration outlined in the chapters above, resulting in debates 
between Japan‟s political elite focussed primarily on contestation over the ability to respond 
with speed and exhibit strength in the face of an entity framed broadly as a belligerent 
aggressor (the DPRK), remained inherent to the manifestation of Diet discourse after the 
Yeonpyeong shelling. Within this, opposition parties were quick to criticise the ruling DPJ 
administration‟s lack of response rapidity and apparent under-calibration of incumbent risks 
potentially posed to Japan by the North‟s “outrageous violation” or bōkyo. This was 
exemplified by Kōmeitō representative, Yamamoto Kanae‟s address to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defense, 25 November 2010 (176: 67), in which she demanded a 
sharper reaction from the government and higher calibration of risks attributed to North 
Korea‟s actions. Having predicated her statement with by then familiar rhetoric referring to 
the illegality of Pyongyang‟s actions, Yamamoto pressed that, 
 
   Although the immediate victim of North Korea‟s shelling was this time South Korea, 
there is no doubt that it represents a grave situation, which has the potential to have a 
serious impact upon our country‟s security. As such, I would like to appeal to the 
government to be conscious of their position as the presiding body directly affected by 
such actions, and to internalize such an awareness so as to take all necessary measures 
to ensure citizens‟ safety.   
 
Yamamoto also went on to criticise the DPJ-led government for its initial assessment that 
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there was no immediate, direct risk posed to Japan‟s citizens by the North‟s shelling.501 The 
DPJ‟s response to Yamamoto‟s contentions, led by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
Fukuyama Tetsurō (176: 68), was swift and robust towards the Yeonpyeong shelling, citing 
the cabinet‟s close coordination with the MOD, and rapid establishment of a headquarters to 
deal with the incident (hōgeki jiken taisaku honbu). In this manner, while the established 
pattern of competition over demonstrating an overtly strong response to North Korean 
actions, including the provision of counter-measures to counter the attributed risks, was 
evident, there was little qualitative evidence from Japan‟s Diet chambers to show that the 
Yeonpyeong shelling was an event sufficient to sustain a more generic upward momentum of 
recalibrated risks – rather, serving only to maintain the existing levels of previously 
recalibrated risks and the perpetuation of North Korea‟s negative framing within the political 
elite. 
 
5.12.iv. Media reaction to North Korea‟s continuation of provocations 
The above events, occurring between October 2009 and November 2010, demonstrated a 
comparatively greater impact in terms of the projection of North Korean risks within Japan‟s 
leading media sources. This was particularly true in terms of a reaction to the Yeonpyeong 
shelling – as expressed by Table 5.2, below. However, here too, there is some evidence, 
both qualitative and quantitative, to suggest that no more than a maintenance of established 
risk calibration was affected – i.e., the predominant discourses within the media did not 
perceive sufficient cause to further recalibrate risks framed against the DPRK.502    
                                                          
501  Yamamoto, thereby, specifically targeted Chief Cabinet Secretary, Sengoku Yoshito’s initial claim regarding   
         the incident, i.e., that “...it is not a situation which immediately effects the lives of our citizens” (kokumin  
         seikatsu ni tadachi ni eikyō wo oyobosu jitai de wa nai) as a point of overly low-calibration for potential  
         risks posed to Japan.     
502  Notably, in contrast to the previous findings of this dissertation, there appears, therein, to have been only  
    limited convergence between political and media spheres in relation to the Yeonpyeong shelling; i.e.,  
    interactions (e.g., in terms of the exchange of information) remained present, but a broader range of  
   opinions and resulting calibrations of risk were manifest in disparate reactions across media and political  
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    Notably, indeed, the Asahi Shimbun, despite affording high-levels of coverage to North 
Korean affairs immediately after the Yeonpyeong shelling, which were comparable to those 
following the April 2009 missile launches and May 2009 nuclear test, was qualitatively less 
hawkish in its stance towards Pyongyang in comparison to reactions against those events.  
Indeed, editorials actually exhibited clear signs of a return to lower levels of risk calibration 
vis-à-vis North Korea, and the reinstating of its, previously prominent, progressive position. 
Further, the tension between maintaining the level of risk calibration established in relation to 
the framing of the DPRK (via the interactive processes discussed above) during the first 
decade of the 21st Century, and, in one sense, attempting to counter calls for swift punitive 
measures made by the most right-of-centre media sources, is apparent. For instance, the 
Asahi‟s first editorial post-dating the shelling (24 November 2010: 3) was still predicated 
using language, by then, adopted consistently within the paper‟s framing of North Korean 
actions; i.e., as illegal, unpardonable, and worthy of being labelled as an outrageous 
violation of international laws (bōkyo). In addition, the same editorial emphasized the risks 
posed by a potentially isolated new leader, in the form of Kim Jong-Il‟s third son and 
successor, Kim Jong-Un, who might need to demonstrate the strength of his leadership 
through external aggressions, as well as referring at once to the Cheonan sinking and 
continuing uncertainties over the North‟s nuclear programmes.503 At the same time, however, 
calls were made from the outset by the Asahi to focus on a coordinated international 
response – led by the US – which did not escalate tensions further.504 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
spheres. This is also evinced in terms of the volume of coverage following the shelling (see Figure 5.2(a) and  
Figure 5.2(b)).   
503   In this sense, once again, the framing of North Korea as the source of multiple risks – which do not  
  necessarily require clear explanation of causal links in order to justify recalibration as a single set of issues –  
  is highlighted. 
504   Once again, the salience of bilateralism is evinced here as a dominant norm within Japan’s responses to,   
         and framing of, the DPRK. Indeed, not only the Asahi, but all major newspapers advocated a strengthening  
of Japan-US initiatives in dealing with risks posed by North Korea’s provocations. 
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 Yet, by the time the following week‟s editorial had been published the emphasis had been 
further reshaped. Within this, North Korea‟s violation and continued instability was identified 
as “continuing to present the single biggest problem for security in East Asia“(28 November 
2010: 3), but calls were made for a calm response (reisei na unyō to taiō ga motomerareru) 
by all parties; claiming that the US and China had the biggest roles to play in engaging the 
DPRK in order to avoid further military escalation. 
 
    While right-of-centre broadsheets, such as the Yomiuri Shimbun, were, as expected, more 
fervent than the Asahi in their responses to the Yeonpyeong shelling, a clear lack of the 
incident‟s use to further recalibrate risks beyond their already established (heightened) levels 
can once again be exposed through content analysis of editorials published in the days that 
followed. This is also evinced by the comparatively subdued levels of coverage assigned to 
the event, as observed in Table 5.2.505 Furthermore, as noted in the two newspapers‟ 
responses to related events occurring throughout 2009, a striking degree of alignment was 
present between the Asahi and the Yomiuri, in terms of prescriptive measures advocated 
vis-à-vis North Korea. For example, reaction in the Yomiuri‟s initial editorial after the shelling 
also included an emphasis on extended bilateralism, international cooperation, and the 
importance of China engaging the DPRK in order to ameliorate risks identified with its 
actions (27 November 2010: 3).506 In this sense, while media coverage exhibited a 
quantitatively greater reaction towards the Cheonan sinking and, even more so, the 
Yeonpyeong shelling than that observed within the Diet, both media and government arms of 
Japan‟s policy community stopped short of significantly further advancing the process of risk 
recalibration manifest in their framing of North Korea. 
                                                          
  505     I.e., the level of coverage on North Korean issues carried by the Yomiuri immediately post-dating the    
            Yeonpyeong shelling completes a series of declining levels of reaction to the DPRK’s perceived    
            provocations from 2006-10 (see Chapter 6, Figure 6.3(a)). 
506     Within these prescriptions, both papers also emphasized trilateralism; in the sense of Japan, South 
              Korea and the US working in unison to counter a variety of risks emanating from the North’s weapons      
              programmes, military provocations, and nuclear development. 
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    Nevertheless, a number of key elements constitutive of such a process, intersecting 
media and Diet actors, such as competition over advocating a hard-line against Pyongyang‟s 
regime, and wariness over underestimating the risks posed by North Korea‟s actions (and 
that of appearing conciliatory towards the DPRK‟s rulers), remained distinctive features of 
reactions made to these events. This suggests that the re(calibration) of risk mediated by the 
policy community in the aftermath of the North‟s nuclear and missile tests conducted in the 
period between 2006 and 2009 was, in effect, maintained (but not additionally recalibrated) 
following the events occurring in the period that followed. Furthermore, this levelling-off of 
the risk recalibration process vis-à-vis North Korea was also evinced by the bureaucracy‟s 
policy responses to the events witnessed after October 2009.507 
 
5.12.v. Policy responses to North Korea‟s continuation of provocations 
As observed in Keidanren‟s policy prescriptions, outlined in Section 5.11, following the 
North‟s missile and nuclear tests, risks attached to the negative framing of North Korea post-
dating the events of October 2009 ~ November 2010 can certainly be seen to have 
maintained momentum for those with an agenda of revising Japan‟s security policy to allow 
for greater military strengthening. However, in totality, the legislature and bureaucracy‟s 
creation and implementation of new policy directives and policies, made in direct response to 
incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling, was minimal.508 This is in 
                                                          
507 Notably, a maintenance of highly calibrated risk levels can also be observed in market-based influences.  
For instance, Keidanren made direct reference to the Cheonan sinking in its 20 July 2010 policy statement, 
as representative of the salience of geo-military risks posed by North Korea. Indeed, the organization 
heavily emphasised the need to revise restrictions upon Japan’s ability to import and export weapon parts 
in order to revitalize Japan’s ailing defence industry (using leading European defence industries as a model), 
which it argued is necessary in order to ameliorate such risks and, pertinently, to sustain a network of inter-
dependent employers within the industry. For details, see Keidanren (2010). 
508 The MOD’s “Defense of Japan 2010 (Annual White Paper)” (2010e: 47) lists the dispatch of four MSDF 
officers as observers to the US and ROK’s joint naval military exercises during July 2010 and Japan’s support 
for the G8 Muskoka Summit declaration and UN Presidential Statement, both of which criticized the 
Cheonan sinking, as the sole measures taken in relation to the incident. Nevertheless, the paper also 
maintains a high calibration of risks associated with Pyongyang’s ruling elite, and their use of WMD and        
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stark contrast to the range of measures implemented following missile and nuclear tests in 
2006, as explicated in Chapter 4, Section 4.9, and 2009, covered in Section 5.10, above.     
 
    Once again, however, there is further evidence to suggest that the relatively hard-line 
policy directives, taken by Japan against Pyongyang on the justification of ameliorating 
potential risks perceived to be posed by the DPRK, have been sustained since 2009.509 
Therein, Japan‟s framing of North Korea as the continued source of geo-military (missile, 
nuclear etc.) threats is a crucial part of maintaining the high-calibration of risks attached to all 
Pyongyang-related issues, and facilitating the continuation of associated policies designed to 
counter them. This is highlighted by Tokyo‟s assessment of the DPRK‟s future oriented 
intentions and strategy – as that which is likely to be imbued with risks influencing the 
security of Japan. For instance, the MOD-affiliated, National Institute of Defense Studies 
(NIDS), claims in its “East Asian Strategic Review 2010” publication that, 
 
As stated above, there has been a softening in North Korea‟s stance, but this is likely to 
be only temporary… Meanwhile, North Korea has so far continued its hard-line rhetoric 
against Japan without specifically naming the new administration. ...it is likely to carry out 
more missile launches and nuclear tests going forward (NIDS, 2010: 81-3).510 
 
    It is also noteworthy that, as highlighted by the Strategic Review and Defense of Japan 
papers quoted in this section, Japan‟s bureaucracy, along with Diet speakers and media-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nuclear armaments. For full text, see MOD (2010e).   
509 Indeed, as one Japanese professor of International Relations concisely remarked when interviewed (9 May  
        2010b, Appendix A), the incoming DPJ administration has probably had little incentive to greatly alter  
       existing policy directives in this field. Such a statement is certainly congruous with the arguments dealt  
       with above (see Section 5.5), in terms of the prevalence of non-uniform approaches to policy spheres  
       within the DPJ-led coalition – therein aligning North Korea  policies with those of the bureaucracy, public- 
       opinion, and market-related interests, as applicable. 
510 Intriguingly, the NIDS continues to make such assertions alluding to risks posed to Japan, despite its in-    
       depth analysis of North Korea’s strategically based tactics; as those designed to draw the US into direct    
       negotiations and secure economic assistance from China and others – therein having conducted missile   
       and nuclear tests in 2009 in order to influence the incoming Obama administration, rather than in order to  
       threaten Tokyo (NIDS, 2010: 72). 
305 
 
sources, showed little desire to recycle the abductions issue as a stimulant to further 
recalibrate risks following the North‟s provocations of 2010.511 Indeed, as Figure 5.5, below, 
suggests, this is consistent with the dramatically reduced coverage of abductions since 2005. 
Congruently, this evinces the hypothesis that a reduction in the conflation of geo-military 
risks with those of the ideationally highly-charged subject of abductions is indicative of a new 
equilibrium which has emerged. Therein, the framing of the DPRK has been sufficiently 
maximised to the point where no additional recalibration of risk is deemed necessary by 
those seeking to advance such an agenda. As such, risks associated with North Korea‟s 
nuclear and missile programmes remain sufficient to maintain existing policy directives in 
this field.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
511 As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, the phenomenon of abductions acted as a key stimulant in the   
process by which North Korea came to be framed in Japan as the source of multiple, salient and uncertain   
risks, and can be seen to have had a major impact on the (re)calibration of risks pertaining to other sections 
– such as those of military, cyber and economic actions, and nuclear activities – as observed in the 
correlation between issues shown in Figure 5.5, below. 
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Table 5.2. Impact of North Korea-related Events in the Media and Diet 
(October 2009 – November 2010) 
 Numbers of articles/items prior to and post 
Months 2009 
October 
missile 
test 
launch 
         ~3 3~ 
  
2010 
Cheonan 
sinking 
           ~3 3~ 2010 
Yeon 
pyeong 
shelling 
          ~3 
Asahi 455 388 620 508 777 
Yomiuri 549 402 618 485 825 
Mainichi 468 320 605 482 790 
Sankei 818 675 972 892 1318 
NHK 
News 
295 178 357 281 626 
Diet 44 75 58 60 28 
Magazine
※ 
44 35 18 38 64 
Source: Author 
Figures shown above are based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi Database, Yomiuri Database, 
Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen.” ※Based on a selection of national news magazines, 
primarily sourced from those listed on the Nikkei Telecom21 database. 
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Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 5.2, above. 
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5.13. Conclusion: from recalibration towards equilibrium  
In essence, then, the data analysed in this chapter have elucidated a sustained interactive 
process of risk recalibration mediated between the state, market and society as a response 
to North Korea‟s nuclear and missile tests of 2009. This resulted in the compounding of the 
DPRK‟s ideologically based negative framing in Japan and has maintained the existing 
momentum of policy provisions (sustained even after the change of the ruling administration) 
made to counter risks perceived to be posed by the actions of Pyongyang‟s ruling regime 
and security forces. Indeed, the sustenance of this process is further evinced by prominent 
intersecting discourses in the public sphere. These features are particularly evident in terms 
of a collusive mass-media stance, which continues to negatively frame North Korea, and 
discourses within the Diet that predominantly remain a function of competition over the ability 
to demonstrate a firm-line towards the DPRK – largely revolving around contestation over 
the means for Japan to counter risks posed by Pyongyang through stick-based rather than 
carrot-based approaches.512 
 
However, waning media interest in the abductions issue, and a lack of major political or 
market-based motivation to recalibrate risks further beyond current levels, has meant that 
only a maintenance of risk calibration (as opposed to a full-scale recalibration) vis-à-vis 
North Korea has been observed in response to further military sabre-rattling witnessed in the 
second half of 2009 and throughout 2010. As such, the process of Japan‟s recalibration of 
risk as a function of the framing of North Korea appears to have reached a zenith – 
                                                          
512 In this sense, the continued prioritization of punitive measures and a hard-line (stick-based approach)  
against the DPRK can be seen as representative of dominant realist tendencies within Japan’s  
contemporary regional international relations. However, the recent prominence of an overtly realist-based  
foreign policy trajectory is, as exposed by the discussion above, actually produced through a complex  
interactive process, which requires an understanding of how actors adhering to norms connected to the  
framing of national and external identities galvanize responses to the DPRK. In this regard, as posited in  
Chapter 2, Section 2.14, and explored further in Chapter 4, Section 4.1, a constructivist conception of how  
actors respond to a set of risks framed against a specific external target has to be employed in order to  
provide meaningful analysis of realist tendencies – i.e., beyond the peripheral observation of state-level  
policies and actions.     
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excluding the emergence of a far greater source of potentially novel risks stemming from 
Pyongyang.513 The potentialities for how risks relating to the DPRK in Japan are likely to be 
calibrated in the contemporary domestic and regional environment going forward are 
discussed further in the following chapter – based on conclusions provided by the event-
based analysis of the processes observed thus far. 
 
In this sense, without further long-range missile or nuclear tests being conducted by the 
North, it is problematic to draw absolute conclusions about the level of framing and risks 
attributed to the DPRK by Japan in the interim. What can be stated from the evidence 
examined in this chapter, however, is that reactions to the events of 2009 represented an 
unprecedented level of countermeasures employed by Japan against North Korea. Therein, 
while Japan‟s framing of the DPRK was created through a complex interactive process – 
intersecting the state, market and society – which became particularly intensified after the 
events of 1998, 2002 and 2006, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (see also Table 
5.3 and Figure 5.5, below), the resulting policy directives reached fruition following the 
cumulative mediation of those risks perceived to be manifest in the missile and nuclear tests 
of 2009.514 Moving into the second decade of the 21st Century, these have now become well 
established – cross-converging with a broad continuation of North Korea‟s existing framing 
within the public sphere – in the form of an equilibrium of risk calibration which is maintained 
(without further extensive recalibration) in response to the DPRK. The implications of such a 
conclusion, based on comparative analyses drawn from the findings of this dissertation, and 
an exploration of the potential for further extensions to the above research, form the basis of 
the following chapter. 
                                                          
513  Plausible sources of a further recalibration of risk vis-à-vis the DPRK include regime collapse or changes to  
  a more overtly aggressive posture towards Tokyo – e.g., under policies restructured following the  
  succession of Kim Jong-Un. Based on the evidence analysed above, focusing on the incidents of 2009, the  
  highly unlikely event of a missile part striking Japan – regardless of whether or not casualties were taken –  
  would also be sufficient to initiate a further recalibration of risk. 
514  As noted above, Japan’s intensification of risk recalibration can be seen in one sense to have peaked as  
early as 2002 in terms of quantitative public and political sphere perceptions (see Chapter 3, Table 3.1). 
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Table 5.3. Quantity of Coverage on North Korea in the Diet and Mass Media 
 1981~ 
1985 
1986~ 
1990 
1991~ 
1995 
1996~ 
2000 
2001~ 
2005 
2006~ 
2010 
Diet 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
44 
(255) 
13 
45 
3 
21 
(195) 
10 
41 
11 
101 
(416) 
95 
270 
3 
144 
(609) 
241 
292 
175 
269 
(969) 
342 
413 
536 
264 
(914) 
432 
521 
558 
Asahi 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
N/A 155 
(5,058) 
78 
414 
14 
399 
(8,343) 
426 
3913 
37 
641 
(10,723) 
1909 
1659 
865 
1015 
(18,815) 
1690 
6950 
6803 
874 
(12,933) 
2597 
5459 
3428 
Yomiuri 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
N/A 
 
141 
(4606) 
84 
389 
17 
461 
(8202) 
465 
4010 
34 
595 
(9616) 
2097 
1707 
939 
1104 
(19,115) 
2020 
5671 
7118 
1080 
(14,510) 
3407 
6580 
3929 
Mainichi 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
23 
(1503) 
23 
39 
32 
376 
(8494) 
423 
4158 
27 
450 
(8975) 
1817 
1194 
646 
1061 
(20,746) 
2127 
5406 
8048 
789 
(12,262) 
2781 
4261 
3440 
Sankei 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
N/A N/A 
 
 
404 
(5601) 
549 
2991 
31 
755 
(11,149) 
2688 
1641 
1278 
1675 
(23,663) 
3177 
6618 
8138 
1656 
(17,703) 
4545 
6943 
5300 
NHK News 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
N/A 13 
(918) 
9 
4 
16 
105 
(3120) 
186 
1962 
9 
130 
(3545) 
1008 
493 
326 
310 
(11,429) 
1096 
4233 
5056 
468 
(10,077) 
2424 
4874 
3030 
Academic Titles (Jp.) 
 
Missiles 
Nuclear 
Abductions 
0 
(5) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(1) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(12) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(11) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(22) 
0 
2 
3 
1 
(72) 
0 
13 
9 
Source: Author  
Figures shown above are for the number of articles/items, based on official database (NDL search engine, Asahi 
Database, Yomiuri Database, Nikkei Telecom 21 Database) hits for “kitachōsen kyōi” (“kitachōsen”), Missiles = 
“kitachōsen misairu”, Nuclear = “kitachōsen kaku”, Abductions = “Kitachōsen Rachi”  
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◆A = Asahi Shimbun, Y = Yomiuri Shimbun, M = Mainichi Shimbun, 
    S = Sankei Shimbun, N= NHK News  
◆ “Threat, DPRK, Missiles, Nuclear, Abductions” refer to subject areas. 
312 
 
 
 
 
 
◆D = Diet Records, A = (Japanese Language (Jp.)) Academic Titles 
◆“Threat, DPRK, Missiles, Nuclear, Abductions” refer to subject areas 
Source: figures adapted by the author from data expressed in Table 5.3, above. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: mediating and maintaining the recalibration 
of risk 
“There‟s a shadow on the faces, of the men who send the guns, to the wars 
that are fought in places, where their business interest runs” 
(Jackson Brown, “Lives in the Balance”, 1986)515 
 
6.1. Explanation of interactive processes: revisiting constructivism and risk 
In conclusion, this chapter attempts to provide a concise comparative analysis of the case 
studies discussed, in order to delineate a compact tangible understanding of how risks have 
been recalibrated during the period covered. In addition, the primacy and relative influence 
of the key actors involved is highlighted. This is achieved firstly by a re-examination of the 
theoretical framework adopted – with regards to its significance to the empirical findings 
exposed. Uncovered comparisons of the qualitative data accessed above are then 
conducted, and are supplemented with a correlating exposition of the quantitative data. This 
is expressed in the form of composite models constructed from the data-sources assimilated 
in relation to each of the case studies examined in the dissertation. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the possibilities for greater employment of approaches based upon risk-
recalibration across relevant disciplines – and addresses the specific prospects for North 
Korea‟s continued framing in Japan. This includes proposals for further comprehensive 
                                                          
515 The prominence of market interests in domestic and international politics has been posited by as diverse 
a set of thinkers as Adam Smith (1723-90), Milton Friedman (1912-2006), David Harvey (1935~), Naomi 
Klein (1970~), and Peter Joseph (1974~). Akin to any other highly politicized sphere, this creates a pre-
disposition to minimize associated risks (Beck, 1992). At one level, then, this is oft-times translatable 
indirectly to the risk of a reduction in revenues benefiting specific actors, such as that gained from military 
spending and industry – as captured by Brown’s lyrics, quoted above. As such, in conclusion, this 
dissertation, while focussing primarily on the identifiable delineation of political elite and media aspects 
affecting Japan’s recalibration of risks in response to North Korea, facilitates a reaffirmation of how those 
spheres have, indeed, been highly contingent upon the underlying agency of market-based factors and 
actors.    
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analysis. Finally, potential areas for future research – in terms of both theoretical 
development and empirical extension – are outlined.   
    As hypothesized in the Introduction, Section 0.1, the empirical evidence examined from 
the series of events covered in the three case study chapters above points clearly to an 
interactive process which cannot be fully explained through traditional political science 
theories. As such, the adoption of a theoretical framework which is ontologically founded on 
constructivist conceptions of actors and agency, and the analytical centralization of risk, as 
the primary tool by which to address how prevailing norms and ideas are operationalized, 
has been key to meaningful analyses in this dissertation. Specifically, the reliance upon a 
combination of constructivism and risk has facilitated a discussion which has elucidated how 
multiple actors, intersecting the state, market and society, have mediated risks perceived to 
emanate from North Korea. This has taken place through a complex process of socio-
economic interaction and political contestation which operates within the context of inter-
subjective identities, as posited in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 and Section 1.6, and Chapter 2, 
Section 2.6, based on a number prevailing norms. The analyses in preceding chapters have, 
therefore, elucidated how Japan‟s recalibration of risks perceived to be posed by the DPRK 
has been realized through its framing of North Korea – as a negatively portrayed external 
entity, ideationally juxtaposed with Japan.516 A series of temporal shifts within that process 
have, therein, been observed in relation to the case study events examined above. 
      As such, as highlighted in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, (neo)realist-based and 
(neo)liberal institutionalist-based theoretical models have been found wanting – in terms of 
                                                          
516  There are a number of excellent concise works that trace how Japan framed North Korea as an increasingly 
salient threat during the post-Cold War period – and identify the core actors and interests therein (e.g., T.J. 
Pempel, 2010; Son, 2010; Hughes, 2009a). However, while supplying highly informative sources of data and 
information, and also providing productive aids to policy, these, and other related works, have a tendency to 
ascribe agency to isolated factors, specific policy implementations, and a limited range of key actors. In this 
sense, the dissertation above has sought to adopt a further level of analysis, which elucidates how the 
(re)calibration of risk is a central element to all of the above and, moreover, how it is manifest in a socially 
constructed process which intersects interactions between each of the above spheres.     
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shortcomings in their explanatory capacity for analyses in this area. This is so not only in 
terms of an inability to convincingly explain Japan‟s actions in the post-Cold War regional 
environment (Grimes, 2003: 355) and a tendency to underestimate the influence of complex 
internal domestic processes, but also by way of their predominant absence of a satisfactory 
explanation for how the (re)calibration of risks has played a central role in Japan‟s foreign 
policy-making – particularly in relation to bilateral relations with North Korea. Indeed, these 
lacunae in the theoretical basis identified in realist and other established schools of 
International Relations are highly significant regardless of the eventual policy outcomes 
witnessed. Furthermore, however, it is particularly pertinent to note the ultimate 
inapplicability of theories which deny the evident relevance and explanatory power of risk as 
a theoretical concept in its own right. Not least, this has been made apparent by the above 
analysis of such processes; i.e., as those underpinning Tokyo‟s framing of the DPRK. 
    Congruently, within the process of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea‟s actions, for instance, it is notable that realist-based theories would, on the surface, 
initially appear to have been applicable in terms of providing a rationale for Tokyo‟s framing 
of the North as a means to justify greater military strengthening and regional independence – 
i.e., vis-à-vis total geo-strategic reliance upon the US. However, this does little to explain the 
extended pattern of risk recalibration which, following a series of vigorous fluctuations 
(resulting in intensifying peaks), can now be seen to have receded in intensity – as 
expressed by Figure 6.3, below.517 Moreover, realist-based, grand-national theories cannot 
effectively explain the individual agency and interactions of specific groups of actors – such 
as those intersecting the state, market and society, analysed above. In this respect, the 
epistemological reliance upon constructivism outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, has played 
an important role by way of providing a plausible explanation for how given actors have 
                                                          
517   (Neo)-liberal theories have been even less effective in explaining Japan’s responses to North Korea – i.e., 
such schools would likely have predicted a rapid progression of normalization between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang, and their integration into a wider sphere of East Asian regional, economic, cooperation. 
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created a variety of specific interests contingent upon their own identities, and those 
perceived to be attributed to external entities such as North Korea. In addition, the 
combination of a constructivist-based conceptualization of structure and agency, and that of 
risk, has offered a coherent explanatory framework with which to address the apparently 
salient influence of prevailing norms. Most pertinently this has facilitated explication of 
Japan‟s consistent adherence to bilateralism (supplemented by US-Japan-ROK trilateralism), 
which, though not entirely unwavering, has been observable throughout the process of 
Tokyo‟s post-Cold War recalibration of risk in response to North Korea up to the present.518 
    
6.2. Comparison of qualitative results: maturation of risk recalibration 
6.2.i. Political reaction and recalibration of risk: the finished framing of North Korea     
In order to accurately delineate the process constitutive of a qualitative recalibration of risk in 
response to North Korea, it is first necessary to return discussion to the specific events and 
time-periods where that process was identified as having been initiated. In this regard, 
concerning the North‟s initial missile test-firings of the 1990s, it was noted that political 
reaction was particularly limited in response to the May 1993 Nodong launch. Indeed, Diet 
members who used the launch to emphasize risks posed by Pyongyang were not only 
comparatively few in number (see also Section 6.2, below), but also had to rely primarily on 
military technicalities and general statements regarding the North‟s hostile intent in order to 
frame the DPRK as a source of such risks, as posited in Chapter 3, Section 3.7; i.e., without 
                                                          
518    At state level, the prioritizing of bilateral (with the US) integration and cooperation, in combination with a 
sustenance of extant levels of risk calibration, can be seen in the GoJ’s responses to North Korea’s actions, 
such as those observed in reaction to the events centring on the Yeongpyeong shelling of Novermber 2010. 
Therein, while additional sanctions and counter-measures are largely absent, discourse emphasising the 
continued uncertainties of potentially salient risks pertaining to the DPRK is sustained, and the emphasis on 
US-Japan cooperation as the most effective means by which to counter such is re-asserted.  For full details, 
and official North Korea policy directives on associated issues, see MOFA (2010, 2011; Seifu intānetto terebi, 
2010).   
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the ability to mobilize and conflate risks associated with abduction and incursion issues, 
which were later to be recalibrated as a function of public sphere mediation, detailed in 
Section 6.1.ii, below. Strikingly, however, it is significant that the geopolitical risks identified 
with North Korea within Japan‟s political elite at this time were, even when isolated from 
other areas of concern, able to gain sufficient prominence to enact an extensive recalibration 
of risk following the Taepodong test-launch of 1998.519 Indeed, this was so even without the 
later tail-wind provided by abductions and incursions incidents – and despite a strong 
(though albeit weakening) cohort of continued voices calling for progress to be made on 
bilateral diplomatic normalization efforts.520 Further, in terms of concrete policies resulting 
from the increased negative framing of the Pyongyang regime, and the recalibration of a 
range of associated risks, the influence of biliateralism as a prominent norm – as discussed 
above – appears to have held considerable primacy.521 This was evident in terms of priming 
the political landscape through the introduction of the coordinated US-Japan New Guidelines 
in 1997 and the introduction of a debate on missile defence systems in the previous year 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc., 2006: 150).    
    These initiatives, then, can be seen to have laid the foundations for a more extensive 
political reaction to the missile test-launch of August 1998; itself acting as a catalyst to frame 
North Korea more concretely as the source of multiple risks. The risk-endowed elements of 
                                                          
519  It should be remembered here that the abduction issue was repeatedly raised by the Japanese side during   
the normalization talks of the 1990s (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc. (ed.), 2006: 197-8), but held substantively   
less weight prior to the Kim-Koizumi summit of 2002 – i.e., before it had become a popular topic      
intersecting the media and polity. Indeed, this reflects the significance of how issues are framed and     
calibrated in terms of the impact they can have upon the process of recalibrating associated risks. Put simply,  
once leading media actors and policy makers had combined to frame North Korea as the source of salient 
and uncertain risks – identified through its admission of state-led abductions – other (conflated) risks could  
be rapidly recalibrated through a similar process. 
520  The influence of North Korea’s suspected nuclear proliferation, particularly in the wake of the 1993-4 
nuclear     crisis – and its potential to be combined with missile technologies – was, however, utilized as a 
central means  by which to recalibrate associated risks. Indeed, though not to the extent of suspected 
abductions by     Pyongyang, this was also an issue which gained a degree of momentum within the public-
political sphere   (see Chapter 3, Section 3.7). 
521  Once again, this can be seen in contrast to the declining influence of anti-militarism, as noted in the      
military-based policy initiatives introduced in 1996-7. 
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the DPRK were also slowly moving towards a conflation of multiple issues which served to 
accelerate the process of recalibration within Japan‟s parliament and bureaucracy. 
Specifically, the incursion incidents of 1999 and 2001 were supplemented by earlier 
indications that the North was being economical with the truth in regards to suspected 
abductions cases – as highlighted in Chapter 3, Section 3.9. As a result, Japan‟s central 
political discourse moved with media and public opinion, as outlined in Section 6.1.ii, below, 
towards a framing of North Korea which portrayed it as the source of a multiplicity of 
potentially deadly risks. Within this process, as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, although 
media and public opinion can in one sense be seen to have taken the lead in directing such 
discourse, particularly in relation to the abductions issue, the resulting recalibration of risks 
pertaining to all elements of North Korea largely took place in tandem, led by prominent 
political figures, but including actors which intersect the state, market and society. Indeed, 
such a conclusion is also evinced by the quantitative shift in reactions, as expressed in 
Section 6.3, below.  
     As highlighted by Black (2006) and Leheny (2006), reviewed in Chapter 1, the 
recalibration of risk was also clearly materialized between the incursion events of 1999 and 
2001 in terms of a sea-change in political discourses and the employment of practical 
counter-measures. Thereby, in a similar dynamic to the recalibration of risk manifest in 
reactions to the missile tests of 1993 and 1998, the former incident acted to prime reactions 
to the latter. Indeed, vociferous Diet reaction from a cross-party section of influential 
politicians, including both foreign minister Kōmura Masahiko and then opposition leader, Kan 
Naoto, to the Taepodong 1 test firing can, in precedence, be seen as a key turning point in 
redirecting the trajectory of discourse pertaining to risks framed against the DPRK. As noted 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, this came in stark contrast to the positions of preceding political 
leaders, such as Takeshita Noboru and Kaifu Toshiki, who had taken a comparatively 
apologetic (dovish) stance towards North Korea, and strongly advocated increased bilateral 
dialogue with Pyongyang. Therein, as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, leading 
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politicians also began to raise the issue of risks posed to Japan by incursions – and attached 
it to the frame of North Korea. This produced a climate whereby the political tide was pre-
disposed to taking a hard-line against Pyongyang following the 2001 maritime encounter – 
which in turn further compounded the framing of North Korea as posing a set of salient risks.   
    From that time, the impact of the Koizumi administration also has to be considered as 
highly significant in terms of facilitating actions based on the qualitative recalibration of risks 
perceived to be posed by Pyongyang. Thereby, like his successor, Abe Shinzō, Koizumi 
sought to demonstrate his (and Japan‟s) capacity to adopt an assertive regional and foreign 
policy stance by taking tough measures against the incursion of 2001, on the one hand, but 
at the same time also attempted to portray himself as a skilful diplomat through his 
resumption of the Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization process.522 Moreover, Koizumi was eager 
to inflate foreign policy issues, particularly North Korea-related problems, as a means to 
distract public attention from his domestic failures. In the same sense, due to the former 
prime minister‟s apparent tendency to act primarily out of individual political interest, his 
reaction to Kim Jong-Il‟s admission over the abductions cases had to be swift and in keeping 
with the public and media storm being created in the wake of Kim‟s surprise admission. In 
effect, this interaction between the ruling administration, and public and media spheres, as 
expressed in Section 6.2.ii, below, resulted in a convergence of market, political and societal 
interests which at once served to frame the DPRK as not only laden with potential geo-
military risks, but as dishonest and overtly hostile – hence triggering an additional 
recalibration of associated risks.523     
                                                          
522    In this sense, Koizumi’s actions can be seen as somewhat erratic in terms of how the LDP leader and his 
administration calibrated risks posed by the DPRK. Indeed, while ultimately creating a recalibration of risk in 
response to North Korea, Koizumi’s moves to meet with Kim Jong-Il were initially seen as a maverick step 
taken, even counter to the norm of bilateralism, in order to secure normalization of relations with the 
North (Yoshida, 2008: 233). 
523    Political interests were driven not only by Koizumi, but, particularly in the wake of the admission, by 
those such as then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Abe Shinzō, and his allies, who ultimately sought to utilize the 
risks presented by the Pyongyang regime as a justification for a tougher line against North Korea and, in 
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    The process of risk recalibration as a function of the North‟s negative framing was then 
given further political momentum as the result of Abe Shinzō‟s rise to power and ascension 
to prime minister – premised on his prioritizing of the abductions issue and need for a 
credible and clearly identifiable enemy state, in order to obtain his goals of restructuring 
Japan‟s offensive operational capabilities (Umeda, 2007: 172-3). As a function of this, Abe‟s 
focus on abductions also perpetuated the element of politically based conflation at state-
level, whereby, for instance, reactions to the nuclear and missile tests of 2006 were framed 
within the context of North Korea as a rogue state which posed multiple risks to Japan.524 
Indeed, the combined effect of these factors upon the highest level of political actors was 
such that even following the advent of a less hawkish prime minister, in the form of Fukuda 
Yasuo, risk could not readily be recalibrated to a lower level – however unlikely might 
actually have been a North Korean missile strike or other military contingencies posed to 
Japan.525 
    Strikingly, during this period, the fruition of a process of almost uniform inter-party shift – 
from debates over how best to engage North Korea and move towards normalization to a 
discourse competing over the demonstration of a firm-line taken against an external foe – 
took hold. Sustained in the wake of further missile and nuclear tests in the summer of 2009, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, this created such political momentum that even a full-scale 
change of administration later in the same year did little to facilitate progress on North 
Korean issues or initiate a re-framing of the DPRK as a whole.526 As such, while the DPJ-led 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conflation with missile and nuclear issues, as the catalyst for reforming Japan’s defence posture and 
operations capabilities. In this instance, market interests rested fore-mostly with the media’s desire to sell 
the story of North Korea as the bad-guy – which required a high calibration of pertaining risks. Societal 
interest rested on indignation at the North’s wrong-doing, and fear of the unknown risks it posed. 
524  I.e., as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.6, this involved Diet members and defence spokespeople  
competing to stress the necessity to deal with a range of risks (including nuclear, missile, abduction, terror 
and cyber-threats), which were bundled together within the frame of “North Korea problems”.   
525 For a logical discussion of the unlikelihood of a North Korean missile strike against Japan, based on the 
argument that the DPRK violated its self-imposed missile moratorium of 2002, see Yoshida (2008, 168-9).   
526  The qualitative cross-party re-framing of North Korean issues, and the resulting recalibration of risks 
pertaining to Pyongyang’s potential actions – most starkly in the period between the missile launches of 
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government appears to have settled for maintaining an approximate calibration of such risks 
reached by the outgoing LDP administration – as opposed to recalibrating risks further – 
there is little to suggest a major softening of stance, or downward recalibration of risks, 
towards Pyongyang from within Japan. However, this may in itself represent a significant 
phase in the recalibration of risks framed against North Korea, not least because it points to 
a plateauing-out effect within Japan‟s political elite, which has limited the scope for further 
concrete moves by policy makers to implement additional measures targeting North Korean 
elements within Japan and the DPRK‟s rulers in Pyongyang. As discussed below (see also 
Chapter 5, Section 5.12), this movement towards an equilibrium of risk recalibration in 
response to North Korea has additionally been contributed to by the waning influences and 
interest of public and media sphere actors.527 
    
6.2.ii. Media reaction and recalibration of risk: the finished framing of North Korea     
As observed in terms of reactions and responses enacted by Japan‟s political elite, media 
sources also demonstrate a qualitative recalibration of risk in response to North Korea – 
which can be delineated with reference to a series of pivotal events. As discussed 
throughout Chapters 3~5, the magnitude of interaction, in terms of discourse, between state 
and media, is identifiable through the two-way referencing and similarities of response to 
specific incidents.528 Moreover, the relative loss of interest in North Korean affairs, and the 
lack of a further recalibration of risks within the media sphere appears, approximately, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1993 and 1998 up to the upper-house election campaigns of 2007 – can also been observed in the 
respective party manifestos of that period (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5). 
527  And, as argued by one prominent political analyst and former Asahi Shimbun columnist in an  
       interview (1 August 2011, Appendix A), and other commentators, has also been affected by a gradual  
       weakening of the far right – as previously represented by the likes of Abe Shinzō and his political allies. 
528  Analyses across the case studies addressed showed that politicians widely cite and use leading 
newspapers as a primary source of information. Conversely, it was also noted that the Asahi and Yomiuri, 
for instance, both regularly quote government sources as a means to construct and disseminate 
information – not least in relation to the risks posed by North Korea. 
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mirror that of Diet speakers and other policy makers – limiting the former in terms of its 
ability to garner public support for additional policy measures, even in the wake of further 
provocations emanating from Pyongyang, as noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.12.v. However, 
reaction from these two sectors to the DPRK‟s post-Cold War actions has by no means been 
identical (e.g., see also quantitative reaction, Section 6.2, Figure 6.1, below), and the mass-
media‟s responses to the events covered above show a number of distinctive features in 
comparison to those observed within the Diet and bureaucracy.    
     As observed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, following the end of the Cold War, prominent 
media sources initially framed the DPRK (albeit with reservations) as a source of potential 
diplomatic progress within a dynamic regional environment. Indeed, despite criticisms in the 
right-of-centre press over the conciliatory nature of Japan‟s position in negotiations for 
diplomatic normalization, led by Kanemaru Shin, from 1990, it was not until the emergence 
of the first nuclear crisis in 1993-4 that media sources began to make broader reference to 
the potential risks posed by Pyongyang‟s regime.529 However, even during this time, media 
coverage was limited, and, as identified in Chapter 3, Section 3.7, reaction to the North‟s 
1993 Nodong test-launch minimal. Akin to reactions from the Diet, the 1998 Taepodong test-
firing produced a far more vociferous response from media sources. Thereby, the qualitative 
recalibration of risks framed against North Korea within the media from this time – at least up 
to the missile and nuclear tests of 2009 – appears to have been led extensively by the 
combination of domestic political interests and external (primarily US) pressure, as 
highlighted in the preceding section.530     
    However, an interactive (two-way) process, mediated between the state and media is also 
                                                          
529 It is important, also, to note the clear disparity between media sources at this time. Specifically, the Asahi 
in particular was initially very much supportive of diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with the DPRK – 
holding less reservations from the outset than its right-of-centre competitors. 
530 Though limited in number, a qualitative shift in the North’s mainstream framing within the media following 
the 1993 Nodong launch – based on government perceptions – is further evinced from NHK news reports of 
the time (see Chapter 3, Section 3.7).     
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visible, once again, particularly in terms of reactions to the Kim-Koizumi summit of 2002.531 
This is in general contrast to media responses to the 1998 Taepodong launch and the 
maritime incursions of 1999 and 2001, which approximately followed those of statements 
made by leading party figures in the Diet, and essentially, as exposed in Chapter 3, Section 
3.9 and Section 3.13, served to justify the revised US-Japan security guidelines and other 
sanctions and measures implemented by the state as counter-measures designed to 
ameliorate risks posed by the DPRK.532 The reverse effect can be seen to have taken place 
in the aftermath of the 2002 leadership summit – in terms of then PM, Koizumi having to 
rapidly re-evaluate his stance on North Korea-targeted policies due to the media outcry 
created in response to Kim‟s admission of the DPRK‟s abduction of Japanese citizens. 
Therein, Kim‟s admission was key in terms of mediating North Korea‟s demonization in the 
public-sphere, which effectively placed media and state actors in convergence with regards 
to their framing of the DPRK and the associated recalibration of risks. This interactive 
process was then given added momentum by the highly-profiled events of missile launches 
and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Amid this, the combined market interests of media 
sources requiring stories to sell, as documented in Chapter 4, Section 4.7, Japan‟s military 
industries and self-defence forces requirement of a potential enemy (Umeda, 2007), and 
those of the US, combining commercial interests and those of Washington‟s regional foreign 
policy (McCormack, 2002), have to be taken in to consideration as major contributing factors. 
In addition, the public‟s ideational requirement of a negatively framed reference point (bad 
guy), against which to self-orientate and juxtapose Japan‟s identity, clearly added to the 
elements that drove the media towards a pervasive process of risk recalibration (Hyung, 
                                                          
531 In one sense, the process of risk recalibration, as a whole, can actually be seen as a three or four-way 
process in terms of additional societal and other market spheres (see Section 6.1.iii), but observation of the 
interaction between state and media is significant here in as much as it serves to identify the primacy of a 
number of leading actors within such a process. 
532  Specifically, these include influential figures such as former Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō, who, with a 
number of supporting actors in government was active in propagating the potentiality of increasing risks 
identified with North Korea prior to the Taepodong launch of 1998 (e.g., see Chapter 3, Section 3.10). This, 
thus, aided the facilitation and justification of a broader-based recalibration of risk following the launch. 
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2006), which intersected the state, market and society. 
    In this sense, leading actors from each of the above sectors can be seen to have largely 
achieved their goals in this sphere, manifest, most recently, in the extensive media and Diet 
reactions to the key events of April~July 2009. However, since then there has been little to 
motivate a further qualitative recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK – something made 
evident by reactions to succeeding events, later in 2009 and 2010. Moreover, with respect to 
the first of the factors identified above, it appears Japan‟s public has tired of North Korea 
stories, and political and market actors have little need to further recalibrate risks which are 
already sufficiently calibrated to facilitate the majority of their policy objectives and 
commercial interests. Indeed, such an assessment is supported by analyses of data 
addressing market and societal actors covered in Section 6.4, below, and the results of 
supplementary quantitative data, explicated further in the following sections.     
  
6.3. Comparison of quantitative results: decreasing momentum in the recalibration of 
risk across a convergent policy community 
The discussion above has, then, outlined how the interactive influences of state, market, 
media and societal actors have created a qualitative process of risk recalibration in response 
to North Korea‟s actions throughout the post-Cold War period – identifiable in general 
convergence up to 2007, and to varying degrees across each sector up to 2009.533 This 
section demonstrates how that recalibration can also be traced in quantitative terms by 
cross-examining the patterns of response to each of the major case studies dealt with in the 
preceding chapters. As confirmed by the random sampling (e.g., see Appendix C) and 
                                                          
533  This dissertation has illuminated the extent to which media and political elite framing of the North has 
primarily expanded rapidly from the time of the Taepodong 1 test-firing in 1998 – having been primed by 
political actors in response to the Nodong launch of 1993. However, it should be noted that for certain 
societal sectors – including Korean residents in Japan – the precursors to the broader-based framing of 
North Korea and the recalibration of associated risks was seen to be present prior to the conclusion of the 
Cold War (Han, 2002: 221). 
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qualitative examples examined throughout, coverage in both the Diet and mass media 
relating to North Korea has been overwhelmingly negative. Therefore, while the qualitative 
analysis above is necessary in order to discern the specific form – particularly in terms of 
public-political sphere discourse – of Japan‟s framing of the DPRK, the extended fluctuating 
quantity of coverage relating to North Korea is also highly illuminating. This is particularly so 
in terms of delineating the impact of specific events upon these core areas of the policy 
community‟s recalibration of risk.534 
    In this sense, comparison of Figure 6.1(a) and Figure 6.1(b), below, reveal a remarkable 
proportional similarity in terms of reactions to North Korea-related events in the period 
examined.535 This not only supports the qualitative evidence exposed above, suggestive of a 
close interaction and convergence of media and Diet spheres, but also reaffirms their 
significance in terms of being constitutive elements of a tangibly identifiable policy 
community which directs responses towards North Korea within Japan. Furthermore, while 
there is a significant difference in the volume of coverage assigned to each event 
(particularly the abduction revelations of 2002) across media sources, the indisputable 
conformity in the correlation between specific time periods and peaks of coverage 
observable in Figure 6.1 demonstrates the pertinence of a addressing the media as a unitary 
actor in itself – i.e. as a predominantly convergent influence upon and amid the policy 
                                                          
534  Indeed, as noted in Section 6.1.ii, market elements are highly entangled with political and other societal, 
as well as media spheres, allowing the assumption that quantitative data relating to media and, to a degree, 
Diet reactions to Pyongyang’s actions reflects powerful elements (interests) of the market. 
535 This proportional similarity is especially convincing as a means by which to support the hypothesis adapted 
from Hyung (2006), which assumes a high degree of convergence between state and media (and intra-
media) sources, not least because of the huge disparity in actual quantities of data relating to each. Therein, 
peaks and troughs mirror one another closely across each sphere despite the fact that media coverage is 
measured in units of thousands, as opposed to Diet and magazine coverage, which is measured in units of 
hundreds. In this respect, the slight disparity in terms of a relatively small quantity of magazine articles 
covering the 1998 Taepondong launch is the lone exception to an otherwise uniformly consistent inter-
correlation.     
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community.536 
    Media and Diet reaction to the 2002 leadership summit has been included in Figure 6.1 on 
the grounds that, as posited in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, it is representative of the dramatic 
influence of the abductions issue upon Japan‟s framing of North Korea and the related 
process of risk recalibration which it has facilitated. However, as observable in Figure 6.2, 
below, removal of data from this event illuminates how quantities of coverage relating to the 
DPRK‟s weapons tests (particularly missile test-firings) exhibit a clear pattern of waves which 
supports the hypothesis of a recalibration of risks as a process affected – in interaction with 
other elements – which can be measured against a series of comparable events (missile 
launches and nuclear tests) taking place between 1993 and 2009.537 
    In addition, data pertaining to the contemporary events covered in Chapter 5, Section 5.12, 
can also be added to expose the pattern of a decreasing (maintained) recalibration of risks in 
the post-2007 period (see Figure 6.3). Indeed, as discussed above, this tendency towards a 
new equilibrium of risk calibrations pertaining to Pyongyang‟s potential actions was also 
evinced by the qualitatively restrained reaction across all spheres with regards to these 
incidents. However, due to the lack of subsequent missile and nuclear tests of a comparable 
calibre to those witnessed between 1993 and 2009, conclusions drawn on the basis of the 
quantitative evidence expressed by Figure 6.3, while suggestive of a movement towards the 
equilibrium of risk calibration posited in Chapter 5, Section 5.13, remain tentative until further 
data can be assimilated. This is particularly so in terms of how these and other events will be 
                                                          
536 In quantitative terms, this is particularly notable with regards to the Asahi Shimbun, which shows a striking 
parallel with other leading newspapers. Specifically, this is so in response to the series of missile and 
nuclear tests, identified in Chapter 3~Chapter 5, as key events in affecting a qualitative repositioning of the 
paper’s stance – more in line with traditionally conservative newspapers. As such, a full archival comparison 
pre-dating the conclusion of the Cold War would be beneficial to furthering quantitative analysis in this 
area. In addition, as noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, media actors have to be considered as politically highly 
embedded in terms of their close relationships to the bureaucracy and specific Diet members.    
537 In terms of quantitative evidence which evinces the recalibration of risks, it is particularly pertinent here to 
note the height of troughs as well as peaks in Figure 6.2. Therein, not only is the reaction to successive 
events greater, the base level for coverage on North Korea has already been heightened prior to each 
incident up to those covered in 2006. 
327 
 
interpreted going forward. Therein, further cross-sectional analyses of the interactive state, 
market and societal sectors which constitute Japan‟s policy community will be required.538     
 
          Time in Months (prior~ and ~post event) 
Source: author  
Figure adapted from data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.1 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5) 
 
                                                          
538  As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.12.i, the test-firing of missiles in October of 2009 cannot be fully included 
in this regard, on account of the range of the missiles being substantially shorter (and hence not logistically 
capable of targeting Japan) than those of Nodong and Taepondong specifications. 
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Time in Months (prior~ and ~post event) 
Source: author  
Figure adapted from data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.1 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5). 
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Source: author  
Figure adapted from data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.1 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5), excluding  
Table 4.1 (Chapter 4). 
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Time in Months (prior~ and ~post event) 
Source: author  
Figure adapted from data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.1 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5), excluding  
Table 4.1 (Chapter 4). 
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Source: author  
Figure adapted from selected data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.2 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5). 
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Source: author  
Figure adapted from selected data expressed in Table 3.1 – Table 5.2 (Chapter 3 – Chapter 5). 
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6.4. Market and societal factors: influences upon the framing of North Korea 
As discussed in Section 6.1, ideational and normative aspects, such as the juxtaposition of 
national identity (Japan -v- DPRK) and adherence to the norm of bilateralism, have clearly 
been leading influences in the process of Japan‟s recalibration of risk in response to North 
Korea. As such, primary attention has been assigned to media and political spheres which 
express the concrete outcomes of such conceptions.539 However, in addition, while societal 
influences upon this process can be seen in many ways – through their interactions – to 
reflect these spheres, major market influences, other than those contained within the media, 
contain elements which require a greater degree of analytical disentanglement. 
    As noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.11, succeeding the key events (specifically missile 
launches) of 1993 and 1998, central market actors such as Nippon Keidanren maintained 
their opposition to confrontational measures (sanctions etc.) taken by the state in response 
to the North‟s actions. However, in line with the three core factors posited in Chapter 3; 
namely: logistical difficulties regarding investment in commercial projects within the DPRK, 
political and media interests being served by the vilification of North Korea, and US and 
domestic military (market and political) actors requiring a recalibration of risks pertaining to 
Pyongyang in order to justify budgets and increased investment, those opposing a hard-line 
against North Korea on market-based grounds were effectively out-weighed by those whose 
interests were better served by its realization. Within this, the introduction of intensified 
restrictions on remittances to North Korea, and the counter-terror directives laid down to 
commercial enterprises, observed in Chapter 4, Section 4.10, in the wake of missile and 
nuclear tests conducted by North Korea during 2006, can be seen as representative of how 
the state dictated to the domestic market how risks posed by Pyongyang were to be 
(re)calibrated. Indeed, Keidanren‟s response to the North‟s further provocations in 2009 – 
highlighting the risks posed by Pyongyang and support for Japan‟s defence industry, as 
                                                          
539 For instance, public opinion can be seen largely to have followed media and political discourse relating to 
North Korea in this sphere – i.e., mediating the calibration of risks (see Chapter 5, Section 5.7). 
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elucidated in Chapter 5, Section 5.11 – can be seen to have reflected how leading market 
actors within Japan shifted their stance in line with the observed recalibration of risk 
witnessed across state and societal sectors.540 This can also be attributed, at least partially, 
to the continued need of both domestic and US military actors – and their associates within 
the policy making sphere – to maintain a high calibration of risks framed against North Korea 
in order to secure investment in hardware and the continued deployment of personnel within 
Japan and the East Asia region.541 
    Furthermore, however, as observed across political elite, societal and media spheres, 
there appears to have been a relatively muted response from other powerful market actors in 
reaction to North Korea‟s actions which involved events in the latter part of 2009, and most 
ostensibly those of 2010. Therein, despite readily identifiable events, such as the Cheonan 
sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling, presenting sufficient means to maintain the high-
calibration of risks now established in relation to North Korea (within Japan‟s framing of the 
DPRK), there has been little obvious movement among leading market and societal actors to 
recalibrate risks beyond the levels of calibration current at that time.542 
    Nevertheless, in totality, the data sets accessed in this dissertation have been only 
partially sufficient in terms of being able to definitively draw conclusions to the specific 
primacy of all the key individual actors across each of the interacting sectors. However, it 
has provided ample data to establish the validity of the core hypothesis, as stated in the 
Introduction, by way of demonstrating the presence of a complex interactive process, 
intersecting the state, market and society which has resulted in the recalibration of risks 
identified with North Korea as a function of Japan‟s framing of that country. Within this, 
                                                          
540  North Korea’s continued economic stagnation can also be considered as a contributing factor against 
potential market-drives towards improved relations with Pyongyang. 
541  In this sense, bilateralism can be seen as not only a political and ideological norm, but one which is highly 
embedded in market-based interests and as such led also by market actors (and their cross-interaction with 
policy makers). 
542  For instance, no mention of either incident was made within Keidanren’s subsequent major policy 
documents relating to international affairs (Keidanren, 2011). 
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moreover, while market influences would appear to have been key to their motivations, 
policy makers and societal actors (primarily leading politicians and media actors) have 
largely, as the result of overlapping areas of interest, converged to give considerable 
momentum to such a process. Those interests have, therein, included commercially and 
politically based aspects which were sufficiently compatible to out-weigh counter forces 
which might have mediated risks potentially posed by Pyongyang‟s regime in a less 
magnified form.543 In addition, the further convergence of US political and market-based 
interests, and their influence upon the above in this area, provided an overwhelmingly 
powerful combination of actors intersecting the state, market and society which served to 
drive the process of risk recalibration – observed in response to a series of identifiable 
events pertaining to North Korea‟s actions. In light of these findings, the following section 
draws a number of conclusions, based on the analyses contained in the chapters above, as 
to why this process appears to have entered a new equilibrium since 2009.544 Additionally, 
areas where extension to this research could provide further empirical evidence to support 
the observation of a more stable pattern of risk calibration in response to the DPRK are 
proposed in relation to each to the sectors discussed above.   
 
6.5. Future research goals: tracking the risk-(re)calibration trajectory 
Put simply, the decrease in additional recalibrations of risks identified with North Korea since 
the summer of 2009, as posited in Chapter 5, Section 5.12, can probably be attributed 
                                                          
543  Indeed, these elements of Japan’s policy community, while diverse in terms of intersecting the state, 
market and society, have in some ways been so closely aligned that they have been comparable to a 
relatively condensed iron triangle in their own right – established between leading politicians, business 
leaders and media actors. 
544  As noted in the analyses of Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3, above (see also Chapter 5, Section 5.13), 
while the missile and nuclear tests of 2009  can be seen as the most recent events which acted as a catalyst 
for the continued recalibration of risks framed against the DPRK – i.e., in terms of a return to high levels of 
Diet and media coverage coupled with extensive policy provisions – their inability to surpass reactions to 
the comparable events of 2006 in one sense highlights the pre-existence of a saturation-point with regards 
to the framing of North Korea and the extent its provocations could facilitate an on-going recalibration of 
risks.   
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broadly to many of the various key actors having achieved their policy goals – and 
maximized the market potential – contained in such a process as a function of Japan‟s 
framing of North Korea.545 This includes Japan‟s convergent right-of-centre policy community, 
which facilitated the process of risk recalibration in order to justify increased or sustained 
levels of military expenditure and investment, and the use of North Korea‟s framing as a 
negative reference point from which to promote a positive image and national identity of 
Japan.546 Media actors also converged towards such a position, and have been able to 
utilize risks associated with the DPRK to create a popular discourse which could be sold to 
the public. In addition, US foreign policy and business interests have also been satisfied by 
the current levels of risk calibration assigned to Pyongyang‟s actions – in terms of providing 
support for a rationale which allows continued levels of US troop deployment and highly 
profitable BMD technology transfer to Japan. 
    Nevertheless, further research will be required in order to fully explain the on-going 
trajectory of risk (re)calibration in relation to North Korea‟s actions going forward. In this 
respect, the complex cross-section of data assimilated and analysed in this dissertation has 
presented findings which can potentially be employed for use in a broad range of future 
research projects in this field. Not least, the focus on risk – and its explication as being 
inextricably reliant upon inter-subjective understandings of national identity and foreign 
policy creation – has offered a theoretical and empirical framework from which to re-evaluate 
North Korea-related problems addressed from Japan.547 Specifically, these include the 
                                                          
545  It can also be posited that an additional recalibration of risk in response to North Korea would be 
problematic – even if desired – to disseminate across state and societal spheres. The DPRK remains a weak 
and potentially self-destructive state which, despite repeated sabre-rattling, provides little tangible 
evidence that could be seized upon to convincingly affect a (re)calibration of risks beyond their already 
heightened levels in Japan. 
546 This can be seen also as closely linked to the re-emergence of exclusionary nationalism in Japan, and is an  
 additional area of investigation requiring further research – particularly in terms of the process by which    
 specific risks, i.e., those posed to national identity are calibrated based on external framings. For excellent   
 existing studies on Japan’s contemporary nationalism, see Morris-Suzuki (2010), Shimazu (2006), Anno  
 (2000). 
547 Many of the core theoretical and empirical elements of such are also explored by Shahar Hameiri and  
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capacity to extend grass-roots understandings of how state, market and societal sectors 
interact to produce specific calibrations of risks which profoundly affect bilateral relations and 
foreign policy.548 As such, among other potential normative aims, a more comprehensive 
understanding at the individual actor level is urgently required in order to fulfil the widely 
sought goal of greater cooperative unity, or kyōdōtai, across the East Asia region (Yoshida, 
2008: 257; Nishimura and Okonogi, 2010: 231-2, 257). 
    Indeed, in this respect, the theoretical reliance upon a combination of constructivism and 
risk also provides a potential means by which to shift the focus of analysis and policy 
formation, particularly in terms of which areas of risk are prioritized and how they are 
calibrated. This offers an opening, for example, to increase the emphasis on human security 
aspects (Okonogi and Isozaki, 2010), and a conceptual tool that supersedes the dichotomy 
of state (or international) relations and domestic politics.549 Within this process, the shift in 
perceptions and conceptions of risk might allow a change of framing for the DPRK – in terms 
of how it is characterised by Tokyo. In this respect, one possibility would be for Japan to re-
frame its own identity – not as a switch to victim from aggressor (Tanaka, 2009: 217) 
manifest via the framing of North Korea and a recalibration of risks identified with Pyongyang 
(observed above), but, rather, from victim to saviour.550 Therein, if national financial 
pressures (budget deficits etc.) influencing US and SDF military deployment capacity, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
      Florian P. Kühn et al. (2011) in the special edition of International Relations on “Risk, Risk Management  
      and International Relations.”  
548 Greater understanding and further research in this area is also, evidently, something which is of potentially 
enormous beneficial value to the analysis of specific case-studies and international relations theory across 
the region – and, indeed, on a global scale.   
549 The need for greater emphasis on human security and internationalism (as opposed to nationalism), in 
terms of a prevailing ideology, has also been stressed by commentators such as Yamanaka. During a high 
profile presentation (2011) she asserted that this should be incorporated as part of the process by which 
Japan “consolidated identities in the post-Cold War era” - specifically in relation to North Korea. 
550 Essentially, the current maintenance of a high-calibration of risks pertaining to North Korea based on the 
risk of military action – sustained on the grounds of uncertainties regarding the constitution of Pyongyang’s 
internal political and military operations (particularly following the transition to a relatively inexperienced 
leadership) – could be replaced by a focus on opportunities which require the taking of risks in order to 
rescue an embattled populous and demonstrate strong regional leadership. 
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other structural elements of the regional security environment, permit Japan to take a less 
combative approach to risks posed by Pyongyang in the coming decades, the risks posed to 
human security might be recalibrated to allow Japan to frame itself (vis-à-vis the North) as a 
powerful and philanthropic saviour of a helpless and needy – if troublesome – regional 
state.551 
    In the case at hand, therefore, future research into the formation of norms and identity – 
and their relation to risk (re)calibration – in this sphere may also be able to better explain the 
apparently symbiotic nature of state, societal and market actors which have broadly moved 
in convergence, as observed in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.3, facilitating the recalibration of 
risks framed against North Korea in Japan. Moreover, an extension of in-depth analysis – 
working within this framework – into contemporary events related to the above, can aspire to 
elucidate further how this process now appears to be reaching a new equilibrium. Therein, 
the findings of this dissertation present a case-study which seeks to facilitate conceptually 
innovative literature relevant to understanding Japan‟s regional and global international 
relations, and the domestic processes which are central to them. In addition, it also provides 
the rudiments of a theoretical and empirical tool that can hopefully be employed in the more 
extensive utilization of risk as a key concept within the fields of Political Science and IR, and 
applied directly to the creation and formation of policy. If this is realized, the day may come 
when risk is understood to shape the future of all.  
 
 
 
                                                          
551  If the salience of the abductions issue continues to lose socio-political influence, the opportunities for 
such a shift would appear greater still. In essence, Tokyo could be framed by a combination of policy makers 
and media sources within Japan as the paternalistic benefactor of a, metaphorically framed, problem-child 
(North Korea). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
 
Interview dates and interviewee titles 
 
Date and Location of Interview Full Title/Position 
21st July 2010 (10:00), Chubu Electric Power 
Company Head Quarters, Nagoya 
Nuclear Plant Manager, Chubu Electric Power 
Company 
20th August 2010 (14:00), Chubu Electric 
Power Company Hamaoka Power Plant, 
Shizuoka 
Nuclear Engineer, Chubu Electric Power 
Company 
22nd September 2010 (12:30), ISS, University 
of Tokyo, Tokyo 
Director of Security and International Studies 
Program, National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS) 
28th September 2010, RIPS (14:00), Tokyo Director of Research Institute for Peace and 
Security (RIPS) 
19th October 2010 (13:30), Tohoku University, 
Sendai 
Professor of Political Science, 
Tohoku University 
26th October 2010 (13:30), Tohoku University, 
Sendai 
Journalist, Post-graduate Scholar of 
International Politics, Tohoku University 
14th December 2010a, Keio University (11:00), 
Tokyo 
Professor of Political Science, Keio University 
14th December 2010b (14:00), Hitotsubashi 
University, Tokyo 
Professor of Political Science, Princeton 
University; Visiting Scholar, Institute of Social 
Science (ISS), University of Tokyo 
20th December 2010 (11:30), Tohoku 
University, Sendai 
Emeritus Professor of Politics, Tohoku University 
8th February 2011a (11:00), Zainichi Chōsenjin 
Rekishi Kenkyū-jo, Tokyo 
Deputy Director, Zainichi Chōsenjin Rekishi 
Kenkyū-jo (Historical Research Centre for 
Resident Koreans in Japan (author‟s translation 
– no official English title)) 
8th February 2011b (15:00), Ebisu, Tokyo Emeritus Professor of Political Science, 
University of Michigan; Visiting Scholar, Institute 
of Gerontology, University of Tokyo 
23rd February 2011, Tohoku University (11:00), 
Sendai 
Assistant Professor of International Politics, 
Chae-ju University 
8th March 2011 (14:30), Tohoku University, 
Sendai 
Emeritus Professor of Politics, Tohoku University 
8th April 2011 (18:30), Naha Airport, Okinawa Emeritus Professor of Education, University of 
the Ryukyus 
12th April 2011, Ryukyu University (11:00), 
Okinawa 
Professor of Geography, University of the 
Ryukyus 
13th April 2011 (16:00), Itoman City, Okinawa Professor of International Politics, Okinawa 
International University 
9th May 2011a (11:00), Sophia University, 
Tokyo 
Professor of Politics, Sophia University, Tokyo 
9th May 2011b (16:30), Sophia University, 
Tokyo 
Professor of International Relations, Sophia 
University, Tokyo 
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9th May 2011c (13:00), Shimbashi, Tokyo Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA) 
3rd June 2011a (13:00), Waseda University, 
Tokyo 
Director of Waseda University Japan-Korea 
Global Research Centre, Waseda University 
3rd June 2011b (15:00), Asahi Shimbun 
Headquarters, Tokyo 
Director of Asahi Shimbun Asia Network (AAN), 
Asahi Shimbun 
25th July 2011a (14:00), Japan Communist 
Party Headquarters, Tokyo 
Executive Committee Member 
Head of Office International Commission, Japan 
Communist Party (JCP) 
25th July 2011b (17:00), GRIPS, Tokyo Director of Security and International Studies 
Program, Graduate Research Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS) 
1st August 2011 (14:00), Ark Hills Club, 
Roppongi, Tokyo 
Political Scientist (Ph.D), Author 
(former Asahi Shimbun columnist) 
23rd August 2011 (12:30), 
Kasumigaseki, Tokyo 
Director, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear 
Energy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) 
25th August 2011  
(by letter and e-mail) 
Emeritus Professor of Politics, Institute of Social 
Science (ISS), University of Tokyo. Author 
27th August 2011 (17:30), Asahi Shimbun 
Headquarters, Tokyo 
Staff Writer, Foreign News department, 
Korean Peninsula Specialist, Asahi Shimbun 
29th August 2011 (15:00) 
IIPS, Toranomon, Tokyo 
Senior Research Fellow 
Research Counsellor, Institute for International 
Policy Studies (IIPS) 
14th September 2011 (14:30), Keio University 
(by telephone) 
Hitachi Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 
Keio University 
20th September 2011 (16:00), Kobe University, 
Kobe 
Professor of Political Science, Kobe University 
22nd September 2011 
(14:00), JRI (by telephone) 
Chairman, Japan Research Institute (JRI) 
27th September 2011 (16:00), Kanda 
University of International Studies (by 
telephone) 
Doctor of Political Science, Kanda University of 
International Studies 
20 October 2011 (11:00), RUSI, London Visiting Fellow, Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI); Senior Fellow, National Institute for 
Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) 
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Appendix B 
 
Random samples of media and Diet coverage of the DPRK 
 
  The samples below were used to verify the qualitative content of quantitative data 
relating to fluctuating levels of coverage of North Korea-related issues in the Media 
and Diet. Specifically, this pertains to the validation of using such (in terms of 
consistent negative framing) as a means by which to measure Japan‟s post-Cold 
War recalibration of risk in response to the DPRK (selected at random from between 
1 January 2002 – 1 January 2011). 
 
Speaker/News Source Date Page Number/Reference/ 
Item Word Count 
Asahi Shimbun 31/12/10 Page 4 
Mainichi Shimbun 20/12/10 Page 8 
Yomiuri Shimbun 17/12/10 Page 31 
Sankei Shimbun 10/12/10 Page 8 
NHK News 02/12/10 504 Words 
National Diet 26/11/10 176: 18 (Main Session) 
Asahi Shimbun 08/08/09 Page 33 
Mainichi Shimbun 07/08/09 Page 8 
Yomiuri Shimbun 31/07/09 Page 2 
Sankei Shimbun 27/07/09 Page 7 
NHK News 23/07/09 514 Words 
National Diet 07/07/09 171: 9 (Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee) 
Asahi Shimbun 07/09/08 Page 4 
Mainichi Shimbun 05/09/08 Page 12 
Yomiuri Shimbun 29/08/08 Page 7 
Sankei Shimbun 28/08/08 Page 3 
NHK News 27/08/08 523 Words 
National Diet 20/06/08 169: 2 (Special Committee for 
Abductions by North Korea) 
Asahi Shimbun 06/06/07 Page 35 
Mainichi Shimbun 29/05/07 Page 7 
Yomiuri Shimbun 19/05/07 Page 2 
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Sankei Shimbun 11/05/07 Page 12 
NHK News 07/05/07 478 
National Diet 26/04/07 166: (Committee for 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries) 
Asahi Shimbun 07/07/06 Page 17 (evening edition) 
Mainichi Shimbun 05/07/06 Page 1 (evening edition) 
Yomiuri Shimbun 30/06/06 Page 4 
Sankei Shimbun 23/06/06 Page 7 
NHK News 16/06/06 266 Words 
National Diet 16/06/06 164: 2 (Main Session) 
Asahi Shimbun 03/03/05 Page 7 
Mainichi Shimbun 28/02/05 Page 2 
Yomiuri Shimbun 26/02/05 Page 4 
Sankei Shimbun 19/02/05 Page 2 
NHK News 15/02/05 530 Words 
National Diet 02/02/05 162: 221 (Budget Committee) 
Asahi Shimbun 04/05/04 Page 5 
Mainichi Shimbun 03/05/04 Page 5 
Yomiuri Shimbun 27/04/04 Page 1 (evening edition) 
Sankei Shimbun 20/04/04 Page 2 
NHK News 13/04/04 579 Words 
National Diet 27/04/04 159: 72 (Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee) 
Asahi Shimbun 04/04/03 Page 4 
Mainichi Shimbun 03/04/03 Page 5 
Yomiuri Shimbun 02/04/03 Page 7 
Sankei Shimbun 31/03/03 Page 4 
NHK News 28/03/03 446 Words 
National Diet 25/04/03 157: 78 (Cabinet Committee) 
Asahi Shimbun 28/02/02 Page 2 (evening edition) 
Mainichi Shimbun 22/02/02 Page 24 
364 
 
Yomiuri Shimbun 20/02//02 Page 1 (evening edition) 
Sankei Shimbun 19/02/02 Page 5 
NHK News 04/02/02 490 Words 
National Diet 18/04/02 156:131 (Security Committee) 
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Appendix C 
 
Japanese materials relating to North Korea 
(documents, financial restrictions, official pamphlets etc.) 
 
NB: The small number of items included is due to the majority of materials being available on line. 
These are referenced in-text throughout and listed fully in the Bibliography. 
 
Item I. Pamphlet distributed at international conferences (e.g., G8 
Deauville Summit) by MOFA 
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Item II. Document relating to financial remittances restrictions to 
DPRK 
 
 
367 
 
 
Item III. Advertisement in local city news magazine (kōhō) for North 
Korea Human Rights Violations Awareness Week event 
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Appendix D 
Political party manifesto data for DPRK-related policies and references 
Party 
Year LDP DPJ Shamintō Kōmeitō Communist Others 
1996 LEM Work to resolve 
DPRK nuclear 
problem 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
Speedy 
realization of 
normalization 
and promotion of 
Six Party Talks 
N/A DPRK is no 
threat to Japan. 
Receives aid and 
totally incapable 
of war 
(Shinshin) No 
direct references 
to DPRK 
1998 UEM No direct ref., but 
need for new 
guidelines for 
unstable Korea 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
Speedy 
realization of 
normalization 
and unification 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
(Shinsakigake) 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
2000 LEM DPRK missiles 
and incursions 
tackled as crisis/ 
emergency 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
Speedy 
realization of 
normalization 
and unification 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
No direct ref, but 
against law 
changes to allow 
Korea operations 
(Jiyū) 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
2001 UEM Comprehensive 
approach with 
US/ROK for 
DPRK problems 
Actively promote 
normalization 
process and 
multi-party talks 
Speedy 
realization of 
normalization 
and unification 
Work towards 
resolving all 
DPRK problems 
- normalization 
Prioritization of 
normalization via 
dialogue. Danger 
of no relations 
(Hoshu) Actively 
support Korean 
unification efforts 
2003 LEM Greater efforts to 
resolve the 
abductions 
issue. Focus on 
bilateralism for 
security 
Comprehensive 
tackling of all 
DPRK problems 
(abductions, 
incursions, 
WMD, nuclear). 
Prioritization of 
UN initiatives to 
deal with DPRK 
Efforts to resolve 
abduction issue 
as part of 
normalization 
process. Create 
non-nuclear 
region and 
promote 6 Party 
Talks 
Prioritize Six 
Party Talks. Take 
firm unwavering 
line on abduction  
and nuclear 
issues. Apply 
joint pressure 
with US and 
ROK 
N/A (Hoshushin) No 
normalization 
until abductions 
problem 
resolved . 
Demand end to 
nuclear and 
missile programs 
via Six Party 
Tallks. 
2004 UEM Demand swift 
resolution to 
abductions and 
nuclear progs. 
Stresses DPRK 
incursions and 
crises of terror 
No direct ref., but 
enhancement of 
capability to deal 
with new threats 
(missiles, terror,  
incursions, spies 
etc.) 
Seek swift 
resolution of the 
abduction issue. 
Engage in 
normalization 
talks and resolve 
post-War issues 
N/A 
(combined with 
LDP) 
Importance of 
Six Party Talks to 
provide a means 
to resolve DPRK 
problems 
N/A 
2005 LEM Greater efforts to 
resolve the 
abductions 
issue. Improve 
ability to deal 
with new threats 
and crises 
Measures to deal 
actively with 
grave abduction, 
missile and 
nuclear issues. 
And for 
narcotics , 
incursions and 
other DPRK 
problems and 
violations 
Strongly demand 
DPRK to act 
honestly in order 
to resolve the 
abduction issue. 
Prioritize 6 Party 
Talks for regional 
stability. Work 
towards  
normalization 
Six party talks to 
push abduction 
issue – which is 
highest priority, 
and apply 
pressure to force 
total nuclear 
abandonment. 
Sanctions to be 
applied if needed 
Prioritization of 
Six Party Talks to 
resolve DPRK 
problems. Agree 
with DPRK to 
make mutual 
efforts to resolve 
abduction issue. 
Adhere to 
Pyongyang Dec. 
(Kokuminshin) 
No direct 
references to 
DPRK 
2007 UEM 
 
 
Commit utterly to 
bringing home all 
abduction 
Raise in 
international 
awareness of 
Strongly demand 
DPRK to act 
honestly in order 
No direct ref., but 
firm support 
sophisticated 
Prioritization of 
Six Party Talks to 
resolve DPRK 
(Kokuminshin) 
Increase 
pressure and 
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2007UEM 
(Continued 
from 
above) 
victims . Tackle 
nuclear and 
missile problems 
with international 
pressure and 
sanctions 
abductions. 
Continue 
sanctions to 
counter threat 
which is greatest 
to Japan 
to resolve the 
abduction issue. 
Prioritize 6 Party 
Talks for regional 
stability. Work 
towards 
normalization 
BMD system problems – 
nuclear, 
abduction, past. 
Efforts to make 
peaceful, 
diplomatic 
solution 
dialogue to 
resolve 
abduction issue. 
Seek to return all 
victims to Japan 
quickly 
2009 LEM DPRK actions a 
clear threat to 
Japanese 
people . 
Abductions are 
state-terror. BMD 
protection with 
bilateralism key. 
Tough measures 
and no aid as is 
Stop DPRK’s 
missile/nuclear 
development (a 
clear threat) with 
tough measures. 
Commit to 
resolution of  
abduction issue . 
Multilateralism 
Determination in 
resolution of the 
abductions issue 
via negotiations. 
Seek security 
agreements via 
Six Party Talks. 
Multilateralism 
Need to impose 
sanctions to 
resolve missile, 
nuclear and 
abductions 
problems in one 
– and move 
process towards 
normalization 
 DPRK nuclear 
test outrageous 
violation. Six 
Party Talks need 
to be restored. 
Multilateralism 
(Kokuminshin) 
DPRK military 
build up a threat. 
Invest in military 
industry to build 
up deterrent for 
missiles. 
Prioritize 
abduction issue 
2010 UEM DPRK actions a 
grave threat to 
Japan’s security. 
Abductions are 
grave state 
crime .Increase 
sanctions and 
withhold aid as is 
Stop DPRK 
missile/nuclear 
programs.  
Commit fully to 
resolving 
abduction issue 
as a violation of 
sovereignty 
Stop nuclear 
development via 
tough 
negotiation . 
Restart talks for 
normalization. 
Seek to resolve 
abduction and 
history issues 
Missile and 
nuclear progs a 
major problem 
for Japan’s 
security. 
Comprehensive 
approach aiming 
for normalization 
Restart Six Party 
Talks. Abduction, 
missile/ nuclear 
issues tackled in 
comprehensive 
approach. 
(minna no) 
DPRK missile, 
nuclear and 
abduction issues 
a grave problem. 
Multilateral 
approach 
required 
Source: Keio World Manifesto Forum (http://www.mag.keio.ac.jp/manifesto/archive.html ) and 
party homepages (post 2007 manifestos). Content translated/summarized from original documents. 
 
Key to Abbreviations: UEM = Upper House Election Manifesto 
                                     LEM = Lower House Election Manifesto 
 
Coded values as an expression of concerns relating to North Korea 
Party 
Year LDP DPJ Shamintō Kōmeitō Communist Others 
1996 LEM 5 3 2  1 3 
1998 UEM 6 3 2 3 3 3 
2000 LEM 7 3 2 3 2 3 
2001 UEM 6 2 2 4 2 2 
2003 LEM 6 6 4 6 N/A 6 
2004 UEM 8 5 4  4 N/A 
2005 LEM 8 8 5 6 4 3 
2007 UEM 7 8 4 6 5 5 
2009 LEM 9 9 5 6 6 8 
2010 UEM 9 8 5 6 5 7 
Coded values are based on qualitative discourse analysis pertaining to the full content of the 
relevant sections (covering North Korea-directed references and policies) of each manifesto 
listed above. 
